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ABSTRACT
STATE COUNTER-INSURGENCY AND POLITICAL POLICING IN COLONIAL AND
POST-COLONIAL MALAWI, 1891-1964

Paul Chiudza Banda

This is a study that adopts the longue durée historical approach to analyze the main causes behind
the rise of ‘insurgencies’ or the so-called resistance against the colonial and post-colonial state in
the present-day southern African country called Malawi from 1891 to 1994. In turn, it also uses
the concept of ‘counter-insurgency’ to analyze the various measures the states in question used to
defeat the ‘insurgents’. To arrive at the conclusions made in the study, I have migrated through
various domestic and transnational spaces, personalities, and documents that inform the current
study. I also adopt two main historical approaches to conduct the analysis, namely: the politicaleconomy approach and the longue durée approach.
On the history of British colonial rule in the country, between 1891 and 1964, the study has
analyzed the rise of anti-state sentiments, right from the point of formal contact between the
colonizer and the colonized ‘other’. I have highlighted that the factors that contributed to the rise
of insurgencies or rebellions were often wide-ranging, including the native people’s unhappiness
with the loss of political and economic power. The latter mainly took place due to the connection
of the colonial policies of land alienation; high rates of taxation; and the elements of forced labor,
mainly to aid European enterprises in the country. During the late colonial period, especially after
the Second World War, it was the notion of state-led development (or the rise of the
‘developmental state’) that significantly contributed to the rise of radical forms of anti-colonial
resistance, especially following the formation of a new political entity called the Central African
Federation (CAF), which brought together the three British territories of Nyasaland (now Malawi),
Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia).
I have argued that in terms of counter-insurgency, the colonial authorities responded to the various
occurrences of native unrest in multiple ways, including the use of brutal force, especially through
the police force and the “para-military” group called the Nyasaland Volunteer Reserve (NVR); the
use of repressive laws; and also the provision of development and/or socio-economic opportunities

to the disaffected communities, in the hope that doing so would win over support for the
government of the day. I have used such phrases as “the winning of hearts and minds” and “the
stick and the carrot,” to describe and discuss these counter-insurgency measures. In terms of the
development initiatives, I have followed the colonial state’s involvement in the country’s
development from the late 1920s, starting from the enactment of land tenure policies; the Colonial
Development Act, 1929; the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, 1940 and 1945; the Colonial
Development Corporation, 1948; and the CAF (1953-1963). In the post-World War II era, I have
also focused the discussion on how the outbreak of the Cold War provided an impetus for the
establishment of the Federation, and for the excuse to describe those who were against the
Federation as Communist implants. The so-called “development” mainly served the interests of
the metropole.
For the post-colonial state, I argue that what emerged was an “imported state,” in the sense that
the post-colonial leadership retained most of the policies and principles that had served the
predecessor colonial state. I have focused on the rise of the ‘developmental state’ during the regime
of Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda (1964 to 1994), who promoted the principles of import substitution
industrialization (ISI) through the control of two conglomerates; the Malawi Development
Corporation (MDC) and the Press Group of Companies (PGC). I have argued that like the
predecessor colonial state, the “protectionism” of the post-colonial state meant that there was little
or no liberalism in the political and economic sense. As such, although there were some signs of
economic progress between 1964 and 1979, the country’s citizens were subjected to various abuses
of human rights. Like the colonial period, those who challenged the legitimacy and authority of
the Banda regime, were also subjected to various “counter-insurgency” measures that adopted
various measures along the same lines as the measures employed by the colonial authorities. In
this, the study highlights the roles played by the country’s women, youth, and the police force, to
help consolidate the Banda regime. I have also zeroed in on the roles played by the international
community, especially the British and American Governments, to help consolidate and prolong
the Banda regime.
Finally, I have argued that the fall of Dr. Banda’ regime in 1994 should be regarded as marking
the end of the “post-colonial state,” following the dilution or in other cases the complete departure
from the policies, practices, and principles that had been “imported” from the colonial to the post-

colonial state. The fall of Banda regime itself had strong connections with the advent of the
economic downturn since the 1979/80 fiscal year, which I have argued, had both domestic and
international causative forces. It was the subsequent intervention of international powers
(especially the Western donor countries and the Bretton Woods Institutions) in determining the
country’s economic process, which significantly undermined the powers of the Banda regime,
especially after the end of the Cold War. In the end, domestic sources of opposition were also
encouraged to spring up, leading to the events of the early 1990s where Banda was forced to give
up some of his powers, and was subsequently trounced in the 1994 general elections.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION
Life can only be understood backwards; but it must be lived forwards.1
Research problem statement
This study adopts the longue durée historical approach2 to discuss the occurrence of different forms
of insurgency and counter-insurgency in the history of colonial and post-colonial Malawi. The
focus is on the underlying causes which compelled subjects, and later, citizens to challenge the
authority and legitimacy of the state, both colonial and post-colonial. During the period between
1891-1994 such factors were clearly dynamic, borne out of the prevailing social, political, and
economic conditions. Similarly, the reactions of the states were dynamic, and they were
determined by the nature of the regimes and the different types of resources at the state’s disposal.
The reactions, hereafter referred to as “counter-insurgency” measures, were expressed in specific
formats, including the use of brutal force (through the state’s security forces and other paramilitary groups), the use of repressive laws, and also through the provision of development
opportunities to the insurgents or their supporters, so as to make the latter believe that siding with
the state would best serve their material needs. State officials used such terms as “rebels”,
“insurgents”, “guerillas”, and “radicals” to refer to those who challenged their authority. The
counter-insurgency tactics have also been referred to under different monikers, including such

1

Soren Kierkegaard, quoted from Steven D. Price, ed., 1001 Smartest Things Ever Said (Connecticut: The Lyons
Press, 2005), 2.
2
The longue durée approach had its origins in the 1950s and was a brainchild of the Annales school of historical
writing in France. Its focus was on the production of historical texts that cover longer historical periods, rather than
the short-termism of other texts and academic disciplines. The term “longue durée” literally means “the history of
long, even of very long duration”. See Jo Guldi and David Armitage, The History Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2014), 14-18.

1

terms as “the stick and the carrot,” and “the winning of hearts and minds.”3 In Malawi, during the
1959-60 State of Emergency, and in the aftermath of the “cabinet crisis” of 1964, the leaders of
the opposition movements were also called “communists” or “communist sympathizers.”4
To date, there is limited literature that has focused on the continuation of practices, systems,
structures, and elements from colonial to post-colonial Malawi. The most recent publications by
John McCracken and Joey Power have, for instance, concentrated on the colonial period, and thus
serve as major influences to analyze the developments of the post-colonial period, especially those
aspects that continued from the colonial period.5 Another recent work that has approached the
history of colonial and post-colonial Malawi is that of Wapulumuka Mulwafu, who primarily
focused on the theme of the agrarian policies of the colonial and post-colonial state, matters that
will be mentioned in passing in this study.6 Harvey Sindima’s work comes closer to my own
analysis, especially his adoption of the political-economy approach. However, his work was more
of a survey of Malawi’s history from the pre-colonial to the colonial and post-colonial periods. His
work falls short of analyzing the history of Malawi from the perspective of British imperialism,
and the connections that one could draw between the colonial and post-colonial state.7

3

The works that have used such terms include: Thomas R. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency, 1919-60 (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990). See also Paul Dixon, “‘Hearts and Minds’? British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya
to Iraq,”Journal of Strategic Studies, 32, no.3, (June 2009): 353-381. See also David French, The British Way in
Counter-Insurgency, 1945-1967 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). See also Susan L. Carruthers, Winning
Hearts and Minds: British Governments, the Media and Colonial Counter-Insurgency, 1944-1960 (London: Leicester
University Press, 1995).
4
‘Security Situation in Nyasaland’: Statement by Sir Roy Welensky, Federal Prime Minister’. March 10 th, 1959: CO
1035/143. See also Henry B.M. Chipembere, “Malawi in Crisis,” Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies, 11, no.1,
(1981): 76-96. See pp80-83.
5
John McCracken, A History of Malawi, 1859-1966 (UK: James Currey Ltd, 2012). See also Joey Power. Political
Culture and Nationalism in Malawi: Building Kwacha (New York: University of Rochester Press, 2010).
6
Wapulumuka O. Mulwafu, Conservation Song: A History of Peasant-State Relations and the Environment in
Malawi, 1860-2000 (Cambridge, UK: The White Horse Press, 2011).
7
Harvey J. Sindima, Malawi’s First Republic: An Economic and Political Analysis (New York: University Press of
America, 2002). In the same vein, another similar older work is that of John G. Pike, Malawi: A Political and
Economic History (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1968).

2

There is, thus, a scarcity of comprehensive studies that analyze the history of Malawi from the
perspective of British colonial rule, and how the systems, elements, and structures of the colonial
period were “imported” into the post-colonial period, bearing in mind that “Malawi” as a country
was and still is, in many ways, a “colonial invention”.8 Most studies tend to present the end of
British rule as marking a significant shift - almost an end - of the colonial administrative systems,
elements, and structures. Furthermore, there has not been a comprehensive study of Malawi that
has tackled the topic of “counter-insurgency” in its wider sense, to include an analysis of the factors
that make citizens or subjects challenge the authority and legitimacy of the state; or the similarities
of the means and ways in which the states were able to respond, using the concept of “winning
hearts and minds” as adopted in this study. One particular issue that has not been explored in detail,
for those who have tackled the question of Malawi’s development discourse, such as John
McCracken, T. David Williams, and Carolyn McMaster, has been the failure to link the rise of
state-led or controlled development to the deterioration of liberalism, which this study traces to
the colonial period.9 On the question of development, there has often been a tendency by Africanist
and Malawianist scholars alike to link the notion of “aid with strings attached” with the postcolonial period, especially during the era of the Cold War and also during the era of the Structural
Adjustment Programs, which in the case of Malawi dates from 1979-80. But this study takes some
steps back, to trace the notion of “aid with strings attached” to the late 1920s, following the
enactment of the Colonial Development Act, 1929. Thus, this study argues that it was the notion

Here, the concept of “colonial invention” is used to refer to the boundary, language, state institutions, and the legal
system, among others, elements that were created during the colonial period. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger are
some of the pioneers of the concept of “invention”, focusing on the relations that ensued between the British
imperialists and their subjects. See Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The invention of tradition (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1983).
9
For studies that have tackled the question of Malawi’s development discourse, see for instance, T. David Williams,
Malawi: The Politics of Despair (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975). See also Carolyn McMaster, Malawi:
Foreign Policy and Development (London: Julian Friedmann Publishers, 1974).
8

3

of “aid with strings attached” that also significantly contributed to the downfall of the post-colonial
state in 1994.
The study begins in 1891, as that was the date when British colonial rule was formally established
in Malawi. Colonial rule continued up to the granting of independence in July 1964, followed by
the confirmation of Malawi’s Republic status two years later. The year 1994, this study argues,
marked the end of the post-colonial state with the downfall of the regime of Dr. Hastings Kamuzu
Banda. The post-Banda era has seen a significant dilution of most of the elements, practices or
systems that had been adopted, adapted, or “imported” from the colonial era, including such
notions as state-centered or directed development; the use of repressive laws; and the brutal means
of dealing with opposition elements.10 More importantly, the study demonstrates how notions of
“development” became a source for the rise of insurgencies, while the same, was also a mechanism
of state counter-insurgency. This study demonstrates that these were recurring themes in the
history of both colonial and post-colonial Malawi, while also referring to similar trends or
influences from elsewhere in colonial and post-colonial Africa and Asia. The rise of insurgencies
and counter-insurgencies in Malawi could be looked at from a historical perspective, and moreover
these were not unique to the history of colonial and post-colonial Malawi. The task will therefore
be to show the connection or continuation between the rise of insurgencies and the counterinsurgency approaches of the two historical periods. In so doing, the study will reveal that the
hand-over of power from the colonizer to the colonized ‘other’ (i.e. the African nationalist elite)
in the early to mid-1960s did not necessarily translate into dramatic changes in the administration
of the state.

See for instance, Crawford Young, “The End of the Post-Colonial State in Africa? Reflections on Changing African
Political Dynamics,” African Affairs 103, no.410, (Jan. 2004): 23-49.
10

4

The study answers a number of key questions, including: (a) What were the underlying factors
behind the rise of African resistance against the establishment and consolidation of British colonial
rule in Malawi from 1891 to the mid-1960s?; (b) What were the major counter-insurgency
measures employed by the colonial and post-colonial state in Malawi?; (c) What were the origins
of the rise of the “developmental state” in the country, and how did the organization of the state in
that manner contribute to the rise of state authoritarianism?; Moreover, what role did the
international community play to help consolidate the state and indeed contribute towards its
downfall? To answer these questions, I relied on both primary and secondary sources of data. The
primary sources include such archival materials as government reports, official correspondences,
newspaper articles, and unpublished dissertations, among others. These were drawn from several
archives and libraries. The secondary sources included books and journal articles drawn from
several libraries.
Background
The country now known as Malawi was a former British protectorate, officially from 1891 to 1966.
The history of British interests in the country began with the exploratory journeys of the famous
Scottish missionary, Dr. David Livingstone, in the late 1850s. It was his reports which alerted other
British missionaries and, later, British administrators to colonize the country. The first British
government appointee to work in the country was Sir Harry Hamilton Johnston, who in 1889, was
appointed to serve as the Consul, combining his responsibilities for both Nyasaland (now Malawi)
and Portuguese East Africa (now Mozambique). It was, however, not until February 1891 that
Nyasaland officially became a British protectorate, known as British Central Africa (BCA),
following a series of treaties signed between the British and the Portuguese, and following the
promise of monetary subsidies from the British South African Company (BSAC) of Cecil John
5

Rhodes. The BSAC continued to fund the Protectorate government until 1910, with the funds
going towards payment for policing and other state services. In February 1893, the name of the
Protectorate was changed to the British Central Africa Protectorate (BCAP). In July 1907, under
a new constitution granted to the Protectorate, the name was changed from BCAP to Nyasaland
Protectorate. With the change in name came a change of title for the Protectorate’s most senior
government official, from Commissioner to Governor. The new constitution also allowed for the
establishment of executive and legislative councils, in which the latter comprised official and
unofficial members nominated under the orders of the British Crown.11 Between 1891 and 1966,
there were a total of thirteen British Governors, of which the first one, as already alluded to was
Sir Harry H. Johnston (1891-1896), while the last was Sir Glyn Smallwood Jones, who served as
Governor from 1961 to 1964, and as Governor-General from 1964 to 1966.12
Although the establishment and later consolidation of British rule in the Protectorate was largely
peaceful, there were several instances, as will be explained later in this study, where the colonial
authorities had to suppress African resistance mainly from non-collaborating chiefs and slave
traders. One of the most famous colonial rebellions in Malawi’s history was the so-called
Chilembwe Uprising of January to February 1915, whose causes and the consequent forms of
British counter-insurgency will be analyzed in chapters three and four of this study.13
The Protectorate was relatively poor and had limited natural resources with which to attract
substantial numbers of British settlers. Most of the settlers in the Protectorate settled in the Shire

Annual Report, Nyasaland Report for 1921 (London: HMSO, 1922), 2-4. See also Colin Baker, “A hundred years
ago: The Nyasaland Order-in-Council, 1907,” Society of Malawi Journal, 60, no.2 (2007): 1-5.
12
David P. Henige, Colonial Governors, from the 15th century to the present (Milwaukee: The University of Wisconsin
Press, 1970), 155-156.
13
See for instance, George Shepperson and Thomas Price, Independent African: John Chilembwe and the Origins,
Setting and Significance of the Nyasaland Native Rising of 1915 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1958).
11
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Highlands, where cooler temperatures allowed for the cultivation of tea and coffee (See map of
modern-day Malawi, where the “Shire Highlands” referred to the following districts: Blantyre,
Thyolo, Mulanje, Chiradzulu, and Zomba). There were also significant levels of poverty and
limited socio-economic development for the first three decades of British rule, in part due to the
colonial policy of laissez faire, which initially supported private business investments and
development in the colonies from the late nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries. It was not until
the Colonial Development Act, 1929, and the Colonial Development and Welfare Act (1940, 1945,
1955 and 1960), that substantial state-led and integrated forms of development were initiated in
the Protectorate. In part, the low levels of socio-economic development were used to justify the
inclusion of Nyasaland, from 1953 to 1963, into a new political entity, called the Central African
Federation (CAF), which brought together the three British territories of Nyasaland, Northern
Rhodesia (now Zambia), and Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe).14 As it will be discussed in
chapter five of this study, while the factors for that decision were mainly economic or
developmental in nature, there were also political or strategic considerations that loomed large,
especially in relation to the then on-going Cold War. It was also the establishment of the
Federation, as I will later discuss, that significantly contributed to the rise of radical forms of
nationalism, as nationalist leaders were branded “communist implants”, leading to the declaration
of a state of emergency in each of the three territories between February and March 1959.
After a series of constitutional talks between 1960 and 1964, Malawi gained its independence in
July 1964, and, two years later, its republican status. Between July 1964 and July 1966, Dr.
Hastings Kamuzu Banda served as the Prime Minister, and from July 1966 to May 1994, he served
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as the country’s president. This study argues that the period between July 1964 and May 1994
should be referred to as “the post-colonial state”, highlighting several practices, systems, and
policies, which were initiated during the colonial period and were continued by or significantly
influenced the operations of the 1964 to 1994 Banda regime. It particularly focuses on such factors
as the developmental state, the personal rule of Dr. Banda, the authoritarian nature of the regime,
the enactment of repressive laws, and the related brutal treatment of perceived “enemies of the
state”. It also zeroes in on how the Banda regime used the notion of “development” as a tool with
which to fight against the opposition elements in the country. Despite the widespread abuses of
human rights, the Western powers often “ignored” their magnitude, particularly because Banda
was their ally during the Cold War. It was only towards the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s
and early 1990s that the West pressurized Banda to liberalize his regime, leading to his subsequent
downfall in 1994.
Review of selected literature
This study has been conducted under the influence of works by scholars who have made
contributions towards the study of colonial and post-colonial Africa under the following thematic
areas: resistance and “collaboration” to colonial rule; measures employed by the state to suppress
resistance and rebellions; the developmental state in late colonial and post-colonial Africa, and its
related focus on protectionism. What follows thus is a brief overview of the earlier studies, many
of which influenced the findings of this study. Many of them fall under the “political economy
approach”, in which it is argued that the economic make up of a given society often provides an
insight into other related aspects, such as its laws, modes of thought, religious systems, and
political organization. One of the main proponents of the approach, Claude Ake, proposed a
number of incidents where the approach could be utilized, including: (1) the notion that
8

economically-privileged groups tend to have access to social, economic, and political power in
society, which means that those with economic power usually have the tendency to encourage the
existence of inequalities; (2) there is always tension between the “haves and the have-nots”, with
the former interested in maintaining the status quo, while the latter have a strong interest in
changing the social, economic, and political order; (3) that due to the presence of economic
inequality, it is usually not possible to have political democracy (or liberalism, in the case of this
study), because political power tends to be polarized around economic power; and (4) that the
morality and values of a society tend to support the preservation of the existing division of labor
and distribution of wealth in that society.15
There are numerous studies that have tackled the subject of resistance to colonial rule in Africa.
One key work is that of Ted Gurr, who is a proponent of the “basic frustration-aggression
approach”. Gurr states that the greater the frustration of a given society, the greater the quantity of
aggression against the source of the frustration. From this perspective, it is argued that the
proportion of a population that participates in resistance and violence ought to vary with the
average intensity of perceived deprivation. Here, mild deprivation will motivate few to violence,
while very intense deprivation is more likely to galvanize large segments of a community to act
against the source of deprivation. In colonial settings, the coercive capacities of the state and the
uses to which they were put were crucial variables that affected the forms and extent of the violence
that ensued. When and where the Africans were convinced that they were denied the goods and
conditions they expected to access they took up arms against the state.16
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Writing on the same subject, James Scott argued that the source of resistance against the state
revolved around the actions of the dominant group in society, which will generate the reactions of
the dominated. In the construction of the “public transcript”, one can notice the open interactions
between the “official” (colonial state) and “hidden” (frustrations and grievances) transcripts of the
dominated. The dominated peoples, despite being aware of the indomitable powers of the
colonizer, still found means and ways of challenging those in authority, in most cases without
success. When the dominated brought their frustrations onto the public space, or “speaking truth
to power”, the colonial authorities used weapons at their disposal to subdue the colonized.17 In this
study, this conceptualization will be used extensively to discuss the grievances of the Africans
during the colonial era in Nyasaland, including the Chilembwe Uprising of 1915. The rise of mass
nationalism in the post-World War Two era to fight against the imposition of the Central African
Federation and later call for independence, can also be explained along the same lines.
Bruce Berman, focusing on the case of colonial Kenya, and indeed most parts of British colonial
Africa, analyzed the central role of the state in the social and economic livelihoods of the societies
it presided over. The state’s involvement often came through conscious and deliberate
interventions, which increased steadily with the passage of time. This saw the state play a critical
role in the political economy of the colony. To a significant extent, the state served as a dependent
superstructure of capitalist development, as it became an instrument of violence and exploitation
meted on the Africans, while at the same time setting up conducive conditions for capitalist
accumulation. In doing so, the colonial state did not always act as an independent actor, but rather,
as an appendage of the metropole, working on behalf and under the directions of London to subdue
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the African population. The operations of the state were also, to an extent, shaped by the prevailing
socio-economic forces in the colonies, including whether the Africans resisted or collaborated with
the state.18
There are several empirical studies that have followed the footpaths of the theoretical works on
African reactions to colonial rule. Michael Tidy, for instance, divided African resistance to
colonial rule into three major periods, namely: primary resistance, secondary resistance, and
modern mass nationalism. Primary resistance took place before the First World War and consisted
of armed struggles against the establishment of colonial rule. It had two sub-divisions, initial
resistance and post-pacification revolts. Some examples under this phase include the NdebeleShona risings of 1896-97 in Southern Rhodesia and the Maji Maji risings of 1905-07 in
Tanganyika. Secondary resistance occurred between the two World Wars and was usually
peaceful. It involved the works of welfare associations, trade unions, and religious groups, to
challenge the colonial state. Most of such groups were either local or regional in nature rather than
cutting across colony-wide boundaries. Modern mass nationalism emerged after the Second World
War. Its aim was to fight for independence from colonial rule. It involved political parties that
attracted nation-wide support as opposed to the local and regional movements that preceded them.
Although many of the movements in this phase were peaceful in nature, some of them were
involved in armed struggles, as was the case in Kenya, Zimbabwe, Algeria and Mozambique.19
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Tidy argued further that one also must consider the responses of Africans who “accepted” or
“welcomed” the Europeans in their societies, a process called “accommodation.”20 This view is
also held by Terence Ranger in his study on African reactions to colonial rule in British East and
Central Africa. Ranger posited that the Africans were not without their own agency to decide
whether to resist or collaborate. While they would not entirely avoid the imposition of colonial
rule, they often had an input in the way colonial rule was established and consolidated. Since the
colonial state was often under-staffed and under-funded, the Africans, either as individuals or
through their traditional leaders, participated in the formulation of the colonial experience,
sometimes at the deliberate invitation of the colonial state. In many cases, it was “smaller” African
societies or ethnic groups that often-welcomed British colonial rule, usually in return for protection
and to access the goods of the new leadership. There were also other so-called “bigger” societies
which were not easily subdued and were only subjugated with the passage of time. The Ngoni of
northern Nyasaland fell in this category. The decision to either resist or collaborate was often
arrived at after careful consideration by the Africans.21
Allen Isaacman and J. Vansina tackled the same subject of African resistance in Central Africa,
focusing on the era of primary resistance between 1880 and 1914. The two scholars used case
studies drawn from what is present-day Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia, Malawi, Angola,
and Mozambique. They argued that African resistance could be categorized in three broad
categories. Firstly, there was resistance which attempted to maintain the sovereignty of the
indigenous societies. Secondly, there was resistance targeted against the specific abuses imposed
by the colonial regime. Lastly, there were rebellions which aimed to destroy the alien system which
20
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had generated the abuses. In the case of Nyasaland, for instance, they highlighted how the Ngoni
(Maseko, Gomani, and Mpezeni) fought long battles against the establishment of British colonial
rule before they were eventually overwhelmed and subdued. The Ngoni, as highlighted above, and
as will be discussed in chapters two and five of this study, were one of the “bigger” and more
organized ethnic groups before the advent of colonial rule. Those who fought against the abuses
of colonial rule, at the local level, often did so to fight against the efforts of the state to reinforce
hegemony and impose capitalist relationships designed to exploit the human and natural resources
of Central Africa. The colonial states often collaborated with capitalist elements to exploit the
Africans, which in the process generated localized resistance. The abuses involved policies and
processes of land alienation, labor exploitation (or forced labor), and the imposition of taxation
measures meant to draw labor to colonial and European settler enterprises. The resistance from
Africans ranged from armed rebellions, such as the Chilembwe uprising in Nyasaland in 1915.
There was also the formation of associations, whose aim was to protect the interests of the
“privileged” classes of Africans. In Nyasaland, for instance, between 1912 and 1918, the North
Nyasa Native Association (NNNA) and the West Nyasa Native Association (WNNA) were
established. Their membership sought to initiate reforms within the colonial system for the benefit
of the educated African elite.22
What the studies by Michael Tidy, T.O Ranger, A. Isaacman and J. Vansina, as outlined here,
failed to appreciate, was the notion that the so-called “collaboration” with colonial rule often
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involved the signing of dubious “treaties.” Leaders of African communities were duped into
signing “treaties” which were in the language of the European colonists. This, in significant
measure, led to the alienation of territory from the Africans. This study addresses these issues in
chapters two and three, as they formed the basis for resistance at the end of the 19th century and
the beginning of the 20th century. The fact that an African chief here or there “welcomed” the
European colonists did not always represent the general will of the communities that the chief
represented. It also did not mean that the Africans had “welcomed” the Europeans and invited
them to stay for good. The African reaction to colonial rule was a complicated and dynamic
process, which has not been fully explained by the simplistic binary of “resistance and
collaboration.” In this study, I also concur with the conceptualization of Klaas van Walvaren and
Jon Abbink, that notions of “resistance” and “collaboration” in African history are much broader
and deeper than previously represented by early scholarship in the field. It is no longer plausible
to simply adopt the two antipoles of “resistance” and “collaboration” as given, rather one must
investigate the agency of the Africans involved in trying to find their space following the
imposition of colonialism and capitalism. Africans often reacted rationally, having weighed the
pros and cons of either resisting or collaborating with the Europeans. People in given societies
tended to straddle between the two extremes depending on the prevailing socio-economic and
political dynamics of the time. Furthermore, as this study investigates, the studies on resistance
against the state must not only be over-concentrated on the colonial period, but focus should also
be given to developments of the post-colonial period.23 And as Leroy Vail and Landeg White have
shown in their studies on colonial Mozambique, studies on resistance and collaboration since the
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early 1970s have also moved from simply analyzing the roles played by African elites, without
giving agency to the ordinary African peoples. Histories of resistance and collaboration must also
move beyond the realms of military and political history. Many of them experienced European
colonial intrusion quite differently from their leaders, and hence reacted out of meeting their selfinterests and basic needs. For instance, there were cases where African peasants showed a quick
willingness to produce for the market, in response to the challenges and opportunities brought
about by the European intrusion.24
There are also several studies that tackle the question of the counter-insurgency measures
employed by the colonial authorities in British-ruled colonies, in Africa and beyond. Most of the
insurgencies, as I have explained above, began because of feelings or beliefs that European
colonialism, in Africa, as elsewhere, had been exploitative and repressive. The seminal work in
the field of counter-insurgency studies was that of Sir Robert Thompson, whose work focused on
British counter-insurgency measures that were developed in Malaya. These measures were later
adopted by the United States in South Vietnam. Thompson himself spent three and half years
between 1961 and 1965, as Head of the British Advisory Mission in Malaya. In working out a
theory of insurgency and counter-insurgency, Thompson argued that it was first important to
understand the driving historical forces or factors that influenced the colonized peoples to
challenge European colonial rule. For instance, in the two colonies, the spread of communism,
which became one of the driving forces against European rule, had begun in the early 1920s
through Chinese immigrants, who targeted students and nationalist political movements as their
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early “converts.” However, it was not until World War Two that the spread of communism became
a major threat to European rule, following the Japanese occupation of Vietnam and the British
defeat in Malaya. 25
In terms of counter-insurgency, the British began by suppressing the activities of the Malayan
Communist Party (MCP) and banned the party in 1947. This, however, only created more chaos
that culminated into the declaration of the State of Emergency in June 1948, which lasted for
twelve years until July 1960 when the Federation of Malaya was granted its independence.
Thompson argued that from 1948 onwards, the British authorities came up with a number of
immediate measures with which to defeat the communist-led insurgents, including the following:
(1) the use of military or armed force (through the police, the army, the home guard, the civil
guard, and other such organs) to defeat the insurgency during the build-up phase or before it
entered the guerilla phase; and (2) the identification of all the possible insurgent combatants and
their likely followers before they became fully organized. The role of identification was to be
performed by the intelligence organs of the state, targeting those who intended to carry out illegal
acts against the state and its security. In the two colonies, it was the Special Branch of the Police
which was entrusted with that responsibility, sometimes in coordination with other security organs.
The advantage of relying on the police forces was that they already had a history of close contact
with the local communities. From then onwards, other long-term measures of counter-insurgency
were put in place, including the need for the government to have a clear political aim – one in
which it sought to maintain control of the entire country by controlling forms of law and order and
the political and economic sectors. This could be done using state repressive structures, including
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the security forces. There was also a need for the government to function in accordance with the
law, as that would increase the legitimacy of the government’s authority, which in turn would
encourage the people to obey the law. For instance, in Malaya, the colonial authorities enacted
strict laws that enabled the government to seize and deport all Chinese personnel found in neutral
zones. Through “legal means” the government also imposed collective fines on areas where the
inhabitants were uncooperative. The colonial authorities also imposed strict curfews; a mandatory
death penalty for carrying arms; life imprisonment for providing supplies or other forms of support
for the terrorists; and restricted residence or detention for suspected terrorist supporters, among
other measures. In other instances, detainees were brought to public trial to show that justice was
being done, but also to spotlight the brutality of terrorist crimes and the whole nature of the
insurgent conspiracy, including any direction and assistance received from outside the country.
There was also need for the government to have an overall plan in which there should be a
coordination of efforts and responsibilities between the administrative, security, and civil efforts
of the counterinsurgency. Even without summarily defeating the guerillas, the government had to
make sure that it eliminated or minimized the contacts between the guerillas and their civilian
supporters. Finally, the government also secured its base area, or capital, before embarking on an
all-out anti-guerilla warfare.26
Aside from the seemingly repressive nature of the Malayan counter-insurgency, the colonial
authorities also provided other development-related programs or projects to the local communities
as a means through which to win them over to the government side. For instance, the authorities
offered citizenship and more economic and political rights to Chinese immigrant communities,
which culminated in the formation of the Alliance Party (AP) made up of the leading Malay,
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Chinese, and Indian political associations. In both Malaya and South Vietnam, the authorities also
promised the provision of new development projects, such as schools, hospitals, clinics, rural
roads, better water supplies, and the supply of electricity. The government also gave up some of
its authoritarian powers, which allowed the local elites to partake in their own government. That,
however, was a ploy, as it did not mean a loss of government authority. The head of state still
retained the authority to lay out policies to guide the direction that the countries took.27 The
colonial authorities also strengthened the information or communication services of the countries
or colonies involved, as information provision was regarded as one of the major tools for
counterinsurgency. The information services would work at two levels, namely one which targeted
the work of the insurgents; and another which was directed at the public, both of which would help
promote “psychological warfare”. Targeting the insurgents through various sets of information and
propaganda helped to reduce the will of the insurgents to fight and to encourage surrenders. At the
same time, the public would also be rallied to provide support for government efforts to end the
insurgency. It was the responsibility of the department of information to inform, while the
propaganda messages (through newspaper articles, radio messages, films, and censorship) were
there to persuade.28
In the aftermath of Thompson’s work, cited above, there have been numerous studies that have
tackled the question of counter-insurgency in the former European colonies in Africa and Asia.
The leading scholarship in the field includes that of Thomas Mockaitis, Paul Dixon, David French,
Susan Carruthers, Erik Linstrum, Huw Bennet, and Daniel Branch, to name but a few. Their studies
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have highlighted that counter-insurgency measures have over the years varied from the use of
brutal force, repressive laws, state propaganda, and the offer of development opportunities.29
This study has been significantly influenced by these earlier studies, many of which are centered
on the inter-war period and the era of decolonization. However, there are several shortfalls or gaps
that I address. Firstly, there has been a tendency to exclude the various forms of insurgency and
counter-insurgency that appeared prior to the Second World War, and whether connections could
be drawn between the pre-World War Two and post-World Two developments. Secondly, the
studies reviewed mostly focused on the so-called classic period of decolonization (immediately
after the Second World War up to the mid-1960s), but limited, if any, effort has been done in
scholarship to consider the continuation of the dynamics that led to the rise of “insurgencies” and
subsequent “counter-insurgency” measures employed by the postcolonial state. It is naïve to
suggest that the end of European colonial rule automatically or immediately led to the end of the
grievances that motivated people to challenge the authority and legitimacy of their government;
and that the new governments completely departed from the systems of governance that were
employed by their colonial predecessor states. In many African countries, Malawi included, the
end of colonial rule did not immediately or completely lead to a complete departure from the
systems and structures that served the colonial state. As such, it is important to conduct a “longue
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durée” study that analyzes the continuity and adaptation that took place in the period after the end
of European rule.
There are also other influential works that have analyzed the making and unmaking of the postcolonial state in Africa. I will briefly discuss some of the key works in the field, specifically
focusing on the advent of the so-called “developmental state”, and the associated failures to
enhance principles of liberalism, both political and economic, leading to the widespread abuse and
disrespect of people’s rights. I have highlighted some of the arguments raised in such works at the
beginning of chapter six of this study (which focuses on the post-colonial state), as a way of
contextualizing and conceptualizing the chapter’s contents. Of note is the work of Bertrand Badie
who argued that what emerged in the aftermath of European rule in Africa were “imported states”.
By this he meant that the states in post-colonial Africa were of European origin and character,
whose form of organization had been imported into Africa during the colonial period. After the
end of colonial rule, the post-colonial leaders continued with similar systems, institutions, and
structures (including the political thought, legal systems, economic systems and theories) that
served the preceding colonial states, hence the notion of “importing” continued. The “importing
actors” imported those systems and other elements that would serve them best, and in the process
help to enhance their access to political and economic power. There were also instances where
some of the imported systems were adapted or were inter-mixed with traditional ones to suit the
needs of the new socio-economic and political environment.30
One other influential work in the field is that of Crawford Young who adopted a continent-wide
approach of analyzing the post-colonial state in Africa, through which he identified six key phases
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which the post-colonial state had undergone, of which I have adopted five in this study, especially
due to its conceptualization of the major developments under each phase. The demarcation of the
phases, many of which had overlapping characteristics, was done to highlight major developments
at each phase. Phase One took place from the late 1950s to the early 1960s, when the dawn of
independence seemed to be full of promise. Most post-colonial states during that phase continued
with the developmental policies of the colonial state, which were characterized by comprehensive
state planning and large-scale public investment. The state was the central actor in the push against
underdevelopment. During the first phase, most states led by the nationalist party, experienced
substantial economic growth, in part due to the purchase of raw materials by former colonial
powers, and because of the substantial economic and material assistance provided from the
international aid which was distributed as part of the Cold War.
The second phase, occurred in the mid-1960s and abruptly ended the optimism of the previous
phase due to the states’ shift from political liberalism to political closure, where both civilian and
military regimes outlawed opposition political groups through the enactment of laws that barred
such groups directly or indirectly, including the emergence of one-party state systems. Most of the
opposition leaders or outspoken critics of the new elite ended up being sent to jails that were once
filled by the nationalist leaders. The argument for the single party was that it would help foster
national unity and promote national development, and that a democratic culture would have been
nurtured within it without the political polarization of multiple parties. Unfortunately, the single
party systems only helped to eclipse the political rights of most citizens and did not bring the
required national unity. What it achieved was to reproduce incumbent rule and preserve the power
and interests of a selected few. Some African leaders, such as Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah, were
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deposed due to such policy shifts, while other governments increased state political surveillance
activities for fear of military coups.
The third phase occurred from the late 1960s to the mid-1970s, an era when state expansionism
brought about some positive results, especially from the economic perspective. Most of the states
adopted indigenization policies and established state-run industries or companies, known as
parastatals, which for some time produced considerable profits, and hence helped to back up the
Dependency Theorists, such as Samir Amin and Walter Rodney, who had argued that extractive
Western capitalism had drained resources from the underdeveloped world.31 There was also
substantial economic growth due to the loans provided by international lending agencies and
nations. Phase four stretched from the late 1970s to the late 1980s, when most African states were
in a downward spiral, both politically and economically. Africanist scholars began to use the terms
“state crisis” or “state decline” when referring to the pessimistic conditions for most of the African
states. Politically, most states degenerated into personal rule characterized by clientelism and neopatrimonialism, where access to state resources was only guaranteed by one’s loyalty and
obedience to the ruler. There was also widespread corruption as politicians channeled state
resources for self-aggrandizement. Most African countries also underwent financial crises due to
the failure to pay back the huge debts owed to international money lenders. Those conditions led
African countries to accept the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) imposed by the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
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The last but one phase, according to Young, occurred from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, when
the so-called “Washington Consensus” introduced
through the SAPS as a therapy for African economies, had been found wanting as most African
economies did not respond positively. However, there was some redemption from the political
sphere, when political liberalization allowed for the formation of opposition political movements
to operate under what has been described as the third wave of democratization. The sixth phase,
which is beyond the scope of this study, focuses on the late 1990s up to the early 2000s. This phase
which is still in its infancy, has come with some mixed results. In some countries the
democratization process has been well established, in other countries there are elements of state
collapse due to internal and international forces that have contributed to civil wars and instability.32
Young’s analysis is a seminal work in the field, particularly for historical studies that adopt a
“longue durée historical approach”, focusing on developments over a longer period, while not
disregarding developments at each of the phases mentioned above.
There are other equally impressive works on the post-colonial state in Africa, whose
conceptualization could be located within the periodization adopted by Crawford Young’s work,
as cited above. Most of the works adopt a pessimistic approach in discussing the historical
processes that the post-colonial state has undergone since the age of decolonization to the 1990s.
Works by such scholars as Michael Crowder, Martin Doornbos, Frederick Cooper, Jeffrey Herbst,
Abdil Ismail Samatar and Ahmed I. Samatar, and Jean-Francois Bayart, all come to mind as
essential contributions to the field.33
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Michael Crowder, for instance, uses the case study of Nigeria as a reflection of the
underdevelopment or the atmosphere of optimism that had taken part in the rest of sub-Saharan
Africa for the first quarter century after independence. He posited that at independence, most of
the African countries, in both Francophone and Anglophone Africa, adopted liberal principles and
constitutions modeled on the metropole, which were generated during the talks that led to
independence. There was also optimism that the economies would continue performing well,
supported by agricultural production, trade, and industrialization. But by the late 1980s, all the
optimism had disappeared, and all the countries, except Botswana had experienced some form of
political and economic upheaval. Some of the key challenges highlighted by Crowder include the
establishment of one-party states and its association with authoritarianism; high levels of
corruption by the ruling elite; and, high levels of poverty. As a result, by the late 1980s, the dream
and optimism of independence and prosperity had been shattered and replaced by a profound
disillusion and a state of hopelessness. For Crowder, the challenge for African states was that the
dreams of socio-economic and political prosperity failed to materialize largely because they were
“manufactured” in Europe, rather than in the individual African states. In his view, the stated
“dream” did not consider the contemporary African realities, nor did it consider the legacy of
colonial rule that would continue in post-colonial Africa, where liberal principles were rarely in
practice. I address such a conceptualization, in chapter six of this study, in agreement with
Crowder, that the systems and structures of the post-colonial state in Malawi, often mirrored the
preceding colonial state.
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Crowder argued that the state of “disaster” which Africa found itself in by the late 1980s should
be analyzed as a continuum from the colonial era, and that African independence should not be
viewed as a historical dividing line. In other words, the colonial experience played a significant
role in influencing what became of post-colonial Africa. He pointed at such processes as statesponsored violence against the opposition forces; the state of underdevelopment where state
resources were not meant for the benefit of the masses; the lack of freedom in political and
economic circles; the personal power exercised by the rulers and leaders; the enactment of
repressive laws; the dependent nature of African economies; and the state structures, including the
boundaries and systems that were handed over at independence. He also reiterated that the dream
of political and economic liberalization, was not a dream of African leaders at independence, rather
it was a dream imposed by the colonizing powers. Many of the African leaders were in favor of
the formation of “strong states” or authoritarian states, which they implemented once colonial rule
was over. The African nationalist elite had a totally different dream or view about the post-colonial
state in which they did not want to tolerate any form of opposition and competition, hence the
downward spiral of events in the twenty-five years after independence. Most of the African leaders
accepted to take part in constitutional talks that imposed the liberal principles, including allowing
the operation of opposition parties, having realized that that they could not achieve independence
by using military means. Only those in the opposition after independence seemed to be interested
in and committed to liberal democracy.34
Similarly, Frederick Cooper, also analyzed developments of post-colonial Africa, which in the first
two decades, performed relatively well, in economic terms, before the downward spiral of the late
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1970s and early 1980s moving onwards. His work addressed the rise of state-led development
since 1940 (hereafter the late-colonial era) and including the post-colonial period. He thus argued
that after almost five decades of independence, in general terms, most African countries had not
been associated with significant forms of development for the African masses. He also posited that
there was very little or limited change between the colonial and post-colonial states in Africa, in
describing both states as ‘gatekeeper states’, that allowed very little or no room for political and
economic participation of the masses or their subjects. For both the late-colonial and post-colonial
periods, development measures were mainly put in place for the benefit of the ruling elite, hence
the development of notions of “state-led development” or “developmental states.”35 Under systems
of state-led development, roughly from 1940 to the mid-1970s, and beyond, there was the
perception that government planning and economic investment (not just the natural operations of
the market) would help African economies emerge from decades of backwardness. While there
were positive results during the late colonial era and in the early years after independence
(characterized by the growth in exports, high levels of literacy, the increase in infrastructural
development, and the growth in life expectancy), the success story was however marred by the
lack of liberalism (economic and political), as doing so would have posed a threat to the “gate”
which the ruling elite were determined to keep or protect. Further challenges followed the
economic downturn of the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, due to both domestic and
international forces, processes which affected the provision of basic socio-economic services. By
the late 1980s, most African countries had their economies subjected to intervention by
international money-lending and donor institutions, such as the Structural Adjustment Programs
(SAPs) imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Failure to attain
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success under the SAPs in part helped to fuel the calls for regime change in most African countries
by the late 1980s and early 1990s. At that point, the so-called “gates” had either collapsed, become
un-guardable, or had been severely weakened, such that the solutions to revive the economy could
only be found through international sources. It was also these international sources that also began
to call for changes in the political system and openly provided support to opposition elements in
individual African countries.36
While the studies by Young, Crowder, and Cooper, among others cited in this study provide an
important framework for understanding the post-colonial state in Africa, they are not without
several shortfalls. Chief among them is that by putting the state as the subject of analysis, they
often overlook the role of African citizens in the making and un-making of the state. As this study
highlights in chapters six and seven, the states in Africa are not always as hegemonic as most
studies present them. Furthermore, the intervention of the international community is not the only
major influence on the operations of the African state. Its operations are in many cases also
influenced by the reactions of the people that they govern. In cases where there is “state overreach”
the African people have used their agency to call for leadership or regime change.
The continued influence of international actors in African affairs, including the former colonial
powers, has led many scholars to question the validity of the concept of “decolonization” in the
continent. Some of the scholarship in this field has come from the works of Frederick Cooper,
Anthony Clayton, Elizabeth Schmidt, and Catherine Gegout, to name a few. According to
Frederick Cooper, while there was “formal” handing over of political power to African leaders,
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the states that they have presided over have not often been regarded as equal partners to other
global superpowers on the international stage. While “sovereignty” allowed African leaders and
their states to act with authority on matters concerning domestic and foreign policy, it is also true
to argue that the individual states have always been and remain riven by distinctions, and that some
are more powerful and influential than others. The former colonial powers and their allies often
looked down upon their former colonial territories, and in the post-colonial period, the former
tended to dictate policy formulation in the latter. In other words, “decolonization” did not end the
inequality that existed between the global powers and their former colonies. This also translates
into the powers that international monetary organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank
have over decision-making in African states. Cooper argues that “it would be a mistake either to
see colonialism as a phenomenon that could be turned off like a television set – with all problems
instantly turned into “African” problems – or to define a colonial “legacy” that determined what
African polities could do, without considering the openings and closures that occurred during the
process of struggle.”37
I agree with Cooper’s analysis, and other such arguments, and grapple with these issues in chapters
six and seven of this current study, where I focus on the role of the international community,
including the British government and the Bretton Woods Institutions, to influence the state-ofaffairs in post-colonial Malawi. The argument adopted is that Malawi clearly gained
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“independence” from British rule, through what John Darwin described as “the surrender of
political sovereignty over the peoples of Africa and Asia and the emergence of independent nationstates.”38 However, for post-colonial Malawi, the process of “decolonization” remained
incomplete and largely superficial. As Darwin put it, “decolonization” should rather be understood
as “a partial retraction, redeployment and redistribution of British and European influences in the
regions of the extra-European world whose economic, political and cultural life had previously
seemed to flow into Western molds.”39 In the case of Malawi, this should be understood because
of the continued influence of the former colonial power and her international allies in the country’s
political and economic developments.
From the accounts and works reviewed above, I have drawn significant lessons and influences that
inform the current study. As previously highlighted, there are limited accounts that address or
adopt a “longue durée approach” in the study of the history of colonial and post-colonial Malawi,
and indeed for the themes that I set out to explore at the outset of this study.
Significance of the study
This study contributes to the study of the relationship between the state and its subjects and citizens
in British colonial Africa, using Malawi as a case study. It also contributes to scholarship that
focuses on the continuation of systems and practices that were employed by the colonial state and
were adopted and sometimes adapted by the post-colonial state. Specifically, this study has
targeted such areas as control of the means and forces of production, such as land and labor; the
concept of taxation; state-centered control of the economy and development, as some of the areas
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where subjects and citizens have risen to challenge the legitimacy and authority of the state
(hereafter “insurgency”). I have also analyzed the different means (hereafter “counterinsurgency”) which the states in question have used over the years to deal with such forces of
opposition. That has included such tactics as the use of brutal force; the use of repressive laws; the
use of state-sponsored propaganda; and the provision of development and/or socio-economic
opportunities to the so-called insurgents or their followers to make it attractive for them to side
with the government of the day. I have also departed from those works that only focus on the topic
of counter-insurgency in relation to the period of decolonization by analyzing developments that
took place both prior to World War Two and those that continued under the post-colonial state.
As I will argue in chapter seven of this study, there is a need to have clear demarcations between
what is meant by such terms as “the colonial state” and the “post-colonial state” in the history of
Malawi. While the colonial state stretched from 1891 to 1964 (the former referring to the date of
formal colonization, and the latter referring to the date of Malawi’s independence followed by a
Republican status in 1966), I have argued that the fall of Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda and his
regime in 1994 should be regarded as the end of the post-colonial state in Malawi. My adoption of
the “longue durée historical approach” also helps to show the relevance of a historical inquiry in
explaining the processes and challenges that societies go through, many of which have answers or
antecedents set in the past, sometimes over decades or hundreds of years. This approach was the
brainchild of the Annales School in France, propounded by such historical figures as Ferdinand
Braudel. It was based on the understanding that while historians were encouraged to borrow from
or cooperate with other related disciplines, they should not navigate away from the centrality of
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time in their studies. In other words, the developments of the present and the future, in significant
measure are often a mirror image of the historical past. 40
One other important component of this study is the focus of the role of the international community
in influencing both the colonial and post-colonial state. This study pinpoints how the global Cold
War and other multi-national players such as the USA, the World Bank, and indeed Britain herself,
influenced the historical trajectory that Malawi underwent between 1891 and 1994. Not many
studies have focused on the state in Malawi, both the colonial and the post-colonial, as an
international actor, and especially how the state was influenced by the Cold War rivalries. The role
of the international community has been extensively discussed in chapters five, six, and seven of
this study. The argument here is that even with the advent of decolonization in Malawi, the British
government and other international powers, continued to exert influence on the country. While
their policies and directions helped determined the longevity of the post-colonial state, they were
also influential in curtailing its existence in the 1990s.
In doing so, the study also places historical developments in Malawi within the “globalization”
paradigm. Beginning from the late 19th century, when Malawi like the rest of Africa was placed
under colonial rule, this study shows how the country was part and parcel of some major
international events and processes. Malawians and their leaders have throughout the period
covered under this study been active participants or agents in the making of their own history,
sometimes “voluntarily” participating and in other times opposing their interaction with the
international community. In such historical processes, their choice on whether to either
“collaborate” or “resist” often had a significant impact on the reactions of the metropole and the
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international community. This includes such historical processes as colonialism, imperialism, the
two World Wars, resistance to colonial rule, the great depression, decolonization, colonial and
post-colonial development, the Cold War, and the engagement with and influence of the former
colonial power, Britain, its American ally, and the Bretton Woods Institutions. As argued by Ralph
Austen, it is high time scholars place Africa as a major player in the globalization process, both
from a historical perspective and from the contemporary world order. 41 This, as Zeleza argued, is
an essential step in the study of African history, as it moves the focus from the nationalist project
and paradigm of the early post-colonial era, with its focus on self-determination, a glorification of
the African past, and the nation-state as the primary focus of analysis. Studying African history
from a global perspective is essential as it highlights the interconnectedness of historical processes
which communities, countries, and continents go through.42
Chapter overview
This study has eight chapters, including the current chapter which serves as the introduction. It has
provided information on the research problems, the background to the study, and the review of
related literature. Chapter two focuses on the first two decades of British rule in Nyasaland,
roughly between 1891 and 1910. This was a period when the colonial state was being established,
and required, in most cases, the use of state brutality to deal with African resistance. I have
specifically dwelt on the political economy approach, to discuss how material needs determined
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the relationship that existed between the colonizer and the colonized. The colonial state was keen
to set up conducive conditions for the operation of European enterprises in the country, hence the
need to eliminate all forms of opposition. Much of what emerged as counter-insurgency, came in
the form of ‘the stick’ against the resisting African societies, something that Crawford Young
refers to as the notion of bula matari (literally “he who crushes rocks”).43
In chapter three, I critically analyze British colonial rule as a form of a “civilizing mission”, by
focusing on the land, labor and taxation policies of the colonial state in Nyasaland. I highlight the
shortfalls of the “civilizing mission,” particularly focusing on the constraints that accompanied
British colonial rule. These in turn contributed to the rise of unrest in the protectorate, including
the famous Chilembwe Uprising of 1915. In chapter four, I focus on the notion of “winning hearts
and minds” as it pertained to the suppression of resistance between 1915 and 1930. I have focused
on the use of both “the carrot and the stick,” as measures employed by the colonial state to defeat
the insurgents. “The stick” refers to the use of brutal force, while “the carrot” refers to the offer of
development opportunities. Unlike other works that only focus on the use of brutal force to crush
or suppress the Chilembwe uprising and its immediate aftermath, I have highlighted how the
initiation of development and welfare programs for the benefit of the colonized peoples, was also
used as a counter-insurgency measure. Following this line argument, the chapter advances the
argument that the origins of a full-blown state involvement in the development of Nyasaland was
in significant measure influenced by the input and demands of the Africans, some of which had
been behind the 1915 uprising. It was African agency, as the chapter argues, that triggered the
implementation of the tenets of the “civilizing mission.” Some of the measures employed by the
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colonial state to meet the demands of the Africans contravened what the European settler
community in the protectorate had advocated for. I have also stretched my focus on the colonial
police, by adopting a political-economy approach to argue that the operations of the Nyasaland
Police reflected the organization of the Nyasaland society of the time. Also important was the
utilization of the “para-military” group, known as the Nyasaland Volunteer Reserve (NVR), whose
activities and importance to the colonial state, matched what later appeared as a tactic of the postcolonial state, through the creation of the Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP). The Reserve served in
both capacities of development, and as an army-in-waiting for the colonial state; and while it
started as a non-state actor, its activities were soon legalized and were funded from state coffers.
Chapter five turns to the question of the ambiguity of colonial notions of development, and how
these ambiguities contributed to the rise of radical forms of nationalism in the post-World War
Two era. I have traced the colonial state’s involvement in the development of the Nyasaland
Protectorate from the late 1920s onwards, from the enactment of the Colonial Development Act
of 1929, to the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts of 1940 and 1945, and the influence of
the Colonial Development Corporation (CDC). I have highlighted that while there were advocates
of colonial development at the Colonial Office, such as Joseph Chamberlain, the Colonial
Secretary, 1895-1903, there was unwillingness by the British Treasury (BT) to commit to colonial
development. Many at the BT were of the view that the colonies should be self-supporting, and
that private enterprise should spearhead the development initiative. However, following the failure
of the private sector to take up that responsibility, especially due to the great depression years of
the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s, it became incumbent upon the colonial state to fill the
gap. With regards to Nyasaland, I have highlighted that the peak of this state-led development
came through the formation of the Central African Federation (CAF). The ambiguity of the notion
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of development at the time was in the fact that the development efforts introduced by the
Federation, just like the other earlier development initiatives, were not intended for the benefit of
the Africans, contrary to the claims made by the colonial authorities. The development initiatives
were designed to serve the exploitative interests of the colonial authorities. After World War Two,
Britain was joined by the USA, to extract as much as possible, from Britain’s colonial possessions
in Tropical Africa. During this phase, the acceleration of insurgency contributed to the declaration
of the 1959 State of Emergency. The leaders of the African nationalist movements in the
Federation were also referred to as “communist implants” even though there was no significant
evidence to justify such claims. In as far as counter-insurgency was concerned at that stage, notions
of “the stick and the carrot” also prevailed, where such measures as brutal force (through the
activities of the Nyasaland Police Force), legalization of state oppression through the enactment
of repressive laws, and indeed the establishment of development initiatives for the benefit of the
both the colonizer and the colonized were initiated.
The post-colonial period is discussed in chapter six, where I have argued that Malawi exhibited
the characteristics of an “an imported state,” where one could trace the continuation of practices
and systems that operated under British rule into the post-colonial period. I have focused on the
rise of the “developmental state”, which I have argued were a continuation from the late colonial
era. Once Dr. Banda, the Malawian leader from 1964 to 1994, adopted this policy, he and his
cronies created a system which followed a “protectionist” approach, thus barring others from
accessing the economic and political opportunities of the time. My research departs from most
other studies which overly concentrate on the brutality of the Banda regime, especially through the
enactment of repressive laws, and the brutal tactics of the Malawi Police Force and two Youth
Movements of the MYP and the Youth League. Instead, I draw attention to the idea that
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“development” was also at the center of Banda’s tactics to prolong his stay in power for three
decades. This then should be considered as part of his overall counter-insurgency strategy. He
incorporated the youth and women, as the main groups through which to carry out his development
agenda, while at the same time, operating his neo-patrimonial regime in which he rewarded those
close to him through blood, marriage, and political connections. The Youth Movements, as
mentioned above, held a similar function to the colonial NVR, as discussed in chapter four, in the
sense that during times of peace they were expected to perform development activities, while
during times of trouble, they were supposed, and were trained to take up arms in support of the
post-colonial state. The MYPs were also placed in various government institutions where they
acted as spies, gathering information on those perceived to be in opposition to the regime. Mention
has also been made of two influential Western powers, the British and American Governments,
especially how their aid helped to sustain the Banda regime. The argument here is that just like
other post-colonial states in Africa, the Banda regime survived for three decades, in part through
the substantial support it enjoyed from the Western powers. Dr. Banda was regarded as an
important regional ally during the Cold War.
The last but one chapter revolves around the argument that the fall of Banda after the 1994 general
elections marked the end of the post-colonial state in Malawi. I have attributed the developments
that led to Banda’s exit from power as emanating from the economic downturn and recession
which the country faced since the 1979/80 fiscal year. The economic downturn was brought about
by both international and domestic forces, including the increase in global oil prices; huge debts
incurred by the Banda regime; environmental challenges; the under-performance of state-run
companies; and the civil war in neighboring Mozambique, which blocked Malawi’s access to the
ports of Nacala and Beira. From this point onwards, Banda lost control of the economy, and had
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to rely on foreign aid from bilateral donors and the Bretton Woods Institutions, which were
influenced by principles of the Washington Consensus, through the Structural Adjustment
Programs (SAPs). The “Washington Consensus,” or the so-called “Neo-Liberalism,” among other
things called for a reduction of the size and influence of the state in the economy and called for
the liberalization of the economy. It also advocated for political liberalization. By the late 1980s
and early 1990s, the international money lenders and aid providers had shifted away from simply
giving their resources to Malawi but had also begun to demand the liberalization of the regime as
a condition for the continuation of provision aid. After the Cold War, the Western powers were no
longer in the mood to tolerate the wide-spread abuses of human rights in countries that relied on
Western support for both budgetary and developmental aid. The international pressure soon ignited
the agency of the Malawian peoples which led to the rise of domestic forms of opposition against
the regime, which included not only opposition political movements but members of the clergy
and the general citizenry as well.
The last chapter is the conclusion, and it summarizes the major issues raised from chapters two to
seven. It also includes a general overview of the lessons to be drawn from studying the history of
Malawi over a long historical period, in this case from the colonial to the post-colonial periods.
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CHAPTER TWO
EARLY FORMS OF AFRICAN RESISTANCE AND STATE COUNTERINSURGENCY, 1891-1914

I spoke of contact. Between the colonizer and the colonized there is room only for forced
labor, intimidation, pressure, the police, taxation, theft, rape, compulsory crops, contempt,
mistrust, arrogance, self-complacency, swinishness, brainless elites, degraded masses. No
human contact, but relations of domination and submission which turn the colonizing man
into a classroom monitor, an army sergeant, a prison guard, a slave driver, and the
indigenous man into an instrument of production.44

Introduction
This chapter focuses on the first two decades of British colonial rule in Nyasaland. During this
early phase, the colonial state focused on the establishment of its hegemony and the consolidation
of its hold on the Protectorate. It was a phase when the colonizer, as argued by Aime Cesaire,
sought to demonstrate his superiority by using the instruments of colonial power such as barbarism,
brutal violence and intimidation against the colonized peoples. The colonized peoples were often
looked at as uncivilized and without a culture equal to that of the colonizer. 45 It also details the
role of local or African “collaborators” in enhancing the colonial enterprise, which substantiates
the notion that the colonial enterprise was a “negotiated” process. It is the position of this chapter
to argue that one has to look at the relationship between the colonizer and the colonized as one
determined by access to material needs and political power The two sides scrambled over the
means and forces of production and also the sources of livelihood, such as land, trade, and labor.
The fight over political power often involved the struggle to subjugate some of the African chiefs.
Here again, as highlighted in chapter one, the “political economy approach” helps to illuminate
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the relationships that were created. During the period in question, the protectorate was ruled by
four British governors, namely: Sir Harry Hamilton Johnston (1891-1896); Sir Alfred Sharpe
(1896-1910); William Henry Manning (1911-1913); and George Smith (1913-1923). And as was
the case in most of colonial Africa, the colonizers faced both resistance and collaboration from the
African subjects, processes and relations which as I have discussed in chapter one of this study,
tended to be very complicated and fluid. To counter the resistance of the Africans, the colonial
state employed the brutality of its armed forces (by using military men and policemen, sourced
both locally and elsewhere in the British Empire), and the legal system to its advantage, by
victimizing the often-defenseless Africans. However, there were limits to which the colonial state
could stump its brutal authority on the colonized peoples, hence its reliance on African
“collaborators” in the form of chiefs and their subjects.
Crawford Young has described the role of the colonial state at this early phase, and indeed
throughout most of the colonial period, as a Bula Matari (“breaker of rocks”), which in a way
meant that the state had to adopt the characteristics of total domination to suppress all forms of
African resistance. For the period between 1875 and 1914, the colonial state had to create various
forms of dominance through the creation of apparatuses, such as the police force, which would
discipline and punish the unruly, and ensure that there was adherence to law and order. 46 There
were also attempts by the colonial state to create a physical base essential for the state’s survival,
which would include controlling African labor and developing a system of tax collection through
the use of intermediaries as tax collectors, in order to meet the revenue imperative of the state. At
the same time, the state could from time-to-time engage in forcing the African population into
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delivering of goods and surrendering land and livestock.47 The subject of the involvement of the
Nyasaland government in matters of land alienation and collection of taxes will be covered in
chapter three of this study.
It is essential to note that at this early phase of the establishment of dominance and consolidation
of colonial state structures, the operations of the state were not a one-way process. In other words,
while the colonial authorities had their own policy preferences, they were often compelled to make
changes following the reactions of the Africans. As already highlighted above, the decisions by
Africans to either “resist” or “collaborate” with the British colonists were usually fluid, and this
also often affected the policy formulation of the colonial authorities. This argument is advanced in
various studies on the early years of British colonial rule across Africa. One such study is by D.A.
Low, which focused on the establishment of colonial rule in what is now Uganda in East Africa.
In what he terms as “ground level imperialism,” Low focused on the reactions of such kingdoms
as the Buganda, Busoga, Bunyoro, and the Bankore. The reactions of the leadership of these
kingdoms to the establishment of colonial rule were in significant measure the main determinants
of the dynamics and operations of the colonial state. The colonial state, which often relied upon
tiny numbers of European administrators, owed its establishment and consolidation to the support
provided by African employees and the chiefs whom they lived under. It is that form of
“construction” of the colonial state that Low termed the “fabrication” of Empire.48 I address these
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issues in both chapters two and three of this study. I focus on how the reactions of Africans to the
imposition of colonial rule and later to the colonial policies on land, labor and taxation often
determined the reactions of the colonial administrators (hereafter “the administrative mind”). In
this case then, the establishment and consolidation of colonial rule was more of a “negotiated”
process and was often determined by the “periphery” rather than always a top-down influence of
the “metropole.”
The First Decade of British Rule and forms of African Resistance

Roland Oliver highlighted that the man given the responsibility for laying the foundations of the
Nyasaland Protectorate, as Consul General, Sir Harry Hamilton Johnston, was charged by the
Foreign Office (FO) with four responsibilities upon his appointment in 1890: (1) to consolidate
the Protectorate of Her Majesty over the native chiefs; (2) to advise the chiefs on their external
relations with each other and with foreigners, not interfering unduly with their internal
administration; (3) to ensure peace and order, and (4) by every legitimate means, to check the slave
trade.49 However, from the start, Johnston was met with stiff African resistance. Hector Duff, a
colonial official in Johnston’s administration, noted that although the formal establishment of
colonial rule preceded the pacification efforts of the early Christian missionaries, such as the
Universities Mission to Central Africa (UMCA), the Free Church of Scotland (FCS), the Dutch
Reformed Church Mission (DRCM), and to an extent the African Lakes Corporation (ALC), by
the early 1890s, the Protectorate was still torn by internal squabbles (inter-ethnic wars) and
external forces (especially Arab slave traders and Portuguese interference). The major external
threat came from the activities of Arab slave raiders who collaborated with Yao traders to terrorize
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other non-militant ethnic groups, largely due to the existence of inter-ethnic jealousy and greed,
which was mostly unchecked due to the lack of any fixed and centralized stable power. 50 On the
other hand, the internal warfare often involved rival chiefs in their attempts to capture slaves for
sale to Arab slave traders. For instance, Yao chiefs such as Mponda versus or against Zarafi (in
the southern province); or a war between the Yao and Angoni peoples; or the Yao against the
Atonga peoples.51
The Arab slave traders in question, according to a visitor to the Nyasaland Protectorate, Dr. Kerr
Cross, were divided into three main classes: (1) the true Muscat traders, who had a white skin,
came from Arabia, had gentlemanly manners, dressed in silk, and was invariably hospitable to
Europeans; (2) the coast Arabs, who were black, hailed from Zanzibar and were of a different fiber
from the first group. In religion, dress and manners, they were of similar character. However, this
group was comprised of shrewd, wily and deceitful businessmen, although they tended to be
hospitable to Europeans. Finally, the third group were comprised of Africans who copied the deeds
of the Arab slave trader in everything. In the clearly biased words of Dr Cross, most of them were
said to be “uncivilized and brutes.”52
It was this “hostile atmosphere” which necessitated the establishment of state dominance which
would translate into the imposition of some degree of order, essential for creating an atmosphere
in which the protectorate would be properly governed. Once Sir Harry Johnston became Consul
General, he embarked on military expeditions against the slave raiders. He planned with the
Government of India to secure the Protectorate with a small force of Sikhs and Muslim troopers,
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under the command of Captain Cecil M. Maguire, of the Hyderabad Contingent. These troops and
policemen encountered a considerable amount of African hostility and resistance. Robert Rotberg
hinted that Sir Harry Johnston had to assure the FO and the British public that the chiefs who led
their peoples against his army were “mere slavers” who fought only to preserve an outmoded social
and economic system. In his eyes, these chiefs were scoundrels and renegades, not patriots, who
deserved summary treatment. In that case, the existence of the slave trade served to justify attacks
against the chiefs who refused to acknowledge the paramountcy or legitimacy of the Johnston
administration, and served to mask the existence of an apparently widely felt antipathy toward
whites and the British occupation of Nyasaland.53
John McCracken posited that upon his arrival in Nyasaland, Sir Harry Johnston was already
convinced of the necessity of using force to establish territorial dominance. That then helps to
explain why in his first year of administration, he had already sent various military expeditions to
attack unfriendly or non-collaborating chiefs, such as the attack on the Yao Chief Chikumbu in
Mulanje (who had been at loggerheads with European settlers in his area over payments for
purchase of land). The other attacks, led by Captain Cecil Maguire, focused on the Lake Nyasa
area, targeting the headquarters of Chiefs Makanjira, Kazembe, and Mponda – all of whom had
known links with Swahili-Arab traders. These early attacks involved the burning of houses and
dhows that were used for transporting slaves and foodstuffs. It was during the subsequent
expedition in December 1891 that Captain Maguire was killed, having run into an ambush laid by
the Yao peoples.54 Chief Makanjira remained a thorn in the colonial government’s operations until
his death in 1915. Having killed Captain Maguire and the other members of his contingent,
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Makanjira retreated to the hills, close to the border with Portuguese East Africa, from where he
carried out a series of guerilla raids on villages close to Fort Maguire. Makanjira’s popularity is
said to have remained undiminished, such that when Major Edwards launched a further expedition
against him in November 1895, he discovered that Makanjira oversaw thickly populated villages
containing as many as 8000 houses. At the time of his death in 1915, Makanjira was still an
“independent” chief.55
In the central province, the Johnston administration also faced stiff resistance from the Chewa and
Ngoni peoples. The Chewa, led by Chief Mwase embarked on a battle against the British-led
forces, but it was a short-lived affair, as the Chief ended up committing suicide to avoid being
arrested after the colonial troops had overrun his village. Among the Ngoni, Chief Inkosi Gomani
Chikusi, also led his people to challenge the colonizers and British mission stations for some
considerable time. The chief was, however, captured and summarily executed thereby ending all
efforts to resist British occupation.56 In his memoirs, R.C.F. Maugham, the government official in
charge of the expedition to capture Chief Chikusi, narrated how the Ngoni chief was finally
captured and later executed. He hinted that the Ngoni people who arrived in the British Central
African territory in the nineteenth century from South Africa, had, by the mid-1890s accepted to
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be placed under British protection, although they had not yet started paying hut taxes. The Ngoni
had also pledged to maintain peace, and in no circumstances to carry arms outside of the area they
settled. However, in September 1896, Chikusi’s men began raiding the “restricted zones,” which
produced an atmosphere of uneasiness among both natives and Christian mission stations. Sir
Alfred Sharpe, Acting Commissioner of the Protectorate, reacted to these reports by issuing orders
that Chikusi had to be captured:
The Acting Commissioner told me that Chikusi would have to be taught a lesson, a
severe one. In defiance of the most definite understanding, he had come down with a
strong fighting force into the country between the Kirk range and the Shire River; he
had destroyed several Anyanja villages; had attacked a mission station, capturing and
putting to death with his own hand several of the mission natives, and, in response to
remonstrance, had returned an insolent and defiant reply threatening shortly to gather
together his impis (subordinate chiefs) and carry a war of extermination into the Shire
Highlands. In these circumstances it was clear that, if no steps were taken, Chifisi and
Mombera (Chikusi’s subordinate chiefs), who were doubtless watching the situation
and ‘sitting on the fence’, would regard our inactivity as an admission of weakness, and
they, in turn would seize the opportunity of breaking out into similar acts of a warlike
character.57

Maugham then was sent as a colonial official to oversee the expedition led by Captain Stewart,
with a force consisting of 80 Sikhs and 60 African troops. Initially Chikusi escaped into
neighboring Mozambique, leaving worries for the Nyasaland authorities who feared that he
(Chikusi) might have established another headquarters in the Portuguese territory from which to
launch attacks into the British Protectorate. A plan was thus hatched to dupe Chikusi into coming
back to Nyasaland to amicably settle the matter with the colonial authorities. When Chikusi met
with Maugham he had one question to ask: “I come to ask…why the white man brings war to my
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country, kills my people, and burns my villages?” To which Mr. Maugham replied, by laying down
the charges against the Ngoni chief, who was then captured and tried before a court martial, and
sentenced to death by execution:
You ask me, Chikusi, why we have come with war. I will tell you. You have promised
the great white man at Zomba that you would never send armed men past the bottom of
the hills. For that you have been left in peace and have never paid taxes to the
Government. But in the last moon, what did you do? You come with an impi to the low
country. You burned and destroyed Anyanja villages. You attacked the men of God at
the mission and have caught and murdered their people. More than that, you have said
that soon you would take your impis and carry war across the Shire. For all these things
that you have done, I am now going to take you where you will have to give an answer
for these crimes.58
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Figure 2.1: A group of Ngoni soldiers, late 19th century. Source: Colonial Office, Photographic
Collection.
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Figure 2.2: Chikuse (Chikusi), the Ngoni Chief. Source: Colonial Office, Photographic
Collection.
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Figure 2.3: Group of Ngoni Chiefs, late 19th century. Source: Colonial Office, Photographic
Collection.

The brutal attacks on sovereign African ethnic groups and their peoples were in contravention of
what had been agreed at the Berlin Conference of 1884-85 but was however not policed effectively
by the European powers. Article Six of Chapter One of the Berlin Act clearly stated that there had
to be diplomatic means whereby Africans (ethnic groups) were to enjoy their sovereignty and
continue with their religious and cultural practices. The article read as follows:
All the powers exercising sovereign rights or influence in the aforesaid territories bind
themselves to watch over the preservation of the native tribes, and to care for the
improvement of the conditions of their moral and material well-being, and to help in
suppressing of slavery, and especially the Slave Trade. They shall, without distinction
of creed or nation, protect and favor all religious, scientific, or charitable institutions,
49

and undertakings created and organized for the above ends, or which aim at instructing
the natives and bringing home to them the blessings of civilization.
Christian missionaries, scientists, and explorers, with their followers, property, and
collections, shall likewise be the objects of special protection.
Freedom of conscience and religious toleration are expressly guaranteed to the natives,
no less than to subjects and foreigners. The free and public exercise of all forms of
Divine worship, and the right to build edifices for religious purposes, and to organize
religious Missions belonging to all creeds, shall not be limited or fettered in any way
whatsoever.59

Following the early setbacks, colonial state authorities began to look for African collaborators,
who were essential towards the establishment of hegemony. For instance, to subdue Chief
Makanjira in 1893, the authorities relied on the support of newly established “alliances” with Chief
Jumbe (of Kota Kota) and his sub-chief, Chiwaura. In the Northern Province the state used the
help of the Angonde peoples to subdue the Swahili-Arab slave trader, Mlozi, who was captured in
1895, while hiding in an underground cellar where he had taken refuge. He was later tried for
murder, convicted, sentenced to death, and hanged.60 The “collaborating” African groups were for
various reasons in need of British protection and alliance. Many of them had long suffered under
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the slave trade perpetrated by the Yao and Swahili-Arabs. For instance, the Makololo and
Man’ganja peoples of the Lower Shire, appealed for British protection against the Portuguese,
whom they did not deem to be “good colonizers” following the brutality experienced by Africans
in neighboring Mozambique. Such groups signed treaties acknowledging the cession of all
sovereign rights and for the acceptance of such laws and regulations as might from time-to-time
be “imposed” by the Queen’s representative.61 Some of the support for the colonial state also came
from outside the Protectorate. For instance, Sir Harry Johnston convinced the Foreign Office and
Lord Salisbury (British Prime Minister) to send gunboats to the Nyasaland Protectorate. The War
Office was also persuaded to send guns, shells, rifles and bullets, uniforms, tents and other military
equipment. The India Office was also persuaded to send more Sikhs to serve as police officers and
to second Indian army officers to the Nyasaland Protectorate. There was also some money which
came as an annual subsidy from Cecil John Rhodes’s British South Africa Company (BSAC),
amounting to £10,000 per annum, which was used to set up a local police force.62
The story of the Makololo peoples, originally from Portuguese East Africa, as narrated by Sir
Harry Johnston, is interesting and compelling to tell. Before they became allies of the colonial
state, they were one of the most troublesome ethnic groups to work with. For instance, in the mid1880s, having previously been more accommodating and welcoming to the British, including
providing porters to serve the British explorer, Dr. David Livingstone, the Makololo peoples under
two prominent chiefs, namely Chief Ramakukane and Chief Chipatula, found themselves at
loggerheads with early British settlers. Both chiefs had worked and accompanied Dr. David
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Livingstone but having settled in the Lower Shire area and established their own chieftaincies,
they also began to establish themselves as slave traders and ivory traders, a development which
often led them into competition with black Portuguese slave traders (half-caste Portuguese slave
traders). Initially, the British missionaries, early explorers, and officials of the African Lakes
Corporation (ALC) collaborated with these chiefs, especially because of their strategic position to
the trade in ivory.
However, things turned sour in 1884, when a Mr. George Fenwick, a former employee of the
Church of Scotland Mission at Blantyre went to Chief Chipatula’s headquarters to settle some
accounts on the ivory trade with the chief. During their discussion, the two gentlemen disagreed
over some details, leading to a verbal war between the two. Mr. Fenwick then took out his rifle
and shot the chief dead. When followers of the Chief learned about the shooting, they began to run
after Mr. Fenwick. Fearing for his own life, Fenwick rushed out of the chief’s hut and ran towards
the shores of the Shire River and shouted at the natives “Your chief is dead, I am your chief now.”
Fenwick successfully crossed the river and ended up seeking refuge at Malo Island. However,
Chief Chipatula’s followers followed him there, and caught up with him after three days of hiding.
Mr. Fenwick was at last overcome and killed, and his head was cut off. From then onwards, most
of the Makololo chiefs became inimical to the European settlers (both British and Portuguese). For
instance, the natives shot and sunk the little steamer, Lady Nyasa; and they also sent an insolent
message to Blantyre (headquarters of the Church of Scotland Mission), demanding that Mrs.
Fenwick, the wife of the murdered adventurer, should be delivered over to them, together with an
enormous sum as compensation for the death of Chief Chipatula. It took the intervention of Consul
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Foot and Chief Ramakukane to negotiate with Chief Chipatula’s followers, to restore peace in the
Lower Shire area.63
The period from 1895 to the close of the nineteenth century was characterized by less confrontation
between the colonizer and the colonized. Roger Tangri argued that for the Africans, they came to
realize that their resistance had been a vain and futile attempt. What they attained were mere
lessons for the future, for instance, that to challenge British authority or even to try to regain their
independence, they had to use non-violent means. Their armed resistance had proved to be
ineffective and had exposed the great technological inferiority of African societies. Furthermore,
for the resisting groups, the experience of defeat still lingered in their memories for years to come,
especially due to the loss of sovereignty and land.64 During that first decade, the colonial state
impinged only slightly on the lives of most natives in the Protectorate. This then partly explains
why, unlike elsewhere in British colonial Africa, Nyasaland did not experience further large-scale
“traditionalist types of resistance,”65 except for a few riots. In the Nyasaland Protectorate, the
pressures from the administration and the European settlers were less intensive. Furthermore,
outside of the Shire Highlands, European settlement was also of little consequence, which meant
that the colonial government, constrained by limitations of men and money, also exercised very
limited or no authority. A case in point was that of the Northern Angoniland under Chief M’belwa,
which remained independent until 1904. In the Shire Highlands itself, there were concerns raised
by the Africans, especially on the policies of land alienation and labor recruitment and the illtreatment of laborers, encouraged by the European settlers’ intrusion in the area. Some discontent
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was also raised in Central Angoniland, an area which was targeted for labor recruitment by the
colonial authorities, leading to minor altercations between 1898 and 1901, when the colonial state
forced men to work for the settlers to raise money for payment of taxes.66 However, most of these
disturbances were small and insignificant.
The early 20th century and the rise of post-pacification resistance

For Nyasaland, the twentieth century began as the previous one had ended, characterized by
disturbances, although most of them were small and insignificant. One significant disturbance
occurred at the end of 1902, though. This was a case connected to the departure of troops from
Nyasaland to British-ruled Somaliland, for defeating an African uprising championed by a
secessionist leader known as the Mad Mullah (real name Muhammad Abduallah Hassan). 67 The
Central African Times presented the proceedings of the disturbances as follows:
The facts are briefly as these. The troops have been expecting for some time to be called
away to Somaliland, and some months ago (in September) a small detachment went
forward. Owing to the bad turn which affairs have taken recently, a cable was received
by the Armed Forces ordering the remainder of the Second Battalion of the Kings
African Rifles and part of the First Battalion to proceed to Somaliland at once. This
order, we say, was expected. The time for movement was short, and hence haste was
required. Instead, however, of using legal and common-sense methods, the troops were
hurried off, and a system of press gang and terrorism used to raise many of the carriers.
Instead of applying to the large firms in the country, the transport firms, and the planters,
who have control of large bodies of labourers and who could as we know from
statements made at the Chamber of Agriculture and Commerce meeting, have supplied
easily the whole number of carriers, the Collector of Blantyre district was told to get the
carriers. Local police and soldiers (all called ‘Askari’) were used to seize everyone at
hand. The result was that on Monday night pandemonium reigned at Blantyre, and the
state of excitement into which the native population was thrown is only comparable to
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the old days when slave raiding and inter-tribal wars were the order of the day. This was
not confined to Blantyre, but all along the Zomba road and the Katunga road, carriers
were molested, and it is alleged women were assaulted and that several have been
carried off.” 68

One key witness to these proceedings was a British settler known as Mr. Hetherwick, who
compared the brutality by the Askari to the Armenian atrocity (by Turkish forces).69 His remarks
were as follows:
On Sunday night the local lines of workers belonging to private firms were visited by
the Chief Constable and the Sub-Collector, and boys press-ganged all over the place.
Most of the local natives fled in terror to the hills round about, and work all over the
place was disorganized. These are sober facts of the case in general terms, what they
mean anyone who is acquainted with native Askari needs not be told. They mean theft,
they mean personal violence, they mean rape, and in extreme cases murder, though
happily we have not heard any of any such cases yet. Carriers on the road were not
protected by the loads as being evidence of deployment … These troops … justified
every adverse criticism which has been passed upon them, by such conduct, and have
forfeited the sympathy of the whole community.70

Had the colonial government authorities simply asked the affected communities to provide the
needed carriers without coercion, the communities would probably have willingly provided the
sought-after carriers. The paper’s editor made these remarks:
People are asking themselves if they are in a British country. The word ‘Protectorate’
(of natives observe) is a misnomer. The utter incapacity of the military to move troops,
is appalling, and remember that is not the first-time similar disturbances, but on a less
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aggravated scale, have occurred. The greatest condemnation of the authorities is that
there is not the slightest shadow of excuse for this conduct, as enough carriers, ready
provisioned, were available at short notice. The community would have been only too
willing to give every available boy to carry loads to help the Empire in its need, had
they been asked, but if the Empire is to be assisted by traversing every tradition of justice
and fair dealing, then people will be tempted to use the historic phrase ‘perish the
Empire’. That a reign of terror such as this should be possible in a civilized country like
British Central Africa is incredible and Europeans could not at first believe the evidence
of their senses.71

The newspaper also reported that the Chamber of Agriculture and Commerce had complained to
the colonial government about the gravity of the ill-treatment of the natives. More importantly, for
the settlers, they complained that the labor recruitment and/or diversion had been done at a critical
time of the year, when the settlers also needed the same manpower to work in the estates of the
Shire Highlands. The settlers also recommended that the European and local Askari involved in
trespassing in settler estates without warrants should be held responsible and possibly punished
with dismissal from the service, and, lastly, that an inquiry should be instituted to scrutinize the
conduct of the Askari in question.72
In terms of statistics and logistics, Major F.B. Pearce, Acting Commissioner for Nyasaland in
1903, highlighted that the first Somaliland expedition from British Central Africa (BCA) started
off in June 1902. That contingent comprised of sixty Sikhs, under the command of Captain
Withers. At the end of July 1902, another contingent was also dispatched, this time under the
command of Major Plunkett, consisting of five British Officers, two Sikhs, one warrant officer,
and 300 native rank and file. The third contingent left at the end of October 1902, under Captain
Olivey, and it consisted of seven British Officers, three Sikhs, and 300 rank and file, with one
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Maxim gun. In the same month, another contingent of the First Battalion of the Kings African
Rifles consisting of eight British Officers, three Sikhs, and 350 native troops also left for
Somaliland.73
It must be highlighted that this was not the first time for the colonial state to utilize the local Askari
in overseas engagements. In July 1899, Colonel G.E. Doyle, from the Army and Navy Club, raised
his concerns through the editor of The London Times, discussing the role to be played by native
battalions across the Empire. Colonel Doyle’s remarks were as follows:
Sir, the new system of employing in British dependencies foreign mercenary troops –
that is, troops other than the Queen’s natural born subjects – which has already been
much deliberated upon in Parliament in the case of the Chinese regiment, has just
received another illustration in the departure, announced in the newspapers last week,
of a battalion of Central Africa rifles from East Africa to reinforce the garrison of
Mauritius. The object of sending these corps thither appears to be not very clear, since
there is already in the Island a force, comprising one British and one Indian regiment,
besides artillery and engineers, far more than sufficient to repress any local disturbance,
unlikely in such an event that could possibly occur, and the only real danger to which
Mauritius can be exposed is that, in case of a great maritime war, an attempt might be
to capture it a coup de grace. Without disparagement of the Central African regiment,
which will no doubt be brought to a high pitch of discipline and efficiency by the picked
officers, the question may be raised whether such corps would be found of much use in
coping with such an emergency. Indeed, not to garrison Mauritius with the best of troops
seems almost to trifle with the possession of an Island which is of the utmost importance
as a cooling station on the long sea route to India.74

Lieutenant-Colonel W.H. Manning, Commander of the Armed Forces of British Central Africa
Rifles also corroborated what was discussed by Colonel Doyle, by stating that the troops in
question were taken from the Second Battalion of the Central Africa Regiment and were
dispatched to Mauritius in July 1899. The Battalion consisted of Yaos and Atonga, with a few
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Anguru (Alomwe). After their success in Mauritius they were transferred to the Somaliland
Protectorate.75
In May 1900, another expedition comprising of four British Officers, seventy-three Sikhs and 267
Nyasaland native troops from the Central Africa Regiment was sent for service to West Africa to
assist the Ashanti Field Force (in Ashanti and Kumasi, where they spent seven months). The
expeditionary force also comprised of a maxim gun, a medical officer, hospital assistant, and a
complement of camp followers, together with 775 carriers from BCA.76 Upon returning from West
Africa, the casualty figures were as follows:
Table 2.1: Casualties: Ashanti Field Force
British
Officers

Sikhs

1st Battalion Central
African Regiment

Total

Killed
Wounded
From other causes
(a) Disease
(b) Invalided
(c) Invalided to India
(d) Discharged as unfit

…
2

2
20

1
20

3
42

…
1
…
…

2
…
12
…

7
…
…
3

1
12
3

Total

3

36

31
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Source: Diplomatic and Consular Reports, Report for the year ending March 31st, 1901, on the
Trade and General Condition of the British Central Africa Protectorate (London: HMSO, October
1901), 16-17.
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Following the demands and pressure from the Chamber of Agriculture and Commerce, in early
November 1902, a Court of Inquiry (in the High Court) was instituted to investigate the events of
October 1902. The High Court had itself just been created that same year under the British Central
Africa Order-in-Council of 1902, which gave the court full jurisdiction over civil and criminal
cases, over all persons and all matters in the Protectorate. The inquiry team was made up of the
following individuals: Judge J.J. Nunan, who served as Chair of the Committee, and he was also
Vice Consul of the Protectorate; Captain Percival, who represented the Armed Forces; Mr.
Moggridge, who represented the Blanytre Police; and Mr. Griffin, who served as a Crown
Prosecutor.
Procedures were put in place in a way that the court arranged to interrogate European eyewitnesses
before African witnesses were brought in. A subpoena was also issued by Judge Nunan to have
the chair of the Chamber of Agriculture and Commerce, Mr. Walker, to give evidence in the court
proceedings. Other businessmen were also called to give evidence, such as a Mr. Blessby, who
was called and examined at length about the loss sustained by men in his employment and as to
the disorganization of his business. Most of the evidence presented in court was chilling, and some
of the accounts will be highlighted in this chapter. One notable witness, a Mr. Martin Haarseth,
gave his side of the story as follows:
The witness said that on the night in question (Sunday, October 26th, 1902), he had
occasion to inspect a brick kiln which he was burning, ongoing to the place he found
only three or four boys and not twelve. He sent one of the boys to call the others, but he
did not return, ultimately, he went himself to the native location and found there only
one little boy, of whom he asked the whereabouts of the other people, the boy did not
give an intelligible answer further than that the people had gone ‘uko’ (over there). On
his way back he encountered two gentlemen, they were Mr. Smyly and Mr. Wilson.
These gentlemen asked him if he had any boys to give as carriers, but he had none left.
He did not know what the matter was. He saw the boy Daniel amongst the boys who
were being escorted. He also saw his cook and the store boy. He remonstrated with the
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two gentlemen who oversaw the party for having taken these boys. The boys were
released on his complaint.77

Another key witness was a Mr. Hynde, and his testimony was as follows: “The next witness heard
of the matter on Sunday night about 8 o’clock when several carriers were found hiding in the bush
near his house at Michiru. About ten p.m. a boy named David came up to complain to him that he
had been seized by the Askari and his clothes and blankets stolen. The boy was practically naked
and was suffering from two severe abrasions on his knees. Next morning the boy was sent to the
Collector along with a companion who had suffered in a similar manner.”78
A Mr. Lindsay also presented some chilling details to the inquiry:

He said he was inside the house at the time but he overhead what passed. There was a
good deal of noise. He was on the point of going out to interfere as he believed the
soldiers were on the point of assaulting Mr. Drever (a settler). When the officer to whom
Mr. Drever complained passed, witness was away. Asked if he saw anything else,
witness replied that he saw several things. He was on the verandah when a woman
passed carrying what appeared to be a heavy box of ammunition on her head. This
woman was also carrying a little child on her back. When she came next to where he
was standing the woman fell with the load, and an Askari struck her when she was on
the ground with the butt end of his rifle, only a few inches from the baby’s head. The
woman was then raised up by two Askari and the load again put on her head and they
went away. Witness further mentioned that the natives had great reason to be afraid of
the police all over the country. The police, in his words, assaulted and raped women,
which explained why most women run from their villages when the police came.79

“The Askari Troubles: Official Inquiry,” The Central African Times, November 8th, 1902. Note that before the
establishment of the High Court in 1902, the delivery of justice had been unsystematic and often haphazard. The
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Development of Native Administration in Nyasaland, 1888-1939.” (Master’s Thesis, Department of Political Science,
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An Anguru (Lomwe) woman called Salima also gave her testimony to the Inquiry. She said she
remembered when the Askari came to Che Nsomba’s village. She was sleeping alone in her hut at
the time. The Askari entered her hut and violated her. Asked if any one asked her permission, she
said no. Only one Askari assaulted her, and she was not offered money. She said she tried to resist,
but the Askari beat her. He struck her with his hands on the face and head. He wore a red cap.80
Another woman, named Tuwenao from Mpemba in Blantyre, said she met many soldiers on the
Katunga road. She was in the company of her husband (named Pete) and her husband’s brother
(named Majowe). It was at the foot of Ntonda Hill. Four of the Askari had, she stated, assaulted
her. They were together with a lot of Askari. The witness was carrying nsima (porridge) and
chimanga (maize), and the Askari took these items from her. The soldiers seized her, and when
her husband and his brother interfered, they were beaten by the soldiers, and ran away. She was
held by the soldiers and violated. Four soldiers assaulted her. She saw someone in a machila
(stretcher) but did not know who it was. She also saw three white men pass before the assault
occurred. There was no white man or Indian with the soldiers when she was assaulted.81
In summing up the evidence, Judge Nunan stated that having heard all the evidence presented
before him, he was convinced that the matter was a serious one. He however argued that while it
was possible to charge the police for the atrocities, the army should not be blamed for the
disturbances as reported by the key witnesses. He argued that it was within the army’s jurisdiction
to look for porters when there was a war within the British Empire with the support of the War
Office. While feeling sorry that gardens belonging to some European settlers had been vandalized
and plundered by the askari, the judge ordered that they should be given some form of
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compensation. On the rape allegations, the judge adopted “a blame the victim approach” when he
ruled that there was lack of medical evidence, including “laughing the cases out of court” due to
lack of permissible evidence. He also laughed off allegations that the Askari could rape the women
in the presence of other people and called it “an insult to intelligence”. Judge Nunan also
questioned the morality of some of the local women, especially Yao women, who he deemed to
be unfaithful to their spouses. Of all the policemen accused in these cases, only five were deemed
to have cases to answer due to permissible evidence on the rape charges of women and young
girls.82
One can thus clearly see that the delivery of justice at that stage was a “racial-determined” process,
in which the Africans, supposedly belonging to an “inferior race,” no matter how clear-cut and
water tight his/her cases might have been, it was often impossible for them to implicate the
colonizer, of an “upper class,” and his allies (the African and European askari), who were always
given the benefit of doubt by the justice system. The judgment also reflected that the judicial
system was part and parcel of a wider system of the domination and subjugation of the Africans
by the colonizers and provided a justification of the violence which was meted out on the Africans.
Furthermore, the judgment also sent a clear message that the colonial state was not going to tolerate
African resistance, in this case, focusing on the resistance to provide labor for state activities.83 In
the process, as argued by Martin J. Weiner, the racial-influenced administration of justice also
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represented one of the contradictions of British colonial rule. This was so because it often
undermined the notions of the “civilizing mission,” as the colonial project depended upon the
subordination of the colonized peoples for the benefit of the small ruling British elite. It also
undermined efforts to apply English law across the empire, with its insistence on the equality of
individuals under the law, and that all could claim protection under the same. Instead of receiving
protection from the law, the colonized were often taken to court rooms, which often served as
“arenas” of their subjugation.84
Furthermore, to divert the attention of the case from focusing on the plight of the victims, Judge
Nunan summoned the proprietor of The Central African Times (Mr. Robert S. Hynde) and the
newspaper’s editor and publisher (Mr. Harold A.S. Rutherford), to appear before the High Court
in Blantyre. They were charged with being in contempt of court for statements made on 8 th and
15th November 1902: firstly, that the said weekly newspaper willfully and maliciously
misrepresented the evidence presented in the High Court, concerning the charges brought against
the army and the police of BCA; secondly, they were also accused of deliberately, willfully,
falsely, and maliciously suppressing important portions of the evidence and proceedings in the
inquiry; and lastly, that they willfully, falsely, and maliciously published an article in the
newspaper, which had falsely quoted the Judge (Judge Nunan) as having stated that a “Reign of
Terror” had been produced by the conscription of carriers, which was contrary to the evidence the
court had gathered.
Responding to the accusations, Mr. Hynde denied all the charges. He stated that it was impossible
for the newspaper to publish the report of the inquiry verbatim, and hence the need for the reporters
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to summarize some of the evidence presented in the court. In mitigation, he also mentioned that
the newspaper had been unable to get a good shorthand writer, as the regular reporter had been
absent for some time. As such, the current reporter was only hinting on some important pieces of
evidence presented. Mr. Hynde also committed his newspaper to publish a statement in full of the
omitted items in the next issue. He also stressed that there was no deliberate malice on the
omissions and that no evidence was tampered with. Taking his turn, Mr. Rutherford argued that it
was impossible to publish a full report because of the limitations of space and time. About the
charge of willfully and maliciously omitting certain portions of the evidence, this was assuredly
not the case. He stated that there was no malice in any article, paragraph, or report, which had
appeared in the paper.
However, the judge insisted that the two gentlemen were in the wrong, stating that the newspaper
articles had been carefully doctored. He thus proceeded to pass the sentence, and fined both
gentlemen the sum of £10 each. Mr. Hynde was ordered to find surety of £250 for his good
behavior, and Mr. Rutherford to find surety of £100 for good behavior. The judge also demanded
that an apology in a prescribed form, which the judge read in court, be inserted in the next issue of
the newspaper, and that failing to comply with these orders would lead to their imprisonment. The
prescribed apology read as follows:
My Lord, we, Harold A.S. Rutherford, editor and publisher, and Robert Spence Hynde,
proprietor of The Central African Times, desire to express our sincere regrets that the
report of the inquiry of the High Court into the recent Askari troubles, published in The
Central African Times of 8th and 15th November 1902, respectively, which of necessity
had to be curtailed owing to limitations of space and time, omitted to publish some
portions of the evidence which, in the opinion of the High Court, were essential to the
case, and we tender our apologies.
(sgd) Harold A.S. Rutherford. (sgd) R.S. Hynde.85
“The Recent Disturbances: Official Inquiry before Judge Nunan,” The Central African Times, November 22nd, 1902.
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As already alluded to, the Somaliland expedition ended up being costly to the British imperial
government, both in terms of human and material resources. The war itself ended in 1904, when
the empire’s forces were able to defeat the Mad Mullah. The First Brigade was led by LieutenantColonel Manning; the Second Brigade was under Lieutenant-Colonel Fasken; and another
contingent was under Major Kenna – making a total strength of 2,200 regulars. These troops
surrounded the enemy forces and inflicted the biggest defeat for the Mad Mullah, who himself
escaped to a distance where he was unable to make further resistance. 300 of the Mad Mullah’s
troops were killed by Sikh soldiers; while Major Kenna’s regiment is said to have killed about 600
of the fleeing followers of the Mullah. The imperial troops also managed to imprison about 215
followers of the Mad Mullah. In total, the number of enemies killed was estimated to have
exceeded 1,200.86 Nyasaland itself paid a heavy price in terms of the total number of casualties
suffered. Combined figures from the First and Second Battalions were as follows: British Officers
killed totaled 13; while Nyasaland soldiers killed in the fighting totaled 208. Special mention was
made of the action at a place called Gamburru, where in one day, seven British Officers and 118
African soldiers from Nyasaland (of the Second Battalion of the Kings African Rifles) were killed
in action, besides the killing of over 50 Sikh soldiers and many others.87
In 1907, another notable form of “traditional resistance” to colonial rule occurred in response to
the imposition of the hut tax and the demands it put on native labor resources. In April of that year,
a Chikunda prophetess, known as Chanjiri appeared on the southern Nyasaland and Portuguese
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East Africa (now Mozambique) border and preached that the Europeans would leave the country
by the end of the year and that no more hut taxes needed to be paid to the colonial government.
The appearance of Chanjiri also coincided with the explosion of a meteor in the same area, and the
prophetess claimed to have miraculous powers, and to have appeared or been sent from heaven.
Although her teachings spread across the Protectorate and indeed began to command a large
following, the colonial government authorities did not immediately take her seriously until they
discovered that the local tax returns showed a total shortage of £3,000. The official concern also
increased when it was learned that the Prophetess had also gained followers amongst several Yao
chiefs, who refused to collect taxes on behalf of the state. Many Africans also visited her with
tribute, and returned with promises of abundant harvests, and stories pointing to the downfall of
the dominant race (i.e. the European colonists). The Nyasaland government then “tactfully dealt
with that passive resistance” by sending its spies and asked the Portuguese authorities to remove
the woman from the vicinity of the British frontier and the prophetess was also warned about her
future conduct.88
The Threat from Religious Zealots
By the early twentieth century, the British colonists in Nyasaland and beyond also expressed
concerns about the ‘threat’ posed by two religious movements present in the protectorate, known
as ‘Mohammedanism’ (associated with Islam) and The Ethiopian Movement (associated with
Christianity). The Central African Times carried several articles to warn both the colonial
authorities and the missionaries about the threat posed by these movements.
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The ‘Mohammedan Movement’89 (named after followers of Prophet Mohammad) was an Islamic
missionary movement which by then was sweeping across most of sub-Saharan Africa. The
movement itself had its origins in 1837, when an Algerian jurisconsult, named Sidi Mohammed
ibn Ali as Sanusi, established a religious society with the object of reforming Islam in North Africa,
and purifying it of the practices that were still being observed by some of the ethnic groups. Sanusi
was able to establish a theocratic state without the shedding of a single drop of blood, and on his
death in 1859, he left a brotherhood of enthusiasts to continue the work to which he had devoted
his life. The worry for most of the colonial states, including that of Nyasaland, in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries was with the rapid spread of the movement and Islam in general, especially
as it had followers in areas where Christian missionaries had penetrated. The followers of Sanusi
were building schools and prayer houses to train African youth in the teachings of Sanusi and to
turn them away from Western civilization.90
Due to these threats, the European settler community in Nyasaland raised the alarm bells, by,
among other things, calling on the Nyasaland government to work together with the Christian
missionaries to block the spread of Islam. The settlers highlighted that Islam was a foreign religion
and that it had strong associations with the slave trade. One notable commentary in the Central
African Times read as follows:
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No one, we think, would criticize the Government of this country if they
discountenanced the religion of Islam, which has done so much harm to the people of
Africa. When we see, however, that the Government precludes Christian proselytizing
in Mohammedan centers without first referring the matter to the people of the villages,
it seems a strange anomaly. So far as we are aware, there is nothing to hinder
Mohammedans about so-called Christian villages or centers of Christian influence, and
carrying on their propaganda, but the Christian missionaries are required to obtain
permission before invading Mohammedan centers. This position merely requires to be
stated to show its absurdity. When this country was taken over by Great Britain it was
hoped that there would be the greatest scope given to the Christian missions, and in fact
it was partly because of the missions that the country was taken over in the first
instance.91

The newspaper commentary went on to state that Christianity should not have to compete with
Islam and ‘Mohammedanism’ in the country. It stated that Christianity should be estimated and
regarded as a “moral policeman,” and that if the people in the country adopted Christianity as their
religion, the gains would be immense, especially because the religion would assist the natives to
be more law-abiding, and that if the natives were to identify with the religion of their rulers, it
could help prevent native insurrections. The threat from ‘Mohammedanism’ was that as a radical
movement, it had the potential to inspire the formation of social and democratic brotherhoods, and
give power to various tribes, whose combined force would be detrimental to the survival of the
colonial state – especially if some new “Madhis” were produced in the protectorate.92

“Commentary,” The Central African Times, July 8th, 1905.
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Another British settler, by the name J.J. Reynard, also raised these issues, in an open letter
addressed to the colonial authorities. He warned that the Islamic faith had been gaining adherents
throughout the Nyasa-Tanganyika region through the work of Swahili slave traders. He highlighted
that although the slave trade had been significantly suppressed by European colonial rule in Central
Africa, it still left behind a legacy of Islamic ‘fundamentalism’ which could challenge the spread
of Christianity and the stability of the colonial state. Part of his letter, which summed up the general
feeling of the European settlers in the Protectorate, read as follows: “the regeneration of Africa
will be accomplished by the official, missionary, and trader, who are inculcating by precept and
example the blessings of civilization that we have acquired after centuries of Christian teaching.
The Crescent will always have its followers, but the Cross will remain supreme wherever the
Caucasian predominates.”93
It also became clear that the colonial authorities were getting increasingly concerned about the
threat posed by the spread of Islam and this was highlighted in the Colonial Annual Report for
Nyasaland for 1906-07: “A “bastard” form of “Mohammedanism” is likewise pervading the
masses. This growth has been very remarkable within the last few years; and in most villages in
the Shire Highlands will be found a small hut, which is used as a mosque, and the monotonous
tones of the worshippers reading from the Koran is not an infrequent feature of village life in the
southern portion of the protectorate. At present the native has a most cloudy and indefinite idea of
the religion which he thus attempts to follow, but there is no doubt that “Mohammedanism” has
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found a permanent home in the country and will in the future compete with Christianity for
supremacy amongst the aboriginal population”.94
Lord Lugard, a former colonial official in Nyasaland, also hinted at the threat posed by the spread
of Islam including in British-controlled Nyasaland. He noted that the Islamic religion or Muslim
rule, which targeted the enforcement of the social regulations of the Quran, had made inroads in
tropical Africa for several reasons. For instance, unlike the European centered Christian teachings,
Islam incorporated African systems of government, modes of dress, and social observance (social
ceremonies), such that it was often hard to distinguish between a peasant or laborer who called
themselves a ‘Mohammedan’ from those who were still regarded as pagans. The main worry for
the colonial officials was that in their perception, Islam was a more militant religion, which taught
contempt for those not its votaries, and that it took advantage of the perceived weaknesses of the
African character to convert Africans to the religion. Furthermore, the other worry was that
Africans had been through centuries of lawless strife, making the African, a worshipper of force,
something which Islam also encouraged. For instance, the connection between Islam and
concubines, and the looting of villages were all associated with the spread of the religion. Africans
were also attracted to Islam because the religion sanctioned polygamy, a practice which was
“natural” to many African tribes. Islam also approved the institution of domestic slavery, hence
holding its leaders responsible for the continuation of slave trade in the continent. Islam’s great
strength was because it combined a social code with simple religious forms, most of which were
interwoven with the daily lives of its followers. The contrast then was that Islam seemed to be a
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religion most suited as a religion of the tropics, while on the other hand, Christianity was perceived
as a religion of the temperate climatic zones.95
Also writing on the threat posed by the “Mohammedan movement,” Robert Greenstein hinted that
there was a growing concern among the missionary and settler communities of the Nyasaland
population during the first quarter of the twentieth-century. These two groups were mainly worried
because it seemed as if the colonial government was not doing enough to protect their interests,
from the perspective that the government felt that their complaints were merely compounded by
religious and economic concerns, rather than being a political threat to the colonial state.
Greenstein posited that for many Nyasa subjects, Islam was an attractive option primarily because
it was a religion that offered a quick route to the social status achieved by nominal adherence to a
religious organization distinct from traditional faith. Africans in Nyasaland had become
particularly suspicious of the Europeans and resented the long process required for one to be fully
accepted as a Christian. For many, conversion to Islam merely meant the acceptance of
circumcision, the imitation of a few rituals and prayers, and the observance of the Ramadan fast.
Amongst the Yao peoples, Islam also spread faster and easily because of similarities that existed
in initiation ceremonies between the Islamic initiation and circumcision called Jando and the Yao’s
own version called Lupanda. There was also a materialistic aspect (or profit-oriented aspect)
connected with the natives’ conversion to Islam, especially for those who were converted and
given the responsibilities of becoming Islamic teachers (waalimu). The teachers were charging
their students a sum of five shillings, to teach them to read and write in Arabic. That amount was
almost double the amount one needed to pay the hut tax. As such, more African men were
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encouraged to enter the Islamic schools, to be trained as waalimu, which was a money-making
venture for them.96 As was the case with other colonial era relations, by the time of the First World
War, especially in the aftermath of the Chilembwe uprising of 1915 (see chapter three), the
government had come to a point of trusting the Muslim communities. By 1916, Governor Smith
had even suggested and appealed, without success, to the Colonial Office, for the Muslims in the
protectorate to be granted more autonomy in their religious and educational affairs. The suggestion
was rejected at Colonial Office because of fears that the suggestion, if adopted, would have
angered the Christian missionaries in the protectorate. However, the Nyasaland government
persisted by trying to be ‘impartial’ in its dealings with the Muslim communities from then
onwards, a policy direction which allowed for the growth and spread of Islam in the protectorate.97
The Ethiopian Movement, which had a connection to Christianity, had its adherents among
European and African religious leaders, who were propagating the concept of “Africa for
Africans” mainly in sub-Saharan Africa. Most of its followers were religious leaders who had
broken away from the European and American mission stations then operating in colonial Africa.
By the early twentieth century, the movement already had a significant following in South Africa,
Southern Rhodesia, Portuguese East Africa, South West Africa, Uganda, and the Central African
Protectorate (and it would later significantly influence the Chilembwe Uprising of 1915 in
Nyasaland). The movement taught Africans that the Europeans had grabbed their countries from
their rightful owners, which caused resentment about paying hut and poll taxes. It also taught
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Africans to resent the coming of Asians into their territories as this would in the long run deprive
them of access to employment.98
The colonists often exaggerated the threat posed by the movement to suit their needs, and some of
their sentiments could best be summarized as follows:
In Africa, the white man is but a drop in the ocean of humanity. The blacks know this.
They believe that if they rose all over the country they could make short work of the
Europeans. The sacredness of the duty of ridding the country of whites is what the
Ethiopian Movement mainly teaches….If the natives of the colonies – Kaffaria,
Rhodesia, Portuguese East Africa, German South West Africa, Uganda, and the Central
Africa Protectorate – rose, it would not take the white men and the garrisons now in the
country, but the armies of Europe to drive them back….Nominally we have abolished
the witch doctor and the medicine man. It would be more rational for the safety of the
country to lay by the heels of the preachers of the Ethiopian doctrine. That is, if it is not
too late, for the seed has been sown in every kraal from Table Mountain to Central
Africa. The situation is not one to be lightly regarded....”99

George Shepperson and Thomas Price also referred to the threat posed by the Watch Tower
Movement led by Elliot Kamwana, as part of the Ethiopian Movement in the protectorate. Elliot
Kamwana was trained by Joseph Booth,100 whom he met in South Africa in 1907. When Elliot
Kamwana returned to Nyasaland in 1908, he began to draw large crowds, many of whom liked his
simple teachings, especially the less time it took for one to be baptized. Kamwana also challenged
the payment of the hut tax, which had been increased on multiple occasions in the first decade of
the twentieth century, which he also attacked because of its associated demands on native labor.
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Africans were often compelled to abandon their gardens at various times of the year to work in
European settler enterprises, where they could raise funds to pay taxes. Just like Prophetess
Chanjiri, discussed above, Elliot Kamwana preached that a new world order was on its way,
prophesying that in October 1914, Jesus Christ would come, and that all Europeans would have to
leave the country, and that there would be no more oppression from tax-gatherers. In retaliation,
the colonial authorities, with the backing of Christian missionaries, stepped in to silence him. He
was imprisoned, and, in June 1909 he was deported to Mauritius. In 1914, he was allowed to return
to the Protectorate after the danger posed by his prophecy had passed. 101 The deportation of
Kamwana was made in line with the British Central Africa Order-in-Council of 1902, which under
the “Removal and Deportation” section provided for a court and/or custodial sentence to be served
outside of a given protectorate or colony, in cases where the convict(s) posed a serious security
threat if they had not been deported.102
Conclusion
This chapter has established that the process of colonizing the Nyasaland Protectorate and indeed
the establishment of dominance involved brutal tactics employed by the colonists. Uncollaborating chieftaincies (such as that of Makanjira, Chikumbu, Mponda and Chikusi Gomani),
and other merchant communities and individuals had to be subdued by using state resources such
as the army and the police. In other instance, the legal system was also manipulated in favor of the
colonial authorities by applying the “blame the victim approach,” such as in the 1902 cases of
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raping and violation of African women. The use of the law in favor of the Europeans also
undermined the concept of the “civilizing mission,” a theme which will be explored further in
chapter three. The disagreements and/or altercations, it has been argued, often arose when the
colonizer and the colonized were fighting for material resources and political power. Counterinsurgency at this stage was also characterized by the tendency to share information and
cooperation between the state and the settler community at large to fight against the threat posed
by some ‘religious zealots,’ such as the “Mohammedan Movement” (Islamic faith) and the
Ethiopian Movement, leading to the deportation of some religious leaders. The “threats” which
these movements posed were also often exaggerated to suit the needs of the European settlers,
many of who were Presbyterian and Protestant. The next chapter focuses on a critical analysis of
the notion of the principle of the “civilizing mission” in relation to, or parallel with the land, labor
and taxation policies of the colonial state.
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CHAPTER THREE

THE LAND, LABOR, AND TAXATION NEXUS: WHITHER ‘CIVILIZING MISSION’

Many books have been written about colonialism, apartheid, imperialism, the
globalization process, and the forces that have shaped the history of Africa. Some
accounts of African history are purely romantic and fanciful, others racist and
Eurocentric. The concrete reality of the situation is domination and resistance, which
has been the true nexus linking Africa to America and Western Europe. Plunder,
domination, and the conversion of able-bodied men and women into desperate laborers
have characterized Africa’s contact with Western and American civilization. Africa’s
physical resources and its human beings have been prized raw materials for American
and Western European industries and world markets.103

Introduction
This chapter covers the period referred to as the age of “new imperialism,” from the late 19th
century to the beginning of the First World War, to analyze the land, labor, and taxation policies
of the colonial state in Nyasaland. In doing so, it offers an assessment of the “civilizing mission”
as it applied to British colonial expansion and rule. The mission was championed by the so-called
“liberal imperialists” in British society from the late nineteenth century onwards. That pioneer
group included such leaders as Edmund Burke, Henry Maine, and James Mill, whose ideas and
works helped to generate political and moral or ethical justifications of imperial rule. They argued
that imperialism could only be justified if it helped to improve and civilize the colonized
peoples.104 I argue that although that principle arose out of genuine concerns for the welfare of
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Africans in Nyasaland, and other parts of the African continent alike, it was overtaken by events,
or the so-called “local and empire-wide constraints.” In other words, what appeared more
appealing and applicable were the economic motivations that characterized the operations of the
colonial state, and more importantly, the relations between the state on one hand, and Africans and
European settlers on the other hand. For the period under study, the protectorate was under the
stewardship of the following colonial officials: Sir Harry H. Johnston (Consul General and
Commissioner, 1891-1896); Alfred Sharpe (Commissioner, 1896-1907, and later Governor from
1907-1910); William H. Manning (Governor, 1911-1913); and George Smith (Governor, 19131923).105 The rest of the chapter analyzes the policies of the Nyasaland Protectorate government
surrounding the acquisition and allocation of land; the extraction and use of native labor; and the
collection of taxes, where the authorities straddled to meet the interests of the state, the European
settlers, and the African societies. It also covers the reaction of the colonized peoples in the
protectorate, which culminated in the 1915 African uprising led by Rev. John Chilembwe of the
Providence Industrial Mission (PIM).
British Imperialism in Context
As previously discussed in chapter two, the colonization of Nyasaland took place at the end of the
19th century. Studies that have been conducted on the expansion of British imperial influence and
control for the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century have historically been
discussed from two main perspectives, namely; the economic perspective and the humanitarian
perspective, with its emphasis on colonization as a “civilizing mission.” That historical era is often
referred to as the “Age of New Imperialism,” roughly stretching from the early 1880s up to the
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outbreak of the First World War and its immediate aftermath.106 The discussion of the land, labor,
and taxation policies of the colonial state in Nyasaland, in this chapter, will revolve around that
historical period. In the case of Nyasaland (now Malawi), John McCracken suggests that the two
decades following the establishment of colonial rule were the most important for the life span of
the protectorate. During that time, the colonial authorities established their territorial dominance
through force and laid the foundations that shaped the country’s economy for the decades that
followed. It was an era characterized by various forms of state and capitalist penetration and
exploitation through policies and practices of land alienation, revenue collection, and labor
exploitation.107
There were also several imperatives, as discussed by Crawford Young, which the colonial states
in Africa had to fulfill. Among the imperatives, which form part of this analysis, were those of
dominance; revenue; and accumulation. The notion of dominance, as used in this study, which has
been covered in chapter two, entailed that the state had to continuously engage in a struggle to
ensure its supremacy over the colonized. It ensured that no one was above the law, and often used
state resources, including the colonial police, to subdue the Africans. In this chapter, I will
highlight how the enactment of taxation measures and the control of African labor was also part
and parcel of establishing colonial dominance. Then there was the revenue imperative, which also
formed the bedrock of the state. This involved taxing the Africans, where the money was used to
pay for goods and services offered in individual colonies. This often involved the struggle between
the colonial state and its subjects, where the latter were compelled to contribute to the cost of
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running the state. Sometimes the state adopted a predatory role, when it forced people to pay taxes,
processes which often evoked resistance from the Africans. The state was also compelled to find
means and ways of accumulation. This often came in the form of taxation and other economic
activities, such as agricultural and industrial production, from which the funds could form the
economic base of the colonial state. This imperative was achieved when the state aligned itself to
capitalist interests or enterprises in the colonies.108 In his study of British colonial rule in Kenya,
Bruce Berman also hinted on the central role played by the colonial state in the social and economic
livelihoods of the societies it presided over. The state’s involvement often came because of
conscious and deliberate interventions, which increased steadily with the passage of time, and saw
the colonial state play a critical role in the political-economy of colonialism. To a significant
extent, the colonial state also served as a dependent superstructure of capitalist development, as it
became an instrument of violence and exploitation meted on the indigenous peoples, while at the
same time setting up conducive conditions for capitalist accumulation.109 The imperatives of
revenue and accumulation will form a significant chunk of this chapter’s analysis, focusing on the
Nyasaland government’s involvement in land alienation, taxation, and control of African labor.
Studies that adopt “the economic perspective” and its influence on British imperial expansion
include classical works by such scholars as J.A. Hobson (1902) and Thomas Ashcroft (1922),
among others.110 Thomas Ashcroft explained that the period of “New Imperialism” emanated from
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the internal industrial transformation of the Western European countries, which subsequently
stimulated a new period of international relations. The internal contradictions of the capitalist
system (including lower wages, lower supplies of raw materials, rising debts, among others),
created the need for the overseas expansion of the capitalist class. As the capitalist system of
production began, it brought significant profits. But as production began to overflow, it reached a
point when the European masses could no longer provide the much-needed market outlet, as many
of the workers were replaced by machinery and many were paid lower wages, which led to “underconsumption.” There was thus need for the European businesses to find markets outside of Europe.
Such processes also required the “exporters of surplus products” to export human resources, tasked
with taking care of machinery, and/or to lay down transport and communication networks – i.e.
the notion of “carrying civilization” to the ends of the earth. In the overseas destinations, the
pioneer capitalists were also involved in such acts as land alienation, labor exploitation, and natural
resource exploitation (the later to feed into European industrial production). In that case, “modern
capitalism” moved on from being primarily economic-oriented to a phase of interfering in the
political life of the native communities where it spread. The political occupation was meant to
safeguard or provide defense for fresh fields of overseas investing of surplus capital from European
industries. In Ashcroft’s analysis, “imperialism” was a system that was rooted in the exploitation
of the masses, both in the metropole and overseas. Eminent British politicians, such as Benjamin
Disraeli (Conservative Prime Minister, 1874-1880) and Joseph Chamberlain (Colonial Secretary,
1895-1903) encouraged outward imperial expansion as avenues through which to invest surplus
British capital.111
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Building upon these classical studies, there have been studies that have been written by historians
of empire, including the British Empire. P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, adopting a similar approach
to that of Ashcroft, also argued that British overseas expansion during the time can best be
understood by considering how economic and political changes in the metropole affected the
direction and trajectory of the expansion. Such studies explain the dynamics of the metropolitan
economy as being the main determinants of imperial expansion, where its shortfalls were to be met
by establishing overseas colonies. Adopting the political economy approach, they analyzed the
economic developments in Britain and policy preferences of the British leaders and how they
worked alongside the empire-builders, both private and official. The dynamics of the time included
an uncertain and incomplete transition to industry; the threat posed by rival Western powers
towards the acquisition of colonies; and the varying interests adopted by interest groups in the
metropolitan cities, both state and private.112 Similarly, G.N. Sanderson, focusing on European
imperial expansion in Africa as a whole, argued that by the late 19th century, when most European
countries were in an economic recession, the prospect of owning colonies in the interior of Africa
seemed very enticing. It was pounced upon by both politicians and businessmen as a source of raw
materials, markets, and an outlet of surplus capital with which to cure the malaise of the ailing
European industrial economy. The interior of Africa was an El Dorado with vast, fertile, empty
lands “awaiting the magic kiss of European energy, skill and capital.”113
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In the overseas colonies, such economic motives were carried out by various groups of British
citizens (of the so-called “capitalist class”), who had the capital to invest in return for profits. Such
people migrated across the empire in search of economic opportunities, and often found
themselves collaborating with the colonial state in search of opportunities and security. 114 A.G.
Hopkins and P.J. Cain have characterized the economic interests of the capitalist class as
“gentlemanly capitalism”, influenced by the business networks which they created in the
metropole, before they embarked on overseas expansion. This class emerged in British society in
the late 17th century, and initially owned huge chunks of land and held commercial interests in the
urban areas. With time, the city of London emerged as the hub of their business interests and
interactions, where they also adopted elements of progressive and market-oriented ambitions. It
was also in London that they took interest in business ventures in such areas as finance,
manufacturing, distribution, and service provision. By the 18th century, many of them also had
links with leading political figures in Britain. And by the late 19th century and early 20th century,
when Britain embarked on expansion into Africa, the capitalists saw it as an opportunity to invest
their surplus capital, establish new markets, seek raw materials, and provide services in the
overseas colonies. This was thought to provide compensation for the economic downturn they
experienced both in Britain and the Americas. Some even ventured into Africa, the so-called
“periphery,” on mere speculation, receiving backing from some banks and the British government,
considering the economic potential which colonization provided.115 The subsequent sections of
this chapter will illustrate how the relationship between the capitalist class or the “gentlemanly
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capitalists” and the “administrative mind” (the colonial state) often undermined the “civilizing”
aspect of British colonial rule in the Nyasaland Protectorate.
The “civilizing mission” perspective considers European overseas expansion as emanating from a
sense of superiority which the Europeans adopted over other races, in heart and brain, and, above
all in their political and social institutions. Their morality and religion were also regarded as
superior, placing them (Europeans) as “God’s chosen peoples.” They felt duty-bound to subjugate
the rest of the world in order to transfer the blessings of their superior civilization. There was also
the view from the leading imperialists that due to the advanced nature of their “character”, they
were able to achieve commercial and industrial success. In cases where inferior races resisted
European intrusion, they were often coerced until they accepted the law of God and of the
conquerors. In other words, the imperial enthusiasts were willing to overlook any atrocities
associated with British imperial expansion, so long as Britain undertook its duty of serving the
colonized peoples. The colonized peoples were regarded as being “fortunate” to have fallen under
British control.116
Prominent British politicians, including Joseph Chamberlain, were influenced by the “Social
Darwinian” conceptualization of racial superiority. It gave the British the impetus to hold on to
their existing colonial possessions or to create new territories – on the justification that since they
belonged to a superior race, then formal colonization would be used as a “civilizing mission.” Such
views were similar to the “mission civilisatrice” ideology that influenced French imperial
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expansion during the same age.117 Chamberlain had strongly-held beliefs that it was “the manifest
destiny of his country to be a great colonizing and civilizing power.” Britain, in his view, had the
obligation to spread the values of her civilization overseas. In Africa, Chamberlain was of the view
that the British peoples would help to abolish the slave trade, and create room for uplifting the
livelihoods of the indigenous societies – “the duty of the landlord to develop his estate.”118
Chamberlain, among other issues, believed that the superiority of British civilization, justice, law,
religion and Christianity were essential to positively transform “backward peoples” – who were
allegedly still bound by bitter conflict and were living in ignorance and various forms of underdevelopment. Further, where the backward societies refused to be colonized, some form of
brutality and/or trickery was justifiable to bring them under British colonial rule.119
A more recent study by Niall Ferguson makes similar claims about the proponents of empire in
Victorian Britain, both missionaries and capitalists, who looked at African indigenous cultures as
primitive, and that it was the duty of the imperialists to expand their civilization to such
“backward” societies. The “civilization” was meant to include elements of “legitimate commerce”
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and Christianity. The major contradiction with that school of thought, as argued by Ferguson, had
been the “contamination” of the “civilizing mission” with “conquest” and its associated use of
force, exploitation, and political domination designed to bolster Britain’s control of global trade
and politics, which negated the notion of “civilization.”120 In the same vein, Aime Cesaire also
questioned whether the Europeans had a “civilization” at all which they could spread to others.
For Cesaire, the Europeans had failed to solve their own internal economic and social problems,
including how to deal with the challenge of the rise of the proletarian class. They transferred their
problems to the overseas colonies and used elements of trickery and deceit to access and exploit
resources and colonize others. He also argued that it is utterly impossible to equate the process of
colonization with the spread of civilization since all forms of colonization were devoid of human
value. Rather, living under colonial rule meant being subjected to forced labor, punitive taxation
measures, being dehumanized and degraded, denied justice, and losing personal property and
natural resources, especially land.121
When British colonial rule was established in Nyasaland, it was the view of the colonial authorities
that they had colonized uncivilized communities. The Africans were described as organized into
family, “tribal” and village societies that were mostly primitive. It was thus the duty of the already
civilized Britons to destroy the power of the “tribes” (ethnic groups) and guide them towards more
advanced forms of government. The new form of government would help maintain law and order,
by among other things ending the slave trade and inter-ethnic warfare. This would then make the
colonial process a beneficial one to both the colonizer and the colonized.122 It is this school of
thought, i.e. the “civilizing mission” school, that I intend to analyze further in this chapter. In doing
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so, I will argue that although the motives to bring about “civilization” might have driven the British
into Nyasaland, they were soon overtaken by realities on the ground, including the reactions of the
Africans and the availability of land, revenue and labor. These factors are often overlooked in
imperial histories by sensationalist narratives.123
While there have emerged more recent works challenging the notion of the civilizing mission, such
as those by Niall Ferguson and Alice Conklin as cited above, I concur with the work of Anne
Phillips, who argued that British colonial rule in Africa tended to be more of a “makeshift
settlement.” British colonial rule in Africa was significantly ad-hoc and characterized by a lot of
inconsistencies, and probably explains why it could not summarily transform African societies.
This includes their political and socio-economic modes of organization, including the failure to
completely eradicate the peasant mode of production. While the colonial experience had some
positive aspects (as argued by the empire’s apologetics), there were also elements of colonial
exploitation of the African subjects. British colonial rule was implemented and operated through
various constraints, both local and empire-wide, which then affected the way policies were
formulated. This for instance saw the colonial state straddle to create alliances with European
capitalists, and in other instances worked with African chiefs and their communities.124 In the
process, it was often impossible to implement the principles of the “civilizing mission.” I use and
adopt Phillip’s analysis to argue that in Nyasaland, the policies introduced by the colonial state in
the Protectorate were in significant measures influenced by the conditions on the ground, and in
significant measure due to the reactions of the Africans. This often undermined some of the
assumptions which the British colonists had when they embarked into imperial expansion into
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what became the Nyasaland Protectorate. In the long run, those that held the “civilizing mission”
perspective to heart, could not curb the negative excesses associated with British imperial
expansion.
The Colonial State and Land Policy Formulation
The question of acquisition of “native-owned” land and imperial expansion has long historical
roots, which many scholars have traced to European imperial expansion in the Western
Hemisphere. According to Camila Boisen, the Europeans relied on the principle of Terra Nullius
to justify their settlement and land appropriation from Native American communities from the
sixteenth century onwards. The concept of Terra Nullius had its origins in Roman Law and referred
to ‘land belonging to no one or unoccupied or empty land,’ in describing a territory not subject to
sovereignty or ownership by any state. The indigenous peoples were regarded as stateless, and
hence could not exercise property rights. The Europeans argued that what they took had been
“waste” and under-cultivated land and were even prepared to use warfare where there was
resistance by the indigenous peoples. The Europeans also argued that it had been their God-given
right and duty to make the under-used land become productive for their own benefit and indeed
for the indigenous peoples. The indigenous people had failed in their moral duty to flourish by
under-utilizing the natural resources, and hence needed a more advanced society to help them
transit towards prosperity and civilization.125
By the late eighteenth and throughout the nineteenth centuries, when European empires spread
across Asia and Africa, such ideas found their home in the “principle of trusteeship.” Trusteeship
was based on the notion that Europeans had the God-given responsibility and duty to hold land in
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trust for the indigenous peoples, until they had reached a stage of civilization at which they could
earn the right of self-determination. Just like, Terra Nullius, the principle of trusteeship had its
foundations in the moral justification for the appropriation of native land. Both principles were
embedded in the concept of the civilizing mission, which recognized that in the long run the
indigenous people would be given rights to own property, especially land. However, it was the
moral duty of the Europeans to act as guardians of the land when colonization was in place.126 In
British society, “Trusteeship” was imbedded in the ‘humanitarian movement,’ which centered its
early attacks on slavery and all forms of human misery, including that caused by colonial
exploitation and oppression. It consisted of people from all walks of life, including politicians,
academics, explorers, and philanthropists, among others. The politician Edmund Burke, and the
missionary and explorer, David Livingstone, were some of the movement’s early proponents. They
called for the commercial development of the colonies which would in the process help to improve
the welfare of the indigenous peoples.127
The acquisition of land by British settlers in Nyasaland started “innocently” enough. It was the
Christian missionaries who first began to acquire land from the mid-nineteenth century onwards.
The early missionary societies went to Nyasaland following the reports and invitation of the British
explorer and missionary, David Livingstone, who had hoped to replace slavery and the slave trade
in the region with both legitimate commerce and Christianity.128 The missionary societies that
heeded his call, such as the Universities Mission to Central Africa (UMCA) and the Church of
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Scotland, argued that to raise the livelihoods of the Africans in Nyasaland, they needed to have
access to lands of their own, where they could establish mission stations to grow food, conduct
experiments, and work out the commercial viability of the country. Many of them were warmly
welcomed by the local authorities, who agreed to give up some portions of their land in return for
security, prestige, and other material benefits, such as guns, blankets, and clothing. Some local
chiefs, such as Chief Kapeni, granted land to the Blantyre Mission to establish their mission site.
The land in question was a dilapidated African village whose inhabitants had left running away
from attacks by the Ngoni. Similarly, the Tonga people of present-day Nkhata-Bay District,
welcomed the establishment of the Livingstonia Mission at Bandawe, under Robert Laws, in the
hope that the missionaries would help provide security against persistent Ngoni attacks.129
However, a series of “unintended consequences” emerged after the Berlin Conference (18841885), when concession-seekers and settlers began to acquire land on an extensive scale from the
African chiefs. Representatives of European companies such as the African Lakes Company
(ALC) and British South Africa Company (BSAC), and other individual European investors and
prospectors, began to entice African chiefs into signing “treaties” which gave up portions of their
land. Many of the chiefs, who were illiterate, and not allowed to access all the terms of the treaties
they were made to sign, ended up giving away huge portions of their territories, including the rights
to land for settlement, cultivation, and mining. The witnesses of the signing ceremony were other
Europeans and employees of the companies involved. When formal British rule was established
in 1891, many of the chiefs expressed ignorance to the colonial state that they had actually “sold”
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their land to the European capitalists. Many of them had also been duped into believing that some
of the companies had been sent to do business under the authority of the British Government.130
When Harry H. Johnston became the Consul General and later Commissioner, he immediately
realized that some of the European settlers harbored motives to exploit the indigenous people, and
that many of them had dubiously acquired the lands they claimed to legally hold. He noted that
many of them were less interested in uplifting the welfare of the indigenous people. It was out of
that distrust for the European settlers, especially the planters, that in early 1892, the Commissioner
instituted the process of inspecting all portions of land that had been claimed by the European
settlers. The lands fell into two categories: claims to mineral rights and claims to land with or
without mineral rights. During the process of land claims inspection, the commission tasked to do
the job investigated the treaties that were claimed to have been signed by the African chiefs and
the European settlers to determine whether a reasonable amount of compensation had been paid to
the chiefs. And in cases where “insufficient” money had been paid, the European settlers were
often required to pay an extra amount. The claims of land ownership by the European settlers were
often confirmed or backed by either long-term occupation and improvements made on the land
(such as cultivation and construction of buildings). Thereafter, after official confirmation, the
Commissioner would issue a “Certificate of Claim” for the “legally” acquired portion of land. A
“non-disturbance clause” was also inserted in the Certificate to ensure that Africans resident on
the newly purchased lands were not haphazardly evacuated without the consent of the government.
In most cases, the extra payments made by these settlers were as little as three pence for an acre,
being the maximum price, one had to pay, especially in the Shire Highlands area which was
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favored by most of the settlers due to the cooler climatic conditions. In other outlying areas, the
price paid to purchase portions of land was as low as a half penny per acre.131
Johnston embarked on that process, because, from his own words, he did not trust the transactions
of the European settlers. He considered them as crooks who had come to Africa to exploit the
Africans. In his description of the Europeans settlers in the Protectorate, Johnston often argued
that they “comprised of decent young men, most of whom possessed a small capital, and had a
desire to embark on a life which shall combine a profitable investment for their money, with no
great need for elaborate technical education, and an open air life in a wild country with plenty of
good sport, and a few or none of the restraints of civilization.” He went on to argue that many of
them had come to Nyasaland in search of cheap land and cheap labor. And that because of their
exploitative motives, he warned that in no way should they be given powers to govern the
Protectorate.132 In Johnston’s words, he described the European settlers in the Protectorate as
follows:
It sometimes seems to me that the bulk of these sturdy pioneers (excellent though the
results of their work have been in developing the resources of the country) would, if
allowed to govern this land, in their own way, use their power too selfishly in the
interests of the white man. This I find to be the tendency everywhere the governing
white men are not wholly disinterested, are not, that is to say paid to see fair play. From
time to time, a planter rises to object to the natives being allowed to plant coffee, in case
they should come into competition with him, or urges the Administration to use its
power despotically to compel a black man to work for wages whether he will or not.
The ideal of the average European trader and planter in Tropical Africa would be a
country where the black millions toil unremittingly for the benefit of the white man.
They would see that the negroes were well fed and not treated with harshness, but
anything like free will as to whether they went to work or not, or any attempt at
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competing with the white man about education, or skilled labor would not be
tolerated.133

By the end of 1893, the Johnston administration had settled all the land claims and developed a
new land policy which, though of dubious legality, laid down a pattern for the future development
of the Protectorate. Under the new measures, the Commissioner stated that he would produce a
“Certificate of Claim” only if he was satisfied with certain points, the criteria for which were
summarized as follows: (1) Had the seller the right to sell? (2) Was there another claimant? (3)
Was a reasonable price paid? (4) Was the claim a monopoly in the area? (5) Had the seller
understood what he was doing? (6) Were there safeguards for the people living on the land in
question? Andrew Ross argued that out of these guiding questions, question number one to five
were the crux of the matter from the African point of view, especially because in “customary”
(traditional) law and custom, chiefs did not have the right to dispose of land. In addition, it was
doubtful if the concept of selling land was one known to the chiefs involved. Most of the chiefs,
being illiterate, never thought that they were completely selling off the land. Rather they thought
they were simply leasing it to the Europeans – and that the land would be returned to them (the
chiefs) in years to come.134 By the end of the process of verifying the land ownership claims, a
total of 66 Certificates of Claim had been registered, 59 of which had land rights, while seven had
mineral rights, covering an area of 3,705,255 acres out of a total landholding of 25,161,924 acres.
That meant that 15 % of the total land area had been alienated for the European settlers. In the
favored Shire Highlands, the European settlers took the finest arable lands (about 867,000 acres),
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most of which was also densely populated by the indigenous peoples – thereby creating an acute
problem over access to land for cultivation.135
Commissioner Johnston himself also oversaw the signing of dubious treaties with some African
chiefs. He ‘coaxed’ the chiefs to sign treaties that saw them give away their land, offered to pay
taxes, and to place their peoples under the authority of H.M. Government. The treaties in question
appeared in the following format:
Liwonde’s Deed of Cession of Sovereign Rights, November 13, 1891
I, LIWONDE, a Chief on the Upper Shire, do hereby cede to Her Majesty the Queen of
Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, the full sovereign rights of my country.
I agree to the entire abolition of slavery and promise to aid to the best of my ability the
officers of Her Majesty’s Government and of the British Central African Administration
in their endeavours to stop the transit of slaves across my territories, and to capture
persons engaged in the Slave Trade.
I make over without reserve to Her Majesty’s Government, or to those to whom Her
Majesty may depute her rights, the collection of custom duties and revenue from
foreigners, complete jurisdiction over all foreigners, and the right to search and work
all minerals in my country. Further, I agree to pay the British Central African
Administration an annual house tax to be computed at the rate of 6s. per house (or at
the value of 6s. in foodstuffs or marketable products), in return for the protection
afforded me by the police force of the Administration.
Given at Karungu, on the Upper Shire, this 13th day of November 1891.
Signed: Liwonde
Witness to signature:
-

H.H. Johnston (Her Majesty’s Commissioner)
Cecil Maguire (Captain, 2nd H.C. Lancers,
Administration).136
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An analysis of the preparation and signing of these (and other related) title deeds clearly indicates
that they were drafted by the European colonists and were made to be too technical and in a foreign
language which the illiterate native chiefs and headmen could not have easily understood at a time
when Western education had not been fully introduced and developed in the Protectorate. The title
deeds also indicate that the notion of revenue collection essential for the survival of the colonial
state was deliberately inserted by the framers of the “treaties” to support the day-to-day
administration of the colonial state even though the chiefs in question did not have a chance to
consult with their own subjects. Furthermore, such deeds did not indicate, as argued by the
colonists, that the said chiefs and headmen had summarily or completely given away their
customary rights to portions of land which they merely controlled as custodians. Edge
Kanyongolo, writing from a legal perspective, also argued that the land transfers of the early
colonial era were mostly frauds of dubious legal validity arrived at by “duping” the African leaders
into giving away their land. The outcome of the “land grab” process was that it converted many of
the African subsistence farmers into labor tenants on the newly created private estates of the
European settlers.137

Elizabeth Colson summed it up well when she argued that it was inevitable that colonial
governments should impinge upon the land rights of the people they conquered for several reasons.
Firstly, because of the new economic system, which colonial governments stimulated, which was
targeted towards exploitation of land and cash cropping – where the crops would be exported to
meet the demands for imported goods. Secondly, because the colonial states regarded themselves
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as modicums for economic development, there was the need to divert some land to new uses
through newly created systems of land tenure. The new land tenure systems were sometimes
implemented with haste because the colonial authorities often felt that they had the political power,
as representatives of their mother government in Europe to impose their views on the African
subjects. That form of domination also included the imposition of European legal practices to be
applicable elsewhere in the European overseas colonies. The colonial authorities often assumed
that the full range of land rights covered by the concept of proprietary ownership must exist in
Africa as they existed in Europe. If no private person appeared to hold such rights over a given
area, then the colonial authorities assumed that the rights must be vested in the political unit
(usually a village or chieftaincy) whose members used the area. Failing this, the land was supposed
to belong to the newly created government which could then alienate the land on its own terms to
commercial corporations or to European settlers, using the policy of “no land could be without an
owner.”138

Upon settling the land claims, the Johnston administration instituted new forms of land tenure,
which replaced the customary land tenure system, where the chief as the custodian of the land, was
not supposed to sell land to “outsiders,” let alone to anyone, but rather to distribute it to his or her
subjects. Under the new land tenure system, the European settlers (and some African elites) were
given access to “Private Land” (with a Certificate of Claim indicating the parameters of their
portion of land), while the colonial state had access to what became “Crown Land,” where the state
could construct its offices, roads, railways, canals, and other related structures without having to
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pay compensation. Most of the Africans were pushed into what became “Native Reserves.”139 The
“Crown Lands,” which covered eighty-five percent of the Protectorate, referred to a condition
where the British Crown became the owner of the land, either by purchase, concession, or
forfeiture. Such lands were earmarked for the state to raise some revenue through rentals and sales
to European settlers and companies, and for other development-related initiatives.140 Most of the
land was taken from unwilling and “unconscious” African chiefs, many of whom had no idea that
they had summarily given away their land. The grabbing of land from the Africans was a deliberate
ploy by the colonial state to effectively control the Africans, starting with the control over land,
the soil and the minerals that lay in it, with the Commissioner (later Governor) as the overseer of
the land on behalf of the British Crown. The “Private Land” on the other hand was mostly occupied
by European settlers, and by 1902 covered an area of over 3,700,000 acres.141
Apart from the individual claims to land by settler planters, huge portions of private lands went to
the British South Africa Company (BSAC) of Cecil John Rhodes, which had freehold rights over
land covering 2,700,000 acres in the Northern Province. This was land that practically covered the
entire province (also known as the North Nyasa Province), which the BSAC earmarked for mineral
exploration. In the Shire Highlands, some of the biggest portions of land were ceded to the
Livingstone-Bruce Estates Company, that occupied about 320,000 acres in a single block, and the
British Central Africa Company (BCAC) that occupied 170,000 acres of land in different parts of
the Blantyre District. While the land alienation practices had robbed the Africans of their most
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reliable natural resources (land), it also denied them the opportunity to practice “shifting
cultivation” (where cultivable land was left to regain fertility while the farmers moved on to
cultivate new portions of farmland). The Livingstone-Bruce Estates in Chiradzulu for instance,
had about 15,000 Africans, who had been alienated from their land, and could be evicted at the
discretion of the new land owners, especially when the tenants refused to work for rent.142 In 1902,
the colonial state’s control over land was further cemented by the enactment of the British Central
Africa Order-in-Council, 1902, which placed all lands (public and crown lands) in the Protectorate
under His Majesty’s Government. That meant that all those claiming ownership to land, except
private land, were only doing so under the authority of the Crown, who had the first rights to all
mines and minerals in such lands.143
The claims and counter-claims over the ownership of land in the protectorate continued well into
the first decade of the twentieth-century. Colin Baker argued that several factors were at play to
help explain the circumstances. Firstly, there was a shift from the pioneer collecting stage, based
on collecting ivory and rubber, to a new stage of extensive settler cultivation of coffee, cotton, and
a little later, tobacco. The shift required far more labor and large portions of land. Secondly, the
contestations over land also increased once the required labor arrived, especially from Portuguese
East Africa (present-day Mozambique). Many of the migrants from Mozambique, especially the
Lomwe peoples settled in the Shire Highlands. Most of the migrant laborers ended up settling on
the private estates, where the land owners began to demand rent in the form of labor from both the
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new comers and the old native settlers – who could not be easily distinguished by the estate owners.
That then marked the beginning of the much-dreaded “Thangata System” (“thangata” means
“help”) in which the African residents on private estates were required to work for a certain portion
of the year to pay their rent in the form of labor provided.144
One such case involving the contestation over land happened in 1903 which came before the High
Court of Nyasaland and revolved around the question of the rights held by Africans living on
estates originally “bought” by Europeans from native chiefs and later re-sold to other European
settlers. The main facts of the case (Supervisor of Native Affairs vs Blantyre and East Africa
Company Limited) were centered on the interpretation of the clause in the Certificates of Claim in
the Thyolo and Ruo Estates in the Shire Highlands, which provided that the Africans resident on
the estates when the land was bought or transferred to a European were not to be “disturbed or
removed” without the sanction in writing of His Majesty’s Commissioner. The Crown Prosecutor
(Mr. J. Charles Casson) argued his case by insisting that the “non-disturbance clause” meant that
the Africans could not be removed from the stated estates, and that they were supposed to enjoy
access to natural resources which included access to land and flora. The prosecutor hinted on the
Africans’ need for land for cultivation, and on the continued rights over land held by some chiefs
and headmen. Mr. R.S. Hynde, who sold the land to Blantyre and East Africa Company Limited
(BEAC Limited), also gave his court statement in support of the prosecutor and His Majesty’s
Commissioner, by pointing out that the clause in his Certificate of Claim was based on African
custom and guaranteed the African against disturbance so long as he liked to occupy the site and
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gardens he had at the time the land was bought. Although the clause said nothing about the
Africans’ shifting cultivation practices, Mr. R.S. Hynde argued that it was held that the African
would return to his land in the immediate future, as they would leave the previous plot to fallow,
more especially that there was still enough Crown Land – where the African could encroach for
some time before returning to the land under “Certificate of Claim.”
In his judgment, High Court Judge J.J. Nunan, began by stating how crucial that case was to the
question of land ownership in British Central Africa, and that at the end of it all, it would be a case
of a “judge making a law” – and not a “judge applying or interpreting an existing law” as was
required. He noted that, usually, judges act as custodians of a body of customary principles which
have only to be applied to each new case as it arises and have the power to modify existing law
from time-to-time depending on circumstances and the changing needs of society. The judge’s
ruling on the case ended up being detrimental to the land-holding interests of the chiefs and their
subjects on private land. Among the key issues raised, the judge ruled that: (1) The chiefs and their
people could only stay on the estates as tenants of the Company (BEAC Limited), and that they
were supposed to renounce any claims they had on the sold land; (2) that as tenants the people
were supposed to agree to provide two-months of work during the rainy season to the land owner
in lieu of rent, and that those working for other Europeans were to pay a yearly rent for their house
and gardens of six shillings per annum; (3) that as tenants they should never cut down timber on
the banks of streams or any other place within the bounds of the estates, and they were also ordered
not to build any new houses without the owner’s permission; (4) the Company was also ordered
to agree that it would pay the taxes of those people who worked on the estate for two months, so
long as the tax remained at three shillings per year; (5) that the tenants in breach of the ruling
would be liable for eviction from the estate, within a short notice issued by the Collector; (6) and
99

that Africans who were working for other Europeans or paying a monetary rent would also be
required to pay cash for taxes in addition to the rent charge for staying on the estate. In conclusion,
the judge hinted that the “Certificates of Claim” issued in the early 1890s, had significant flaws.
For instance, he raised several important questions regarding the “Claims”: To whom were the
rights secured by the Certificates of Claim? To the tribe? To the village community or to the
individual African? What was the nature and extent of the rights so secured? How are the persons
or bodies in whom the rights in-here to be ascertained and upon whom does the onus of proof lie?
He argued further that although the “Certificates of Claim” and treaties were made with chiefs, the
agreements were now null and void (had been nullified and without any legal binding) following
the advent of European courts and magistrates who were the new custodians of the law. The village
headmen no longer had rights over the lands where they and their peoples settled.145
At the conclusion of the court case, and acting on recommendations by Judge Nunan, the Acting
Commissioner of the Protectorate, Major F.B. Pearce, appointed a Commission, consisting of
Judge Nunan, the Chief Surveyor for the Protectorate, and the Superintendent of Native Affairs –
to inquire into and report upon the natives’ rights to land. At the end of the inquiry, the Commission
reported that up to May 1903, European landowners had recognized no established African land
rights in so far as native land rights were concerned. The Africans resident on European-owned
estates were, in most cases, asked to pay a rent in labor varying from three to six shillings per year
(equal to one- or two-months’ work). The recommendations from the Commission to His
Majesty’s Commissioner were summarized as follows: (1) European land owners were to set apart
a portion of their estates, not to exceed one-tenth of the whole, for the creation of African reserves;
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(2) African residents on European estates were to be entitled to land for villages and food
plantations on a basis of eight acres per family; and (3) Each African head of family had to pay a
yearly rent of four shillings to the land owner (except for lands within three miles of the four
townships of Zomba, Blantyre, Fort Johnston, and Chiromo, for which a rent of up to two shillings
an acre might be paid). It was from these recommendations that the colonial government enacted
“The Lands Ordinance (Natives Reserves) of 1904.”146
In a nutshell, it became clear in the case of Nyasaland that the claims of appropriating land on trust
to maximize its use for the benefit of humanity were false. While the early migrants, mostly
Christian missionaries, had some “good” intentions, it became clear that after the Berlin
Conference, the entry of the capitalist class and later the colonial state, meant that it was the
commercial interests, rather than the “civilizing mission,” that dominated the processes of land
appropriation. It alienated Africans from their land regardless of the pre-contact systems of land
tenure and land transfer. I contend that, in the case of Nyasaland, the appropriation of land for the
commercial interests of the colonizers, should be understood as a manifestation of the notion that
the colonial experience was a “makeshift settlement”. As the colonial state straddled between
meeting the interests of the European capitalist class and those of the indigenous people, it ended
up depriving the Africans of their primary source of livelihood and subsistence. While the state
needed the support of the settlers, whose resources and revenue would have been used in the
development of the country that should not have been achieved by dubiously appropriating land
from the indigenous people. While Commissioner Johnston sometimes sided with the indigenous
peoples, when he declared that about eighty-five percent of the Protectorate should be under Crown

146

Great Britain, Report on the Trade and General Condition of the British Central Africa Protectorate for 1903-04
(London: HMSO, September 1904), 35-41. See Annex no.3: Report by Mr. J.C. Casson, Superintendent of Native
Affairs.

101

lands, and thus ensuring that such lands did not fall under capitalist monopolies, it is impossible
to absolve him and indeed the British government from the atrocities that were committed in the
Protectorate, especially when it came to practices of land alienation and the denial of livelihoods
for the Africans. Similarly, the labor and taxation policies, to be discussed in the next section, also
reflected badly on the “good will,” if any, of the colonizing power.
The colonial state and “gentlemanly capitalism”: access to African labor and the taxation
regime
The control of African labor and collection of revenue also became contested and were part and
parcel of the “makeshift settlement” that characterized British colonial rule in Nyasaland. The two
areas became avenues for the “legalization” of state oppression, as the colonial state worked
towards meeting its revenue and accumulation imperatives, essential for its own survival. There
were often cases of “collaboration” between the colonial state and European settlers in soliciting
both labor and revenue (taxes) from the African population. The state needed revenue for it to
survive and pay for administrative services, while the settlers needed a steady supply of labor, both
agricultural and porterage. That collaboration contributed to what has been described elsewhere as
a form of “primitive accumulation,” in which the state used its powers and brute force, to compel
Africans to provide their labor and taxes, aiding the colonial enterprise and fulfilling the interests
of both the colonial state and the European settlers.147 By adopting the elements of “primitive
capitalism,” the colonial state then contradicted the concept of “civilizing mission,” which in
practice should have encouraged the African to voluntarily participate in the colonial enterprise

Mathew Forstater, “Taxation and Primitive Accumulation: The Case of Colonial Africa,” The Capitalist State and
Its Economy: Democracy in Socialism Research in Political Economy, 22 (Elsevier Ltd. 2005): 51-65. See also Joel
S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 70-71.
147

102

rather than the coercion that ensued. By 1915, rules and regulations were enacted which compelled
Africans to work for European settlers, and in turn, for the European employers to pay the taxes
of their employees to the colonial state’s coffers, a system that was from time-to-time abused by
the employers usually through the extension of the period the laborers had to work or by not issuing
the required work or tax certificate for the laborers.
It must be borne in mind that the colonial state was administered with very limited resources during
the period under study. The late 19th and early 20th centuries were a time when the British
government expected the colonies to be financially self-supporting, such that it only provided
“grants-in-aid” from the Treasury only in instances where local revenue could not meet the
necessary local expenditure, and often disallowed deliberate budgeting for a deficit in the
colonies.148 Before the outbreak of the First World War, when the British Treasury committed
itself to sending funds to the colonies, subventions were provided only to balance colonial budgets
and pay the salaries of European officials. The Treasury was of the view that the colonial subjects
should pay, through taxation, for the services provided by the colonial state.149 For the first two
decades of colonial rule, the Nyasaland government, hampered by a lack of reliable sources of
revenue from taxes and an underdeveloped agricultural and transport economy, survived on annual
subsidies from the BSAC, which was giving the protectorate’s government an average of £8,000
per annum.150
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From this background, it became essential to attract European investment and impose tax
collection as one of the first measures for the state’s survival. The taxation regime, was also, as
argued by Andrew Burton, an avenue through which the colonial state imposed its political
authority on its subjects. It allowed the colonial state to impose its demands on the colonized
peoples by demanding that they contribute to the costs of administering the colonies. While the
government embarked on “uplifting the livelihoods” of the colonized peoples, the latter had to pay
for the costs of security, good government, education, communications, medical attention, and
agricultural activities, among others. This occurred irrespective of whether the taxes were collected
by European officials or African intermediaries, such as chiefs, who received a percentage of the
money raised.151 Michael Tuck, focusing on taxation in colonial Uganda, also argues that the
taxation regime, apart from being an avenue for imposing colonial authority, was also one way of
“monetizing” that colony’s economy. The introduction of a new currency and collection of taxes
compelled the colonial subjects to seek wage labor or grow cash crops to meet the taxation
demands and to pay for other services.152 The treaties of occupation, signed with African chiefs,
such as the one cited above, with Chief Liwonde, also clearly stipulated the centrality of tax
collection, where the African chiefs committed themselves to collect taxes in return for both
protection and payment for the costs of being placed under British rule. The “collaborating” chiefs
received a 10 % stipend from the taxes they collected. This also in significant measure undermined
the concept of the “civilizing mission,” especially as it exposed the weaknesses of the colonial
enterprise. This was so because it was clear that the colonial state could not perform its duties
without the input and effort of African “intermediaries,” both the chiefs and other local colonial
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employees. The basic form of taxation in the colonies was the income tax (direct tax), which was
initially collected through the pre-existing or newly created African administration structures
headed by chiefs, most of whom worked under the supervision of British staff. While the amount
of money for taxation tended to vary from colony-to-colony, the official names given to the taxes
also varied from colony-to-colony, and in other instances totally different taxes were also
imposed.153 In Nyasaland, there were two main forms of taxation, namely the hut tax and the poll
tax. The former was intended to be paid by the male head of a household, and the latter had to be
paid by all males above the age of sixteen. The Africans were compelled to pay taxes under duress,
as those who failed to pay were subjected to various kinds of punitive measures, including having
their household property confiscated, houses demolished, and, in some cases, women were held
hostage until their spouses could pay the taxes.154
The process of tax collection in Nyasaland was institutionalized by Commissioner Harry H.
Johnston as early as 1892, who, after deliberations with native authorities, estimated the number
of hut occupants at three individuals, and hence fixed the annual hut tax at six shillings per annum.
Initially, tax collection began in the southern province, before it was later applied to other parts of
the protectorate. By then, the southern province had been significantly subdued by the incoming
British colonists, hence creating conducive conditions to commence the taxation process. The
initial payments were made in kind, before a full blown monetary-based taxation system was
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implemented. Johnston’s policy stipulated that the African chiefs were to be given 10 percent of
the total tax proceeds. This served as some form of government subsidy and to coax them to collect
more taxes from their subjects. According to Johnston, the Africans, especially those in the Lower
Shire region, asked to be taxed by the incoming British colonists. Many of them had been
accustomed to pay taxes to Portuguese authorities, and hence felt obligated to do the same when
the British colonized their territories. That then explains why in the treaties that were signed with
African chiefs, a clause of payment of taxes was inserted.155 Further amendments were made to
the taxation regulations, including the regulations of 1894, which fixed the tax at 3 shillings, due
and payable on the 31st of December each year. In 1901, the maximum rate was fixed at 12 shillings
per hut, with a rebate of half if the native had worked for a European for one month at the current
rates of pay. In 1911 (Ordinance 13 of 1911), the tax remained at 12 shillings, whereas for 191213, the tax was revised down to 8 shillings. In the 1921 Tax Ordinance, the rebate system was
abolished, and the tax was fixed at 6 shillings.156 The colonial authorities often waived taxing their
European colleagues in the Protectorate, for fear of driving out the limited number of foreign
investors, who were comparatively few. Many of them had already shown discontent at the lack
of mineral resources worthy of mining at the time. This also raises questions about the extent of
the “capital” that the European settlers took to Nyasaland, if one is to follow the notion of
“gentlemanly capitalism,” as discussed above. The capitalists who trekked to the overseas colonies
should thus not be regarded as a homogenous entity. Many of those that went to Nyasaland were
clearly of very limited financial means. In turn, what became imperative for the state was to collect
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as much money (in the form of taxes) from the Africans as possible, more especially as the
protectorate had no major industries from which the government could collect extra revenues.157
It was also often difficult for the Nyasaland government to tax the Asian community in the
protectorate. Although some of them had some relatively higher incomes, compared to the
Africans, it was not easy for the government to calculate their income for taxation purposes. Thus,
it was not until 1928 that a “non-native poll tax” began to be levied on the Asians, many of whom
were private traders.158
Once full-scale hut tax collection began, the records indicate that the annual amounts increased
each year, providing over fifty-percent of the local revenue by 1905. The table below illustrates
the trend:
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Table 3.1: Tax Collection in Nyasaland Protectorate, 1895-1914

Year

Total Revenue (£)

1895-6
1896-7
1897-8
1898-9
1899-1900
1900-01
1901-02
1902-03
1903-04
1904-05
1905-06
1906-07
1907-08
1908-09
1909-10
1910-11
1911-12
1912-13
1913-14

No figures available
About 22,000
No figures available
No figures available
No figures available
49,214
51,704
67,477
75,895
67,553
79,738
82,107
75,197
79,852
68,592
86,430
95,482
127,596
124,849

Amount Collected (£)
4,704
7,201
8,083
12,646
13,466
16,756
21,235
26,145
26,276
29,024
31,074
35,619
36,605
38,389
41,530
46,534
50,970
65,685
69,810

Tax percentage
of local revenue
32.73
34.04
41.07
38.74
34.62
42.96
38.97
43.38
48.67
48.07
60.54
53.84
53.38
51.47
55.91

Source: See the following Colonial Annual Reports for the Nyasaland Protectorate: 1905-’06,
1908-’09, 1912-’13, and 1913-’14. All these reports were published in London: HMSO. See also
Nyasaland Protectorate, Report of the Treasurer with the financial statements of the Protectorate
for the year 1913-1914 (Zomba: Government Printer, 1914), 319. See also Johnston, British
Central Africa, 111-112 and 150. See also Handbook of Nyasaland (London: HMSO, 1920), 76.159
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As the taxation regime progressed, it was also connected to the notion of labor demands by the
European settler community, especially the planters. The European planters usually had problems
to recruit African labor, when the laborers were needed, such as during the rainy season, as the
laborers often chose to tend to their own agricultural gardens.160 As such, the planters, most of
whom had limited economic means, often pressured the colonial state to institute measures that
would compel African laborers to work in their estates and other enterprises. Such demands were
often made through influential settler associations in the protectorate, such as the Chamber of
Agriculture and Commerce and the Mlanje Planters Association, who among other things
advocated that the African laborers under their watch should not be paid in cash, but rather that
they should be paid in kind – while the money would be paid to the government as a form of
taxation. The planters also advocated that the salaries for the Africans had to be deliberately kept
low, as higher payments or salaries would have made them self-sufficient and abandon their jobs
or abstain from working for Europeans.161 Following continued deliberations between the settlers
and the state authorities, under Commissioner Alfred Sharpe (who succeeded Harry H. Johnston
in 1897), the colonial state came up with a number of policies “legalizing” the association between
the settlers’ demands for native labor and the state’s demands for revenue. Some of the measures
agreed upon included the following: firstly, an estate owner or a planter was required to either pay
the taxes of the entire African population residing on his estate, or none. In either case, the planter
had to work closely with state authorities to make sure that all Africans of tax paying age and
ability had paid their dues. Secondly, the planters were also given powers to employ Africans
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resident on their estates, while withholding a month’s payment by sending it to government coffers
through authorized tax collection officers. The estate owner was required to issue the laborers with
a stamped tax receipt (or a tax certificate), a system which also ended up being abused, as planters
often deliberately withheld the receipts and continued to demand more labor from the natives.162
Under further taxation regulations instituted in 1902, Africans who produced fake work or tax
certificates were liable to a punishment of £100 or imprisonment for three calendar months, or to
both fine and punishment.163
There was also the appalling Thangata system (“Thangata” means “help”) in which some of the
European planters demanded “free labor” from the Africans settled on their estates but could not
be moved due to the “Non-Disturbance Clause,” inserted on the Certificate of Claim. Under the
Thangata system, which resembled European feudalism, Africans were required to pay “land rent”
in form of their labor. The system was often subject to abuse, as the Africans ended up working
for extended periods of time, more than what was agreed upon of two months. The payment for
the first month was supposed to be sent to the government, in the form of tax, whereas the second
month’s payment was to be used to pay rent for settling on the farm. Many of the African workers
under that system were forced to work for long working hours, could not grow their own crops,
could not cut timber to make their own huts, and were subjected to various forms of corporal
punishment for failing to meet set targets. Many of them had no choice but to live under such poor
working conditions, for fear of being evicted from the private estates with the help of colonial
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administrative officials and police. Those who moved to crown lands often lived in densely overpopulated settlements.164
Attati Mpakati argued that the labor of the Africans under the Thangata system was often
demanded by the European “landowner” at the peak cultivation period, which often prevented the
African peasants from cultivating crops for their own families. Where they could grow cash crops,
the “squatters” were often coerced to sell them to the landowner at the price dictated by him (the
landowner). While the concept and practice of thangata was predominant in the southern region,
there was also a similar practice in the central region. In the latter, European settlers introduced a
system called the “visiting system”, which entailed that an African family would stay on a farm
owned by a European for a limited time while providing free labor. In return, the European settlers
were expected to provide the “visiting” family with farm inputs and food, although such pledges
were usually never honored.165 When the First World War broke out in 1914, the colonial
authorities took advantage of the existing thangata labor system to forcibly enlist the Africans in
Nyasaland to fight on behalf of Britain in the war. Many were enlisted to defend the protectorate’s
northern frontier, which bordered the German colony of Tanganyika (German East Africa). The
Nyasaland Government ran a propaganda campaign to suggest that fighting in the war would
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prevent a German takeover of Nyasaland and would ensure that the Africans did not lose their
portions of land.166
The colonial taxation regime was in significant measure the major driving force behind the rise of
labor migration from Nyasaland to other colonies in the region. The migration of labor in a way
also reduced the number of Africans who could be compelled to work under either the “Thangata”
or “visiting system,” and that meant that labor would remain a scare commodity. Most of the men
in the protectorate were compelled to find meaningful employment in the mining areas of South
Africa and the two Rhodesias (Northern and Southern), with an aim of raising funds to pay the
taxes and pay for the deficit of having lost their access to the means of subsistence production. The
major companies involved in recruiting labor from the Protectorate included the Witwatersrand
Native Labor Association (WNLA) and the Rhodesia Native Labor Bureau (RNLB). These were
companies set up by European settlers in South Africa (WNLA) and Southern Rhodesia (RNLB).
They worked together with their respective colonial governments in British colonial Africa,
especially British Central Africa, to recruit African laborers for the mining and plantation
enterprises in the countries mentioned. The companies also helped the migrant laborers to remit
significant sums of money to their respective countries, money that was deducted as payment of
the poll and hut taxes discussed above. There were also other Africans who migrated without the
assistance of the recruiting companies, to avoid the “yoke” and control of the recruiters. These
were known as “independent migrants.” They often took advantage of the protectorate’s long
unguarded borders to migrate.167 The salaries paid in South Africa and the two Rhodesias
(Northern and Southern Rhodesia) were better than those paid by the settlers in Nyasaland, mainly
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because of limited agricultural and industrial production. For instance, in Southern Rhodesia, a
migrant farm laborer could be paid as much as 22 shillings per month; a domestic laborer was paid
in the range of 15 to 60 shillings per month; and a mining laborer was paid between 20 to 40
shillings per month. In Nyasaland, most of such laborers were paid for the same period as little as
3 to 4 shillings.168
The agreement between the Nyasaland government and the foreign labor recruiting agencies did
not always go down well with the European planters in the protectorate, who could not compete
with the better wages paid by the mine and plantation owners in those two countries. At the
beginning of 1900, the planters sent a petition to be acted upon by the Foreign Office. Some of the
issues raised in that petition against the system of labor migration included the following: firstly,
that the Africans who went to work in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, for a period of six
months or more, and later returned to the Protectorate, were bringing back unwanted vices and/or
influences, including beer drinking habits and unruly behavior, which would be detrimental to
agricultural production in the protectorate; secondly, that the long absence of men from their
homes was detrimental to family and village livelihoods, and that it significantly encouraged the
evil of concubinage on the part of the men and to that of unfaithfulness on the part of the women
– who went out in search of money for survival; thirdly, that it was risky for the Africans to work
in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, where, despite being paid higher wages, they were not
guaranteed the provision of proper medical care and security; and lastly, that it was not necessary
to increase wages paid to African laborers in the Protectorate because the rates of pay were enough
to sustain African families; that more pay would make Africans work only for a shorter term; and
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also because the coffee industry in the Protectorate had also failed to produce the desired profits.
One outstanding point raised in that petition read as follows:
My Lord, Your petitioners desire also to point out that there is no primary reason why
these natives should be taken away from B.C.A. seeing that there is ample work for
them to be had in their own country at fair wages. B.C.A. depends upon its native
population and hitherto has succeeded in carrying on a large industry by the aid of the
natives and so long as the coffee industry is flourishing there will always be congenial
work for the natives in their own country. It is hardly necessary to point out to Your
Lordship that it is better for the country’s progress that the natives should be employed
in developing the resources of their own country than they should be taken four hundred
miles away to work.169

At that stage, it was clear that the “alliance” between the settler planters (the “gentlemanly
capitalists”) on one hand, and the colonial state and the British Government, on the other, could
not continue to be workable. In other words, it also put to test the so-called relationship between
“gentlemanly capitalism” and the political and administrative leadership both in the metropole and
in the Nyasaland protectorate. One also notes the limitations which the capitalists had in terms of
influencing colonial policy formulation. It also shows, as Andrew Porter argued, that the
“gentlemanly capitalists” did not significantly benefit, as is sometimes argued, from imperial
favors and subsidies. The relationship between capital and the state was usually dynamic,
influenced by both metropolitan and peripheral developments.170 And as Jonathan Crush put it, the
colonial authorities at times found it to be a daunting task to provide favors necessary to sustain
the conditions for capitalist production. The state had to take into consideration that it also had
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other roles, including where it served as a guarantor of political and social order. As such, the
colonial state would not continually coerce the Africans to meet the demands of the European
settlers.171 The colonial authorities had their own interests in encouraging African labor migration
and did not want to continually oppress the Africans to the point of denying them the opportunity
to find alternative means of employment outside the Protectorate, so long as they fulfilled their tax
obligations to the Nyasaland government’s coffers. The colonial government’s policy of
encouraging labor migration to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia was best summarized by
Reverend Alexander Hetherwick, Head of the Blantyre Mission, expressing the sentiments of
Commissioner Alfred Sharpe:
The country was ‘going down’. Coffee, its chief product, was a failure, there was
nothing to take its place, and consequently a fresh outlet must be found for the labor of
the people. The wages earned by those who went to the south under the proposed
scheme would be paid to them on their return to the Protectorate, and this would bring
a great increase of wealth to the country. Moreover, also in return for this concession to
recruit in the Protectorate, South Africa would admit free of import duty some of our
local products. And it was only a thousand they wanted – a thousand ‘as an
experiment’.172

In London, government authorities were also not keen to issue a policy that would place a ban on
African labor migration, as the officials argued that the Africans of the Protectorate should be
given the freedom to work where they wanted, both within and outside the Protectorate. For
instance, Joseph Chamberlain, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, made the following
remarks in the House of Commons:
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Turning to other districts north of the Zambezi, I agree with my Right Honorable friend
the member of the University of Cambridge that we have to be careful in any matter of
this kind, and there can be no possible objection to laying on the table of the House
regulations which have been framed. As I have said, it is expected now to put 1000
natives of Central Africa in the mines if they appreciate the life then in no doubt a much
larger number will hereafter go there. …And let me point out that it is a very unfair
thing to say to the laborers in a particular colony or protectorate, ‘You should not go,
whether you like it or not where your labor will best be remunerated’. The feeling of
anxiety to prevent laborers going from the Central Africa or East African Protectorates
is the feeling of the people on the spot who are now getting the labor of these men for a
quarter or a fifth of what the mines are willing to pay, because when they return they
will demand larger wages from their former employers than are now being paid in these
Protectorates. I think it would be wrong to lay down any general policy and to declare
that the native laborer is practically to be adiscriptus gleboe; that he must not move
from his own protectorate even if higher wages are offered to him elsewhere.173

From such policy formulations, the picture one gets is that the relationship between the colonial
state and the European settlers tended to be influenced by conditions in the colony, both the wellbeing of the economy and the reactions and preferences of Africans. However, when the two sides
(the government and European settlers) collaborated, they at times connived to create forms of
“forced labor,” of a slightly lesser magnitude than the system of slavery. The Africans, especially
men, were compelled to abandon the subsistence forms of production, as they were forced to work
for the Europeans where they were issued with either the work or taxation certificates. Subsistence
agricultural production was often left for their spouses, which often limited the amount of produce
per household with the loss of male labor supply. Some were compelled to find higher-paying jobs
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outside the Protectorate, to pay for the cost of being placed under British colonial rule. For the
Africans who failed to pay the taxes, they were subjected to all forms of harsh treatment by the
colonial authorities. The state often dispatched small military and police expeditions to punish
villagers who refused to pay tax by burning down their huts and confiscating their grain and
livestock. In the 1890s, such aggressive methods were mainly confined to the Shire Highlands
districts, and mostly around the townships of Zomba and Blantyre due to their proximity to the
colonial capital. It was thus unsurprising that the imposition of the hut tax and bullying tactics of
tax collection created discontent among the Africans, circumstances that were pounced upon by
the Christian missionaries and the native elites such as Rev. John Chilembwe (discussed below)
and his accomplices.174 A former colonial official, Hector Duff, highlighted that it was government
policy to literally “hunt down” the Africans to pay the taxes as many of them took long to accept
and recognize the authority of the colonial state.175
As in the earlier argument above, the revenue imperative of the colonial state and the labor
demands of the settlers also helped to undermine the implementation of the civilizing mission. As
the state needed revenue for its operations, and as the settlers needed African labor to enhance
their production, they produced forms of forced labor that undermined the positive aspects of the
civilizing mission. It became one of the major contradictions of colonial infiltration in Nyasaland,
as the state relied on punitive taxation measures and forced labor sources, for the survival of the
colonial enterprise. Clearly, that was not in the original script of the civilizing mission, as the
conceptualization was undermined by the several factors. This included the fact that there were
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low levels of revenue collected by the colonial state, hence the imposition of punitive taxation
measures to compel Africans to pay taxes. The fact that the supply of African labor was also erratic,
where some Africans were still attached to subsistence production and others migrated to other
colonies in search of labor, also undermined the colonial enterprise, which culminated in various
forms of forced labor. As Anne Phillips argued elsewhere, the colonial state usually operated with
a lot of constraints, either financial, recruitment, revenue collection, or accumulation. That then
often compelled the colonial authorities to rely on African collaborators and the use of the state’s
coercive capacities.176
African reactions to the alien land, labor, and taxation measures
In significant measures, the failure to implement the civilizing mission, and the repression that
characterized life under British colonial rule in Nyasaland during the period covered in this
chapter, created an atmosphere of discontent against both the colonial state and most of the
European settler community. The discontent appeared in multiple forms, some of which was
through “passive resistance,” as opposed to physical confrontation with the colonial authorities
(such as “independent labor migration”), while in other cases, there was widespread violence used
against the European colonists.
As alluded to in the previous chapter, there was an altercation or resistance of a traditional nature,
led by the Prophetess Chanjiri in 1907, which was immediately subdued by the colonial authorities.
The 1907 case bordered on native resistance to the taxation regime imposed by the colonial state,
and within a short period had the impact of lowering the revenue collection by the state
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authorities.177 It was not until January 1915, that further native discontent culminated into the
outbreak of a major native uprising, the so-called “Chilembwe uprising,” as it was led by Reverend
John Chilembwe, who established an independent mission station known as Providence Industrial
Mission (PIM), at Chiradzulu District. As a landowner and entrepreneur, Chilembwe and his
fellow African smallholder farmers and businessmen had long harbored ambitions to compete in
the colonial enterprise but had been hampered by the colonial policies of land alienation, forced
labor on European-owned plantations, and the related taxation regime. Furthermore, some of
Chilembwe’s own flock at his mission had suffered immensely at the hands of the colonial
authorities and the planters in the Shire Highlands. It was thus not surprising that the uprising
begun with an attack on a European owned estate, known as the Livingstone-Bruce Estates, which
bordered Chilembwe’s mission station. The manager of the estate, a Mr. William Jervis
Livingstone, was beheaded on 23rd January 1915, alongside two other European males.
Livingstone had long been associated with ill-treating Africans on the estate, including personally
whipping his workers, and had also been implicated in the burning down of Chilembwe’s church
at PIM, as Livingstone argued that the church had been built on land that belonged to the
Livingstone-Bruce Estates.178 In their actions, Rev. Chilembwe and his accomplices seized upon
the grievances of their fellow Africans, and took up the mantle of trying to recreate the fabric and
organization of the colonial state. Mekki Mtewa argued elsewhere that Chilembwe “played a
Marxian game of an intermediary between those who possessed the means of production (the
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colonial state and the European settlers) and those who did not (the Africans).”179 The grievances
of the Africans in the Protectorate were presented to the commission appointed to inquire into the
major causes of the uprising. Among the key witnesses were Rev. Stephen M. Kundecha of the
Blantyre Mission, Rev. Harry Kambwiri of the Church of Scotland Mission, the African
businessman, Joseph Bismarck, and Elliot Kamwana of the Watch Tower Movement. Among the
key issues raised were the following: demands for better housing conditions; demands to be offered
opportunities to do business; disappointments of poor treatment by their European superiors at
work and hatred of the thangata system; the freedom to cut trees for household use and to hunt
wild animals; the ill-treatment of African soldiers during the war (First World War); the need for
more comfort whenever an African was sentenced to death; the calls for the government to pay
more attention to African petitions; the calls for periodic meetings between African representatives
and the government; demands by Africans to be allowed to wear clothes and hats of their choice;
the need for British laws to be translated into local languages; and the calls for a fairer taxation
regime, one that was not abused by the government and European settlers.180
It was not until 3rd February 1915, that Chilembwe was himself captured and subsequently
executed, alongside his brother, Morris, as they tried to escape into neighboring Portuguese East
Africa, thereby officially marking the end of the uprising. The execution of the two fugitives was
one of a series of “illegal” acts by the colonial authorities, as it contravened the “The Fugitive
Offenders Act of 1881,” which required that fugitives be pursued and brought before a magistrate
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court.181 Most likely the colonial authorities did not want to raise another spectacle by bringing
Chilembwe and his brother to a court of law.
Conclusion
This chapter has contributed to the historiography of Malawi’s early colonial history, focusing on
the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, a historical period which defined the
subsequent trajectory of British colonial rule in the country. The major focus has been on critically
analyzing how the notion of the “civilizing mission” came to be applied in what was then called
the Nyasaland Protectorate, which was used to justify, on moral and ethical grounds, Britain’s
colonial expansion. The analysis revolved around three major areas: colonial land, labor, and
taxation policies vis-a-vis the revenue and accumulation imperatives of the colonial state. While
one could argue that the original formulation of the civilizing mission did not have ill intentions,
there were various local and empire-wide constraints that revolved around the system of land
tenure, taxation and labor availability that ended up undermining the mission. What emerged on
the ground, especially in the aftermath of the Berlin Conference, and the intrusion of the capitalist
class, were elements of dubious modes of land appropriation, and forms of forced labor and
revenue collection. Such policies and practices created room for African discontent, and hence
formed the basis of the early forms of anti-colonial agitation in the early twentieth century. The
peak of the African discontent came in the form of the 1915 native uprising led by Rev. John
Chilembwe, leader of the PIM in the Shire Highlands. The next chapter builds upon this and
analyzes the various forms of counter-insurgency measures employed by the state during the inter-

“The Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881,” Orders of the King in Council Relating to the Nyasaland Protectorate, in
force by 31st December 1913 (Zomba: Government Printer, December 1913), 143-146.
181

121

war period. It focuses on the use of excessive force and the offer of development opportunities as
some of the measures employed by the colonial state.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE WINNING OF HEARTS AND MINDS DURING AND AFTER THE 1915 AFRICAN
UPRISING

Every punishment which is not derived from absolute necessity is tyrannous, says the
great Montesquieu, a proposition which may be generalized as follows: every act of
authority between one man and another which is not derived from absolute necessity is
tyrannous.182

Introduction
This chapter discusses the counter-insurgency measures employed by the colonial state to suppress
African resistance in Nyasaland during the period between 1915 and the late 1930s. I argue that
the state counter-insurgency measures operated at two levels, figuratively described as “a carrot
and a stick”. Firstly, there was the use of brutal force, which included capital punishment (which
came in the form of public executions or hangings for those alleged to have been directly involved
in the native uprising); the turn to “para-military” group tactics through the Nyasaland Volunteer
Reserve (NVR); the burning down of structures belonging to the insurgents; enacting strict laws
of censorship; and also forcibly detaining and deporting some of the felons. Secondly, the colonial
authorities also resorted to using tactics that were aimed at making one’s association and support
for the colonial state more attractive or appealing than supporting the “rebels” behind the uprising.
By the 1920s and 1930s, such measures included the initiation of development and welfare
programs that were for the benefit of the colonized in line with the tenets of the “civilizing
mission.” In doing so, this chapter argues that the origins of the development initiatives of the
Nyasaland government were in significant measures influenced by the demands of the Africans,
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some of which formed the backbone of the 1915 African uprising. The colonial state’s response to
meet such demands, was in many times against the needs of the “gentlemanly capitalists” then
operating in the protectorate. I will also adopt the political-economy approach to focus on how the
colonial state re-organized and upgraded its police force, following the findings and
recommendations of the commission of inquiry, which had been instituted to investigate the causes
of the uprising. The Nyasaland police force from then onwards became one of the major weapons
of the “interventionist state”, alongside the law, aimed at both detecting crime, preventing crime,
and political surveillance.
The use of brutal force
The colonial authorities, initially caught unawares by the “sudden” occurrence of the 1915 native
uprising, resorted to the use of brutal force through the armed forces from the King’s African Rifles
(KAR) and the Nyasaland police force. The use of brutal force was merely a continuation of the
violence which characterized British colonial rule in most of colonial Africa, including Nyasaland,
as a means of establishing domination and to deter others from challenging the authority of the
colonial state.
One dimension of the assault on the insurgents was to follow the movements of Rev. Chilembwe,
who had been on the run until the troops captured him alongside his brother, Morris Chilembwe,
near the Nyasaland-Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique) border, in Mlanje District, on February
3rd, 1915. Despite Rev. Chilembwe’s plea for mercy, as posited by Desmond D. Phiri, the askari
(troops), “allegedly” Africans (Private Naluso and Sergeant Useni), deliberately executed him for
fear that if they had travelled with him alive from Mlanje to Zomba (the colonial capital), it would
have led to further native unrest. The Reverend’s corpse was taken to Mlanje boma (district
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headquarters) on February 4th, 1915, where he was unceremoniously buried at what is present-day
Esperanza Estate.183
As alluded to in the preceding chapter, the summary executions of Rev. Chilembwe and his
brother, Morris were in contravention of “The Fugitive Offenders Act of 1881,” to which the
subjects of the Protectorate were subjected. The stated act provided that any fugitive, regardless of
the crime committed had to be pursued and when captured brought before a magistrate court, which
would have in the first place issued a warrant of arrest for the fugitive. However, in the case of
Reverend Chilembwe and his brother, they were summarily executed without even being brought
to a court of law, as the askari simply “took the law into their own hands” to mercilessly execute
the two gentlemen.184 As Crawford Young noted, there was often the “temptation” by the colonial
administrators to turn to “arbitrary authority”, which was vested in the officials of the colonial
administrations – such as judges, police chiefs, military commanders, prison staff – who could
sometimes take matters in their own hands to interpret and implement what they felt was legally
binding.185
From the correspondences exchanged between the Governor of Nyasaland and the Secretary of
State for the Colonies, we also get a picture of how the British Government was involved in
suppressing the native uprising. Governor George Smith sent a dispatch of the uprising to London,
indicating its severity, especially referring to the murders of several Europeans and the attack on
the government storehouse at Mandala in Blantyre. He reported to the Colonial Office (CO) that
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he had called for reinforcements from the King’s African Rifles and Portuguese East Africa. By
January 28th, 1915, he sent another report to the CO, in which he reported that Rev. Chilembwe
had not yet been captured, but that some rebels had been captured and three of them had been
executed. On February 3rd, 1915, the day of the capture and subsequent murder of the Reverend,
the CO informed Governor Smith that the British Government had sent more reinforcements from
the War Office to help combat the uprising, as well as four maxim guns on tripod mountings, and
80,000 rounds of ammunition from British-controlled Ceylon.186
Aside from the executions of Rev. Chilembwe and his brother Morris, it also became imperative
for state authorities to “rush to justice” to try the suspected accomplices and supporters of the
uprising. Most of those suspected of being close allies of Rev. Chilembwe were handed capital
punishment sentences and were summarily executed in public view. It must be noted that in
England (hereafter the metropole), punishment by public execution had already been repealed by
an Act of Parliament in 1868, and therefore it was hypocritical not to apply the same principle to
felons in the colonies. Randall McGowen indicates that the calls for putting an end to public
executions in England dated as far back as the mid-18th century, when those opposed to the practice
argued that public hangings lacked the element of respecting human dignity. Leading English
scholars and thinkers such as Henry Fielding and John Scott had for some time argued that the
public hangings, apart from being poorly organized, also tended to corrupt public morality because
of the violence which they promoted. Further to that, the scholars argued that violence, in whatever
form, severed the link of civilization and sensitivity to human suffering, and rendered one
insensitive to others, and even went further to insinuate that there was but a slight distance between
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watching a public execution and committing a murder. In the British Parliament, the Liberals had
for some time argued that public executions merely repeated the crime for which the offender
committed, and that judicial murder was like any form of murder, which was contrary to Western
tenets of civilization.187
Stacey Hynd has also contributed to the study of the history of public execution in British colonies,
including Nyasaland. Her work suggests that it was a common practice by the British colonists to
use public executions as a favorite form of public spectacle and citizenship lesson. The methods
of execution were often based on the outlawed British models, but also adopted some local
practices. In Nyasaland, for instance, the colonial authorities preferred to employ or use public
hangings, which she argued was necessary for the British officials on the ground to continue with
barbaric acts to convey the message of British power, order and the necessity of obeying the law.
To do so, the state authorities allowed for the general public, especially male adults and members
of the condemned person’s village, to bear witness to the public hangings, in order to maximize
the deterrent impact.188
The selective application of court sentences in the Protectorate (a common occurrence in other
overseas British colonies, as highlighted in chapters 2 and 3 of this study) thus presented another
aspect of the contradictions of the “British Empire Project.”189 One would have expected that this

Randall McGowen, “Civilizing Punishment: The end of the public execution in England,” Journal of British Studies
33, no.3 (July 1994): 257-277.
188
Stacey Hynd, “Decorum or Deterrence? The politics of execution in Malawi, 1915-66,” Cultural and Social History
5, Issue 4 (2008): 437-439. There were similar cases of public executions in other British colonies in Africa well into
the post-World War II era. See for instance, David Anderson, Histories of the hanged: The dirty war in Kenya and the
end of Empire (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2005). See also Caroline Elkins, Imperial Reckoning: The
untold story of Britain’s gulag in Kenya (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2005).
189
The concept of “The Empire Project” was coined by John Darwin. He argued that between 1830 and 1970, the
British authorities had created a “British-world system” with London as its center. From London, the British
coordinated the administration of an empire which encompassed peoples of different nationalities and continents. The
“project” also included colonies of rule, settlement colonies, protectorates, mandates, naval and military fortresses,
informal colonies, spheres of interference, occupations, and treaty ports and concessions. See John Darwin, The
187

127

being an “Empire” there would have been a uniform application of legal values and court
sentences, and that acts that had been deemed to be primitive and barbaric in the metropole would
also be deemed as such in the periphery of empire. In the case of Nyasaland, while we know that
in total, 36 Africans190 were publicly executed as punishment for partaking in the 1915 uprising,
we do not have the complete statistics of the number of Africans who perished during the period
of the uprising, as there were some unrecorded cases where Africans were hunted down, whole
villages set on fire and natives killed by the colonial authorities (police, soldiers, and members of
the NVR). In cases where the state relied on non-state actors (especially the NVR) to conduct
counter-insurgency on its behalf, it was not easy to achieve accountability.191
The public executions were not something that the colonial government could be ashamed of,
especially as the colonial authorities had achieved their aim of teaching a hard lesson to those
involved in the rising. The local print media covered several headlines to publicize the punishments
handed out to the Africans. For instance, The Nyasaland Times of February 4th, 1915 had the
following entry:
Since our last issue nothing of note has transpired. The country is now quiet. Many
arrests have been made of those who participated in the murders and the raids and most
of the ringleaders have been imprisoned. Among those who are alleged to have taken
part and who have been arrested and are now awaiting trial are John Grey Kufa, Duncan
Njilima, Wilson Foster, and Hugh Mataka. It is quite possible that some of these were
not concerned in the trouble but their guilt or innocence will be soon proved as complete
information is now in the hands of the Government….
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The Zomba Headman, Makangwala, who lives on Government land about eight miles
from Zomba was tried by the High Court and sentenced to death in the usual manner.
The sentence was carried out publicly at Zomba on Tuesday afternoon.192

The rush to justice in arriving at such death sentences was often questionable. To note that such
high-profile cases bordering on treason, whose punishment was a death sentence (if found guilty)
could have been concluded within a space of a fortnight, only shows how desperate the colonial
authorities were to stamp their authority by turning to “the rule of law” to suppress the uprising.
Another chilling entry in The Nyasaland Times of February 18th, 1915 read as follows:
During the past week there has continued an inflow of prisoners and witnesses into
Zomba in connection with the Chilembwe affair. The High Court continues to deal in
rotation with the large number of cases awaiting trial.
John Grey Kufa and Duncan Njilima have been found guilty of treason and sentenced
to death. They were present at seditious meetings held by the late John Chilembwe and
were deeply involved in his schemes. We understand John Grey made a confession to
the Judge of his share in the matter. Seven other natives who took up arms have been
executed. A number of natives whose part in the rising was small, they have been misled
by the older and better educated boys have been sentenced to terms of imprisonment
mostly of six months each with a certain number of lashes.193

Apart from the publicized executions of the felons, other atrocities were also committed by the
colonial authorities, with the help of reserves from the KAR, divisions of the NVR, and policemen
from across the country, who went from village-to-village, to round up those suspected of aiding
the native uprising. Even some European settlers were involved in the counter-insurgency drive,
an example being Mr. A.L. Bruce, owner of the Livingstone–Bruce Estates, where the Estate
Manager, Mr. William Jervis Livingstone, had been beheaded during the native uprising. Mr. A.L.
Bruce used his status to arrest some Africans and took written statements at his house in
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Chiradzulo. Members of the NVR also went as far as burning down and looting houses and
property that belonged to suspected ring leaders such as Hugh Mataka, John Grey Kufa, and
Duncan Njilima. Such village-to-village raids contributed to the rise in the numbers of fugitives
most of whom made their way into the neighboring Portuguese territory of Mozambique. Landeg
White noted that those captured were given summary trials and executed immediately. For
instance, an African known as Hinges, was court-martialed and shot at his own village less than a
kilometer from the Livingstone-Bruce Estates. Another close ally of Rev. Chilembwe, a Mr. David
Kaduya, was caught while trying to escape, and was taken back to Chiradzulo boma, where he was
shot in front of his estate workers. Three other accomplices of the Reverend, Wilson Zimba,
Stephen Mkulichi and John Grey Kufa were hanged in public in Blantyre Township in midFebruary 1915.194
The African authorities (chiefs and headmen) from the concerned and suspected villages were also
required to travel to the district headquarters (the boma) to make their statements before a resident
magistrate, where they were coerced into making statements pleading their own innocence and
that they would report to the colonial authorities the appearance of any such fugitives in their areas
of jurisdiction.195Apart from soliciting the support of the Chiefs, the colonial authorities also
utilized the support of their Portuguese counterparts in neighboring Mozambique, where some of
the fugitives had escaped to, from where intelligence gathered by the Portuguese authorities
indicated that the fugitives had been planning to re-launch an assault on Nyasaland. One such
exchange of intelligence notes read as follows: “Governor of Nyasaland reports that fugitive rebels
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of native rising in Protectorate armed with rifles have established themselves in Portuguese East
Africa just over border east of Lake Chilwa and have threatened Nyasaland natives approaching
their villages. Please urge strongly that Governor General may be instructed to comply with urgent
request which is being made to him for removal of these men from the frontier.”196
Further references to intelligence-sharing and support from Portuguese East Africa were also
mentioned in correspondences at the CO, including one from Sir Herbert Read to Sir George
Fiddes, at the beginning of May 1915. Part of their communication relating to Nyasaland which
indicated the sophisticated nature of counter-insurgency measures, read as follows:
This is the Governor’s third dispatch … reporting on the native rising. The rebellion has
been completely crushed and steps have been taken against the majority of those who
supported John Chilembwe, the rebel leader. A Commission of Inquiry under Judge
Grant has been set up to investigate the whole question of the origin and cause of the
rising, and the question of what is to be done with various missionary bodies is to await
the Commission’s report. All this is very good and efficient work and reflects great
credit on the Nyasaland administration….
It will be remembered that the Governor telegraphed in February…to ask for Indian
reinforcements. To obtain Indian troops was quite impossible, as well as inadvisable,
and it was arranged that should an Emergency arise, assistance should be obtained from
Portuguese East Africa by the Governor, through active Portuguese assistance was only
to be invoked in the last resort.197

It is also captivating to note that the sharing of intelligence between the Nyasaland and
Mozambican Governments continued beyond the 1915 uprising. For instance, after the First World
War, we learn of another impending native uprising which was detected through confidential
dispatches exchanged between the leadership of both governments. The rumored uprising was
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planned to take place in the Central Angoniland Province (Ntcheu District) in 1919, organized by
the Ngoni peoples on the border between Nyasaland and Mozambique. One of the dispatches
exchanged between the two governments read as follows:
…As it may interest Your Excellency I beg to inform you that H.E. the Acting Governor
of the Tete District reports, on the 26th instant (April), that the Administrator of Angonia
states unofficially, from information imparted by ‘Britishers’ to the Guarda fiscal
(constable) and others, that the Natives in the British Territory are badly disposed and
that there will soon be a rebellion. Apparently it is chiefly in the southern part of British
Territory that there are signs of rebellious tendencies, and that the cause of the ill-feeling
among the Natives, which has shown itself for a long time, is the forcible recruitment
carried out for war purposes.198

As indicated above, one other important resource used by the Nyasaland Government was the
NVR, which was a “para-military”199 wing of the state, responsible for helping to maintain law
and order on a day-to-day basis, and one whose members would be needed in the event of an
emergency or internal trouble. The membership of the NVR were also more important to the
colonial state because they played key roles in a number of areas, including the production of food
and revenue generation (because they employed native laborers from whom the colonial state drew
the hut taxes; and also because the state directly taxed the import and export services it offered to
the European settlers), a process described as “the coming together of economic and political
forces.”200 The NVR was established in 1901, and its membership was only opened to British
citizens resident in Nyasaland. It began to appear in official colonial annual reports in the 1902-03
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annual report, where it was clearly stated that it was a grouping only open to European settlers
resident in the Protectorate, who were earmarked for “para-military” training on a yearly basis. By
the 1902-03 fiscal year the group’s membership stood at 96 and had four sections across the
Protectorate. The Blantyre section had 34 members; Zomba had 31; Chiromo had 19; and Fort
Johnston had 12, making a total of 96 reservists.201
In the 1907-1908 fiscal year the Legislative Council “officially” reorganized the NVR and began
to allocate direct state funding to the activities of the group’s various sections, providing the
reserves with a grant of £600 for that year to be used for purchasing firearms. In 1908, the
“Volunteer Reserve Ordinance” also allowed for the appointment of an organizing secretary as the
officer responsible for the general works of the NVR. In 1913, the post of staff officer was also
created and was filled by Major C.W. Barton, C.M.G., D.S.O., Northamptonshire Regiment.202
In 1908, the enactment of Ordinance Number 18 of that year, also provided what became the key
guiding principles of the NVR’s various sections. Some of the key guiding principles were as
follows: (1) For a section to be established, the organization had to submit names of not less than
ten persons of over the age of 16 for approval by the Governor through the District Resident of the
district in which its headquarters were to be fixed. Thereafter, the Governor was supposed to
Gazette the Section to signify official state approval; (2) each section was only allowed to exist so
long as the number did not fall below ten registered members. In case of a drop in the numbers
below ten, all arms and other articles issued were supposed to be returned to the state, unless there
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were special orders not to do so; (3) each section was supposed to hold an annual general meeting
to be held in the second week of January, or a date to be determined by the government; (4) the
members of each section were also required to attend the musketry course, with guidance from the
National Rifle Association under agreeable army musketry regulations; (5) for one to be regarded
as a full-time member of the NVR they had to (a) complete the musketry course; (b) undergo
fifteen hours of military instruction at a section headquarters or under special arrangements made
by the staff officer; (6) each section was entitled to draw 200 rounds of ammunition per annum
free of charge, on account of each registered member who would fire thirty rounds on a range.
Each Section was also entitled to purchase additional ammunition, at a cost price, up to 300 rounds
per annum, or even more, as sanctioned by the Governor; (7) each section secretary was supposed
to draw rifles, ammunition and equipment from the Organizing Secretary, who was responsible
for the Quartermaster of the Kings African Rifles for them; (8) every registered member of a
section was to be provided with a government rifle on his entering a bond with or without sureties;
and (9) all the rifles handed out by the government remained government property and were not
transferable to any other member of the section without the sanction of the section secretary.203
It was from the ranks of those with para-military training and allegiance to the colonial state such
as members of the NVR, that Governor George Smith called to help in the suppression of the
insurgency, both as patrol and combat officers when the 1915 uprising broke out. The reserves, for
instance, were responsible for the capture of some of Rev. Chilembwe’s accomplices, including
those who were publicly executed, such as Wilson Zimba, Stephen Mkulichi and John Grey Kufa
– who were all given summary trials and executed by hanging, allegedly on a large tree outside
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the Town Hall in Blantyre Township.204 The NVRs were also responsible for extensive looting
and the destruction of Rev. Chilembwe’s church at Providence Industrial Mission Headquarters in
Chiradzulo. They were also associated with numerous atrocities, the most chilling of which was
their involvement in the public execution of suspected followers of Rev. Chilembwe, which meant
that the NVRs had assumed powers both to police and try native “criminals” even though most of
them had no legal training. Peter Charlton noted such atrocities in the following description:
One of Chilembwe’s lieutenants and best men, the ex KAR Askari, John Kaduya, was
shot and badly wounded in the leg during the fighting…. That same Monday, the four
prisoners from the abortive assault on Mandala (the government storehouse) were put
on trial. They confessed their involvement in the attack, and were tried, convicted and
shot by an NVR firing party against the walls of the European prison in Blantyre later
that afternoon. There was a large crowd present and the bodies were left where they fell
until the following day. The firing party consisted of eight members of the Blantyre
Section of the NVR: Messrs. Roe, Morrison, Fairbrother, Apps, Miskin, Haarseth,
Jones, and J.A. Brown. It was the first of a number of similar quick trials meant to teach
other potential supporters of Chilembwe a lesson in advance.205

British and Nyasaland government records also indicate that by August 1914, when Nyasaland
was drawn into the hostilities of the First World War in German East Africa (Tanganyika), the
NVR was also asked to supply its members to fight on behalf of Britain. By August 1914, the NVR
had 181 members in seven sections, most of whom were in the Shire Highlands. Furthermore, the
outbreak of the war also gave an immediate impetus for recruitment, such that about 400 more
Britons joined the NVR, some coming from outside the Protectorate. By 1918, the membership of
the NVR had swollen to 455 reserves, of whom 158 members saw service in the fighting line, and
180 were employed in various capacities on the lines of communication and at the bases in
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connection with transport, supplies, and other such roles. 51 of the reserves received commission
into the KAR and other branches of the Nyasaland Field Force. 21 of them were killed in action
or died on active service, while large numbers were wounded or invalidated.206 After the end of
the hostilities, the NVR continued to exist, and by 1932, it had ten sections at Zomba, Blantyre,
Limbe, Indian Section, Mlanje, Fort Lister, Chiradzulu, Port Herald, Namwera, Dedza, and
Mikolongwe. Enrollment rules and regulations were put in place for members to take the oath of
allegiance that they would be required to appear for military service within the Protectorate when
called out by the governor.207
This section has discussed the use of brutal force to suppress the 1915 uprising. These have been
extensively covered by other earlier works on the subject, including those by Landeg White, Stacey
Hynd, and George Shepperson and Thomas Price, as cited above. The “less brutal” or “non-brutal”
measures utilized to suppress the uprising are however often omitted in Nyasaland’s
historiography. These included the use of fines, deportations and censorship, and later by the late
1920s, the use of development initiatives. All these efforts were aimed at deterring the recurrence
of another uprising. Such measures will be discussed in the section that follows, with the argument
that African agency became one of the primary forces towards the enactment of colonial era
development policies and initiatives.
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Fines, Deportations, and Censorship
This section analyzes how the colonial authorities also turned to the use of “soft-power” (or “less
brutal”) measures of counter-insurgency, through the imposition of fines and deportation of some
of the “insurgents” and by enacting new rules and regulations on censorship. In their study of the
development of “punishment” in Western societies, Georg Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer argued
that it was not uncommon for European liberal societies to punish offenders and that such
punishments were a means of providing protection and order to society. Punishments, such as
imprisonment helped to contain offenders for some time, and where necessary to re-integrate them
in society as useful members. The liberals also viewed the end result of punishment or penal
treatment as being better than direct revenge or retribution; although in actual sense it is not
possible to separate any form of punishment from revenge or retribution, as the two processes
often work hand-in-hand to protect and promote social values that are deemed desirable by any
particular society. One of the most commonly-given punishments were monetary fines, which
were regarded as lesser punishments and were usually targeted at or reserved for specific upper
classes – especially in times when the lower classes had limited access to finances. However, once
money began to regularly circulate by the mid-nineteenth century, the fine became the most go-to
form of punishment as a means of taking away wealth from criminals. The proponents of
punishments through monetary fines argued that it was a good, cost-effective method because it
cost nothing to the state while it procured the maximum penal effect. In using the fine as a form
of punishment, the society, as represented by the state, received damages for the wrongs done
instead of having to pay the costs of punishment in case of imprisonment.208
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The subject of deportation of convicts in the British Empire was historicized in the work of Javier
Bleichmar, who acknowledged that there have been scholarly and legal debates on whether
deportation of criminals is a punishment or not. His argument was that the framers of the
“deportation court sentence” in the British Empire had always settled for deportation as a form of
punishment, alongside other forms of punishment such as imprisonment or the death penalty.
Bleichmar traced the banishment of criminals in the British Isles to as early as the twelfth-century
when Anglo-Saxon institutions used banishment or deportation as a form of punishment. In those
societies, anyone who committed a crime would first flee for refuge to consecrated soil for
sanctuary, usually a sacred place that under Christian tradition would protect a man from
punishment. The criminal then had 40 days after taking sanctuary to confess to the crime and take
an oath to leave the kingdom and not return unless permitted to do so by the Crown. A convict’s
confession often gave them a safe passage to an assigned port from which departure from the
kingdom was mandatory. However, due to public opposition to this form of punishment, in 1623,
King James I abolished the punishment of banishment altogether. It was not until the early 18 th
century that the punishment of banishment (or transportation) would re-appear in English society.
Its proponents argued that it was a merciful act, in that the convict was provided an opportunity to
make a fresh start in a new land. The punishment also served the state by removing from society
individuals who had proven to be a danger to the community – like the death penalty.
As such, in late 1717, the “Transportation Bill” was introduced in the House of Commons, which
led to the enactment of the “Transportation Act of 1718.” Those who supported the bill argued
that it would serve the purpose of relieving the society from robbery, burglary, and other felonies.
The Transportation Act was revolutionary in terms of the administration of punishment in three
key areas: Firstly, it created a statutory basis for a middle alternative to the death penalty and
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benefit of clergy. From then onwards, “transportation” became the normal sentence for those
convicted of “clergyable” offences – such as the receiving and buying of stolen goods. Secondly,
the act also gave the courts powers to directly order felons to be transported, but also to directly
contract private merchants for the transportation of the felons. Previously, the final decision of
transportation of convicts was made by the Crown after referral by the courts. Lastly, the act also
allocated public funds to ensure that felons were in fact taken to the colonies and not let loose by
unscrupulous merchants. The act provided that merchants would be paid a fee of £3 by the
Treasury for each convict to be taken across the Atlantic.209
In the 1915 uprising in Nyasaland, a significant number of Africans, sometimes whole villages,
were subjected to the punishment of paying fines for their role in the uprising. The fines in question
had the approval of the British government, through the then Secretary of State for the Colonies,
Andrew Bonar Law. The following minute illustrates that “seal of approval” from the British
government: “I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch No.126 of the 21 st of
June and to inform you that I approve of your action with regard to the infliction of fines on natives
in certain districts in connection with the native rising.”210 The orders for fines as a form of
punishment emanated from the Collective Punishment Ordinance of 1909, from which Section
2(a) provided for a collective punishment to groups of people deemed to have colluded with or
harbored or failed to take all reasonable means to prevent the escape of any criminal.211
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The Executive Council meeting of March 30th, 1915 analyzed intelligence reports indicating that
some villages in the central and southern provinces had colluded with the “rebels” and had not
rendered due assistance to the government. A fine of four shillings was fixed for those convicted
an amount which was the equivalent of half the hut tax. The Executive Council passed the
following resolution: “The Council advised and His Excellency ordered that under Section 2 the
Ordinance should be applied to particular areas or localities where it has appeared that the
inhabitants thereof had colluded with the authors of the rising and had not given active assistance
in apprehending the rebels but that the question as to the exact areas, localities or villages to which
the Ordinance should be applied be further considered on the receipt of Residents’ reports on the
subject.”212 Below is a sample of how the orders to punish African felons through the payment of
fines were worded:
I have the honour to inform you that it has been decided to impose the Collective
Punishment Ordinance, 1909, to the following areas in your district, viz:- … (certain
areas as defined by the Executive Council with boundaries herewith set forth) on the
ground that the inhabitants of such areas have colluded with the rebels and have not
rendered that assistance expected of them in connection with the quelling of the recent
native rising.
You should summon before you Chiefs of the District, take such evidence as in your
opinion would be sufficient to prove the charge and then call upon the Chiefs to show
cause why the Ordinance should not be applied.
I shall be obliged by your holding the enquiry as soon as possible and returning the
minutes to me without delay.213
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It is important to note that the application of these collective punishments under the Collective
Punishment Ordinance, 1909, only helped to “legalize” and perpetuate British colonial dominance
and repression. Most of the Africans subjected to the fines were already presumed “guilty” and
subjected to the “staged” inquiries where they were expected to prove their innocence under district
magistrates, who themselves were part and parcel of the colonial administrative machinery.
Furthermore, the fines that were imposed, half the rate of a hut tax, were another form of state-led
exploitation of the native peoples – whose land, labor and revenue had already been appropriated
by the state authorities, as discussed in chapter three of this study. It was also immoral, insensitive,
inhumane and unmerciful on the part of the British officials in the Protectorate to punish the
Africans at a time when they were most needed to “fight for Britain” and the Empire in the First
World War, with troops from Nyasaland essential in protecting Britain’s East African interests and
imperial possessions.
As already alluded to, it was common practice across the British Empire to deport felons since the
twelfth-century, and later through the Transportation Act of 1718. In Nyasaland, the colonial
authorities adopted the same principles during and after the 1915 uprising. The sentence of
transportation or deportation had already been “legalized” or formalized through the enactment of
the British Central Africa Order-in-Council of 1902, which had some of the following conditions:
First, where an offender convicted before any court was sentenced to imprisonment, the
commissioner, later governor, acting under Section 7 of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890, had
the powers to order the convicted felon to be removed to some part of His Majesty’s dominions
out of the United Kingdom, and to a place where the recipient government had consented to receive
the felons. Second, in cases where it was shown and proven to the commissioner that any person
was conducting themselves so as to be dangerous to peace and good order in the Protectorate, or
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had been endeavoring to excite enmity between the people of Protectorate and His Majesty, or
intriguing against His Majesty’s power and authority in the Protectorate, the Commissioner had
the powers, where he saw fit, to order that person to be deported from the Protectorate to any place
as directed by the Commissioner. The said place could be in any of His Majesty’s dominions, and
that the convicted felon had no right to appeal against the Commissioner’s decision or verdict.
Third, where a person was deported and decided to return to the Protectorate without the
permission in writing of the Secretary of State, that person was deemed guilty of committing an
offence and liable on conviction to imprisonment for any period not exceeding three months, with
or without a fine not exceeding £50, after-which the person could be deported again.214
The deportations that took place in Nyasaland received the full blessing of the British Government
under the sanctions of an Order of His Majesty in Council, and was communicated to Governor
George Smith, and later included in the Nyasaland Government Gazette of August 29th, 1917. Part
of the British Government’s approval read as follows: “…And whereas by an Order of His Majesty
the King-in-Council, bearing the 12th day of August, 1915, His Majesty, by virtue and in exercise
of the powers in that behalf by the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts, 1890 and 1913, or otherwise in His
Majesty vested, was pleased, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, to order that the Colonial
Prisoners Removal Act, 1869, should, from the date of the said Order, apply to the Nyasaland
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Protectorate, as though that Protectorate were, within the meaning of the said Act, a Colony not
having a Legislative Body…”215
This then gave powers to the Nyasaland government in the aftermath of the 1915 uprising, in
conjunction with the CO to collaborate and deport those suspected to have taken part or assisted
in the uprising, processes that affected both Africans and peoples of Western origin. On the side
of the Africans, three religious leaders, with distant connections to Rev. Chilembwe, named Pastor
Elliot Kamwana, Pastor Yohane Chirwa and Pastor W. Mwenda (all from the Watch Tower
Movement) were all deported to Mauritius, at the beginning of December 1916.216 The exigencies
of the charges and deportation of the three members of the clergy were that they had provided
support to the native uprising and also that they had been carrying and distributing documents of
a seditious character in the Protectorate. In the case of Pastor Elliot Kamwana, he had already been
previously deported from the Protectorate in 1909, for his religious activities, and had only been
allowed back into the Protectorate in September 1914, from his exile in Portuguese East Africa.
According to colonial government intelligence sources, the three pastors had not been directly
involved in the planning of the native uprising, however the reports noted that the pastors knew
what was going on (were privy to the plans of the uprising), and that the three religious leaders
had also been caught secretly authoring their own seditious document. The Nyasaland government
also argued that pastor Elliot Kamwana was a keen ally and follower of Joseph Booth, the
missionary suspected to have been one of the masterminds of the uprising. Elliot Kamwana was
also accused of spreading false alarms where he predicted that the world would come to an end at
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the end of 1914, following the second coming of Jesus Christ, due to the outbreak of the First
World War.217
Several Western missionaries suspected of aiding the native uprising were also subjected to the
punishment of deportation. One such person was the American missionary, Mr. Walter B.
Cockerill, of the Seventh Day Baptist Church, who was deported from the Protectorate under
Ordinance No.11 of 1914. He was ordered to proceed to Portuguese East Africa through Port
Herald in the Lower Shire, on April 6th, 1915.218 Upon receiving the deportation orders, Mr.
Cockerill vehemently protested, and wrote to Governor George Smith arguing that he had done
nothing wrong to be given such type of treatment. He wrote to the Governor on April 9th, 1915 as
follows: “Your order directing me to leave the Protectorate received. I hereby protest that I am not
an enemy of the country and have been given no reason for being treated thus. I have heretofore
obeyed the orders and laws of the Government and have been engaged in missionary work which
I believe I have every right to do.”219
Despite his plea for mercy and reconsideration, the Nyasaland government insisted that it would
not reverse its decision, referring Mr. Cockerill to the 1914 Nyasaland Defense Ordinance, enacted
to maintain peace and security in the Protectorate. Part of the reply from the Nyasaland
Government’s representative read as follows: “The right to which reference has been made above
is more particularly vested in the Governor by the Nyasaland Defense Ordinance, 1914, and His
Excellency is and must be sole judge of the sufficiency of the grounds which dictate the exercise
of that right in any particular case. He has decided that the continued presence in this country of
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certain persons, of whom you are one, is particularly undesirable in existing circumstances by
reason of their teaching which, in His Excellency’s judgment, tends to unsettle and disturb the
minds of the native population.”220
The other strategy of counter-insurgency, closely related to the employment of fines and
deportations, was the state’s use of strict rules and regulations of censorship. In 1916, the
Nyasaland government enacted the “British Protectorates (Defense) Order-in-Council,” which
began the process of strict censorship of perceived seditious publications. Under the 1916 order,
the following regulations were put in force: no person, either a proprietor or a manager of a
telegraph line or operator of a telegraph line in the protectorate was to be allowed to dispatch any
message unless and until it was first approved by a censor; no person, whether a proprietor or a
manager of a printing press was allowed to publish and circulate their publication without first
getting the approval of a censor; the contravention of these rules and regulations was to be
punishable by imprisonment with or without hard labor for a term not exceeding six months, or by
a fine not exceeding £100, or by both imprisonment and fine, or in extreme cases one would also
be sentenced to death, if found to be assisting enemies of the state.221
In May 1917, the 1916 Defense Ordinance was also amended to include some of the following
terms and conditions: First, that no person was to knowingly print, publish, circulate or have in
possession any publication that contained seditious articles or articles likely to promote
disaffection, alarm or despondency or to interfere with the success of the British Government and
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the Nyasaland Government. Second, no person was allowed, without lawful authority, to transmit
or post or convey or attempt to convey, to or from the Protectorate, or receive or have in possession
of susceptible documents, and of documents whose writing was not clearly visible. Third, that
proprietors or managers or operators of telegraph lines would dispatch information only after the
approval of a government-appointed censor. Fourth, that all printed material in the protectorate
had to first receive the approval of a government-appointed censor before circulation to the public.
Five, the punishment for those found in contravention of these laws remained the same as that of
1916 (i.e. imprisonment for a time not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding £100, or both
fine and imprisonment).222 Just as in the 1916 Defense Ordinance, the 1917 Ordinance did not
specify which publications would be deemed unwelcome or seditious, and thus left the law subject
to abuse by the state authorities.
In 1918, the colonial state also enacted the “Seditious Publication (Prohibition) Ordinance” which
was essential for blocking the distribution of materials or documents that could incite more native
resistance. The said ordinance targeted the prohibition of publications including newspapers,
books, and other documents (such as paintings, photographs, and drawings). The ordinance was
essential because of the perception and discovery that the organizers of the uprising, especially
Rev. Chilembwe, had been in touch with dissidents such as the missionary Joseph Booth, who had
been an “enemy” of the colonial state since the late 1890s. The 1918 ordinance targeted persons
resident in the protectorate found in possession of the “unspecified” publications either as a printer,
publisher, importer, seller, and distributor. It was incumbent upon state authorities to determine
whether the said publication would incite violence, murder, hatred, and contempt against both the
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British government and the Nyasaland government or indeed any British colonial possession. Once
the authorities had made the determination, those charged under that law, had to have their
publications forfeited, destroyed or otherwise disposed of as directed by the Governor. The 1918
ordinance also provided that any person who was found guilty of the offences outlined was to be
imprisoned for life, or sometimes to a pay a fine not exceeding £500 depending on the severity of
the case.223
Commissions of Inquiry, Counter-insurgency, and Development
Amidst the chaos created by the uprising, Governor George Smith, with approval of the CO,
constituted a Commission of Inquiry (COI), to investigate the underlying causes of the 1915
disturbances. As I will discuss in chapters five and six, the subsequent leadership of the Nyasaland
Protectorate in the 1950s and later independent Malawi between 1994 and 1996, would also adopt
a similar strategy to investigate past atrocities to “catch” their opponents and to implicate the
culprits and perpetrators. In almost all the cases discussed in this study, it came out very clearly
that the findings of such inquiries were often “doctored” to suit the views of those with positions
of power, especially where the practice has historically been that the findings of these commissions
should only be made public upon the approval of the authority (either the governor or the state
president). The flip side of the COI reports analyzed in this study is that some of their
recommendations, where implemented, brought about positive outcomes for the natives/citizens
of the country and were partly responsible for the establishment of pro-native welfare programs.

“The Seditious Publication (Prohibition) Ordinance, 1918,” in Ordinances of the Nyasaland Protectorate for Year
ended 31st December 1913 (Zomba: Government Printer, 1919). See also “Order Number 3 of 1918,” The Nyasaland
Government Gazette, March 23rd, 1918.
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The calls for a COI to be instituted came from a number of quarters, including the Nyasaland
Legislative Council, religious bodies, and also from European settlers resident in the Protectorate.
The Nyasaland Legislative Council, for instance, deliberated on the causes of the 1915 native
uprising during its meetings in April 1915. During the deliberations, The Honorable and Rev. Dr.
Laws moved a motion that a Commission of Inquiry be appointed to consist of representatives of
the key interested parties in the Protectorate, to be tasked with inquiring into the origins, cause,
history and the extent or scope of the native uprising. Furthermore, he suggested that the said
Commission should inquire on whether any warnings had been given to the authorities; whether
various steps had been taken for the suppression of the uprising; whether there were any grievances
or other causes of the native discontent; and also to suggest remedies that could be used to prevent
the outbreak of further uprisings.224
In its complaints to the CO, following the detention of its missionaries in Nyasaland, the Church
of Christ Mission, through its headquarters in Great Britain, also called for the establishment of a
COI, which, church authorities argued, would help to absolve the detained missionaries of any
wrong doing. The leadership of the church argued that the mere connections that existed between
the missionaries and some of the rebels did not mean that the missionaries had been part and parcel
of the native insurgency.225 There was also pressure for a commission from other interested groups,
such as the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, from its headquarters in London, and
the influential Chamber of Agriculture and Commerce in Nyasaland. Both groups also called on

“The Chilembwe Trouble: The Debate in the Council,” The Nyasaland Times, April 22nd, 1915.
General Secretary of the Churches of Christ Foreign Missions Committee in Great Britain and Ireland, to the Under
Secretary of State, July 9th, 1915, BNA: CO 525/65.
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the Nyasaland government to coordinate with the British government, to institute an inquiry to
investigate the origins, causes, and history of the uprising.226
It was out of this pressure and upon recommendations from the CO that Governor George Smith
set up a COI in May 1915. The commission was comprised of the following personnel: R.W. LyallGrant (Judge of the High Court and Chair of the Commission); Aubrey M. D. Turnbull, Esq.
(Assistant Chief Secretary); Joseph C. Casson, Esq. (Superintendent of Native Affairs); The
Venerable Arthur G.B. Glossop (Archdeacon of Likoma and of the Universities Mission to Central
Africa); Claude Metcalfe, Esq. (from Blantyre, and a representative of the Planting and
Commercial society, as Manager of the British Central Africa Company). The Commission was
appointed under the Commission of Inquiry Ordinance of 1914, which gave powers to the
Governor to institute such a body to investigate matters arising in the protectorate. The
commission’s terms of reference were to investigate a number of issues concerning the native
uprising, with four key guiding principles: (1) the origin, causes and objects of the said rising,
whether it was general or confined to particular classes of Africans, to what extent it could have
been attributed to false ideas acquired and disseminated by emigrant Africans who had returned to
the Protectorate, to correspondence between persons resident in other countries and local Africans
or to literature circulated among the more educated Africans; (2) any alleged grievances of the
Africans which led to the uprising, whether against Europeans generally or against particular

“Petition for Appointment of Commission Presented,” Extract from The African World April 24th, 1915, BNA: CO
525/65. See also Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, to Hon. Lewis Harcourt, M.P., The Principal
Secretary of State for the Colonies, May 10th, 1915, BNA: CO 525/65. According to Bernard Porter, the Anti-Slavery
and Aborigines Protection Society was founded in the 1830s. And since its inception had preached about moderating
Britain’s imperial destiny, by among other things encouraging the spread of Christian values and justice in Britain’s
colonial possessions. In other words, they were proponents of the “civilizing mission”, addressed in chapter three of
this study. See Bernard Porter, Critics of empire: British radical attitudes to colonialism, 1895-1914 (New York:
Macmillan, 1968), 50-52.
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classes of the community; (3) the adequacy or otherwise of the means available for obtaining
information on the state of African feeling; and (4) the effects of mission teaching – religious,
educational, or individual – on the African mind and character.227
It is important to note that the commission was only comprised of European colonists (judicial,
administrative, missionary, and planter personnel), and left out the Africans, whose grievances
contributed to the uprising. Furthermore, in the accompanying notes to be acted upon by the
commission, it seemed very clear that colonial authorities knew what had led to the uprising, but
only constituted the commission either to be seen as a listening or caring government or to use the
findings of the inquiry to the state’s own advantage and to legitimize the violence that had been
targeted against the African insurgents. For instance, the accompanying notes highlighted the
following sentiments: (1) to find out if the uprising had only been led by educated Africans; (2)
whether one of the key grievances of the natives revolved around the question of land alienation
and distribution; (3) whether the Ethiopian Movement played a role in the native uprising; (4)
whether the exploitation of African labor by European settlers played a role in the uprising; (5)
whether Africans were unhappy with the general administration of justice in the Protectorate,
especially in cases involving Whites and other colored classes; (6) to look into the effectiveness
of the Nyasaland Police and other forms of district administration; and (7) to conduct a thorough
analysis of the teachings and activities of Christian mission stations, especially their influence on
the African mind.228
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The COI, under Judge Lyall-Grant, concluded its investigation and presented its report to Governor
Smith by early 1916. The findings of the inquiry were wide-ranging, and almost all the key areas
pointed to issues already known to the colonial authorities, including: first, that the uprising had
been largely engineered by, and almost confined to, the educated Africans. It was the educated
Africans who often complained about ill-treatment, including writing letters to newspaper editors.
That finding, clearly implicated Rev. Chilembwe and his accomplices, and other educated elites
in the protectorate. And yet as has been explained in chapter three of this study, the grievances
which the Africans had (over land, taxation, and labor) were not just concentrated on the demands
of the elites, as they affected both the African elites and the ordinary people. Furthermore, when
using brutal force to defeat the insurgents, the government authorities did not spare the ordinary
people from the state-sponsored forms of violence. The report simply zeroed in on the teachings
of Rev. Chilembwe and his misunderstandings with some European planters such as those from
the Bruce Estates to conclude that the uprising was more personal to the Reverend rather than a
wider expression against European rule. It also referred to Rev. Chilembwe’s past experiences
such as his close relationship with the deported missionary Joseph Booth and the Reverend’s
(Chilembwe) experiences in the USA where he received his pastoral training, as being the sources
of his radical principles. Secondly, the report also blamed the teachings of Christian mission
stations, both Western-led and African-led, where the teachings were said to be responsible for
radicalizing the natives. As already alluded to, the relationship between the colonial state and the
missionaries had, since the era of Sir Harry Johnston as commissioner, already been shaky, where
the state authorities accused the missionaries of being hypocrites and self-righteous, while the
missionaries, on the other hand, accused the state authorities of ill-treating the Africans. It has also
been established that even before the appointment of the commission, the state authorities had
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already arrested, detained, and later deported some religious leaders of both African and Western
origin. In the Shire Highlands area, some mission structures (in the form of schools and chapels)
had been ransacked, destroyed and looted under state orders.229 As such, the findings of the
commission simply vindicated the government’s actions as they implicated the missionaries to
have been part of the uprising.
From the key findings, it was clear that there was no space to blame the colonial state for the
atrocities committed by its agents in the immediate aftermath of the uprising. As already
highlighted, the state authorities embarked on a merciless execution of those suspected to have
taken part in the uprising. The report also deliberately overlooked the destruction and looting that
occurred in the Shire Highlands area, where whole villages were set on fire as punishment for their
alleged complicity in the uprising. In a way, the report indirectly vindicated the state’s use of
violence, despite the unlawful and inhumane nature of the actions of the state’s agents (the police,
the NVR, and some soldiers) whose target had been to re-establish colonial dominance through
violent means.
The commission’s report also presented several recommendations to be addressed. First, it
proposed that the colonial state had to take more strict control of certain forms of religious
literature and missionary agencies of a certain type, especially those without satisfactory European
control or without proper religious considerations. The state was urged, under those proposals, not
to infringe upon the conditions set by the “Brussels Treaty” which guaranteed religious liberty and
freedom of religious teaching. However, that caution did not apply to the threat posed by the
Mohammedanism Movement due to its violent activities. Secondly, the commission also
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recommended that the colonial state should begin to take an active role in the “development” of
the African – focusing on areas such as opening more education opportunities, and access to land
and its related agricultural usage. This, as I argue in the rest of this study, represented the beginning
of the use of “the carrot” as a means with which to fight against African resistance. There was a
realization that the use of brutal force was an unsustainable means with which to deter Africans
from challenging state authority. On the other hand, this also showed that African agency or input
in the colonial enterprise, played a significant role in the determination of the formulation of
colonial policies and practices. In the education sector, the report for instance suggested that the
government should appoint a director of education; and an advisory board made up of members of
the various missionary agencies in the country to co-operate with the government in dealing with
the differences that appeared between the two sides. The report deplored the lack of government
interest in the education sector, where the government had been subsidizing the sector with only
£1,000 per year. Under this recommendation the report urged the state authorities to desist from
simply using brutal force to defeat African insurgents, but by looking at means and ways of
uplifting the livelihoods of the same Africans who had been accused of plotting to overthrow the
colonial state. The report deplored the colonial state’s lack of investment in native education, by
making comparisons with government spending on education in other British colonies in Africa,
as shown in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Comparing Government spending on Education in British Colonies, 1916
British Colony/Protectorate

Amount spent per pupil

Cape Colony
Natal
Bechuanaland
Basutoland
Gold Coast
Southern Nigeria
Nyasaland

15s 9d per pupil
14s 4d per pupil
10s per pupil
13s 5d per pupil
6s 3d per pupil
10s per pupil
2d per pupil

Source: Report on the Government Commission of Inquiry into the Recent Native Rising, June
19th, 1916, BNA: CO 525/71.
It must be noted that in Nyasaland, the government’s contribution to the education sector had been
to support Christian mission schools, a practice which continued well into the 1920s. In 1923, the
British Government instituted an advisory committee on African education in British tropical
Africa to, among other things, investigate areas where colonial governments could contribute more
to the education sector. The following year, in 1924, the committee coordinated with the PhelpsStokes Commission, where officials from the two concerned parties investigated the protectorate’s
educational systems and facilities. The Phelps-Stokes Commission was a US-based humanitarian
organization, in existence since 1908, with special interests in education in tropical Africa. Among
other issues highlighted in the report of the Phelps-Stokes Commission, were the deplorable
conditions for African education in the protectorate, and the lack of government investment in the
education sector. It also noted the general high levels of poverty for the Africans, including its
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description of Nyasaland as the poorest colony in Africa. It thus recommended the setting up of a
Department of Education, to coordinate education provision in the country.230
It was not until May 1926 that a department of education was established, to take over “the burden”
previously shouldered by the various missionary groups. In 1927, an Education Ordinance was
also passed, which provided for the institution of a board of education to act as an advisory body
on all educational matters, and for the appointment of provincial and district school committees to
deal with native or local educational demands.231 In 1928-29, further government intervention led
to the laying of the foundations of the Jeanes Training Center at Domasi in Zomba, which became
the first state-funded teachers’ training center in the protectorate. The government had also
increased its annual subsidy to the education sector from the meagre £1,000 by granting the
mission-led schools a figure of £7,842 in the 1928 fiscal year.232 By 1930, the British government
had also approved a grant to the Nyasaland government for a sum of £8,040 from the Colonial
Development Fund, to be used for the establishment of a training institute and hostel, at which to
train the natives in such areas as teaching; telegraphy and telephony; printing and composing;
commercial and accounting work; carpentry, joinery and smith’s work. 233 In the 1938-39 annual
budget (before the outbreak of the Second World War and its accompanying disturbances), the
Nyasaland government provided a total of £21,216 to the education department, from which
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£11,250 was set aside for grants to mission schools. The previous year (1937), the government had
spent a total of £18,787 on the education sector.234
By the 1920s, the policy perspective of the British government had become one which argued that
opening more schools and the colonial government’s involvement in the education sector would
in a way contribute to economic development in the colonies. It was also the British government’s
position that the education opportunities would create a desire amongst the Africans to participate
in the white man’s enterprise – “which offered so many new opportunities for adventure and for
earning money when the old tribal activities, migration, fighting, and hunting were becoming more
and more restricted, and also to a general demand from the European trader or settler for African
assistants, African artisans and labor”.235 It also became imperative for the CO to encourage the
education of Africans, because it needed the human resources to take up the responsibilities under
the system of “Indirect Rule”, which had been implemented in other British colonies, beginning
with northern Nigeria, using more local personnel to assume government posts and
responsibilities. The establishment of the departments of agriculture, forestry, and health, among
others required large numbers of African assistants. Furthermore, there was also need for
manpower to construct roads, harbors, and railways – duties that needed both the physical and
mental know-how.236
By then, the view from the CO was that the provision of basic or elementary education (primary
and secondary education) opportunities could also form part and parcel of the “civilizing mission”
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or “trusteeship”, a theme that has been extensively covered in chapter three of this study. With
lessons drawn from British-ruled India, the curriculum was to among other things include such
areas as arts and crafts, hygiene and sanitation, writing skills, and mathematics. It would also
include religious education, which was thought to be essential towards replacing the supernatural
beliefs of the Africans. African religious beliefs were deemed to be barbarous and inhuman, such
that they had to be replaced by the European religious values. One of the leading proponents of
this view was Sir Frederick Lugard, who argued as follows:
As applied to backward races, the word “education” must be used in its derivative sense
as the “bringing forth” of the latent possibilities in the individual, or the community –
the guiding of the evolution of a race to a higher plane of thought and action. …
In Africa, the object in view is to enable the African to “find himself” – to emerge from
the habit of mind which has through centuries marked him out as the slave of other
races; to show him the higher rungs of the ladder which lead from mere obedience to
co-operation, from servile imitation to individual initiative and a sense of personal
responsibility – in short, “a new way of life,” with higher standards of duty and of
efficiency.237

By the 1930s, as already alluded to, the Nyasaland government had begun to use extensive amounts
of money from the annual budget to help in the education of Africans. Although the amount spent
was not the largest chunk from the total revenue collected, the money was still significant and
more substantive than the pre-World War One figures. The table below illustrates that perspective.

237

See Education in Tropical Africa, August 1930, BNA: CO 879/123/12, African, No.1135. This piece was adopted
and included in the CO file, from The Rt. Hon. Sir F.D. Lugard, “Education in Tropical Africa,” The Edinburgh
Review, July 1925. In his speech, Lugard also referred to the influential role of the Phelps-Stokes Commission and the
advisory committee on African education, in shaping what became of British colonial education policies from the
mid-1920s onwards. These issues have also been highlighted elsewhere by Joseph M. Hodge. See Joseph M. Hodge,
Triumph of the expert: Agrarian doctrines of development and the legacies of British colonialism (Athens, OH: Ohio
University Press, 2007), 126-134.

157

Table 4.2: Percentages of Revenue Spent on African Education in Nyasaland, 1930-1934

Year

Revenue (£)

Expenditure on
Education (£)

1930
1931
1932
1933
1934

381,610
370,403
530,931
541,181
560,552

13,200
18,825
17,104
16,106
17,491

Percentage
spent on
education
2.8
3.2
3.2
3
3.2

Source: W.R. Bryant Mumford and B.N Parker, “Education in British African dependencies: A
review of the 1935 annual reports on native education in Nyasaland, N. Rhodesia, Tanganyika,
Uganda, Gold Coast, Nigeria and Sierra Leone,” Journal of the Royal African Society (Jan.1937):
20. Adopted from Education of African Communities in Social and Economic Development in
Native Territories, BNA: CO 847/9/1.

A COI appointed by the CO in 1937 to investigate Nyasaland’s financial position and further
development also discussed the progress of African education. The commission was led by R.D.
Bell and worked in the Protectorate between October 15th and December 4th, 1937. Among other
issues, the report of the commission highlighted some notable state interventions in the education
sector, beginning with the establishment of the Department of Education in 1926. In 1927, the first
education ordinance was enacted which provided that the government should increase its grants to
schools, based on the number of students in training. In 1930, another education ordinance was
enacted, and it provided for the payment of grants by the government to schools where European
and African teachers were employed and where English was the medium of instruction. Some
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funds were also provided to technical schools, where a trade or industry was taught in addition to
literary instruction, and at boarding schools for girls.238
In 1928, the Nyasaland Government in conjunction with the Carnegie Corporation of New York
established the Jeanes Training Center239 at Domasi in Zomba. The Carnegie Corporation
guaranteed to grant US $5,000 a year for five years on condition that the government would
contribute at least an equal amount. The original plan for the center was to give two-year courses
of training to batches of twenty-four selected mission teachers and their wives. The intention was
that the teachers would afterwards serve as supervisory teachers for the primary schools of their
missions and also, with the help of their wives, assist in general rural uplift. In 1934, the
government also began to use the center to train selected chiefs and their wives, in rural
reconstruction and uplifting courses for a duration of four months. In 1936, further investments
saw the British government pump in some funds amounting to £1,750 from the Colonial
Development Fund, meant for paying additional European staff and housing expenses. Between
1928 and 1937, the Nyasaland government had spent a total of £24,934 on the center, whose
outcomes had been the graduation of 75 supervisory teachers and sixty wives and the training of
19 African chiefs. In 1938, the year the report came out, the center had in its enrollment twentyfour trainee teachers and their wives, and twenty-two welfare workers and their wives. The twoyear courses given to the teachers/supervisors included, for the men – methods and practice of
teaching; child study; social and class management; hygiene and sanitation; agriculture and nature
studies; handwork; blackboard work and drawing; civics; book-keeping; singing; simple physical
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drill; and training in general village improvement work. The wives were instructed in mid-wifery;
child welfare; hygiene and sick nursing; home-craft; cooking; sewing and handcrafts. The
community workers’ course, which also lasted two years, was designed by the Native Welfare
Committee, and it included instruction in medicine; hygiene and sanitation; agriculture and soil
management; forest policy and management; animal husbandry, and the use and preparation of
manure. The training was provided by state technical officers from the medical, agricultural,
forestry, and veterinary departments.240 It is important to note that the idea to offer the Africans
instruction in improved methods of agriculture was also put across by the commission charged to
investigate the causes of the outbreak of the 1915 uprising, to augment mission work, with a goal
to improve the African as an individual and also his own community development.241
As highlighted above, it must be noted that it was only elementary forms of education that were
offered to the Africans. Until the late 1930s, the Nyasaland authorities often complained and
argued that the protectorate was not ready to offer university education, both due to lack of
education facilities and finances to embark on such endeavors. Remarks by the Director of
Education, T.N. Lacey, supported by Governor Sir H. Kittermaster, in 1934, supported that school
of thought and policy framework as follows:
As I stated before the Advisory Committee in London, I am in complete agreement with
these arguments as applied generally to British Tropical Africa. My only fear is that we
in East and Central Africa may be rushed into university education long before we are
ready for it. On the West Coast, owing largely to economic conditions, education
generally is far more advanced than in East and Central Africa. …
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Our most urgent need at present and for more years to come will be secondary education
– and even this is impossible for financial reasons until the earning and spending power
of the man in the village has increased considerably. 242

The other notable recommendation from the report on the 1915 uprising tackled the question of
redistribution of land (that is for Africans to have access to some form of life tenancy on land),
and the position of Africans resident on private estates owned by European settlers, where most of
the trouble leading to the uprising emanated from. The commission recommended that where there
was enough land, the Africans should be allowed to build schools and churches for themselves;
and deplored the unfriendly conditions at the Bruce Estates, where the African tenants had very
limited rights to the land. The commission noted that at the Bruce Estates, the management
operated a rent system where they refused to accept money payments, only African labor. Africans
were forced to work for one month in the wet season for rent, and for another month also in the
wet season for hut tax. A month was reckoned at 28 days actual work, and it was stated before the
commission that in other instances, the Africans were compelled to work considerably longer
periods. For instance, where an African had failed to complete a day’s task, they were not given
credit for the time they had worked, and hence forced to work extra days.243 The first step taken to
resolve the land question came through the enactment of the “Native Rents (Private Estates)
Ordinance of 1917.” The ordinance intended to reduce the powers which land owners had over
Africans resident on their estate, by, among other things, prohibiting the soliciting of the tenants’
labor as payment for rent. The ordinance recommended that the land owner and the tenants should

242

(Higher education in Africa): memorandum by AT Lacey (Nyasaland) on the Currie Report, CO 847/4/3, no.28,
enclosure, 29 October 1934. Lacey was replying to the findings of an Advisory Committee on Education, which
released its report earlier that year. Adopted from S.R, Ashton and S.E. Stockwell, eds., Imperial Policy and Colonial
Practice, 1925-1945, Part II: Economic Policy, Social Policies, and Colonial Research (London: HMSO, 1996), 244245
243
Nyasaland Rising Commission of Inquiry (Zomba: Government Printer, 1916). BNA: WO/106/262 and BNA: CO
525/71.

161

enter into a contract in which the tenants would pay an agreed amount of money as rent whose
amount had to be fixed by the governor. The said rent should then entitle the tenant to have a site
for his hut and some cultivable land required to grow food crops for the subsistence of the tenant’s
family. It also required the estate owner to provide grass and other materials necessary for the
erection and maintenance of his hut (if the materials were available on the estate). There was also
a provision that the land owner could not forcibly remove the tenants from the estate, unless a
notice, (given through the district resident), of not less than six months had been issued prior to
the eviction. It also required that the tenants could not be evicted until they had been allowed to
harvest their crops.244
As argued in chapter three of this study, there were limits to which the colonial authorities could
continuously suppress the colonized subjects. The colonial state, as the one in Nyasaland, had to
take into consideration the demands of the Africans, sometimes to the detriment of the demands
of the “gentlemanly capitalists” then operating in Nyasaland. The maintenance of law and order
and general stability in the protectorate was essential to assure the continuation of the colonial
enterprise. The African communities were the major source of revenue (through taxes) and labor
on which the colonial state relied. This, as I argue here and beyond, often included listening to and
fulfilling the demands of the colonized peoples.
Anthony E. Woods Jr., in his discussion of the Nyasaland government’s reactions to the 1915
uprising, argued that in the aftermath of the uprising, the colonial state had realized that it could
no longer afford to overlook the native grievances, and that the enactment of the land tenure
changes had been one of such new pro-African policies. He argued that, at that time, the colonial
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authorities had reached a stage where they were prepared to come up with policies, some of which
were antagonistic to capitalist (European settler) economic interests. In a way, as argued by
Woods, that also marked a process where the state was becoming more and more autonomous
from the influence of the settler capitalists. The new land tenure system allowed for Africans to
own more land for the cultivation of both cash and subsistence crops. Woods hinted about the
advantages of such a policy trend as follows: “The political basis for such decisions are relatively
obvious. A population with a vested interest in land, no matter how disadvantageous vis-à-vis other
groups in the country, is always less susceptible to rebel against authority. The state always has
the means of revoking the small privileges granted at the first signs of discontent or rebellion.”245
Due to limited changes brought about by the “Native Rents (Private Estates) Ordinance of 1917,”
in 1920, Governor Smith also instituted another COI, under the “Commission of Inquiry
Ordinance, 1914.” That commission was tasked to look further into the question of land occupation
and allocation in the protectorate, as a follow up to the recommendations of the 1917 “Native Rents
(Private Estates) Ordinance”, especially because the European settlers (land owners) had often
disobeyed the rules and regulations of the 1917 Ordinance, including subjecting the tenants to the
Thangata system.246 The 1920 commission was comprised of the following personnel: His Honor
Edward St. John Jackson, Esq. (Judge of the High Court and Chair of the Commission); Claude
Ambrose Cardew, Esq. (Senior District Resident); Jacobus Stewart Johnston McCall, Esq.
(Director of Agriculture); Bertram Edward Lilley, Esq. (Lands Officer); The Rev. Alexander
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Hetherwick (from the Blantyre Mission); John Scott, Esq. (Solicitor); Robert Spence Hynde, Esq.
(Businessman); and Mr. Geoffrey Cheston. The commission’s terms of reference were as follows:
(1) to review the existing laws and policies of land tenure especially for non-Africans; (2) to find
out if there were further areas where to set aside land for settlement of non-Africans; (3) to
investigate the feasibility of creating reserves for the settlement of Africans, both in the rural areas
and near townships; (4) to find means and ways of including the Africans in the cultivation of
industrial and economic crops on Crown Lands; and (5) to investigate the status of Africans
resident on private estates.
The 1920 Commission conducted its investigations between September and December of that year.
Most of its sessions were conducted in Blantyre, and were open to the public, with the first 17 days
set aside for discussion among the members on the scope of the inquiry, the collection of
provisional views of members, and the discovery of points upon which the evidence of witnesses
seemed desirable. In total, 44 individuals were summoned to give evidence before the commission,
and of that number, 38, including eight Africans and five Asians, attended. Some of the
commission’s key findings and recommendations were as follows: firstly, the commission noted
that the land tenure system of the native societies was that of a communal system. Under that
system, there was no absolute ownership of land by an individual, as land was regarded as
belonging to the community, with the head of each community being responsible for allocating
land to households. The commission recommended to the government not to disrupt the African
land tenure system, and not to institute the policy of creating “native reserves” (i.e. the collection
of large numbers of African in defined areas), as doing so would have disrupted their access to
water sources and expressed concern about the provision of proper sanitation conditions.
Furthermore, “reserves,” as experience had shown in other colonies, were said to be breeding
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grounds for bad behavior and sloth (laziness and reluctance to work). What was needed then was
for the state to provide more access of land for native cultivation and settlement.
Secondly, the commission also recommended that the state should allow more Africans to be
involved in cash-crop production, especially the cultivation of cotton and tobacco on public land
(Crown Land). It was suggested that the increase in cash-crop production would have created more
avenues for extraction of revenues by the state, while at the same time giving the Africans an
opportunity to take part in the protectorate’s commercial activities. However, there was need to
limit African cash-crop production to only a maximum of three acres. Perhaps this was done to
make sure that the African was not totally independent and had to rely on the colonial state for
other social services. Another key recommendation by the Commission was that a system of land
tenure should be devised which would have created individual land ownership by the natives,
especially targeting the educated and propertied elite. In doing so, the Commission argued that it
would have improved methods of native agriculture and the greater economy of the soil. The
Commission also recommended that measures should be put in place to ensure that the “native”
tenants resident on private estates should not be compelled to work for the land owner (under the
Thangata system), but that a rent payment in cash could be the substitute mode of payment. And
that where there was need to pay labor-rent, there was need to specify the amount of time one was
expected to provide the labor. It was also recommended that the native tenants should be given a
fixed tenure policy, starting from four years onwards, to stay on the private estates. It was also
recommended that where the Africans were evicted by a land owner, the state should set aside
some Crown Land for the resettlement of the evictees.247
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What came out clearly from the 1921 Land Commission Report was the need for the colonial state
to begin to consider opening more socio-economic opportunities for the Africans. Since it was a
largely agro-based economy, the settlement of the land question would have settled some of the
grievances that led to the 1915 native uprising. Like the question of opening of education
opportunities, the question of land re-distribution and re-allocation would perform the role of “a
carrot” dangled towards the Africans that would encourage them to associate themselves with a
government that cared for their concerns. Further changes were also made to the land tenure
system, when in 1928 the government enacted the “Natives on Private Estates Ordinance,” which
created three categories for the Africans. Category one was called “exempted natives,” and referred
to domestic servants and temporary laborers. The second category was called “natives under
special agreement” and it included those entitled to stay on the estate subject to a written contract
and provided that they had to work for the land owner for not more than six months in any one
year. The third category was called “resident natives” and it included those who had owned or
resided in a hut on the estate for three years. Such Africans were liable to pay rent to the land
owner at a figure determined by the district rent board subject to the governor’s approval. The
“resident native” was entitled to enough cultivable land to produce his own food supply but could
also grow cash crops at the land owner’s consent.248
In 1936 the Nyasaland government enacted the “Native Trust Land Order-in-Council,” as a byproduct of the decision not to create “native reserves.” The 1936 Order declared that all lands,
other than those already alienated as Crown Lands (for state purposes or occupied by reserve
forests or townships) had to be converted into “native trust lands,” which were to be held for the
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use or common benefit, direct or indirect, of the natives of the protectorate. Under the 1936 order,
the government also officially recognized the “native authorities” (African chiefs) as the guardians
of the land for the community and that with time, the system would evolve to allow individual
ownership of land.249 The “created” native trust lands were to be the third category in the land
tenure system which also recognized “Crown Lands” and “Reserved Lands.” Although African
chiefs were recognized as custodians of “native trust lands,” they were only doing so as
representatives of the Secretary of State for the Colonies in whom the rights to the land had been
vested. Rights of occupancy would be granted for a term of 99 years, at a rent revisable at intervals
of not more than thirty-three years, but before any land grants were to be made, there was a
requirement to consult the Native Authority of the area. From then onwards, Africans settled on
Native Trust Lands stayed there free of rent, on conditions determined by African traditional law
and custom.250 It is important to note that while the Nyasaland government, and to an extent the
British government, showed their willingness to resolve the land question, and indirectly or
directly, to aid African agriculture, there were minor benefits accrued to the Africans, because they
were never given full rights towards ownership of the land. Such conditions, as I will argue in
chapter five of this study, sowed the seeds of further land tenure troubles in the aftermath of the
Second World War.
It also must be borne in mind that from the perspective of British government policies on colonial
development after the First World War, the development and welfare measures were located along
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the same lines as the recommendations that were suggested by the Colonial Development
Committee (CDC) which had been set up in December 1919. 251 The CDC acknowledged that the
British Treasury (BT) had been stretched in terms of spending its resources in the war effort, and
hence could not be expected to continue spending its meagre resources in supplementing colonial
economies. As such there were recommendations, among other things, that it would be important
to tap into the agricultural and mineral resources of the colonies, where the subjects would produce
raw materials for British industries, and have the capacity to supply a great variety of foodstuffs
to the United Kingdom. To British government officials, the colonial empire was at that time
regarded as one with huge potential to revive the British economy which had been battered
severely by Britain’s participation in the First World War.252 In other words, the kind of
development that was initiated during the inter-war period, while it benefited the colonized
peoples, had been deliberately planned to aid and revive the British economy.
In the same vein, the Conservative-led British government of the late 1920s also enacted the
Colonial Development Act (CDA) of 1929, which, although it contributed towards the boosting of
colonial economies through monetary grants and loans, had also been specifically passed to help
in the improvement of trade or commerce and industry and in turn also reduce the levels of
unemployment in the United Kingdom (UK). By the late 1920s and early 1930s, Britain’s
unemployment levels had reached as high as over ten percent hence the need to create avenues for
increased production in the colonies, to create more employment opportunities for British citizens,
as was argued by Leo Amery, the Conservative Secretary of State for the Colonies. One of the key
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issues raised by the Act was how the BT, in conjunction with the CO could advance money to the
colonies for purposes of developing agriculture and industry, which in turn would help to promote
commerce and industry in the UK. Another issue was to provide funds to such sectors as
agricultural production (through provision of farm machinery and other related equipment);
improvements in the communication sector; construction of harbors or improvements in existing
ones; promotion of education and scientific research; provision and promotion of the public health
sector; improvement of water supply and electricity generation – all aimed at meeting the existing
socio-economic needs in the colonies. Finally, the Act was designed as a cure for unemployment
in the UK.253
The latter was also a point of view shared by Stanley Baldwin, British Prime Minister between
1924 and 1929, when he made the following remarks at the Annual Conference of the Conservative
Party on November 21st, 1929: “Our progress depends on our capacity to visualize the Empire, the
Dominions and colonies alike, as one eternal and indestructible unit for production, for
consumption, for distribution, for the maintenance and improvement of the lot of those who, under
Providence, are dwellers within the confines of our Commonwealth.”254 It was clear from the
remarks by the Prime Minister, that the Conservatives believed that time had come for more state
intervention in development in all overseas British possessions, hence the Party’s support for the
CDA of 1929.
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D.J. Morgan also hinted that when the Act was enacted in 1929, it provided for the first time,
regular funds for the development of the colonies. The Act led to the setting up of a Colonial
Development Fund (CDF), into which the British Parliament annually voted such sums as were
estimated to be needed, up to an annual maximum of £1 million. The funding targeted several
development-related areas, including improvements in transport, harbor facilities, fisheries,
forestry, surveys, land reclamation and irrigation, electric power, water supplies, mining, research
and instruction methods of agriculture and industry, and the promotion of public health.255
It was out of the enactment of the CDA in 1929, that the Nyasaland Government received extensive
amounts of funding from the British Treasury (BT), amounting to £726,534 between 1930 and
1936. Out of that amount, £500,000 was earmarked for the purpose of meeting the interest charges
on the Nyasaland Guarantee Loan. Governor Thomas Shenton of Nyasaland had persuaded the
Colonial Development Act Committee (CDAC), chaired by Sir Basil Blackett, that it was essential
for Nyasaland to receive funds under the Act, as its proceeds would aid the development of both
the native and European settler sectors. He argued that the funds, if provided, would help to
improve the welfare of the natives (targeting sectors such as education, public health, agricultural
production, and food supply), who would in turn be more productive in providing the much-needed
labor for European settler production. In turn, that was also going to positively contribute towards
the enhancement of the British economy.256 The table below gives a picture of the distribution of
the rest of the funds:
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Table 4.3: Disbursement of Colonial Development Funds, 1930-1936
TARGETED SECTOR

AMOUNT (£)

Hospitals and Public Health
Water Supply
Geological Survey
Agricultural Development
Public Works
Telegraph and Telephone System
Veterinary Department
Agricultural Surveys
Jeanes Training Center
Financial Commission
Miscellaneous

78,284
75,430
18,000
15,000
12,386
12,310
7,630
3,500
1,750
1,400
844

Total

£226,534

Source: Great Britain, Report of the Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Financial Position
and Further Development of Nyasaland (London: HMSO, 1938), 114-115. See also Colonial
Annual Reports for Nyasaland for 1930-1938. Note that this table excludes expenditure on
education, which has already been covered extensively above.
This section has advanced the argument that the origins of the colonial state’s involvement in the
development of Nyasaland was in significant measure influenced by the outbreak and aftermath
of the 1915 uprising. The findings and recommendations of the commission tasked to investigate
the origins of the uprising, as discussed above, to a large extent called upon the colonial authorities
to find means and ways of uplifting the socio-economic livelihoods of the Africans. Some of the
measures recommended and policies introduced by the colonial state were detriment to the needs
of the “gentlemanly capitalists’ resident in the protectorate. The colonial state had to straddle to
meet the interests of both the Africans and the European settlers, while also meeting the state’s
own imperatives. An analysis of the origins of colonial development policies and initiatives in
Nyasaland, must therefore consider the influence or input of the demands put across by the
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Africans, of which the Chilembwe uprising of 1915 was the peak of such demands. The section
that follows considers the role that the Nyasaland police force played in enhancing colonial
counter-insurgency initiatives.
The reorganization and role of the Police Force
The other key recommendation that came out of the 1915 uprising commission report was for the
Nyasaland government to make improvements in the police system. Specifically, it was
recommended that the police officers receive more training fit for the discharge of their duties.
There was need, the report stated, for better training, to focus on the detection of crime. It was
noted that a large amount of crime in the protectorate often went undetected and unpunished, and
deplored the use of the Collective Punishments Ordinance, because it failed to bring the criminals
to justice. The report also recommended the establishment of a central police training depot, to be
run by expert European staff, with experience to handle native-caused trouble.257
In discussing the development of colonial policing in the Nyasaland Protectorate, I concur with
the work of Martin Thomas, who argues for the adoption of the “political-economy approach” in
the study of the development of colonial policing in the British, French and Belgian empires. 258
Thomas posited that one can understand the activities of the colonial police by analyzing the
existing political-economy, or simply put, to make connections between the politics of imperial
oppression and the economic structures of the European colonies. He pointed to the development
of the colonial state and its needs for revenue (tax collection), land, and labor, which could best be
attained when the colonial state, through the police force, had been able to maintain law and order
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or to combat internal threats. The police forces were serving colonial states that had entangled
themselves in the economic development and exploitation of the colonies, at the level of
production of primary goods; export of those goods; and the control of native labor.259 In the case
of Nyasaland, as already discussed in chapter three of this study, the colonial state had a “handson approach” or “interventionist approach” in matters relating to land alienation, revenue
collection, and labor allocation, hence the turn to the police force to enforce and reinforce those
imperatives. In other words, state repression, through the police force, became crucial to entrench
the political economy of British colonialism in Nyasaland.
Mathieu Deflem provides an important background towards the history of British colonial policing
in Africa, focusing on the Nyasaland, Gold Coast, and Kenya colonies. He posited that in the
British Empire, policing services developed at two main levels. The first group was that of the
Metropolitan Police, which was first established in London in 1829, and was tasked to perform the
role of a civil police force aimed at the preservation of law and order and the prevention and
detection of crime. That group was not organized as a military force, but rather as a civilian force,
put in place to enforce the law, rather than serve the interests of any political government. The
second group was that of the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC), which was established in 1836,
initially to deal with the disturbances in British-occupied Ireland. The latter group was organized
like a military force, where the police agents lived in a barracks and the police units were headed
by a commander who reported directly to the British administration in Ireland. As British colonial
rule spread to Africa in the late nineteenth-century, it was the policemen from the RIC who were
deemed fit to serve in the colonies, as it was argued that force was better suited to establish,
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maintain, and secure the enforcement of British imposed colonial laws. It was later in the colonial
period, after the formative years had passed, that some form of civil policing was employed in the
African colonies, to replace the more militant forms of policing.260
C. Marlow, a former Assistant Commissioner of Police in both the Nyasaland and later Malawi
governments, documented a history of the Malawi Police Force since its inception in the late
nineteenth century. He traced the history of the police force to as far back as 1891, when Sir Harry
Hamilton Johnston, appointed Captain Cecil M. Maguire, to form a military force to police the
protectorate. The initial police force comprised of seventy volunteers from the Indian Army,
mainly Sikhs, some volunteers from Zanzibar, and some British officers, with responsibilities to
help maintain law and order, to suppress the slave trade, and to keep a close guard against the
territorial ambitions of the Portuguese in neighboring Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique). By
1893, some African regular troops also formed part of the police force. In 1896, further changes
were approved when the government approved to form a body of policemen to be attached to each
district, a system which continued up to 1921. These police officers worked under a district
commissioner, whose office received state funding to pay the officers. Due to lack of national
guiding principles for the police officers, it was common for the policemen to abuse their powers
and to go beyond their jurisdiction to demand fowls, food, and beer, and even women from the
local population.261 The sentiments were also expressed in a dispatch from the Governor of
Nyasaland, Hubert Young (1932-1934), to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, when he hinted
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that prior to 1920, the Nyasaland Police consisted entirely of separate native units, stationed at
various district headquarters, and served under respective district administrative officers. Most of
the African policemen were recruited locally targeting those who had served in the KAR, and
hence with limited or no police training.262
Following the recommendations of the commission on the 1915 uprising, after the First World
War, Governor Smith began a process of reforming the police force. In 1919, he proposed (to the
Secretary of State for the Colonies) the need to appoint a chief commissioner of the police force,
and to have a European officer in each district. The Governor also suggested a uniform training
for all police officers, and that the policemen should continue to be armed and organized as a quasimilitary police unit as a symbol of authority and to deal with extensive revolts beyond the scope
of a civil police, and also that the numbers of police personnel had to be increased with more
policemen trained as detectives. All these proposals were duly approved by the London-based
authorities. The changes were deemed necessary to provide the answers to the shortfalls in
policing, where the police had failed to detect the outbreak of the 1915 uprising. The proposed
changes began with the appointment of Major Francis Trant Stephens (a former soldier in the
KAR) as the chief commissioner of the police force in 1920. Governor George Smith approved
the appointment of Major Stephens because of his extensive experience working amongst
Africans, as he had also previously served in the British South Africa Police since 1903. His first
major contribution was to set up the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), headed by a
European police officer, whose role was to detect serious crimes in the country. Major Stephens’
military background and re-organization of the police force, is said to have begun a process of
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diverting the police from its civil responsibilities to a more militant force than had previously been
the case before the native uprising. In 1921, Major Stephens oversaw the establishment of a
Fingerprint Bureau based at Zomba, to detect serious criminals and crimes. Further changes in the
Police Force led to the establishment of a Police Intelligence Bureau in 1939, whose role was
primarily to deal with the threat posed by pro-Nazi and pro-Fascist organizations in East Africa,
who might have infiltrated in Nyasaland. When World War II broke out, the Bureau increased its
censorship activities, and arrested all German nationals in the country, along with other enemy
aliens (especially Italian nationals) who were rounded up by the police in 1940. 263 From 1921
onwards, the re-organization of the police force occurred in the following statistical details, both
in terms of personnel and funding:
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Table 4.4: Nyasaland Police Reinforcements, 1921-1938

Year

No. of
European
Officers

1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938

1
2
13
12
13
14
14
14
14
13
13
13
13
13
13
11
9

No. of Assistant
Asian
African
Superintendents Policemen Ranks
7
11
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
5

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

450
441
457
440
459
474
502
521
515
500
496
496
496
489
499
499
499

Budgeted
Funds (£)
13,616
12,904
14,801
16,144
16,977
18,910
19,724
-

Source: Nyasaland Protectorate, Colonial Annual Reports for Nyasaland from 1921-1938.264

From 1920/21 onwards, the Nyasaland policemen took up such roles as warders of district prisons;
revenue collectors; court servers and messengers; while the chief commissioner of police also
served as the chief inspector of prisons.265 It was also the re-organized police force that began the
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process of political surveillance of those suspected to be enemies of the state. One high profile
case was that of a Mr. Joshua Chateka of the Seventh Day Baptist, who had close links with the
deported American missionary, Walter B. Cockerill, and had been previously detained at Mlanje
Prison in 1915. When he was released the following year, he was warned against further inciting
of the natives to challenge the authority of the government, and he was also marked as an expolitical prisoner. In November 1922, the district magistrate at Lilongwe and the police
commissioner of the central province both recommended that Mr. Chateka should be reimprisoned, and that he should be locked up for the rest of his life. To arrive at that decision, the
government used divide-and-rule tactics, where it summoned two headmen, Masula and Chimdidi
(both from Lilongwe District), to implicate Mr. Chateka, that he had been inciting people in their
areas of jurisdiction to disobey state orders. The recommendation from the police commissioner,
which received full approval from Governor Smith, read as follows:
I notice that Joshua’s second arrest was due to the fact that he preached in contravention
of the conditions under which he was released; not that he preached sedition. It seems
rather best to keep him as a political prisoner for the rest of his life because he could not
resist the temptation to talk in public. Also I think his detention rather tends to give him
and his followers a sense of fictitious importance. ...If Joshua were released, I should
not have the slightest fear of his getting sufficient following in Lilongwe to be a
nuisance. My only doubt is whether any headman can be found willing to let him live
in his village.266

It was not until October 1930, that the political detainee, Mr. Joshua Chateka, who was detained
at Port Herald Prison, located over 500 miles from his home in Lilongwe District, for eight good
years, was finally released. The order for his release was issued by Governor Thomas Shenton
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Whitelegge Thomas (1929-1932), who had been informed that Mr. Chateka had proven to be of
good conduct while in police custody.267
Another equally compelling case was that of the detention of Mr. David Shirt, a resident of Ntcheu
District, and a member of the Church of Christ, and a keen supporter of the teachings of Rev.
Chilembwe. Mr. Shirt too was implicated of misconduct when the police and the courts issued a
subpoena for three headmen (Kwataine, Kachimanga, and Mingola) to present themselves in court
where they gave evidence before Magistrate H.C.J. Barker at Ntcheu, where Mr. Shirt was accused
of preaching sedition. The Acting Provincial Commissioner for the Central Province made the
following recommendation on Mr. Shirt’s case:
It will be noted that Shirt admits that he is preaching the doctrine of the Church of Christ
as expounded by one Njirayafa, a disciple of Mr. Hollis who was deported after the
rebellion of 1915. The Resident, Ntcheu, appears to be under some misapprehension as
to the cause of David Shirt’s original sentence of imprisonment and his finding is
lacking in precision, but the evidence and the attitude of Shirt convinces me that the
continued presence of this native at large in the Ntcheu or any other District would be
dangerous to peace, order and good government, and I therefore wish to recommend
that he be detained as a political prisoner for such time as His Excellency the Governor
may consider necessary.268

Another case of “political imprisonment” in which the Nyasaland police was heavily involved
was the detention of a Mr. Isa Macdonald Lawrence from 1923 to 1928. Lawrence was accused
and charged of possessing “seditious literature” and associating with the Providence Industrial
Mission (PIM) of Rev. Chilembwe. The Nyasaland Police personnel and customs officials found

267

Political Cases: Joshua Chateka, 1922-1930, MNA: S2/39/22. See also MNA: S2/39/22, memo from Governor
George Smith to the District Resident at Lilongwe. In the memo of July 5 th 1918, the Governor issued instructions
using police-sourced intelligence, to detain Mr. Jackson Banda, as a political prisoner at Nkhota-Kota Prison, as he
was deemed to be dangerous to peace, order, and good governance in the Protectorate. Nkhota-Kota Prison was
approximately 300 miles from Lilongwe District.
268
Political Cases: David Shirt, 1923-1924, MNA: S2/102/23. This was a confidential memo from the Acting
Provincial Commissioner, Central Province, to the Chief Secretary at Zomba. December 14 th 1923. The detention of
Mr. Shirt was approved under the Political Removal and Detention of Natives Ordinance.

179

Mr. Lawrence with the said seditious literature, in the form of two newsletters called The Negro
World (an organ of Marcus Garvey’s teachings) and The Workers Herald as he crossed the border
between Nyasaland and Mozambique in 1923. The Workers Herald was published by the Industrial
Commercial Workers Union of Africa, whose headquarters was in Johannesburg in South Africa,
an organization which Mr. Lawrence had expressed interest to join.
Upon his arrest, Lawrence’s case was committed to the high court, where he was charged with
being in contravention of Section 4(2) Seditious Publication Ordinance of 1918, which prohibited
the publication, possession, and distribution of “anti-government” literature. The evidence from
the Government side was provided by Assistant Superintendent of the CID, Mr. Victor Colin
Curnock, who had been responsible for issuing the warrant of arrest when Mr. Lawrence was found
in possession of the newsletters. In his judgment, Judge C.F. Belcher, noted that the accused had
been associating with radical movements such as that led by Marcus Garvey (through The Negro
World) and the Russian Bolsheviks (through The Workers Herald), both of which promoted an
anticipated world revolution. The judge thus sentenced him to three years imprisonment with hard
labor, and to be deported from the Protectorate at the end of his prison stint.269 The National
Secretary of the Workers Union (mentioned above), a man from Nyasaland, named Clements
Kadalie, who exchanged several correspondences with Mr. Lawrence prior to his detention (on the
latter’s intention to join the Trade Union), sent a letter of protest to London directed to the
Secretary for Dominion Affairs, to complain about the ill-treatment of Mr. Lawrence. Part of that
letter read as follows:
…According to Judge Belcher of the Nyasaland High Court, I fail to be convinced that
The Workers Herald referred to by His Honor, a few copies of which I am forwarding
to you for your perusal, is in any way seditious. If The Workers Herald which is the
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official organ of a legitimate Trade Union, is seditious, then I submit all Labor papers,
such as The New Leader, Daily Herald, etc, etc, published in London and elsewhere in
the British Commonwealth of Nations must also be labelled as ‘seditious literature’. But
the conviction of this African Native in Nyasaland, whose sentence to three years hard
labor coupled with deportation from his own native land, one would describe as
outrageous, is that which proves the atrocities being perpetrated upon the African
communities under British rule in Africa. There is much brutality on the natives under
British rule in Africa than what has already been known throughout the civilized world.
I submit Sir, the sentence passed upon Macdonald Lawrence in Nyasaland High Court
will evoke the anger of all the civilized black men and women, who in the long run in
desperation will look upon British rule with greatest contempt.270

It is clear from the case studies (involving Messrs. Joshua Chateka, David Shirt, and Isa Macdonald
Lawrence) that the Nyasaland police force had since its re-organization become a very important
“weapon” in counter-insurgency, especially the detection of crime and recommending and
implementing the harsh prison sentences for those convicted. There was also a very strong
connection between the activities of the police force, the courts system, and the Office of the
Attorney-General, to bring the implicated “insurgents” to “justice”. It was in such processes that
we notice some of the atrocities committed by the colonial state in the protectorate, as had been
the case elsewhere in British colonial Africa. The activities of the Nyasaland police force will be
significantly discussed in the chapter that follows (chapter five), where by the late 1950s,
Nyasaland was described as a “police state” following the declaration of the 1959 state of
emergency. Similar police tactics would also become the order of the day in post-colonial Malawi,
as I will highlight in chapter six of this study.
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Conclusion
This chapter has tackled the question of state-organized forms of counter-insurgency, using both
“the carrot and the stick”. It has focused on the immediate reaction by the colonial state towards
the outbreak of the 1915 African uprising in Nyasaland, and the actions taken by the state during
the inter-war period, between 1919 and 1939. I have argued that the state used tactics that included
the use of brutal force (such as public executions, imprisonment, looting of houses belonging to
insurgents, heavy fines, and deportations). I have also explored the concept of “politicaleconomy”, by examining how the colonial state turned to both the police and the legal system, as
organs of the state, with the former detecting and detaining insurgents, and the latter passing out
stiff punishments on the insurgents, which became the chief means through which the state reestablished and maintained its authority and domination. The chapter also hints that there were
limits to which the colonial state could use brutal tactics against the colonized, hence the dangling
of “the carrot” which I have argued that for the period under study, had been recommended by the
commission that investigated the causes and origins of the 1915 uprising, whose report called for
the provision of education and employment opportunities (within the colonial structures), and also
through giving back some portions of land to the Africans, whose economy was agro-based and
hence dependent on the land. The “carrot” strategy was one where the colonial state-initiated
development and welfare programs that were for the benefit of the colonized peoples, which meant
that with “political will”, it was possible for the colonial experience to be worthwhile for the
colonized peoples. It has also been highlighted that the advent of the colonial state’s involvement
in the development and uplifting the socio-economic livelihoods in Nyasaland had much more to
do with the input and influence of the Africans. The measures employed by the colonial state were
in many instances detrimental to the needs of the European settlers. The next chapter covers the
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period after the Second World War up to the early 1960s. It revolves around the analysis of the
notion of the ambiguity of the concept of “development”, especially how its implementation or
lack thereof became the basis of African discontent and the rise of radical nationalism, challenging
the authority of the colonial state. In turn, the colonial state also employed similar “carrot and
stick” measures that had been initiated during the inter-war period.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICS IN
THE LATE COLONIAL PERIOD

Today it is avowed by the Charter of the United Nations that the interests of the
inhabitants of non-self-governing territories are paramount, that the Colonial Powers
accept a sacred trust to promote to the utmost the well-being of their inhabitants, and
that the purpose of the administering power is to develop self-government and promote
constructive measures of development. The clause in the Charter owes its presence to
British and Commonwealth advocacy and expresses the objectives of British colonial
policy.271

Introduction
This chapter examines the background to the colonial state’s involvement in the development of
the Nyasaland protectorate, which became one of the major colonial policy initiatives immediately
before and after the Second World War. I will concentrate on the Colonial Development Acts of
1929, 1940 and 1945, and the related development programs implemented in Nyasaland under
these Acts. These acts serve as precursors to the establishment of the Central African Federation
(CAF) from 1953 to 1963, when the state adopted both a state-led development agenda and an
integrated approach to colonial development. I will argue that these state-led development
initiatives, although they had good intentions, also came with some hidden agendas. That helps to
explain why they lacked the requisite support from local people. An analysis of the development
programs will help show that despite the claims that they were primarily meant for the socioeconomic development of Africans, in practice they were also designed to boost the economy of
the metropole and its allies. By zeroing in on the CAF, for instance, I will highlight that much as

“The Future of the African Colonies”, Speech by The Rt. Hon. Arthur Creech Jones, P.C., Cust Foundation Lecture
at the University of Nottingham, March 9th, 1951.
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it was touted to be beneficial to the inhabitants (of all races) in the concerned territories, the scheme
itself served metropolitan (British) and to an extent American, political and economic interests at
the height of the Cold War. The lack of substantive support from Africans in the three territories
created the impetus for the establishment and consolidation of nationalist movements, many of
which attained mass support by attacking the federal scheme. In Nyasaland, the main nationalist
movement was the Nyasaland African Congress (NAC), which was established in 1944. The
appearance of widespread opposition against the federation compelled the colonial authorities to
create counter-insurgency measures that would help check those who challenged the authority of
the colonial state and promote the spirit of protectionism for the state’s economic interests. I will
specifically focus on such measures as the use of brutal force, through the police force, and the
offer of development opportunities to the African masses during the late colonial era.
The State and Colonial Development in Nyasaland, 1891-1953
The concept of development has been defined differently by various scholars. As argued by M.P.
Cowen and R.W. Shenton, the concept of “development,” should be viewed from two main
perspectives. Firstly, development should be analyzed as a process of enlarging people’s choices,
of enhancing participatory democratic processes, and their ability to have a say in the decisions
that shape their lives. Development can also be defined as the means to carry out a nation’s
development goals and of promoting economic growth, equity and national self-reliance. This
conceptualization encompasses the notion that there must be a goal or by-product of the process
of development.272 This chapter explores both the processes and perceived goals of the
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development initiatives in Nyasaland focusing on the period after the Second World War. It
sustains the argument that “development” as it occurred in colonial era Malawi was often a
contested process and was at times opposed by Africans if it did not meet their short term and
long-term needs at the time.
The initiation of or lack of development programs in the Nyasaland protectorate should be traced
back to the mid nineteenth century, when the British government established the protectorate. This
involves an examination of the private or mercantilist values and “official mind” of Victorian
Britons, with regards to the question of development programs in Britain’s tropical colonies.
Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher argued that the official and private (or public) mind of the
late nineteenth century was one which did not necessarily favor the continued outward expansion
of the British Empire, which would involve the setting up of colonial states. Most of the capitalist
class favored an improvement in the human conditions of the people they traded with, elsewhere,
but were not in favor of an interventionist state in their enterprise. In that atmosphere, as argued
by Robinson and Gallagher, a “formal empire” tended to be thought of as an auxiliary, in much
the same way as the liberal state in the United Kingdom (UK). All that was needed was for the
capitalists (traders and farmers) and missionaries to take up the roles of liberating the producers of
Africa and Asia, in the hope that the indigenous people would be incorporated in the liberal British
world view. This spirit of free trade zones also influenced British politicians, especially at a time
when the British Treasury usually had less money to spare for more colonial activities – especially
in areas where the actual economic potential had not yet been proven. For Africa, up to the 1880s,

employment opportunities, education and health, and a clean and safe physical environment. Everyone should also
have the opportunity to participate fully in community decisions and to enjoy human, economic, and political
freedoms. See United Nations, Human Development Report, 1991 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 1. Under
the UN definition, ‘development’ could represent the ‘processes’ and the ‘end results’ of all actions being taken to
uplift the livelihoods of a given people.
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British merchants and politicians had been concerned with the coastal areas of the continent, to
keep the sea-ways around the continent safe, open, and clear of rival powers – hence the Empire’s
concentration on coastal areas such as Egypt, West Africa, South Africa, and Zanzibar in East
Africa.273
That however did not mean that there were no advocates for “constructive” or state-led
development in the tropical colonies. We know for instance that Joseph Chamberlain, Colonial
Secretary from 1895 to 1903, tried his best to advocate for more funding towards development
programs in the British colonies. Robert V. Kubicek (1969), for instance quoted Joseph
Chamberlain as having called for colonial development in the following passage:
… (It is) Not enough to occupy certain great spaces of the world’s surface unless you
can make the best of them, unless you are willing to develop them. We are landlords of
a great estate; it is the duty of the landlord to develop his estate …. In my opinion … it
would be the wisest course for the Government of this country to use British capital and
British credit to create an instrument of trade (i.e. railways) in all … new important
countries. I firmly believe that not only would they in so doing give an immediate
impetus to British trade and industry in the manufacture of the machinery that is
necessary for that purpose, but that in the long run … they would sooner or later earn a
large reward either directly or indirectly.274

Wm. Roger Louis, writing about the lives of Joseph Chamberlain and Leo Amery, both former
Colonial Secretaries, argued that the two men’s insistence on colonial development in the British
colonies and dominions was motivated by the perceived benefit for Britain’s own economic
development. As Roger Louis hinted: “In substance it was a sophisticated version of the old
mercantilist system whereby Britain would become the workshop of the colonies which in turn
would provide markets and raw materials. The British Empire would emerge as a single and
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prosperous economic unit with an unbroken tariff wall around it, which in turn would enhance
British power throughout the world. Prosperity within the Empire would improve conditions
within the United Kingdom. Imperial strength would guarantee British security against Germany
and the United States.”275
As Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain developed what was known as an “Imperial Estates
Program” – in which he wanted the British Government to provide capital and credit for railways
and improved harbors in the underdeveloped colonies of tropical Africa, and an irrigation system
and a railway system in British-ruled Cyprus. He also called for credit grants and loans to be
provided to help revive the economies of the West Indian Sugar Islands. His argument had been
that the provision of British imperial aid would promote the economic and political viability of the
regions, attract private investors and provide ultimately lucrative markets and raw materials for
British industry. However, one major stumbling block for such plans was the lack of support from
the British Treasury, an arm of the government which controlled state expenditure. Under Mr.
Hicks Beach, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Treasury viewed Chamberlain’s demand for
funds within the context of the government’s general financial position, which by the late 1890s
was not necessarily a healthy one. Hence it was not possible, by the late 1890s and early 1900s,
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for the government to conduct a state interventionist type of development, to promote the welfare
of the colonized peoples in the poorer overseas territories, as much as the Colonial Secretary had
wanted. The fears of the Treasury had been that it was a risky adventure for the government to
provide loans to the overseas territories when there was no guarantee that the loans would have
been paid back.276
Joseph M. Hodge also argued that what held the hand of the Treasury from supporting
Chamberlain’s campaign for colonial development was that, firstly, it had connections with the
interests of financial speculators, monopoly capitalists, and concessionary companies who were
said to be at the root cause of the Anglo-Boer War in South Africa (1899-1902). There was also
apathy due to the military expansion and upheaval that characterized the so-called “Scramble for
Africa.” Britain emerged out of the war and the pacification efforts with an unprecedented public
debt, such that the Treasury was unwilling to approve or provide extra funding towards costly
military interventions and ambitious colonial development projects. Furthermore the Treasury also
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referred to the scandals and colonial resistance in Africa, most notably on the west coast, where a
hut tax war took place in 1898 in Sierra Leone; and also the atrocities of King Leopold’s Congo
Free State at the end of the nineteenth century.277 The arguments by critics of imperialism at that
stage had been that the Anglo-Boer War had been inspired by British imperial demands in South
Africa. It had been interpreted as a war between two nations and opposing political and economic
interests, rather than a mere chapter in the history of the industrialization of Africa. That meant
that imperialism had reached a stage where it was ready to send its adherents to war. The war had
also shown the close connection that existed between economics and politics, where politics
covered the shortfalls of economics. The government was thus seen to be essential to bail out
capitalists from the economic downturn of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.278
Stephen Constantine also questioned the willingness of the Treasury and indeed the government
to accelerate the economic development of the colonial empire through either grants or loans or
other forms of direct aid. However, there were also other associated reasons, which included, firstly
that the Colonial Office (CO) was itself to blame, because of its own understanding of colonial
development – one in which the officials simply wanted to increase the production of primary
products (raw materials) and not to institute structural changes in the local economy, nor
industrialization. The other reason had been that there was a limited relationship that existed
between the CO and the other parts of the colonial empire. The empire was highly decentralized,
with limited communication between the colonial governors and the CO. The CO had simply given
itself a supervisory role, which limited the CO’s access to internal developments within colonies.
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In that case, the CO did not even have an empire-wide development plan, as that was regarded as
a responsibility of officials in the colonies. There was also an assumption by many in the CO that
it was private enterprise and not the state that was responsible for the economic development of
colonial territories. The assumption was that if the CO had initiated development schemes, it would
likely obstruct the proper functioning of private businessmen who needed less state intervention
to practice in a laissez faire atmosphere. The CO was also pre-occupied with the doctrine of
“trusteeship” – whereby the CO claimed that its primary administrative concern was with the
welfare and rights of subject colonial peoples, and not necessarily participating in the direct
investment of state funds in colonial development programs.279
In the case of Nyasaland, it was not until the 1890s that the British government was finally
convinced of the need to establish a formal empire. The motives for the occupation of Nyasaland
were mainly strategic, to drive out the Portuguese who had been approaching the Shire Highlands
– an area which the British government intended to secure to serve the interests of British traders,
planters, and missionaries operating in the area, and in need of access to the Zambezi river for
transportation. To the north-east of Nyasaland, the Germans had also begun to show imperial
interests, which led to the colonization of German East Africa ( later Tanganyika), which again
compelled the British government to move in faster, to block the Germans from occupying the
northern part of Lake Nyasa (now Lake Malawi), where the British firm African Lakes Corporation
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(ALC) and missionaries had been operating since the early 1880s. Even when the decision to
establish a protectorate over Nyasaland between 1889 and 1891 was finally made, some in the
British government remained reluctant to commit government funds for the project, and it had to
take the persuasion of Lord Salisbury (then British Prime Minister) by Sir Harry Johnston (the first
Commissioner of Nyasaland), that it would be worthwhile to establish the protectorate. Sir Harry
Johnston had even initially suggested, without success, that the protectorate should be
administered by Cecil John Rhodes and his British South Africa Company (BSAC), which was
allowed to subsidize funding to the Nyasaland government to the sum of £10,000 per annum up to
1895, when the arrangement ceased.280 In the 1903-04 fiscal year the subsidies from the BSAC to
the Nyasaland government were resumed and continued until 1911. The following sums of money
were provided to subsidize the administration of Nyasaland: 1903-04 (£10,435); 1904-05 (£5,350);
1905-06 (£7,350); 1906-07 (£7,350); 1907-08 (£8,000); 1908-09 (£10,000); 1909-10 (£8,000);
1910-11 (£8,000).281
In this atmosphere, where the British government was unwilling to commit itself to the formal
colonization of the protectorate, and where the policy of laissez-faire championed by British
mercantilists had been dominant, it was unexpected at least in the immediate future that concern
for the people’s welfare would have been among the government’s top priorities. The British
authorities expected the economic development of the tropical colonies to be taken up as a
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responsibility of capable colonial government and private international investors. As I have
discussed in chapters two and three of this study, the top priorities of the colonial state in the early
years had been to maintain law and order, to provide security (to European settlers), and to find
means of revenue collection (which led to the imposition of the hut tax in the early 1890s). This
background provides a clear picture about why there was limited development, if any at all, in the
tropical colonies before the outbreak of the First World War. If the Treasury released any funds at
all, they were meant for balancing the budgets of colonial states, rather than the funding of colonial
development. It was expected of colonial governments to raise their own revenue or raise loans to
fund internal developmental needs. I have for instance discussed in chapter three of this study, how
the Nyasaland government initiated the hut tax as soon as the colonial state was established in the
1890s, and that the local chiefs who signed the “treaties” to acknowledge their being placed under
British colonial authority, were also compelled to agree that they would pay taxes to the colonial
state. Part of the reason for the lack of colonial development, in colonies of East and Central Africa,
where Nyasaland was located, as already highlighted above, was the lack of commitment along
that line by government administrators, based on the belief in the principles of free trade and less
state intervention. It was argued in some quarters that the economic benefits of free trade would
have been obtained without incurring further costs of colonial administration. That was true for
Nyasaland and explains why the British government dilly-dallied in assuming full control of the
protectorate after the 1884 - 85 Berlin Conference. I have argued in chapter four of this study, that
it was not until after the 1915 native uprising, that the Nyasaland Government, now “aware” of the
grievances of the natives, began to roll out welfare development programs for the colonized
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peoples – in agricultural production, land re-distribution and provision of education
opportunities.282
I have also highlighted, in chapter four, that it was not until 1929-1930, that a consistent
development program was put in place, under the Colonial Development Act (CDA) of 1929,
whose aim had been to both revive the ailing colonial economies, and to create employment
opportunities for British citizens, both in the UK and in the colonies. This was particularly
important to sort out the mess created by the Great Depression. Between 1930 and 1936, Nyasaland
benefitted from the CDA of 1929, to the sum of £726,534. Once disbursed, the funds served in the
sectors of agricultural production, public health, water supply, public works, geological survey,
and the communication sector.283 It is also clear from that background, that the type of
development that was initiated in the late 1920s, and particularly since the enactment of the CDA
of 1929, onwards, was one in which the state was at the center of planning, funding, and
implementing development programs, i.e. an interventionist state development program or statedirected development.284 According to Atul Kohli once the state began to take a more central role
in economic development, there developed a “protectionist,” rather than a laissez faire economic
policy, which meant the beginning of blocking out potential competitors. The state became a key
player on tariffs, subsidies, credit control, manpower training, technology promotion, and
bureaucratic cooperation.285
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In Nyasaland, the state had to intervene in the development sector because, as already alluded to
in chapter three of this study, most of the European settlers in the country were of limited economic
means, and hence could not spearhead the country’s economic development. Along the same lines,
Mapopa Chipeta argued that most of the European capitalist settlers in the country, who were
members of the Chamber of Agriculture and Commerce (established in 1895), relied on the
goodwill of the Nyasaland government to provide them with access to land and cheap (sometimes
free) labor resources, and better trade policies, including lower rates of imports and exports. This
induced the colonial state to take an active role in the country’s economic development, especially
where the private sector had been unable to spearhead the development of the country. 286
Furthermore, the onset of the Great Depression also bankrupted many of the settler farmers. The
future of a settler-led economy looked bleak, and by the early 1930s most of the settlers had
exhausted their credit facilities at the commercial banks and many could not repay the loans.
Between 1929 and 1939, the colonial government advanced loans amounting to £34,868 to a total
of 188 settler farmers, especially those that had leased land from the government. However, that
initiative did not yield positive results, as by 1935, most settler farms in the southern and central
provinces were abandoned and many of the settlers left the country for Southern Rhodesia. Of the
estimated 400 settler plantations in 1928, only 82 remained in operation by 1936, of which 50 were
predominantly tobacco farms and the remainder produced tea, sisal, and cotton. As such, by the
eve of the Second World War, it was clear that a settler-led economy had failed to take root in the
country, hence the need for state intervention.287
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By the 1930s, however, as already alluded to, British colonial policy had changed, which saw the
state being more-interventionist in the political and socio-economic aspects of the colonized
peoples, although its development and implementation tended to vary from colony to colony. The
view from the CO was summarized in 1938 as follows:
Our task presumably in the Colonial Office is to lead Colonial people to a larger and a
fuller life, to make them capable of realizing their own potentialities and to enable them
to appreciate the moral standards and ethical values upon which we in Europe set store.
That implies quite clearly many other things besides merely material prosperity. It
means the development of social and political institutions: it means the steady increase
of educational facilities: it means the improvement of the health of the communities
and, above all, it means the inculcation by precept and by example of certain ethical and
moral standards to which we attain importance.288

In July 1940, the British government, not surprisingly, followed up its earlier colonial development
efforts by enacting the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, (hereafter CDWA, 1940), which
was another significant step in the process of state-led development. According to D.J. Morgan,
the Act came into being following deliberations between the Treasury and the CO, where it was
agreed to come up with a new ten-year colonial development program, for a maximum of £5
million a year, distributed to colonial governments to cover for both capital schemes and recurrent
expenditure on certain specified services. In his support for the Colonial Development Bill, the
Secretary of State for the Colonies, Malcolm MacDonald, is said to have reiterated Britain’s
commitment to colonial development, hinting that “it establishes the duty of taxpayers in this

Depression had a severe impact on colonial budgets, especially as many experienced a reduction in the amount of
revenue collected. See Leigh A. Gardner, Taxing Colonial Africa: The Political Economy of British Imperialism, 133144. Similarly, the Depression also affected the former European colonies and mostly dependent economies
(especially on the USA) of Latin America. Once the private sector had been negatively affected, it contributed to more
state intervention in the economy, including the rise of ‘protectionism’ and import substitution industrialization (ISI).
See Rosemary Thorp, “Introduction,” in Rosemary Thorp, ed., Latin America in the 1930s: the role of the periphery
in world crisis (London: The Macmillan Press, 1984), 1-15. On Latin America, see also Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro,
“Latin America in Depression, 1929-1939,” Center discussion Paper no. 344 (Yale University, Economic Growth
Center, March 1980): 1-41.
288
The Crucial Problem of Imperial Development, no.15. Royal Empire Society (London: Longmans, Green and Co.,
1938), 72-73. The remarks were made by the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies.

196

country to contribute directly and for its own sake towards the development of the colonial peoples
for whose good government the taxpayers of this country are ultimately responsible”. 289 Colonial
governments were thus asked to prepare development plans that could be funded under the new
Act (CDWA, 1940), particularly focusing on the improvement of the economic position of the
colonies, so that they could finance their own social and economic services (especially health care
and building human capacity) in the long run. However, due to the increasing intensity of the
Second World War, most of such plans were rarely implemented until after the war was over in
1945.290
For instance, John McCracken observes that Nyasaland only benefitted to the tune of about
£100,000 from the CDWA, 1940. He argued that among other reasons, those funds were channeled
to the Nyasaland government to stimulate the protectorate’s economy, and to guard against
American anti-imperialist pressure, whereby the United States Government had often condemned
colonial rule’s exploitative policies and practices.291 In other instances, the British government
was also receiving funds from the colonies to support the war effort. For instance, between 1940
and 1942, the Nyasaland government submitted a sum of £117,000. In 1943, a further £15,000 was
“subscribed” by the people of Nyasaland to various war funds. In the same year, the Nyasaland
government also lent a further £100,000 to the British government, free of interest, which brought
the total amount of money given or lent to the British Government to £427,000.292
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Due to the obstacles faced by the CDWA of 1940, as outlined above, the British government
enacted the CDWA of 1945, whose aim was to extend the development program for a further ten
years. The 1945 Act also addressed the shortfalls of both the 1929 and 1940 Development Acts,
especially in terms of the amount of funds provided to the colonies. It was suggested by the
Secretary of State for the Colonies that the figures proposed in the 1940 Act had to be doubled,
and also that the annual limit of funds released by the British government had to be increased in
stages over the next ten year period, providing a maximum of £10 million for three years up to
1948-49, a maximum of £15 million from 1949-53, and a maximum of £20 million from 1953-56.
These grants were mainly targeted at providing funds for research and the development of higher
education. By the end of the deliberations on the Act, a compromise was reached between the
Treasury and the CO, where it was agreed that a total of £120 million would be set aside under the
CDWA of 1945, to be utilized between 1946 and 1956.293 British colonies could draw money from
the fund during that ten-year period, with an annual maximum of £17.5 million (instead of the
previous £5.5), of which a maximum of £1 million could be spent on research. 294 In London, the
enactment of the CDWA of 1945 was also positively welcomed by King George VI, as he made
the following remarks in the House of Commons: “The development of the Colonial Territories
and the welfare of their peoples will continue to receive the attention of My Government, and they
will introduce legislation to supplement the sums made available for these purposes by the Colonial
Development Welfare Act, 1945.”295
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While the above-mentioned transactions affected the empire at large, in Nyasaland, the story of
whether the protectorate benefitted, if any at all, from the CDWA of 1945, can be traced from the
reports compiled by the Post War Development Committee (PWDC). The PWDC was put in place
in Nyasaland by Governor Sir Edmund Charles Richards in 1943, and it consisted of the following
officials: The Chief Secretary (Chairperson); The Financial Secretary; Six Honorable Unofficial
Members of the Legislative Council; and Mr. J. Marshall of the African Lakes Corporation (ALC).
The PWDC adopted an integrated approach of development planning, which saw the colonial
government combine different aspects of development initiatives in the protectorate. The
committee was responsible for overseeing all development-related matters, such as education for
all races in the country, public health, the training of medical personnel, the incidence of disease
and of lunacy, agriculture development (both European and native), and transport and
communication.296
A study of the roles played by the PWDC thus challenges the proposition by Colin Baker (1994),
that Sir Geoffrey Colby, who became Governor of Nyasaland between 1948 and 1956, was the
“Development Governor.”297 It is fair to state, that although Governor Colby played an important
role in the economic development of the country, his predecessor, Governor Sir Charles Edmund
Richards, also played an important role worth acknowledging. For instance, in his maiden speech
in the Legco, Governor Colby also acknowledged the work that his predecessor had done in as far
as the development of the country had progressed, by making the following remarks: “Since I
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arrived here, I have made a careful study of the Development Plan. At the present time the various
development proposals are contained in the reports of the Post War Development Committee. In
order that the Plan can be presented in a self-contained form I am causing a White Paper to be
published shortly which will set out in a concise form the various departmental plans of the
Government.”298
In continuation of the development agenda across the empire, in 1948, the Labor government
established the Colonial Development Corporation (CDC), as an organ to take up the
responsibilities of recommending the funding and implementation of colonial development
projects. The CDC was placed under the Secretary of State for the Colonies, following the
enactment of “The Overseas Resources Development Act of 1948,” in which the Secretary of State
was responsible for appointing directors of the CDC, made up of a minimum of four directors and
a maximum of ten. The government provided an initial operating capital of £160 million, to be
split between the CDC and the Overseas Food Corporation. In 1949, the Secretary of State for the
Colonies, James Griffiths, moved a motion in the House of Commons, to analyze the Annual
Report and Statement of Accounts of the CDC for the year 1949. He made the following remarks
to open the deliberations:
This organization, still in its infancy, is already showing itself to be a powerful
instrument for economic development in the Colonial Territories, and it is already clear
beyond doubt that when its resources are fully deployed it will undoubtedly have
considerable influence on both the rate and the direction of economic progress in those
Colonies. I believe it will make a contribution not only to the economic well-being of
the people in those territories, but also to that of the sterling area and of the world. I
think it is therefore right that the operations of the corporation, its method of work and
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its achievements, should receive the scrutiny of the House, as indeed is required by the
statue which the Corporation was set up.299

The section below continues with the analysis of the efforts of the British government, in
collaboration with its colonial states, to get more involved in colonial development. In the British
territories of Nyasaland, Southern Rhodesia, and Northern Rhodesia, such efforts culminated in
the creation of the Central African Federation (CAF), a political entity which existed from 1953
to 1963. I will argue that since the Federation was imposed on the African natives, it emerged as
the focal point of the agitation for independence in the three territories.
Federation and the ambiguity of development, 1953-1963
This section continues with the analysis of the colonial state’s involvement in the development
narrative, a process that culminated in the creation of the Central African Federation (CAF), a
political entity which brought together the three British territories of Nyasaland, Southern
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), and Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia). I argue that the decision should
not be studied in isolation, but as part and parcel of the history and efforts of creating a state-led
and integrated approach to colonial development, which has been discussed in the previous section.
I will demonstrate that in creating the federation, the touted economic or developmental gains were
not just for the benefit of Africans, as it was superficially presented, but rather, to also serve the
developmental and economic needs of the metropole. As Gilbert Rist argued, it is often wrong to
suggest that only countries in the global South (most of which were former European colonies)
were and still are deserving targets for developmental intervention. Instead, all countries, in one
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way or the other deserve development-related intervention.300 Furthermore, I will also illustrate
how the Cold War played an important role in accelerating the creation of the Federation. It was
due to the vested economic and political interests that it became important to create counterinsurgency measures aimed at suppressing all forms of anti-Federation resistance in the three
territories, and in Nyasaland in particular.
In his memoirs, Sir Roy Welensky (the Federation’s Prime Minister from 1956-1963), pointed out
that during the deliberations that led to the establishment of the CAF, there was always a desire by
the European settlers and the British government to maximize the exploitation of mineral resources
in the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland. The argument raised was that there was no need to accelerate
political development for the Africans, as that would have “naturally” flowed if and when there
was economic health or development (i.e. that without economic health, there could be no political
development).301 Along the same lines of argument, Oliver Lyttelton (later Lord Chandos), who
was the Secretary of State for the Colonies from 1951 to 1954, argued in his memoirs, that due to
the economic benefits to be attained from the creation of the federation, the “official point of view”
had been that there was no need to bow down to opposition demands (both in the metropole and
in the concerned territories). In the United Kingdom (UK), the Labor Party leadership opposed the
creation of the federation, since it was against the wishes of the African inhabitants. While African
political leaders argued that the federation would only delay and derail the decolonization process,
while also promoting the dominance of the European settlers. Lord Chandos described most of the
Africans as being illiterate who did not even have the term “federation” in the vocabulary of their
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native languages, hence they could not even comprehend what the concept stood for. 302 In
Nyasaland, “the administrative mind,” led by Governor Geoffrey Colby, also held similar
sentiments, where the authorities argued that the protectorate was bound to reap significant
economic benefits from the federal scheme.303
These sentiments were also raised in a message from Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, to the
peoples of the three territories in the federation:
Today, when the Constitution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland comes into
operation, I send to you, and through you to all my people in the Federation, my heartfelt
good wishes.
I pray that the blessing of the Almighty God may rest upon the people of the Federation,
and that, living together in increasing fellowship and goodwill, they may use their
combined efforts for the advancement of all. May those with whom the burden of
government will rest be guided with wisdom in the tasks ahead.
An inspiring vision has been vouchsafed to you. To realise it will call for sustained
endeavours in so developing the resources of the Federation as to make possible a better
living for all by the expansion of education, health and other services. These endeavours
will meet with the sympathy of all those who, in every part of the world, look with
goodwill upon your efforts and wish for the Federation a great and successful future.
To you all I declare my sympathy in your resolve to fulfil the great ideals to which we
are devoted.304

Aside from the economic benefits, another covert determining factor was political. Michael
Collins, in his study of the creation of federations, with focus on the CAF, in the post-World War
Two era, argued that on the part of the British authorities, their aim had been to revive the British
Empire in the aftermath of the war and amidst the ensuing nationalist drive. The creation of the
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federation, in imperial thought, was meant to create a larger political entity, one in which the
European settlers would continue to control political power and colonial resources. At the time,
the British authorities were clearly not ready to hand over political power to the African majority
under newly-established nation-states.305 There is also the notion that the British authorities feared
the infiltration of communism in their territories. This argument is centered on the outbreak and
spread of the Cold War, whose peak was from 1947 to the late 1980s, whereby the capitalistinfluenced Western powers (led by the USA) sought to outwit the communist-influenced Eastern
powers (led by the USSR) in an ongoing ideological warfare.306 In establishing the federation, part
of the reasoning had been to create a strong state, essential for hampering the spread of
communism. The talks to establish the federation accelerated in the aftermath of the Second World
War, especially following the infiltration of communism in Asia, leading to the outbreak of such
wars as the Korean War (1950-1953). The “official mind” at the time believed that territories in
the Middle East and Africa would be the next targets, hence the need to form a buffer against the
global spread of communism.307 At that time, the communist countries, led by the USSR, sought
to take advantage of the grievances of the colonized peoples, especially material and racial-based
discrimination – in which the minority European settlers dominated them, both politically and
economically. Communist propaganda was said to have found a fertile ground in societies where
the Africans were agitating for political and economic opportunities. Between 1948 and 1950, the
Foreign Office (FO) instituted a general survey of communist activities and movements across the
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African continent. In general, the report indicated that the spread of Communism had not been as
rapid as previously anticipated, but still warned that there was need for the British government to
remain vigilant.308 There were also numerous motions in the House of Commons, where MPs
expressed worries about the spread of communism across Europe, and in Britain’s colonial
empire.309
It is no wonder, therefore, that once the Federation was established, one of the primary agencies
to be created under the federation was the Federal Security and Intelligence Bureau (FSIB), to help
maintain security and monitor the threat posed by the potential spread of communism in the region.
The FSIB’s headquarters was in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, the capital of the Federation. The
first leader of the FSIB was a Mr. Maurice “Bob” de Quehen, formerly of the MI5.310 Philip
Murphy also posited that intelligence gathering became one of the major pre-occupations of British
Government officials in the post-World War II era, and that explains the setting up of the FSIB in
June 1954. The FSIB was there to coordinate intelligence gathering in the Federation, in liaison
with the police’s special branch in each of the three territories.311 There were also security-based
collaborations between the British and US security organs, monitoring developments in the
federation. The US operated through the National Security Agency (NSA) in the USA and later
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) established in 1947. The British Government worked

308

A Survey of Communism in Africa, Extract from a Paper by the Research Department, Foreign Office. BNA: CO
537/5263.
309
Speech by Mr. Follick, MP for Loughborough Constituency, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons Official
Report, 5th Series, Vol.473. March 27th to April 6th, 1950., 287-288. See also Speech by the Right Hon. Clement Attlee,
the British PM in the House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons Official Report, 5 th Series,
Vol.478. July 24th to October 26th, 1950., 951-954. See also BNA: CO 1035/126: Official Committee on CounterSubversion in Colonial Territories – Communism in Africa, 1956 Report. This was a Committee established by the
British Government to counter the spread of Communism in Africa, by coordinating with intelligence organs in each
of the British Territories.
310
Calder Walton, Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence, The Cold War, and the Twilight of Empire (London:
William Collins, 2013), 278-279.
311
Philip Murphy, “Intelligence and Decolonization: The Life and Death of the Federal Intelligence and Security
Bureau, 1954-63,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 29, no.2 (2008): 106-112.

205

through the Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ) and later through the MI6
(Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service for Foreign Affairs).312
There are also arguments that Britain had ambitions to be regarded as a “Third Leading Power”
during the Cold War and had therefore put in place plans to develop its own nuclear weapons. The
federation was thus earmarked as an area where to source minerals, especially uranium which was
essential in making the nuclear weapons was abundant. The most commercially-viable source of
uranium was discovered in Northern Rhodesia in 1951, hence the need to press ahead with the
federation plans, fearing that a delay would have provided room for either the USA or USSR to
interfere. The US also immediately jumped in to offer support to the British authorities to enhance
the mining efforts, in the form of finances, equipment, and other facilities. The US had intentions
to use the uranium to be used for weaponry in the Korean War, and as a response to the USSR’s
unexpected atom bomb test in 1949.313 Other equally attractive minerals included copper, coal,
chrome, zinc, and asbestos. The three territories were also a source of settler-grown varieties of
coffee, tea, and tobacco. This background (of increased state intervention in development and
domination of the economy) provided the impetus for the creation of strong counter-insurgency
strategies, to block the potential spread of communism, to block the rise of African opposition,
and to create room for continued colonial exploitation of the territories. I address such measures
in the subsequent sections.
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Counter-insurgency and some dirty work of empire
In this section, I argue that it was due to the increased levels of state interventionism that Nyasaland
witnessed a significant rise in the levels and forms of African resistance until the end of the
federation in 1963. The anti-federation resistance occurred both through the work of the leading
nationalist party, the Nyasaland African Congress (NAC), and the African traditional leaders who
rallied their subjects to oppose the federal scheme. Furthermore, just like the previous disturbances
in the protectorate (for instance, the African uprising of 1915), there were also other factors (socioeconomic and political) that coincided with the anti-Federation resistance. The country’s leading
nationalist movement, the NAC, fed-off from the anti-federation atmosphere, by exploiting every
African grievance as part of the party’s anti-Federation initiative. I will highlight some case studies
of those forms of African resistance, before discussing the counter-insurgency measures employed
by the state to suppress the various forms of opposition and resistance.
Similar to the 1915 native disturbances (see chapter 3), the Shire Highlands became the center of
the anti-federation movement and agitation. Colin Legum in 1953, hinted that the disturbances
were inter-mixed with the African hunger for land, an issue that had not been resolved (from the
Africans’ perspective) since the enactment of the 1902 Order-in-Council (which placed all the land
in the protectorate under ownership of His Majesty’s Government). Legum likened the 1953
disturbances to the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya, and the Witwatersrand African uprising in South
Africa, by pinpointing several similarities: Firstly, just like the Kenya highlands uprising, the
Nyasaland episode also occurred in an area which was exclusively owned by European settlers.
The only difference was that in Kenya the settlers were individual farmers, whereas in Nyasaland,
they were plantation owners. Secondly, just like in the Witwatersrand mining belt, there was a
shortage of local labor to work in the plantations. That shortage motivated the employers to look
207

elsewhere for labor, including outside the country, something which in the Shire Highlands,
created a challenge in terms of scarcity of land for cultivation. Many of the labor migrants
experienced two main types of land and labor tenancy. There was one system where the plantation
worker, as squatter, was allowed access to a small garden to cultivate crops for his own household.
He was paid a wage for his work and was not required to pay rent for his ground. Then there was
the category of African tenant farmers who were not employees on the plantation. These were
asked to pay rent, which was calculated in relation to the wages earned in the area, which in the
early 1950s was pegged at £3 per year. By the early 1940s, the second category of tenants had
already been at loggerheads with the plantation owners, especially over the tenants’ non-ability to
pay rent, and the efforts of the plantation owners to evict the rent-defaulters.314
It was due to these disagreements on the land tenure system that His Majesty’s Government
appointed the so-called Abrahams Commission in 1946. The commission collected its data in the
protectorate between July 28th and October 4th, in which some of the findings seemed to predict
what would later occur as African disturbances from 1953 onwards. The report of the commission
noted that there was congestion of African population in the Shire Highlands (referring to the
districts of Thyolo, Mulanje, Chiradzulo, Zomba and Blantyre), noting that approximately 652,700
Africans (31 percent of the total population of the protectorate) were living on 2,677,520 acres of
land (11 percent of the whole land area of the Protectorate). Furthermore, in terms of population
density, the whole country had 42.55 people to the square mile – while in the Shire Highlands the
population density was 156.6 people per square mile. These were the issues that lay behind some
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of the anti-federation protests in the country.315 This was also the view shared by many in London,
who argued that the 1953 disturbances had very little to do with the anger about the establishment
of the federation, but instead had been instigated by politicians who had their own political
ambitions. In the Thyolo district disturbances, the understanding had been that the land tenure
system was to blame, especially the announcement earlier that year, by the British Central Africa
Company, that it would start charging additional rent to tenants residing on the Company’s land.316
In the central province, anti-Federation demonstrations also served as an “Achilles heel” for the
colonial authorities. The Africans, led by their chiefs, had been particularly displeased that
promises made by two successive British Secretaries of State for the Colonies, Arthur Creech Jones
and James Griffiths, had not been kept. Both had visited Nyasaland and assured them that the
federation would only be implemented with the approval of the African community. In the central
province district of Ntcheu, Chief Philip Gomani, who served as the paramount chief of the Ngoni
peoples, issued an order to his followers to disobey the colonial state, by among other things
contravening state conservation (of natural resources) policies. He also called on his subjects to
disobey agricultural extension advisers, to boycott the ceremonies to celebrate the coronation of
Queen Elizabeth II, and to stop paying the hut tax. The government intervened to stop the
disturbances, through the police force and the DC’s office at Ntcheu boma, urging the chief to
withdraw his order. However, when the chief refused to withdraw the order, Governor Geoffrey
Colby issued an order to suspend the chief, and removed him from his headquarters, even though
by that time the chief was not in good health. When riots broke out following attempts by the
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police to arrest the chief, a significant number of the Africans were arrested, including the chief’s
son, Willard. The chief himself managed to escape into the neighboring Portuguese territory of
Mozambique. At the end of June 1953, the Portuguese authorities arrested and returned the fugitive
chief to Nyasaland, who was later detained at the Central Prison in Zomba.317
The colonial authorities often argued that although there was no direct link between the Nyasaland
disturbances of the early 1950s and the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya, there were strong similarities
in their dynamics, especially on the role played by chiefs in coaxing their subjects to oppose the
colonial state. By the early 1950s, the government authorities had lost their control over African
affairs, as most of the chiefs were subjected to the demands of the radical nationalist elements, to
which the chiefs obliged, for fear of betraying their own people. The Nyasaland Intelligence Report
of November 1952 emphasized these points:
With regard to Africans the stage has now been reached when any African entering into
discussion or speaking in favor of Federation is accused of receiving money and of
being a traitor who is prepared to sell his people and his country to the Europeans and
is often subject to victimization. Nevertheless, there are some bold spirits who still wish
to continue discussions with Europeans….
The Chiefs, the great majority of whom have always been apathetic, now find
themselves in the position of having to side with Congress against the Government or
to side with the Government against the Congress, thereby laying themselves open to a
charge of betraying their people. As a way out of their dilemma, many of the Chiefs are
therefore adopting the role of figureheads voicing the opinion of the vocal elements. To
what extent the events in Kenya are influencing the attitude of the Chiefs is not known,
but it is noticeable that they have been more inclined to subordinate themselves to
Congress since the Mau Mau disturbances started.318
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The general atmosphere of the country was summarized by Governor Geoffrey Colby in his
dispatch to the Secretary of State for the Colonies at the beginning of July 1953, part of which read
as follows:
…A certain amount of agitation which was noticeable in past weeks on the B.C.A.
Company’s estates in the Thyolo district, where tenants were refusing to pay rent, has
at any rate not increased. …It is probable that during the next few weeks Congress will
intensify its attempts to seduce the chiefs from their loyalty to the government.
Wholesale defection of the Native Authorities would of course make things very
difficult indeed and it is now the first concern of government to support those chiefs
who are loyal, and to buttress the waverers. If this can be done successfully for the next
six to eight weeks, it is at least reasonable to hope that if the Congress tries to put into
effect its threat of ‘country-wide civil disobedience when Federation is announced’ the
campaign will fizzle out without much harm being done.319

The governor also made the following statement in the Nyasaland legislative assembly:
The year was unhappily marred by outbreaks of violence in the Southern Province.
These outbreaks were the culmination of a campaign of subversive and false propaganda
which had been going on for a period of two or three years during which members of
the African Congress, encouraged by trouble-makers from outside the territory, directed
their efforts to misleading the people and undermining confidence in the administration.
In April this year the African Congress circulated a number a number of resolutions
passed at a public meeting which enjoined the people not to obey agricultural and other
laws and not to pay their taxes. This foolish and reprehensible action was the immediate
cause of the ensuing unrest and disturbances: innocent and law-abiding folk were
confused by the Congress announcement which was reinforced by wide-spread
intimidation: many local people went in constant fear as a result.
I personally warned the President-General and other members of Congress where this
foolishness would lead, but my warnings went unheeded and events took their
melancholy and inevitable course – so-called non-violence developed into violence –
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lives were lost, property was destroyed, great expense to the territory was caused and
incalculable damage done to previously harmonious race relations.320

From the reports, it was clear that the opposition to the federation came from a wide-range of stake
holders across the country, both political movements and non-political ones. Such broad
opposition necessitated the need for the government put in place measures to suppress the rise of
the anti-federation disturbances, which I will discuss as having characterized the lifespan of the
federal government between 1953 and 1963. Similar to previous measures discussed in chapter
four of this study, the counter-insurgency measures adopted were in the form of “the stick and the
carrot.” Such strategies ranged from strengthening the role of the police force and its intelligence
gathering activities; detention of those in opposition to the federation; outlawing of opposition
political movements; making changes to the country’s legal codes; and offering some
developmental programs to the African communities.
“The Stick” and Counter-insurgency
Apart from the arrests and detention of the most radical elements of the anti-federation movement,
one other important initial reaction of the Nyasaland government was to rush to the use of
propaganda, in creating and finding possible links between the disturbances and the spread of the
Soviet-type of communism.321 The main target was the NAC whose activities were heavily linked
to socialist movements in the metropole, particularly the Fabian Society which was founded in
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1884 in Britain and always had strong links with the Labor Party. The following statement from
the Nyasaland government attested to this line of thought and propaganda:
There is no doubt that the Congress has greatly added to its prestige as a result of its
campaigning efforts… Congress has announced its intention of creating and staffing
separate headquarters in each province, with general headquarters in Lilongwe. It has
reduced its entrance fee from 5/- to 3d., with the idea of building up its membership and
creating a powerful national movement embracing all Nyasaland Africans including
civil servants and police. It is said that thousands of membership cards are to be printed
in the United Kingdom and there are rumors that a Congress newspaper is to be started;
machinery is also to be evolved with a view to sending regularly political news to the
Fabian Society and the African Colonial Bureau in London. The President-General has
declared that Congress’ aim is self-government within five years.322

When the anti-federation resistance moved beyond non-cooperation and turned violent, the
country’s security forces, especially the police forces and some troops from the Kings African
Rifles, were compelled to intervene. The Nyasaland police force was beefed up (as provided for
in the Police Ordinance of July 1953) with police reinforcements from other British territories in
the region to deal with the acts of resistance. Through that arrangement, fifty policemen were sent
from Tanganyika, 100 riot squad policemen from Northern Rhodesia, and a 100 more from
Southern Rhodesia. These policemen were involved in arresting and detaining those involved in
the disturbances, where in the process eleven Africans were shot dead and seventy-two others were
wounded.323
The CO also came up with a counterinsurgency strategy, known as “Operation Bessie,” which was
initiated by Oliver Lyttleton (the Secretary of State for the Colonies) and General Erskine. The socalled operation would involve flying a battalion of troops from the Kings African Rifles to
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Nyasaland if the African trouble reached unmanageable levels as had been the case in the Mau
Mau uprising in Kenya. The operation would also involve spending increased resources (monetary
and material) to beef up the Nyasaland police force and encouraging more police and troop
reinforcements from the two Rhodesias.324 In Nyasaland itself, Governor Colby was also
contemplating declaring a state of emergency, if the disturbances increased in intensity, especially
following the rise in cases of intimidation by Congress authorities.325
The country’s penal code was also amended at the end of 1955 to include the more serious charge
of treason for all those suspected of leading the anti-federation movement and agitations. The
penalty for treason was death or life imprisonment if convicted. The treason clause in the penal
code, which applied to those who challenged the authority of the imperial crown of the United
Kingdom and its representatives in the dominions, colonies, and protectorates, was presented as
follows:
Any person who encompasses, imagines, invents, devises or intends any act, matter or
theory the compassing, imagining, inventing, devising or intending whereof is treason
by the law of England for the time being in force, and expresses, utters or declares such
compassing, imagining, inventing, devising or intending by publishing and printing or
writing or by any overt act which, if done in England, would be deemed to be treason
according to the law of England for the time being in force, is guilty of the offence
termed treason and shall be liable to suffer death.
Any person who instigates any foreigner to invade the Protectorate with an armed force
is guilty of treason and is liable to the punishment of death.
Any person who (1) becomes an accessory after the fact or (2) knowing that any person
intends to commit treason, does not give information thereof with all reasonable
dispatch to the Governor, a District Officer, Magistrate, or Officer of Police or use other
reasonable endeavors to prevent the commission of the offence, is guilty of the felony
termed misprision of treason, and is liable to imprisonment for life….
Any person who, without lawful authority, carries on, or makes preparation for carrying
on, or aids in or advises the carrying on of, or preparation for, any war or warlike
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undertaking with, for, by, or against any native chief, or with, for, by, or against any
band of natives, is guilty of a felony, and is liable to imprisonment for life.326

A clause was also inserted under the 1955 laws for the crime of sedition, which had similar
undertones to the clause on treason. Those deemed to be of “seditious intent” were those who were
implicated in challenging or exciting disaffection against the British crown and its representatives
across the empire (i.e. the government of the protectorate or the CAF). Also charged under the
new laws were those accused of promoting a feeling of ill-will and hostility between different
classes of the population of the protectorate or any of the territories. Those convicted under the
clause, were liable for a first offence to imprisonment for five years or to a fine not exceeding £400
or to both imprisonment and fine, and for a subsequent offence to imprisonment for seven years.327
Under the 1955 laws, the Nyasaland governor was also given powers of censorship targeted at
banning or outlawing publications that were deemed to be seditious in nature. The publications in
question included the following: all written and printed matter; any gramophone or other record,
perforated roll, recording tape, cinematograph film or other related materials. It was incumbent
upon the governor to declare any of these publications to be contrary to the public interest, and
thus empowered him to prohibit either their publication or importation in the country. Those
convicted of importing, publishing, and distribution such prohibited publications would be given
penalties ranging from a fine of up to £400; or to pay both the fine and be sent to prison for four
years; and had their publication forfeited. These offences were deemed to be seditious so long as
it could be proven that they would bring in hatred and disaffection against the British crown, heirs
or successors, or indeed the government of the protectorate or of the federation; and, that they
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would have excited residents of the protectorate to overthrow their government of the protectorate
and of the federation.328
The laws also provided the colonial state authorities with powers to regulate or deny permission
to any form of African public assemblies of three or more persons. The Penal Code provided the
following powers to the state:
When three or more persons assemble with intent to commit an offence, or, being
assembled with intent to carry out some common purpose, conduct themselves in such
a manner as to cause persons in the neighborhood reasonably to fear that the persons so
assembled will commit a breach of the peace, or will by such assembly needlessly and
without any reasonable occasion provoke other persons to commit a breach of the peace,
they are an unlawful assembly. It is immaterial that the original assembling was lawful
if, being assembled, they conduct themselves with a common purpose in such manner
as aforesaid. When an unlawful assembly has begun to execute the purpose for which it
assembled by a breach of the peace and to the terror of the public, the assembly is called
a riot, and the persons assembled are said to be riotously assembled. Any person who
takes part in an unlawful assembly is guilty of a misdemeanor and is liable to
imprisonment to one year.329

By 1957, the colonial authorities, had also inserted a clause in the penal code, which gave the
powers that be a more authoritarian role, one in which the state would outlaw any of such societies
deemed to be ‘seditious and dangerous’ to the country. The governor was given the following
powers:
Wherever the Governor in Council is satisfied from the information or advice which he
deems to be reliable that the doctrines held or disseminated by any society, organization,
or body of persons whether corporate or incorporate established in the Protectorate
either before or after the commencement of this Ordinance, are seditious, or detrimental
or dangerous to the maintenance of public security or public order, the Governor may,
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if he thinks fit, by order under his hand and the public seal of the Protectorate direct that
society, organization or body of persons shall cease operations in the Protectorate within
such time as may be specified in the order… .330

Some of the Africans deemed to be members of the ‘seditious and dangerous societies’ ended up
being detained without any court trial. Under the ‘Political Removal and Detention of Africans
Ordinance, 1957, powers were given to the governor and district commissioners, to detain and
where necessary order the removal from a locality those challenging the authority of the state.
Those detained were not provided the right to appeal against their detention or removal from a
stated location.331
“The Carrot” and Counterinsurgency
Apart from introducing such strict counter-insurgency measures (i.e. “the stick”), other measures
were put in place to attract African support for the colonial state. For instance, on the question of
land tenure, the laws of the protectorate were amended in favor of some African societies,
especially focusing on the troubled southern province where disturbances had begun partly due to
land shortages. That came through the amendment of the “Natives on Private Estates Ordinance,”
which secured the land tenure system for Africans resident on private estates. The 1957 Ordinance
was worded as follows: “Subject to the provisions of this Ordinance, every resident African shall
be entitled on the estate on which he resides to the allocation of a site for his dwelling and to the
use of such extent of cultivable land as he had under cultivation on the date on which this
Ordinance came into operation: Provided that no resident African shall be entitled to the use of a
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greater area of cultivable land than he and his wife and his sons and daughters are capable of
cultivating without assistance: Provided further that no resident African shall be entitled to the use
cultivable land unless he maintains it in efficient agricultural use.”332 This land ordinance was
important because of the country’s long history of reliance of agricultural production, mainly of
the subsistence kind. Furthermore, Governor Colby also made proposals to several of the larger
estates, especially in the southern province, to give up portions of land that were not under
cultivation, to be used by the government for resettlement of African families, within a period of
five years.333
There were also improvements in the transport sector, especially in the construction of paved
roads. According to Henry A. Thiessen, there was only 5 miles of paved roads in the entire country
in 1948. However, once the federation was established, the development of the road network
became one of the leading projects in the country’s development agenda. The roads themselves
were deemed to be essential to complement the railroad network in transporting agricultural
products. By 1961, the road network consisted of 6,127 miles of roads, of which paved roads
covered 295.5 miles; all weather roads covered 872 miles; all season roads (roads that were
impassable for a few days during the rainy season, but usually open throughout the year) covered
1,398 miles; whereas dry weather roads covered 3,561 miles. Most of these good roads were in
the southern province, with one major paved road for the Central Province connecting Lilongwe
to the lakeshore district of Salima before later connecting to the lake port at Chipoka. In the
northern province, there was an all-weather road that connected the main economic hub of Mzuzu
to the lakeshore district of Nkhata-Bay, and another that connected Chendo with the port of
“The Africans on Private Estates Ordinance, 1957,” Chapter 78, of The Laws of Nyasaland, Vol. II. January 1957.
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Studies, no.3 (1965): 229-285. See pp.239-247.
333
Colin Baker, Development Governor: A Biography of Sir Geoffrey Colby (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994), 238-239.
332

218

Karonga. Most of the roads constructed in the rural districts or remote areas were essential in
transporting farmers’ produce and were also constructed under a self-help program of the
Nyasaland government. The very same roads were also used by agricultural extension and
veterinary service personnel.334 The table below illustrates the increased amounts of government
expenditure in the construction of road networks:
Table 5.1: Expenditure by the Nyasaland and Federal Governments on Road Building and
Maintenance, 1948-1958

Financial Year
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953/54 (18
months)
1954/55
1955/56
1956/58
1957/58
TOTAL

Construction and
Reconstruction (£)
17,000
116,000
112,000
297,000
322,000

Maintenance (£)
37,000
58,000
86,000
70,000
86,000

639,000

155,000

387,000
595,000
877,000
494,000

114,000
130,000
158,000
203,000

£3,856,000

£1,097,000

Source: Henry A. Thiessen. ‘Some Remarks on Transportation and Economic Development in
Nyasaland’. March 18th, 1963. Unpublished. Sourced from the H.K. Banda Archive.335
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The Federal government also used the health sector as an arena of winning the “hearts and minds”
of the Africans. There were state-sponsored, deliberate investments of money and other material
resources in the country’s health sector during the lifespan of the federation. In a propaganda
pamphlet produced by the Federal government in 1962, for instance, it was established that funding
for Nyasaland’s health sector had quadrupled when contrasting the figures of 1952 and 1961. In
1952 (one year before the Federation was established), the Nyasaland government spent only
£310,395 on its health services. But in 1961, the Federal Government spent £1,220,873 on the
health sector. The report also hinted at the infrastructural changes in the sector, when, for instance,
it highlighted that in 1953 Nyasaland only had 19 hospitals, but by 1961, the number had risen to
30. The number of hospital beds also increased by fifty percent, and admissions rose from 36,000
to 83,000. The numbers of outpatient attendance also soared from 1,141,000 in 1953 to almost
6,200,000 in 1961. There was also improvement in hospital staff personnel, from the 1,567 medical
staff in 1954, to more than 2,000 in 1961. By 1961, Nyasaland also had seventy-three qualified
nurses (including four matrons), compared to 1954, when there were only twenty-five nurses, none
of whom was a matron. However, the report also had some political connotations, when it praised
the efforts of the Federal and Nyasaland governments, while deploring and demonizing the works
of the leading nationalist movement in the country, the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), as being
anti-development through its campaign of disturbance and resistance. The following statement
illustrates that line of state-sponsored propaganda:
…But this happy picture was sadly marred some 18 months ago when a campaign of
disturbance and intimidation was started against the Federal health services. It is an
amazing situation when an allegedly responsible political party, purporting to be able
to govern the country, wantonly and flagrantly puts the lives of hundreds of thousands
of its people into jeopardy in order to make political scoring points….
The efforts of Ministry of Health teams to vaccinate the people of Nyasaland against
smallpox and other diseases were largely frustrated by leading officials of this political
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party who, while taking great care to obtain their own vaccinations, travelled around the
country, urging villagers and schoolchildren to boycott the vaccinations.336

This 1962 propaganda report also praised government efforts to improve the education sector,
amid the rising tide of opposition. The framers of the report, for instance, noted that by 1953, there
was no secondary education institution for Europeans in the country; the same applied for Asians
who had no secondary school; while only one government secondary school served the Africans.
Only eight Africans throughout the protectorate were receiving higher education. Once the federal
government took over, the report stated, it embarked on a massive improvement of the sector,
including building more schools, training more teachers, encouraging in-service training, and the
use of audio-visual services. In the first six years of the federation, the number of Asian and
African (Colored) primary schools increased from only one in 1954 to 27 in 1960, while in the
same period, enrolments soared from 133 to 3,430, an increase of 2,500 percent. During the same
period, some Asian and African students were also allowed to attend the federal secondary school
in Bulawayo, while another was being built at Blantyre in the southern province at a cost of more
than £100,000. Hostels for students (both boys and girls) were also constructed at the Blantyre
school at a total amount of £145,000. The Federal government also set aside nearly £45,000 which
was earmarked for scholarship purposes for students from Nyasaland to attend the University
College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in Southern Rhodesia. By 1962, fifty-seven Africans from
Nyasaland had benefited from the Federal scholarship program at an average cost of £320 per year.
Just as in the health sector, the Federal government deplored the works of the nationalist movement
(MCP), accusing its officials of overtly intimidating Africans who were willing to accept Federal
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aid for university training.337 In that way, developments in the education sector were similarly
being used to contrast the roles of the CAF and the radical nationalist movement. The same
argument was also mentioned in the report when it blamed the extremist politicians for sabotaging
the Nkula Falls Hydro-Electric Project which the Federal government had planned to commence
in 1962, with an estimated government expenditure of £3 million, and a capacity of 24
megawatts.338
The picture that was being painted from such claims, whether realistic or “doctored,”was that
Nyasaland had benefited from its inclusion in the federation, and that the Africans were bound to
gain more by supporting the government of the day, rather than siding with the nationalists. It was
noted, for instance, in the protectorate’s economic survey for 1958-1959, that by being part of the
federation, Nyasaland had broadened the sources of funds earmarked for development programs.
For instance, prior to the federation, development funds were coming entirely from the meagre
local revenue; and from grants and loans guaranteed by the British government. However, since
the federation, the sources of development funds included further avenues: special loans; the
African Development and Welfare Fund; internal and external borrowing from the Federation
government; and, revenues collected by the Federation government. The framers of the economic
survey summarized their perspective as follows:
From our examination of Nyasaland’s economy, we are convinced that the country’s
economic development has been accelerated as a direct consequence of its federal
association with the two Rhodesias and that the economic benefits which have been
enjoyed have been substantial. We think it right to state this view in the forefront of our
337
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Report. In doing so we are anxious not to overstate the position. It is not suggested that
in the years prior to Federation no economic development occurred; nor need it be
suggested that a return to the former political status of the country would necessarily
mean that no further expansion would take place in the future. But, as we see it, the
evidence is conclusive that the greater rate of economic development which has
occurred since 1953 must be attributed to the constitutional changes which were made
in that year and that this greater rate of development could not be maintained if
Nyasaland were to depend entirely upon its own resources.339

Policing the anti-Federation Insurgency
In this section, this study continues with the argument that the roles and operations of the police
force during the colonial period can best be understood by employing the political economy
approach. This is based on the argument that the police operations in the late colonial era, covered
in this chapter, reflected the political and economic climate of the time, which included the need
for the police to cover up for the “protectionist” policies of the state. In Nyasaland, in the
immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the police force underwent multiple phases of reorganization to suit the prevailing political and economic needs of the time, including cases where
the police force became essential in tracking down the suspected “enemies of the state.” Under the
1946 Police Ordinance, the duties of the Nyasaland Police Force were as follows:
…employed in … the Protectorate for the prevention of crime, the apprehension of
offenders, the preservation of law and order, the protection of property and the due
enforcement of all laws and regulation with which they are directly charged; and as a
military force when called upon … to discharge such military duties within or without
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the Protectorate as may be required of them by, or under the authority of the Governor;
and for the performance of all such duties shall be entitled to carry arms.340

Apart from adopting more of the military roles, the Nyasaland police force also began to receive
policemen from other troubled spots of the empire and from recently decolonized areas, such as
Palestine and India. By the early 1950s, the police force had the following offices and branches:
Office of the Commissioner; Special Branch; Criminal Investigation Department; Signals Branch;
Police Training School and Band; Pay and Quartermaster; Immigration and Passport Control;
Police Reserve; and Firearms Registry.341 Out of these police branches, it would be the Special
Branch that would play an important role in the counterinsurgency activities during the era of the
federation. Its roles included serving as an alternative and additional source of gathering
information on the political activists in the country. The Special Branch had replaced the former
Nyasaland Political Intelligence Bureau (NPIB), which was established in August 1939, and
placed under the Commissioner of Police. The Intelligence Bureau’s key duties included compiling
political intelligence bulletins and coordinating with other intelligence organizations in the region.
A secretariat was established to keep files of intelligence documents and to keep track of records
and addresses of those under police surveillance, especially suspects and politically dangerous
persons. Its documents were filed separately from other police papers, or criminal records, and
were only handled by a few selected persons, preferably non-Africans. The Bureau itself would
also deal with other African affairs such as bazaar gossip, the trend of “native thought” and other
special persons in the native communities. Hence, it was deemed to be fatal if such information
would have leaked back to the Africans through native clerks. Other duties of the Bureau also
focused on censorship, targeted at undesirable literature and propaganda. As such, the Bureau’s
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office was provided with an ultra violet lamp, to be used to detect the presence or otherwise of
writing in invisible ink.342 These responsibilities were taken over by the Special Branch in the postWorld War II era and became ‘handy’ during the disturbances against the CAF from 1953 onwards.
When the 1953 disturbances broke out, and having noticed the inadequacy of the regular police,
the state authorities established another branch known as the Police Mobile Force (PMF). The
PMF, which in 1954 numbered fourteen European officers most of whom had served in Palestine,
and about 200 Africans, was trained and equipped to deal with situations requiring mobile force
reserves at short notice. The PMF also served as a training ground for newly appointed European
policemen in the protectorate before they were transferred to new stations. Furthermore, from 1954
onwards, there was an increased rate of expansion for the police, following the creation of new
police stations, police posts and quarters, to improve the protectorate’s surveillance and security
services.343 By 1958, the PMF consisted of six highly trained platoons, each consisting of European
police officers and thirty-three African rank and file, most of whom were former soldiers in the
Kings African Rifles (KAR). The policemen were placed under a superintendent, who had to make
sure that his platoons were always ready for emergency operations in cases of civil disturbances
and riots.344
The police restructuring measures were important throughout the lifespan of the federation,
because, as already alluded to, most of the traditional authorities had either willingly or forcibly
pledged their allegiance to the anti-federation movement, something which was self-defeating to
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the policy of indirect rule, with its heavy reliance on African chiefs to run some government affairs.
This was highlighted in a State Intelligence Dispatch of September 1953, which stated:
The situation in Nyasaland has shown that any Native Authorities, mostly in the
Southern Province, hitherto loyal to the Government, have been so undermined by
Congress that they cannot with certainty be relied upon to maintain law and order among
their people and to resist the strong influence exerted upon them by Congress agitators.
Those who still repose their faith in Government are bewildered and do not know which
way to turn. The mass of loyal subjects who are tired of demonstrations and of seeing
police and military operating primarily as anti-riot squads would probably welcome a
return to normal conditions. It is of course obviously important at this time when
Congress have been jolted by the arrest of many of their ringleaders, and show signs of
climbing down, to bolster the morale of the loyal element by carrying out as much
preventive and normal police patrolling as possible. It is satisfactory to know that
patrolling is being carried out in increasing measure because, quite apart from the fact
that the uniform branch should itself collect much useful information, it acts in a
preventive and complementary role to the C.I.D. and Special Branch, thereby indirectly
reducing the weight of the problems with which the latter have to deal.345

Through these measures, the Special Branch was organized to operate at two levels. The first level
was semi-operational and was mainly concerned with providing advice to the police and the state
of any impending native disturbances. The second level was mainly to cover strategic and longterm operations, including the investigation of underlying causes of native uprisings. The second
level was particularly important as the police had learnt that most of the native disturbances
followed a similar “modus operandi”, which also suggested that there was some measure of
planning, rather than being merely sporadic incidents. It was also recommended that the officers
of the Special Branch (both European and African) had to be of high caliber, and that the European
officers employed in the Nyasaland Special Branch should acquaint themselves with the local
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language dialects and all traditional beliefs or customs, to assist them in conducting their duties of
analyzing and African movements and organizations.346
The “political policing” roles of the Nyasaland Police became even more important from mid1958 onwards, following the re-organization of the Nyasaland African Congress (NAC).
According to one of the leading figures of the party, M.W. Kanyama Chiume, significant changes
appeared in the party beginning from early July 1958, when Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda, a
member of the party who had been in exile for over three decades, returned to the country upon
the invitation of the locally-based party leaders to spearhead the nationalist and anti-Federation
cause, and also to revive the party, as it had been undergoing its own internal challenges and had
begun to lose its support base. When Dr. Banda returned to Nyasaland, he was welcomed by
demonstrations of enthusiasm from the African peoples, and he also had the immediate impact of
re-organizing the party into a well-disciplined political movement unanimous in its aims of selfgovernment and secession from the CAF. Africans looked to him as their “Messiah” or “Savior,”
who would deliver them from the bondage of the federation and British colonial rule, hence the
massive following and out-pouring of support. For instance, from having about 80 branches in
mid-1958, the number increased to about 200 branches by the close of that year. The party’s
national secretariat also became well-organized, and was equipped with duplicating and other
machinery, used to print the party’s newsletter, The Kwacha. The party’s rallies also began to
attract a lot of support, with people travelling long distances to hear Dr. Banda speak. Most of the
traditional leaders (chiefs) also began to boycott meetings with the governors (both federal and
protectorate) and their representatives, and instead pledged their allegiance to the ANC. Many of
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the chiefs might have anticipated that independence from British rule was within reach, hence the
need to side with the re-energized nationalist movement.
In December 1958, Dr. Banda and M.W. Chiume, went to Accra, Ghana, to represent the party at
the All-African People’s Conference. At the Conference, which was held from 5th to 13th December
1958, Dr. Banda was said to be re-energized following his deliberations with other leading
nationalist figures from across the continent, such that when he returned to the country in January
1959, he began to preach that the country would soon gain self-government and secession, while
stressing that his followers had to adopt non-violent strategies.347
Due to incidences of African unrest, the Nyasaland police initiated a campaign of violence against
African crowds and supporters of Dr. Banda and the NAC. The police would send their personnel
to the public rallies, who often provoked the situation by interfering in the activities of the Africans,
which from time-to-time culminated in stone throwing at the police by the Africans. The police
force was also responsible for coming up with tramped-up charges of Congress functionaries, such
that by February 1959, close to 300 Africans had either been fined or imprisoned under such
charges. Among them included 37 women who were beaten by the police in Zomba in January
1959.348 The perceptions of the police were reflected in the 1959 annual police report, which stated:
The disregard for law and order and contempt for authority which was being displayed
by adherents of the Nyasaland African Congress towards the end of 1958 continued
unabated in the New Year. The pattern followed appeared to be to provoke incidents by
deliberately flouting the law. There were cases of stoning cars after meetings and abuse
of and, at times, assaults on Government officers and others engaged in enforcing
legislation such as Agricultural and Forestry Rules. In some instances demonstrations
were staged, not only at Native Courts, but also in Magistrates’ Courts when offenders
were brought to trial. At large public meetings for which permission had been granted
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intemperate speeches were made and, in addition, there was evidence that a large
number of small meetings were being held without permission in rural areas. The
authority of Chiefs was being undermined and Chiefs themselves subjected to
intimidation….349

The police infiltration of the Congress rallies was also in part influenced by leaked information
from the December 1958 All-African People’s Conference, where it was noted that the nationalist
leaders from the federation had pledged themselves to drive the Europeans out of Central Africa,
preferably through non-violent means, but violence was also advocated in other circumstances.
That was allegedly to be done with the help of Ghana and the support of the communist regimes
from the East. It was no wonder that the charge of communism figured often in the public speeches
of the Federal Prime Minister, Sir Roy Welensky, during the first two months of 1959, as he and
his officials painted the nationalist movements as communist implants in the three territories.350
In a way, there was some form of authenticity to the claims about the role of communists in the
anti-Federation movements due to what transpired at the Accra conference. A report compiled in
January 1959 from the conference seemed to back the claims that the African nationalists were
significantly being influenced by Soviet communism. Although the host of the conference, Dr.
Kwame Nkrumah, then Prime Minister of Ghana, had attempted to assure the Western powers,
especially the British and US governments, that the communist bloc would not control the
proceedings of the conference, that was not necessarily the way things turned out to be. For
instance, Russia sent a strong seven-man official delegation, more than any other overseas power,
which also represented the greatest number of communist leaders ever gathered south of the Sahara
Desert, hoping to manipulate the anti-colonial and nationalist movements. Behind the scenes, the
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Russian government had also already put in place a standing offer of £100 a month salary, plus an
office, a typewriter, and a telephone, for almost any African from a colonial territory who wanted
to set up a political party office in Cairo, Egypt, where President Gamal Abdel Nasser, was keen
to help fellow Africans remove the yoke of European colonial rule.351
In Nyasaland, by December 1958, the government also issued a serious warning to those involved
in the disturbances, telling them that the government would not tolerate elements of lawlessness.
The Acting Chief Secretary, P.W. Youens, made these remarks in the Legislative Council:
If Honourable members consider that this government will be diverted from its belief
in Federation by evil deeds they are wrong. Entirely wrong. Let them disabuse
themselves. This government will not bow to hooliganism. It will do everything it can
to seek it out and stamp it out. That these incidents which have given rise to this debate
occurred is to be greatly deplored. That they should have happened in a territory of such
traditional friendliness as Nyasaland is a bitter thought. That innocent passers-by, going
about their lawful occasion should have been harmed is a shameful thing… Such acts
of hooliganism and unprovoked violence are vile things, in whatever name or cause they
are committed. Nothing good ever came or ever will come of them… Men who incite
or permit such acts are evil men, and if there is justice in this world, and I believe there
is, they will be rooted out…352

Such sentiments, made by one of the Nyasaland government’s highest-ranking officials, clearly
stipulated that the government had been preparing to “eliminate” troublesome elements in the
country. The main target by this time was clearly the re-energized Nyasaland African Congress
(NAC), whose members were feeding off from the energy of Dr. Banda and other radical young
leaders of the party. It would only be a matter of months, as highlighted in the next section, when
a state of emergency was declared in the country.

‘All-African People’s Conference, Accra, Ghana’. Report compiled by Edwin S. Munger, for American
Universities Field Staff, January 1959. Source: H.K. Banda Archive.
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Counter-insurgency and the 1959 State of Emergency
As already alluded to, following the disturbances and commotion created by the return of Dr.
Banda and the subsequent reorganization and radicalization of the NAC, the Nyasaland
government seemed to be preparing for “the worst.” Perhaps afraid of being outdone by the
nationalists, Governor Sir Robert Armitage decided to strike first. Having consulted and received
the backing of both the Federal and British governments, on March 3rd, 1959, the governor declared
a State of Emergency using intelligence briefings of the plans by the Congress to embark on a plot
of disturbance and violence, including the purported murder of Europeans in the country. Under
what was called “Operation Sunrise”, the security forces planned and implemented the arrest of
“hard core” Congress leaders. A second operation was also planned to pacify the disturbed areas,
while a third was also in the pipeline to eliminate the NAC. Most of the policemen involved in the
operations came from within the Federation and the neighboring British territory of Tanganyika.
The policemen were issued with instructions to round up all political activists and radical members
of the congress in follow up operations throughout the country.353 The stated police and military
reinforcements arrived in Nyasaland by the end of February 1959, following requests by Armitage
for a supply of forces from the Royal Rhodesian Regiment (RRR), comprised mainly of European
troops, and KAR. The plans were for the deployment of three regular battalions of the KAR and
RRR, complimented by two further battalions of European territorials, plus one hundred members
of the British Southern Africa Police (BSAP), thirty European and seventy Africans. There was
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also going to be a Tanganyika platoon of sixty troops who would enter the Nyasaland territory
from the northern part of the protectorate.354 Philip Murphy argued that the Colonial Secretary,
Alan Lennox-Boyd, felt duty-bound to support the Nyasaland governor, because in the governor’s
previous posting in Cyprus, he (Lennox Boyd), had repeatedly denied his requests for a security
clamp-down against nationalist agitators, in which the dilly-dallying of the CO presented room for
the growth of the opposition camp, leading to the disturbances of 1954-1955. As such, the colonial
secretary felt compelled to rely on the intelligence reports dispatched by the Nyasaland
governor.355
When the emergency was declared on March 3rd, hundreds of congress leaders (both local and
national), including Dr. Banda, were arrested by Special Branch policemen, and later placed in
detention without being tried in court. Out-going telegraph traffic was monitored, including press
telegrams, while curfews were also imposed in the urban centers and townships. Dr. Banda was
captured (alongside his personal bodyguard and later cabinet minister, Yatuta Chisiza) at dawn at
his home in Blantyre in a carefully planned arrest involving six groups of policemen, from both
the Special Branch and the PMF, mostly made up of European officers, and also with support of
three platoons from the D Company of the 2nd Battalion of the Kings African Rifles. The large
group of security forces was needed to counter the anticipated resistance of Dr. Banda’s
bodyguards (some of whom were shot at). About 60 of them spent the night at his house on the
night of the operations, in anticipation of their leader’s impending arrest. After his arrest, Special
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Branch policemen also went to the Congress Secretariat and his private clinic in the city, allegedly
to search and clear any suspected arms and documents used to indoctrinate Dr. Banda’s followers
and patients, respectively.356 By the end of April 1959, over 1,000 Africans had been detained
without trial and over 2,000 had been convicted of political offences. The sentences of those
convicted were harsh, ranging from four months to twenty-two years, while others paid fines or
had their property confiscated, depending on the seriousness of the offence. The NAC was also
outlawed and immediately ceased to exist as a legally recognized political entity. 357 In conducting
the arrests, Armitage had at his disposal the following troop reinforcements: military (2 Territorial
Force Battalions, 4 Independent Territorial Force Companies, 3 African Battalions, a total of 11
Territorial Force Companies and 9 African Companies, and 1 Platoon of armored cars); police (9
Platoons from the Nyasaland PMF, 2 Platoons from the Tanganyika Police, and 4 sections of the
BSAP); and the Royal Rhodesian Air Force (7 Vampires, 10 Provosts of whom 7 were armed, 2
Pembrokes, 1 Beaver, and 1 Cessna). The Nyasaland government’s intention in bringing such
reinforcements had been to achieve an immediate restoration of law and order in the
protectorate.358
The arrests of the congress leaders sparked widespread protests in some of the major urban centers
in the country. One of the most important protests (due to the high casualty figures), took place at
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Nkhata-Bay district center in the northern province. A protest organized by the local people saw
them attack the district prison and later the M.V. Mpasa, which was a ship that would have been
used to transfer political detainees to the main prison in the colonial capital at Zomba. The NkhataBay district commissioner, John Brock, called for police and military reinforcements to help him
execute the orders, especially following the rumors that the Africans had plotted to protest before
their leaders would be transported to Zomba. The demonstrators were allegedly defiant and rude
in the eyes of the security forces, some daring the security forces to shoot them, as they were ready
to both die and kill for their country. In the Nkhata-Bay demonstrations, 21 demonstrators were
mercilessly killed by the security forces, some from the RRR, under the orders of the district
commissioner, while twenty-nine others were severely injured.359 In other separate incidents in the
following weeks, about 30 Africans were also reportedly killed by the security forces, which
brought the total number of those killed during the Emergency to over 50. There were also
numerous cases where Africans were dispersed through the throwing of tear gas canisters and
using baton charges. Sir Robert Armitage also launched a “campaign of harassment”, designed to
eradicate Congress leadership and doctrines, which was characterized by frequent police patrols
where houses were searched, documents seized, and widespread arrests were made. Orders were
given to police officers and/or soldiers to search without warrant any premises of suspected
congress operatives, which led to the arrest of some, even where their membership of congress had
not been confirmed.360
One of the detained Congress leaders narrated his ordeal in a 2009 interview:
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The night of my arrest, I was forewarned by a Mr. Musa Gama, that we were going to
be arrested. As such, on that night (March 3rd, 1959), I was not surprised to see the
policemen come to my house. They came at around 3am, and immediately began
breaking into my house. I immediately woke up and told them to stop their actions and
arrest me. The policemen then demanded that I should show them where I was keeping
party membership cards and receipts. They also demanded that I should give them the
list of Congress members. When I gave them all that information they arrested me and
also took away all the party funds that I was keeping in my house. When they took me
to the police station, I found out that there were other Congress members in handcuffs,
including Mr. Musa Gama, and other fellow party leaders in Zomba. We were then
placed under the guard of troops from Somaliland as we were being kept at Zomba
Prison. The prison conditions were very appalling. Imagine, we were just given one
blanket each, and they confiscated all our clothes. We were also given just one meal per
day. We were also prohibited from speaking anything to do with the Congress….361

At the Federal government level, the leadership did not hesitate to link the disturbances in
Nyasaland (and the other two territories) to the influence of the spread of the Russian Communism.
That perception was reflected in a communique from Sir Roy Welensky, the Federal Prime
Minister, who was fed with information by the Federal Security Intelligence Bureau (FSIB), within
a week of the Nyasaland arrests. Welensky wrote:
The Nyasaland uprising plans were inspired at the Accra Conference in Ghana. I must
register a protest that plans of this nature should have been evolved at a Conference held
in that country. I do not consider this a friendly act to a fellow Member State of the
Commonwealth. At the Accra Conference, the Russians had a strong team and what is
more, we have it from factual evidence that direct contact was made between the
Russian representative and certain of the African leaders from the Federation.
The Federation has tried hard to bring the African into a system of government and the
African Federal Parliamentary representation now amounts to twenty-five percent. I
believe that the prospects of a successful multi-racial society are good. As the African
shows a capability of participating in Government and State development, he will be
given a bigger say in running the Federation.362
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Clearly, Sir Roy Welensky and others around him had not succeeded in drawing the interests of
the Africans to the idea and concept of the CAF, hence the disturbances that arose in each of the
three territories. In April 1959, following pressure from the opposition benches and other
concerned quarters, including the media, the Conservative government in Britain appointed a
Commission of Inquiry, chaired by Justice Patrick Devlin (hence “The Devlin Commission”). He
was assisted by Messrs. J. Ure Primrose, P. Wyn-Harris, and E.T. Williams, as committee
members. The Commission was charged with the responsibility to inquire into the causes of the
Nyasaland disturbances and the response of the colonial state prior to and after the Declaration of
the Emergency. The commissioners collected their information in Nyasaland between April and
May of that year, and in June they travelled to Southern Rhodesia to interview some of the political
detainees. In total, there was evidence collected from 455 individual witnesses, and about 1,300
witnesses in groups. They also analyzed various memoranda and government documents.
The report of the commission highlighted that in the disturbances that took place from January to
March 1959, about 51 Africans had been killed, and over 80 others were wounded. There was also
a possibility that the numbers of those injured might have been more than what was accounted for,
especially where those injured did not seek treatment at government hospitals or health centers.
The atrocities in question were part of three key “Operations” ordered by Governor Sir Robert
Armitage. The first was “Operation Sunrise”, which led to the arrest in the early hours of March
3rd, 1959, of the so-called “hard-core” leaders of Congress and their subsequent detention. The
second operation began on March 9th and was aimed at restoring law and order in areas where
groups of disaffected people were still operating under the leadership of Congress. Most of the

pushed the Communist line, and advised the Africans to use any means to obtain freedom, and to use Communism if
they thought it would help.

236

casualties (six deaths and five injuries) occurred through actions initiated by the security forces,
and not necessarily because of African agitation. The third began on April 13th and was aimed at
“stamping out Congress” and to return the country to a governable condition, without necessarily
employing lethal force.363
In the final report, the commissioners deplored the rush to use firearms and military force to subdue
the African disturbances. Referring to the Nyasaland Police Standing Orders, the police were
supposed to use long batons to disperse crowds as a first resort. If the disorderly crowds were too
large and the force available was too small, then they were allowed to use smoke grenades.
Firearms were only accepted as a last resort and could only be used upon an executive order from
the executive, administrative, and security arms of the government, having initially gauged the
numbers, temper, and threat posed by the masses. The biggest regret to the commissioners was
their discovery that during the disturbances, the only force that was available was the military one
(one where firearms had to be used by soldiers and other policemen using lethal force), rather than
minimum means of crowd control.364
The report of the commission also hinted that the actions of the Nyasaland government, through
its executive and security arms, were arrived at based on mere rumors and hearsay. The
government had acted on reports that the Congress leadership had organized a country-wide
campaign of violence targeted at destroying government property and a plot to murder Europeans,
especially those in government service. That was based on secret information allegedly gathered
from some informants at meetings of the Congress in January and February of that year. However,
in the commission’s findings, there were four main issues that were agreed at the meetings, for
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which the Nyasaland police nor other state intelligence or security operatives were not invited to
attend. Firstly, that a Mr. Yatuta K. Chisiza should be appointed as a private secretary and as a sort
of bodyguard to Dr. Banda; that the Congress should keep a black list of “stooges and quislings”,
which would include both politicians and traditional leaders opposed to the policies of Dr. Banda
and the NAC; the approval of the policy of sabotage – which would involve the cutting of
telephone wires, blocking of roads, destruction of bridges, etc. and also a campaign of defiance,
which would include holding public meetings without seeking police permission; and a general
approval of a policy of resisting with violence any attempts to enforce unpopular laws, and
attempts to arrest those who broke them.365
Although there were elements of violence mentioned at the meetings, the commission found that
there were no plans to murder Europeans in the country. Furthermore, no official report was ever
made public or published for the authorities to back their claims and actions. The practice, since
1954, had been that the Special Branch of the Nyasaland police had been keeping a keen eye on
political activities, and maintained a list of “suspects” whom it could have arrested on the
Declaration of an Emergency. As such, the purported murder plot or a blood bath, was only
mentioned following such “misplaced” intelligence reports.366 The security forces however went
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ahead and used the illegal measures of force, during the operations, most of which were conducted
at night, which increased the likelihood of the abuse of the suspects. Further abuse of police powers
was observed in a number of areas, for instance, the erection of impromptu road blocks across the
country; the organizing of extensive search operations; the burning of houses belonging to
suspects, especially Congress leaders; charging of collective fines (as an extra-judicial form of
punishment, for instance, in Mulanje District, where the district commissioner imposed a fine of
£8,734 to cover damage assessed at £8,510 for government structures that had been destroyed);
confiscation of implements (such as axes, choppers, and pangas) from the houses that were
searched during the operations. These measures were synonymous with a “police state,” especially
because at no time during the investigations, did government officials express any regret or
disapproval of the atrocities committed prior to and during the Emergency.367
It was thus clear from the findings of the Devlin Commission that there were instances where
intelligence reports and activities of the police force were misleading and detrimental to the general
goodwill towards the government, respectively, sometimes bringing the colonial state into
disrepute. In the absence of the purported “murder plot”, there was no need to employ maximum
force in the process of subduing the native disturbances, most of which were conducted by
unarmed Africans, who simply expressed their unhappiness with the way the government was
being run. What was also deplorable was the harsh conditions which the political detainees
underwent during their time especially at Kanjedza Detention Camp.368 As argued by Georgina
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Sinclair, the police forces truly became pawns that were utilized to fulfill the interests of the
politicians of the time.369 Elsewhere, Philip Murphy posited that the use of the term “police state”
by the Devlin Commission, referring to the tough and punitive measures employed by the security
forces, was very embarrassing for the both the British and Nyasaland governments, as during the
Second World War and later during the Cold War, such terminology had been more associated
with the Fascist and Communist regimes, and their associated human rights abuses, thereby posing
serious questions about how colonial affairs were being handled at the time.370
When Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, visited Nyasaland in January 1960, he saw for himself
the levels of police brutality, following a scuffle that occurred on January 26th, as he addressed
delegates to a state-sponsored luncheon at Ryall’s Hotel in Blantyre. We know more about the
incidents of that day from a Commission of Inquiry, set up by Sir Glyn Jones (Armitage’s
successor), in early February 1960. The Commission was chaired by Judge Frederick Southworth
(hence “The Southworth Commission”) of the High Court of Nyasaland. A total of 81 witnesses,
from Nyasaland and from outside the country gave evidence between February and April of that
year. Some eyewitness accounts of the disturbances appeared as newspaper articles in The London
Times and The News Chronicle and were included in the Southworth Commission Report. As one
witness reported:
Before leaving Nyasaland today, Mr. Macmillan was the object of another hostile, and
this time more violent, demonstration. A crowd of a few hundred Africans had
assembled quietly outside the hotel at Blantyre where the Prime Minister was due to
arrive to attend a civic luncheon, given by the mayor of Blantyre-Limbe and councilors.
As the official party arrived the crowd suddenly produced banners and set up a
prolonged growlingly cry, that continued throughout the half-hour of the demonstration.
369
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A hardcore of about a hundred Africans began pushing through the small police cordon.
Some managed to get through and ran up and down the road waving banners and
shouting ‘All we want is Banda now’. Soon stones and mud were flying as the police
reserves moved in. Four demonstrators picked out for arrest, but when they were taken
to a police van dozens more offered themselves for arrest amid cries of ‘Freedom’ and
loud applause from the watching crowd, the vast majority of whom were no more than
spectators. Only some half a dozen Africans could be packed into the small van, though
later another 20 were encouraged to run into a larger one that had been brought up.
Meanwhile, the Police had cordoned off the demonstrators and were holding them back
with some difficulty. Apart from trying to push the police backwards the demonstrators’
main tactics were knocking off policemen’s caps and screaming ‘Give us Banda’ in
their faces, for which many of them were rapped with hard canes. One or two Africans,
including a woman who had been shouting ‘Give us back our Messiah’, were knocked
down, but no one was seriously hurt.371

One of the key witnesses was the Commissioner of Police, Mr. Long, who in his testimony
admitted that the police acted under his orders, with the intention to remove the ringleaders of the
demonstration. He mentioned that the actions of the demonstrators had almost made it impossible
to avoid confrontation with the police. Among his key responsibilities, the commissioner stated
that he gave up his official vehicle, a Land Rover, to be used in the arrest of the native
demonstrators. He also mentioned that he himself arrested one of the ring leaders, following a
photograph of the incident which was presented as part of the inquiry. However, Long, upon being
pressed, admitted that some of the actions of his policemen were uncalled for, especially when
they failed to supervise the demonstrations, rather than rushing to use force. That failure was in
part blamed on the limited numbers of police personnel, and the lack of experience by some of the
officers, some of whom had only a year or two of police service. In his closing remarks, Long told
the inquiry that under the prevailing conditions, he was generally pleased with the conduct of the
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policemen. He also said that shortly after the incident, he was introduced to Macmillan, at the
airport, where the Prime Minister congratulated him on the conduct of the police.372
In summing up the report, the commission agreed with a cross section of journalists and other
independent observers, that the incident of January 26th, 1960, could be described as a “riot”, which
only lasted for about an hour or so. The African protestors, who numbered between 800 and a
thousand, carried placards outside the hotel where the Prime Minster was to speak. About 35 of
the more active demonstrators were removed from the scene by police personnel, during a “kickabout” involving the police against the Africans and some Africans against the police, causing
some minor injuries on either side, for a period of about forty minutes. The report, unlike that of
the Devlin Commission, cited above, however, fell short of condemning the actions of the police.
For instance, it referred to the injuries suffered by the African protestors as less severe and went
on to describe an injury suffered by one witness, a Miss Phombeya, as “only covering an area of
one square inch, and probably no more than the area of a penny postage stamp. And that the amount
of blood that was shed would not be enough to test the capacity of an ordinary mustard spoon.”373
The report also blamed the media for blowing the disturbances out of proportion, through
“irresponsible reporting,” aimed at creating an impression that Nyasaland was ungovernable.374
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Figure 5.1: Rejecting imperialism amidst the blowing ‘winds of change’: Native protestors outside
of Ryalls Hotel, Blantyre, Nyasaland, on January 26th, 1960. The Rt. Hon. Harold Macmillan was
in the Hotel addressing delegates to a state-sponsored luncheon. Source: H.K. Banda Archive.

By the end of that year (1960), a Bill was also passed in the Legislative Council (Legco), leading
to the establishment of the “Nyasaland Police Reserve”. The Reserve was comprised of persons
above the age of 18, who would be called upon by the police commissioner during emergencies.
The Bill’s sponsor, P.W. Youens, then Acting Chief Secretary, argued that the Reserve was needed
to support the maintenance of law and order in the country in collaboration with the local police
and other parts of the CAF. The main function of the reserves was to police the activities of
political organizations, which were said to be the source of trouble in the country.375
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While the events in Nyasaland had left an indelible mark on Macmillan and other colonial
officials,376 it is also arguable that indeed Nyasaland had indeed become a “police state”, where
even the Prime Minister commended the use of brutality against the Africans. It would however
not take long before the CAF was disbanded in 1963, and independence granted to Nyasaland in
July 1964. The post-colonial leadership, as I will argue in chapter six, continued with most of the
policies, structures, and practices of the predecessor colonial state.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the efforts of the colonial state’s involvement in the protectorate’s
economy and development narrative, especially in the post-World War II era. It has been
highlighted that colonial development efforts were often accompanied by hidden agendas or
motives, both political and economic, and were meant to satisfy the needs of both the colonies and
the metropole. Using the case study of the creation of the CAF (1953-1963), it has been highlighted
that because the project did not have substantial African support, the opposition to the CAF became
a fertile breeding ground for the rise of radical forms of nationalism, in the form of the NAC and
later the MCP. The rise of such anti-colonial discontent was met with various forms of counterinsurgency employed by the colonial state. I have focused on the use of police brutality and the
enactment of laws to deter further African unrest. On the other hand, there were also several
development initiatives (in the education, transport, health, and agricultural sectors) employed by
the state to win the support of the Africans. The next chapter focuses on the post-colonial state in
Malawi, where effort will be made to show that there was a continuation of some of the policies,
institutions, and practices employed by its colonial predecessor. This would include such practices
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as “developmentalism”; political policing; the enactment of strict laws; and the use of “carrots” or
development initiatives to deter opposition against the state.
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CHAPTER SIX
POST-COLONIAL MALAWI: THE DYNAMICS OF AN “IMPORTED STATE”

Then there is the problem of initiative. If a nationalist movement is to achieve the goal
of independence, it is vitally important that one of the leaders should be elevated well
above the others; that his former equals should look upon themselves as his juniors; that
they should accept his decision as final; and that they should pledge loyalty to his
leadership. But once independence has been achieved, the problem of reconciling
submissiveness to the top leader and individual initiative on the part of the second-level
leaders arises. To a man who has been surrounded by submissive associates for a long
time, the exercise of initiative by his associates is easily misconstrued as a sign of rivalry
and disloyalty.377

Introduction
This chapter focuses on the processes involved in the making of the post-colonial state in Malawi,
from 1964 to 1994, covering the regime of Malawi’s first post-colonial head of state, Dr. Hastings
Kamuzu Banda. The focus is on the fact that since Malawi emerged as a “developmental state,”
the leadership developed “protectionist” tendencies, where opposition to the state was not
tolerated. This involved closing spaces for both political and economic participation for individuals
and other interested groups, such as trade unions and political parties. The ‘protectionism’ in
question contributed to both the rise of anti-state resistance, to which the state reacted by creating
counter-insurgency (or counter-opposition) measures, which, as I will discuss, came in multiple
forms, including the use of brutal force; the enactment of repressive laws; and the offer of
development opportunities. I also highlight how the West, especially the British and American
governments, helped to consolidate and prolong the Banda regime, as the Malawian leader was
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regarded as an important ally during the Cold War. Here, the argument is that the post-colonial
state in Malawi owed its survival and longevity to the Western support it received, without which
it could have easily been toppled.
Contextualizing the post-colonial state in Africa
There has been a wide range of scholarship that has focused on the dynamics of the African postcolonial state since the 1960s. The concept of the “state” has been defined by various scholars,
including Joel S. Migdal, who posited that an ideal definition of state should be: it is an
organization, composed of numerous agencies led and coordinated by the state’s leadership
(executive authority) that has the ability to make and implement the binding rules for all the people
as well as the parameters of rule-making for other social organizations in a given territory, using
force if necessary to have its way.378 Migdal posited further that wherever the “state” has
developed, it has had the capacity to make a difference, in one way or the other, in the people it
governs, sometimes successfully and sometimes not as planned. Those that succeed are regarded
as “strong states” and those that fail are regarded as “weak states.” This analysis then positions or
locates “states” as arenas of contestation. He used this definition to create a model described as
“state-society relations,” whereby the actions of the state affect people’s livelihoods, but also the
actions of the people can dictate the way the state is organized and run.379
In this section, I will discuss some of the key issues and debates, most of which revolve around a
pessimistic view of what has become of the post-colonial state since the age of independence. One
of the key scholars on the subject is Young, whose works have left an indelible mark on the study
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of both the colonial and post-colonial state in Africa. In his analysis of the “post-colonial state” in
Africa, Crawford Young presented what I adopt to be a convincing argument that scholars of
African must adopt parameters regarding the time line for post-colonial Africa. He posited that the
label “post-colonial state” in African studies should only be used to describe dynamics in African
states between the age of independence in the early 1960s, and the early 1990s, immediately after
the Cold War, and the collapse of the Soviet Union. He argued that for those three to four decades,
it could be arguable that there was a significant, sometimes wholesale, importation of the routines,
practices, and mentalities of the African colonial state into its post-colonial successor. From the
mid-1990s onwards, Young argues, both at the level of semantics and practicality, that the concept
of the “post-colonial state” begins to lose its usefulness, especially as many African countries, due
to the political and economic changes that took place, experienced a significant shift in the
structures and systems of government, away from those inherited from European colonial masters.
Since the mid-1990s, the dominating powers of the state have been significantly reduced, and the
concept of bula matari (“he who crashes rocks”), or Leviathan, as was the case during the colonial
period, bears only a remote resemblance.380 In the case of Malawi, I will discuss the factors behind
the fall of the post-colonial state in chapter seven of this study.
According to Young, some of the core elements of the colonial state that were transferred to the
“post-colonial state” could be summarized as follows: first, the models of development, especially
state-led development and control of the economy, that were adopted wholesale by the postcolonial state. The post-colonial state took over the responsibilities of fighting in the wars against
poverty, ignorance, and disease, and as the manager of transformation. Secondly, the silent
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codification of laws and legal codes from the colonial to the post-colonial state. In most countries,
there was simply a transfer of colonial era legal codes, disregarding the existence of pre-colonial
African legal systems, a process which helped to reproduce systems and/or practices of the colonial
era. Thirdly, apart from continuity, the post-colonial states also built upon the existing colonial
structures, policies and practices, as the new (post-colonial) elites took over power at a time when
there was overwhelming confidence in state-led development initiatives in which many leaders
preached against reliance upon the market but advocated for state-led development strategies. Last
but not least, the position to be adopted by the state in the “East versus West” Cold War rivalry
was also adopted from the colonial state. The new African states became a diplomatic battlefield,
and became a target for international aid, both military and economic, essential for both state and
nation-building in the post-colonial era. Lastly, the creation of single-party regimes, and
centralized authority in a single ruler, was also something adopted from decades of European
colonial rule. Political competition was not entertained, as that was deemed to be detrimental to
cohesiveness and national unity. Hence the citizens were expected to be obedient and loyal to the
state, the political party, and the ruler.381
Most studies on the post-colonial state in Africa have adopted Marxist and underdevelopment
approaches. Under the former, there was a tendency from most of the scholarship to conceptualize
and analyze the modern state, as posited by Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum, from the
perspective that “the economic structure of a society is the real foundation on which arises a legal
political superstructure.”382 On the other hand, those in the underdevelopment school have tended
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to concentrate on the limited or lack of economic and political grwoth of the post-colonial state,
with some of the factors traced back to hundreds of years of contacts with the West.383
Crawford Young identified six key phases of the state in Africa, from the late 1950s to the close
of the 20th century and early 21st century (see chapter one of this dissertation). This study falls
under five of the six phases identified by Young, and from his analysis, one gets the picture that
African states have since independence been affected by one crisis after another. The crises range
from authoritarian leadership, economic downturns, failed “developmentalism,” civil wars, neocolonialism, and more recently the lingering impacts of the Structural Adjustment Programs
(SAPs) imposed by the Bretton Woods Institutions.384
There is also scholarship that argues that the states that emerged in post-colonial Africa, can be
described as “imported states.” This includes works by Bertrand Badie, Pierre Englebert and Kevin
C. Dunn. Bertrand Badie, for his part, argued that the current model of a “state” is of Western
origin, having been formulated during the Middle Ages and enhanced during the age of
Enlightenment. It was European colonialism and conquest, which was responsible for transferring
the Western models of statehood to the non-Western world (i.e. that there was a diffusion of
political thought, institutions, and practices as well as legal codes and economic theories, from the
shores of Europe and North America towards the south and the east). Even after decolonization in
the early 1960s, for most of the former colonies (in Africa and Asia), the characteristics of Western
models of government both in the metropole and in the former colonies, were not discarded, but
rather continued to be the building blocks for the post-colonial state, which in a sense also tended
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to universalize the Western models of government. For instance, in the immediate aftermath of
European colonial rule, the post-colonial states adopted or “imported” tendencies of state-led
developmentalism and authoritarianism from their colonial era predecessors. These two tendencies
or practices progressed together, from Western origins, where “the Western prince is the one who
super-legitimizes his order and justifies the constitution of an international system based on his
legal system and its institutions. The prince of a developing society (or the nationalist elites, most
of whom were educated in the Western world) had however to include some form of
authoritarianism tendencies for him to back the claims of modernizing his own state.”385
The Malawian post-colonial state and its development model
Anyone who talks about development in this country must not have a narrow view of
what development is. All I had to do was to get independence. Once I was independent,
my people were independent, this country was independent, I too could go to New York,
go to Washington, go to London and borrow money. My job is to develop this country
because the political struggle is over. To wage war against three enemies – poverty,
ignorance, and disease and to do this, to fight these three, all of us have to be busy. I
must find money to build bridges, to build roads, to do many other things, schools and
run our University. You have a part to play because we cannot develop this country by
the old methods….386

As alluded to above, the post-colonial state in Malawi could be regarded as an “imported state.”
This refers to the continuation of practices, structures, and ideologies that were previously
employed by the colonial state and were emulated by the successor post-colonial state. There are

385

Bertrand Badie, The Imported State: The Westernization of the Political Order (California: Stanford University
Press, 2000), 48-77. See also Pierre Englebert and Kevin C. Dunn, Inside African Politics (London: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 2013), 48. In the same vein, see also Cooper, Africa since 1940: 5-6. Cooper posited that both the late
colonial and post-colonial governments in Africa were ‘Gate-Keeper States,’ in a way that the developmentalism of
both states influenced the leadership to stifle the economic and political opportunities of those in the opposition. See
also Jean-Francois Bayart. The State in Africa: Politics of the Belly, 2nd edition. (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2009),
60-61. Bayart also argued that the ‘development’ claims of most post-colonial states, created a loophole from which
the states were able to ban attempts of political competition and social protest.
386
“Speech by Dr. H.K. Banda, Malawi Parliament, July 1965,” Adopted from Malawi at War: Against Poverty,
Disease and Ignorance. Source: H.K. Banda Archive.

251

two key similarities that I will draw upon. Firstly, similar to what transpired in the late colonial
era, the post-colonial government also embarked on state-led or interventionist control and
management of the economy and the development narrative, where the state was involved in
comprehensive development planning and large-scale public investment (such a state may be
described as a “developmental state”). In part, that was because some colonial officials remained
in the country’s civil service or as advisors of the new government and kept adhering to the colonial
development policies. Secondly, there was a tendency by the postcolonial ruling elite (formerly
the nationalist elite) to block the rise of any opposition elements, and they employed propaganda
tactics such as labelling them as communist implants, as a strategy used to gain the sympathy of
Western powers, while “blinding” them to the human rights abuses of the state. Like most leaders
of post-colonial Africa and beyond, Malawi’s leader believed in the power of the state to shape
post-colonial society, where the state and the institutions under it would be used create a new social
order, in the image of the leader.
The first post-colonial Development Plan (1965-1969) outlined four main areas, that placed the
government at the center of the development agenda and initiatives. The areas included: the
expansion of agricultural production, to meet the demands of the domestic and export markets;
improvement of the communication and transport infrastructure; expansion of facilities for
secondary and tertiary education, to build the human resources to work in government and the
private sector; and the encouragement of industrialization by the private sector and parastatals.
The plan also clearly stipulated the need to maintain political stability in the country by, among
other things removing all forms of political opposition. It expressed the following sentiments:
“Development is never easy. But the difficulties involved in developing a nation are nevertheless
greatly eased if the nation possesses political stability. This Malawi has. At the head of
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Government is a popular, elected and undisputed leader. Behind the Government stand the people
whose support was evidenced more recently and clearly at the April General Election. There is,
therefore, no dissipation of resources or energy over disputes as to who is to conduct policy or
what policy is to be followed. This is a major asset.”387 The 1965-1969 Development Plan, was
followed by other similar policy documents, titled “Development Policies,” in which the
government retained keen interest in development and controlling the economy.388
Dr. Banda also clearly stipulated the path which his government would take in the Cold War
rivalry. He acknowledged, in a speech, delivered at a debating society in Zomba, in 1964, that
there had been a tendency by colonial authorities to label those in the opposition, including himself,
as communists. Furthermore, he stated that the post-colonial states in Africa were left with tough
decisions on which camp to side with. As for his preference, he made it clear that he was in favor
of the middle ground – i.e. the compromise between capitalism and communism – where the state
would have a stake in the economy (hence encouraging the spirit of protectionism), while also
allowing some form of independence for private ownership of the means and proceeds of
production. On the question of the Cold War, he mentioned that he would not drag his country into
the East vs West rivalry, rather that he would be open to diplomatic relationships with countries
that would help to improve Malawi’s economy and that of its four million people.389 As I will
discuss later in the chapter, Dr. Banda ended up changing his seemingly “non-aligned” position
when Malawi gained independence.
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Figure 6.1: Image depicting the handover of power from the colonial to the post-colonial state in
July 1964. I argue in this chapter that that was merely symbolic, as what emerged in the postcolonial period, was merely a continuation of the policies and practices that had served and
sustained the colonial regime, particularly Banda’s admiration of the British model of economic
development, i.e. that of a ‘developmental state.’ Source: Malawi, 1964-1974: Building the Nation.
1974. H.K. Banda Archive.

The Postcolonial Development Model
Once Dr. Banda settled on that model of development and state control and management of the
economy, he made sure that it was implemented when he became head of state in July 1964. His
government was involved in such areas as in agricultural production, credit control, manpower
training, transportation, and beverage production, leading to a situation where there was almost no
clear-cut distinction between the public and private sectors. There was a tendency for public
officers to treat public resources as their personal patrimony. There were also cases where that socalled “developmental state” tended to equate rapid economic growth with national security and
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described these as the priority areas of the state, while any form of opposition was despised as
dragging and derailing the development agenda.390
There were two main conglomerates, where the Banda regime was heavily involved in the control
and management of the economy. Due to the vested interests in the country’s economy, Dr. Banda
and those around him, were not willing to allow any form of opposition in the form of political
parties or individuals, to operate in the country, as doing so threatened their political and economic
base. This then continued the trend of a “gate-keeper state,”391 which I discussed in chapter five of
this study. In the process, those who clung to political power did so not just for the sake of retaining
a political position, but also because of the economic gains associated with political power. In the
process, the state, through these conglomerates, encouraged the principles of import substitution
industrialization (ISI)392 where the state encouraged domestic production, to reduce the
importation of basic products. The MCP elite and Dr. Banda’s relatives held leadership positions,
mostly as trustees and board members, in the companies under the conglomerates. As posited by
Guy Mhone the state’s strategy of intervention and participation in the Malawian economy led to
the manipulation of the political and economic spaces, often in favor of the state president, his
relatives and party cohorts.393
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The first conglomerate was the Malawi Development Corporation (MDC), which was established
in January 1964, through an Act of Parliament, and was also heralded as one of the most important
outcomes of the 1962-65 Development Plan. Among the key functions and terms of reference for
the establishment of MDC were the following: (a) to develop the agricultural, commercial,
industrial, and mineral resources and the economy of Malawi; (b) to have the power either alone
or in association with other bodies or persons – of operating commercial or business activities or
enterprises – be they agricultural, industrial, commercial, or mining related; (c) and to promote,
assist or finance any project – through providing training, loans and/or grants – to projects that had
similar aims as that of MDC and the Malawi government. In terms of funding, the MDC was also
empowered to source funds from both within Malawi (from the government and the private sector)
and also from foreign investors and donors agencies and countries, and also to channel its profits
to the Malawi government.394 The government, working through the MDC, went into joint
ventures or operated singularly, leading to stakes in a number of companies, including the
Commercial Bank of Malawi; the National Oil Company; Carlsberg Brewery; The Match
Company (Malawi) Limited; United Transport Malawi Limited; City Developments Limited;
Packaging Industries Malawi Limited; Pipe Extruders Limited; Brick and Tile Company Limited;
B&C Metal Products Limited; Malawi Motors Limited; Cold Storage Company Limited; Import
and Export Company Limited; among others.395
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Dr. Banda liked the association that emerged between his government, the MDC, and the country’s
development agenda. In a speech delivered to parliament in 1968, he argued as follows:
“Therefore, the government must go into business through the MDC. We are not going to close
the private enterprises and say, ‘Oh No, you must not do this, you must not do that.’ No, we are
going to compete. But I must not deceive anyone. When I was introducing the bill to create or
establish the MDC, I made it quite clear that where business and private enterprise is willing to
risk its capital, the Government will let private enterprise do business, but where private enterprise
is shy, afraid, unwilling to risk its capital, then the Government has to step in.”396 The song below,
adopted from the speech, supports that notion:
Song Number One:
Eeee Ngwazi lero

Eeee Ngwazi today

Zikomo a Ngwazi

Thank you Ngwazi

Tithokoza Ngwazi lero

We thank the Ngwazi today

Commercial Bankiyi

This Commercial Bank

Wamangitsa ndani?

Who has constructed it

Aaaa! Ngwazi!

Aaaa it’s the Ngwazi

Chitukuko chonsechi

All this Development

Wabweretsa ndani?

Who has brought it?

Aaaa! Ngwazi! Ngwazi! Ngwazi!

Aaaa Ngwazi! Ngwazi! Ngwazi!

Zikomo a Ngwazi tithokoza Ngwazi.

Thanks to the Ngwazi.397
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Dr. Banda also held substantive business interests in a private company called the Press Group of
Companies (PGC), which began as an off-shoot of a company called The Malawi Press
(established in 1961), which published the newspaper of Dr. Banda’s own political party, the MCP.
In 1969, the company diversified and diverted to become more of Banda’s personal company, as
Life President of the MCP, under the name of Press Holdings Limited (PHL), with Dr. Banda
owning ninety-nine percent of the conglomerates’ shares. Dr. Banda also regarded the PGC as an
agent of development, but also a source of employment for thousands of Malawians. However,
with the passage of time, the PGC began to be incorporated into the state system, or became a
“semi-state” organ, including cases where the government guaranteed loans for the conglomerate.
That was often the case because there was often no separation of powers between Dr. Banda, the
party, and the state. There were eight wholly-owned subsidiary companies under the PHL, namely:
Press Farming Limited; Hardware and General Dealers Limited; Press Trading Limited; Press
Industries Limited; Press Produce Limited; Press Agencies Limited; Press Transport Limited; and
Press Properties Limited. Furthermore, the Group was also a major shareholder in some of the
country’s major banks, including 38.4 percent in the National Bank of Malawi, and 40 percent in
the Commercial Bank of Malawi.398The Group also had business partnerships with other domestic
and foreign or international conglomerates, either as a subsidiary or an associate, which included
the following: African Lakes (UK); CMI (Belgium); Bergers (South Africa); Boart International
(South Africa); British Petroleum (UK); Carlsberg International (Denmark); I.D.V. (UK); Namib
Group (South Africa); Premier Group (South Africa); Standard Chartered (UK); Truworths
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(Zimbabwe); Universal Leaf (USA); and Swaziland Tyres (Swaziland).399 By the early 1970s, the
PGC’s economic monopoly had already reached worrying levels, with secret dispatches exchanged
between the British High Commissioner in Malawi and his superiors in London. There was
concern with the way the PGC was involved in land grabbing and easing out other businesses, both
locally-owned and foreign-owned.400 By 1993/94, the conglomerate was still one of the major
players in the country’s economy, with an estimated thirty-percent of the country’s formal GDP,
and offered employment to about 23,000 people, mostly Malawian citizens.401 In 1997, following
the change of government, from the MCP to the United Democratic Front (UDF), the PGC was
stripped away from the control of the Banda family and the MCP, following a protracted court
battle. In 1996, the UDF-led government passed “The Press Trust Reconstruction Bill” (later
“Act”), in the National Assembly. The conglomerate became a “Trust,” hereafter “Press Trust,”
working for the benefit of all Malawians, rather than just being a private entity. While “Press
Trust” still owns some of the companies established during the Banda regime, it is no longer as
large as it used to be. Currently, it uses the proceeds from the businesses in ensuring the socioeconomic well-being of Malawians.402
By the late 1960s, there were already brewing signs of discontent emanating from the top
politicians in the country. Many of them were dismayed at the self-enrichment activities of the
president and his close allies. They deemed this to be against the communal ownership of property
that was characteristic of African communities, and hence concluded that Dr. Banda’s capitalist
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tendencies had been adopted from his lengthy stay out of the country. Those deemed to be critical
to Banda’s policies were soon replaced. This included such names as Mr. Kumbweza (central
region minister), Mr. Chibambo (northern region minister, and Mr. Aleke Banda (finance
minister). Some of them confided their concerns with Glyn Jones, the last British Governor, who
had stayed on as an advisor to the newly independent government. 403 The rise and growth of
opposition to Dr. Banda from within the party (MCP) ranks, even saw the British authorities begin
to raise questions about how long he would stay on as president. Many of the diplomatic reports
even predicted that Dr. Banda would be out of office by 1974, when Malawi celebrated a decade
of independence.404 However, Dr. Banda stayed on until the early 1990s, as will be discussed in
chapter seven.
The Opposition – Communism Nexus under the Banda Regime
Since Dr. Banda had envisaged a state-led development agenda and had also acquired the stakes
in the above-mentioned conglomerates, he was, like the colonial state, not ready to accept any form
of opposition to himself and his government, as that threatened both his political and economic
positions. And just like the late colonial state, Dr. Banda also turned to the communist ideology,
as a label with which to describe the opposition elements in both his own party and outside. In the
words of one of Dr. Banda’s former nationalist colleagues, Dunduzu Chisiza, “it was almost a
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universal tendency in the less developed regions of the world, that if the ruling party or the leader
was pro-West, the opposition was deemed to be pro-East.”405
A good example was the fall out in his cabinet (i.e. the cabinet crisis) which took place barely two
months after independence in July 1964, following differences in both domestic and foreign
policy-formulation. At the end of the “crisis” three cabinet ministers were fired, while three others
resigned in solidarity with their fired colleagues.406 One important cause, related to the subject of
this study, was Dr. Banda’s preference for a slow-rate of “Africanization,” in which he retained
European officers in his government and the security service. It was the officials in the intelligence
and security services, mostly British, who began to feed Dr. Banda with intelligence reports that
some of his radical cabinet ministers were communist sympathizers who were determined to
overthrow him and establish a communist system of government. Most of the officials were the
very same British officers who had identified the NAC politicians as communists during the
disturbances of the late 1950s.407 Such trends, where officials from the metropole remained
influential in post-colonial Africa, often resulted in a conveniently moderate African leadership,
which maintained the status quo and continued to entertain western interests. The “mercenaries”
left behind in the former colonies to serve the newly independent African states often undermined
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the whole concept of “decolonization,” often leading to the elimination of revolutionary
nationalism.408

Figure 6.2: Dr. H.K. Banda (left) and Henry M. Chipembere (one of the Cabinet Ministers who
resigned during the Cabinet Crisis), during campaigning for Legislative Council positions, 1962.
Source: H.K. Banda Archive.

To gain both the Malawian public and Western sympathy, and to protect his own position, Dr.
Banda also embarked on a propaganda campaign to label the dismissed cabinet ministers as
communist sympathizers. Specifically, he began spreading information that some of the ministers
had received bribes from Communist China (the People’s Republic of China), to push for the
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establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. He insinuated that some of his
cabinet ministers had met with the Chinese Ambassador in neighboring Tanzania, where they were
promised that Malawi would be given £18 million, if it entered diplomatic relations with China.
Dr. Banda’s argument was that since he himself had met with the same ambassador, a Mr. Ho
Ying, who promised to give Malawi only £6 million, it meant that his ministers had been bribed
in his absence.409 The notion that the cabinet ministers were communist implants seemed to make
sense especially as all of them fled either to neighboring Tanzania or Zambia, countries whose
leaders had adopted pro-socialist policies, ujamaa in Tanzania, and “humanism” in Zambia.
Once he gained the confidence of the Malawian public and the international community, Dr. Banda
embarked on a process to consolidate his position. For instance, in 1966 he amended the country’s
constitution in which he outlawed all opposition political parties. In 1971, the constitution was
again amended allow him to serve as “president for life,” arguing that political stability would
ensure continued economic development in the country.410 The so-called “development,” as I have
discussed above, was mainly for the self-aggrandizement of Dr. Banda and his cronies. Dr. Banda
also adopted characteristics of a “paternalist despot,” in which he took state matters as his own
personal responsibility, and was thus willing to use lethal force and a patronage-based system to
alienate his perceived political enemies and/or those deemed to be detrimental to the development
agenda, while handsomely rewarding those who were his close allies.411 In other words, he sought
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to retain political power, not simply for personal glory, but also for material advantage, as is
common in patrimonial and neo-patrimonial systems.412 Dr. Banda, who had no vice or deputy,
and held the position of Minister of Defense throughout his reign, oversaw the multiple atrocities
of his tenure.413 A cross section of Malawians suffered under his 30 year regime, many of them
run into self-imposed exiles (including all the ministers who were fired or resigned during the
cabinet crisis), while a majority of others, regarded as “enemies of the state” (including members
of the clergy, the media, the academia, the civil service, and the business community) were thrown
into detention camps (at Mikuyu in Zomba District; and Dzaleka in Dowa District), where many
served time without being tried in a court of law.414 Public executions of government critics were
also the order of the day.415 Under the “Forfeiture Act,” passed into law in 1966, most of those
deemed to be a threat to the regime, also had their property confiscated by the state, concurrent
with the jail terms or detentions most of them were serving. The “forfeited” property and
businesses were handed over to members of the regime, which fed into the patronage system the
regime had created. The charge of “treason,” like its colonial era predecessor, was also made to be
very “fluid,” and was from time-to-time used by the authorities to legitimize the arrest of
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government critics.416 Under the 1968 laws, one could be convicted of treason for the following
conditions: firstly, if they prepared, endeavored, or conspired to overthrow the lawfully constituted
Government by force or other unlawful means; secondly, if they prepared, endeavored, or
conspired to procure by force any alteration of the law or the policies of the lawfully constituted
Government; thirdly, if they prepared, endeavored, or conspired to carry out by force any
enterprise which would, if effected, usurp the executive power of the State; and lastly, if they
incited or assisted any person or conspired to invade the Republic with force or unlawfully to
subject any part of the Republic to armed attack by land, sea, or assisted in the preparation of any
such invasions or attacks. The punishment for treason was a mandatory death sentence. The laws
also prescribed that hiding information on anyone suspected to be involved in a treasonous crime
would also be guilty and would be liable to imprisonment - for - life.417
Many of the critics were accused of not adhering to the “four corner stones” of his government
and political party, namely: Unity; Loyalty; Obedience and Discipline.418 Dr. Banda used the “four
corner stones” ideology to instill party discipline in the run up to the independence period, during
the “cabinet crisis,” and continued to rely on it for the rest of reign. In his own words, during the
“cabinet crisis,” he stated the following: “What are the four cornerstones on which our party, our
government, our state, was built? Here they are. Unity, Loyalty, Discipline, and Obedience. These
are the four cornerstones on which destruction of the Malawi Congress Party – destruction of the
Malawi Government, destruction of the Malawi State itself, Mr. Speaker, stands. Once these four
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cornerstones are broken away, one by one, the obedience, unity, loyalty, discipline, responsibility,
there is no Malawi Congress Party. There is no government, no Malawi government in this country,
and there is no state, the state of Malawi. What do we get? Another Congo? Is that what anyone in
this country wants? (Interjection: No! No!). … Once there is no unity, no loyalty, no discipline,
no obedience, we are finished; we are finished. Just as the Congo.”419
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Figure 6.3: In better days. Dr. Banda to the left, and Albert A. Muwalo Nqumayo, early 1970s,
admiring farm products by Malawian women. Later that decade, Banda would give orders for the
execution of Muwalo. Muwalo was a Cabinet Minister and the Administrative Secretary of the
MCP. In 1977, he was charged with treason, accused of plotting to overthrow Dr. Banda. Source:
H.K. Banda Archive. See also Memo from the British High Commission Office, Malawi to the
FCO, Central and Southern African Department, titled ‘The Treason Trial,’ 31st January 1977.
Confidential. BNA: FCO 45/2169: Malawi Internal Political Situation, 1977.

The Role of the Party and Women as Political Pawns
In this section, and the two that follow (on the youth and the police force), I posit that Dr. Banda
relied on a set of institutions to consolidate his regime. “Institutions” in their nature, have
historically adopted both physical and non-physical forms.420 The physical aspects often focus on
the legally established organizations, while the non-physical aspects revolve around such things
as the values, customs, rules and regulations, codes of conduct, beliefs, and practices associated
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with one’s membership of an organization. In other cases, the non-physical aspects are also
influenced by the prevailing political climate. In adopting that perspective, I focus on how the
ruling party, its organs, and the Malawi Police Force, were at the center of the counter-insurgency
measures of the post-colonial state. Membership in such organizations not only shaped one’s
behavior, but also ensured the continuity of certain actions over the duration of the post-colonial
state.
The Banda regime created the notion that only the one-party state under the MCP, would guarantee
development in the country. That often came through public pronouncements by the Party’s
leadership, and through other official publications. The Department of Information was on
numerous occasions compelled to produce pro-MCP pamphlets to highlight the major
development initiatives championed by Dr. Banda and the MCP. In such publications, it was often
made clear that only the MCP under the leadership of the “life president” had the ability to develop
the country beyond recognition. In one of such publications, the party was praised as follows:
Over three decades have passed since the mighty MCP was formed to mobilize the
people in the fight for political freedom and independence. In those short but eventful
years, the Party under the wise and foresighted leadership of the Life President, Ngwazi
Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda, has more than delivered the goods. The MCP manifesto of 1960
pledged, among other things to combat the three deadly enemies, namely ignorance,
poverty, and disease. These pledges have been fulfilled. Throughout Malawi today there
is remarkable evidence of progress in the fight against these enemies…. In light of what
has been said above, one cannot talk of development in Malawi without recognizing the
Party’s crucial role. The Party has played an important role in all fields of development.
It is, itself, an agent of change. The Party’s platform is used in the dissemination of
information to the people at the grassroots level on various projects. The Party has
continued to be instrumental in mobilizing the masses in various self-help projects
throughout the country.421
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Those deemed to contravene the position and dictates of the party were regarded as enemies of not
just the MCP, but also of the state, and of the people of Malawi in general. During its annual
conventions, the party’s leadership passed a series of resolutions, most of which were turned into
law, to eliminate all forms of opposition in the country. Those targeted included politicians,
business leaders, and other religious groups, who opposed the party’s policies. Members of the
Jehovah’s Witnesses religious sect were, for instance, among the most to suffer from the party’s
long arm of the law, especially as the sect ordered its members not to buy party (MCP) membership
cards, not to pay taxes, and not to patronize secular politics. The party leadership would on various
occasions confiscate property and businesses owned by the Witnesses and ordered that the
Witnesses be dismissed from their civil service jobs. Such measures saw many of them flee into
exile, settling in neighboring Zambia (13,000 by 1972) and Mozambique (12,500 by 1972).422
Dr. Banda also mobilized and extensively utilized the country’s women towards the consolidation
of his political position. The women were often utilized as development and propaganda agents of
the regime. The main women’s organization, which operated under the MCP was the Women’s
League (later League of Malawi Women (LMW). The League was established in the mid-1950s
and played a key role in the anti-Federation (CAF) struggles. Following the 1959 State of
Emergency, and the outlawing of the NAC, the Women’s League was also banned. When the MCP
was launched in 1959, the Women’s League rebranded and became the LMW, and Mrs. Margaret
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Mlanga became its first chairperson in 1960. The aims of LMW remained constant, and among
others included the fight for the freedom of the country’s citizens through the abolition of the
Federation; the campaign for the release of all political prisoners; and finally, the education of
local women about their political and socio-economic rights.423 By 1961, the LMW registered a
total of 551 branches across the country; 69 in the Northern Province, 73 in the Central, and 249
in the Southern region. And because of their crucial role in fighting against the colonial state, Dr.
Banda had already began making promises that he would reward the women with higher political
positions, including seats in the Legislative Council (later Parliament) when Malawi attained its
independence.424
While the women from the LMW were “repaid” for the loyalty to the party and Dr. Banda in
particular, after independence their influence increased, reaching its peak in the mid-1980s. In
1984, the Malawi government approved the establishment of the National Commission on Women
in Development (NCWD) which operated under the Ministry of Community Services and the
Office of President and Cabinet (OPC). Since the OPC was under Dr. Banda’s stewardship, it
meant that women’s welfare, under the NCWD, was officially under the watchful eye of the State
President. It was also the climax of the realization that women were a major factor in the country’s
development.425 The following year, 1985, Dr. Banda, alongside his longtime “Official Hostess,”
Madam Cecilia T. Kadzamira, established a women’s developmental organization, called
Chitukuko cha Amai M’Malawi (CCAM), which literally means “Women’s Development in
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Malawi,” with Madam Kadzamira as the patron.426 The CCAM was regarded as a development
organ of the LMW, with both organizations placed directly under Party authorities. The CCAM
was directly placed under the OPC, which meant that it had access to state resources. It operated
several development programs, chief among them being several farms where free labor was sought
from women in the name of “self-help,” and the proceeds, both agricultural and hand-craft based,
were deemed to be women’s contribution to the country’s development agenda.427 There were also
wide-spread claims that although the women worked hard in the CCAM projects, the moneys
raised were often diverted into private accounts of Party officials.428
Banda would also from time-to-time adopt traditional powers by describing himself as “Nkhoswe
Number 1,” literally referring to himself as the protector and defender of Malawian women, from
any possible abuse from their husbands and other males alike. In May 1964, for instance, Banda
introduced the “Mbumba Protection Bill,” intended to promote family stability, strengthen
marriages, and provide security to women and children from being abused by men. The Bill also
allowed women to inherit property upon the demise of their spouse.429 Banda also included
Malawian women in his overseas trips, and constructed houses for some of the leaders of the
CCAM and the LMW. He regarded the foreign trips as a learning experience for the women, who
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could apply what they learned abroad to uplift their own livelihoods.430 Malawian women
composed or sang various pro-Banda songs at public rallies, such as the following:
Song Number Two:
Popanda a Ngwazi tikadafa,

(Without the Ngwazi we could have died)

Tikadafa, tikadafa,

(We could have died, we could have died)

Inde, inde, a Ngwazi mwatiombola,

(Yes, Yes, Mr. Ngwazi you rescued us)

A Ngwazi adatiombola,

(The Ngwazi rescued us)

Eeee,

(Eeee)

M’manja mwa atsamunda,

(From the hands of colonial masters)

Eeee,

(Eeee)

Inde, inde, inde, inde,

(Yes, Yes, Yes, Yes)

A Ngwazi adatiombola,

(The Ngwazi rescued us)

Amayi tikunyada,

(As women we are walking with pomp)

Eeee,

(Eeee)

Chifukwa cha a Ngwazi,

(Because of the Ngwazi)

Eeee,

(Eeee)

Inde, inde, inde, inde,

(Yes, Yes, Yes, Yes)

A Ngwazi adatiombola.

(The Ngwazi rescued us).431
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Figure 6.4: Dr. Banda dancing along to songs and dances performed by members of the Women’s
League of his MCP. Undated. Note that the women’s attire had Dr. Banda’s face on it. Also note
the flywhisk in Banda’s right hand, which was used as a symbol connecting him to his traditional
Malawian and African roots. Source: H.K. Banda Archive.
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Figure 6.5: Dr. Banda (center), and Mama Cecilia T. Kadzamira (the Official Hostess) on the
extreme left, preside over the official handover of a house built by the Banda government as a
reward to women members of the Women’s League, in 1978. Source: H.K. Banda Archive.

Malawian Youth, Political Pawns and Counter-Insurgency
Similar to the roles that women of the CCAM and LMW played under the Banda regime, in this
sub-section I argue that Malawian youth also played a dual role in Banda’s counter-insurgency
strategy. On the one side, young Malawians who belonged to two interconnected and interrelated
movements, namely the Youth League, and the Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP), were used as
development agents, while on the other hand, they served the interests of the ruling elite who
oversaw the youth commit various atrocities associated with the Banda regime, terrorizing the
perceived “enemies of the state.” Among other memorable development projects, the two
movements worked together during the so-called “Youth Week” programs, held in March of each
274

year, where the members participated in construction of structures such as school blocks, teachers’
houses, and post offices. However, it was in the instances where the two youth movements served
as the party’s and the state’s “political police” and spied on suspected opposition elements that
they helped serve the purpose of maintaining regime stability and political and economic security
and power for the ruling elite.
The Youth League, established in the late 1950s, under the NAC and later the MCP, was initially
meant to be a training ground for future leaders of the party. The youths were to be trained in all
aspects of party affairs, including political, social, and economic responsibilities. Some of the main
duties of the League were as follows: (1) to follow orders and obey instructions from the party
leader, Dr. Banda; (2) to help in publicizing party meetings, and to maintain order at political
rallies; (3) to participate in and help publicize various party developmental agendas; (4) and to
help in recruiting more members into the party to increase membership.432 While some of these
duties were neutral and non-confrontational, it did not take long for the Youth Leaguers to start
operating as party hooligans. In the late colonial era, and indeed after independence, it was the
Youth Leaguers who were responsible for several altercations with members of other political
movements, and those deemed to be “enemies of the state.” The party leaders were, at times,
unapologetic of the atrocities committed by the members of the Youth League in the early 1960s,
as the following statement by Hon. Henry M. Chipembere, then Minister of Local Government,
attests:
If he did give us that permission to perpetuate acts of vengeance … we would let loose
our Youth League on them, and, Mr. Speaker, you probably know our Youth League.
We have tough boys in the Youth League only one boy is enough to fix Mr. Peterkins.
Even now, as I speak, even now, as I speak, the hands of the Youth Leaguers are itching.
They want action, but it is this great man (Dr. Banda) who is controlling them, because
“Role of Youth League,” The Times, June 1st, 1961. See also “The duty of the League of Malawi Youth,” Malawi
News, March 27th, 1964.
432
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as far as Africans are concerned his word is law. But should he ever say one day ‘Go
ahead boys and do what you can’…then it is common knowledge, isn’t it, that we are
the masters at the art of incitement, aren’t we? If people like us stand on a platform of
10,000 people, for instance, here in Zomba, like the rally that we had here last week of
20,000, if we told a crowd ‘Go ahead, phani mfiti (‘kill a witch’), what would happen
here? They should remember, they should remember, that their friends in the Congo
have seen real trouble when law and order did in fact break down. When, in Africa, law
and order breaks down, it does indeed break down….433

According to intelligence records from the Special Branch of the Nyasaland Police, most of the
late colonial era cases of violence, intimidation, and arson, against non-MCP supporters, were
perpetrated by members of the Youth League. By 1961, the League had 551 branches across the
country, distributed as follows: Northern Province (126 branches); Central Province (114
branches); and Southern Province (311 branches), with a Mr. C.D. Chindongo, as the National
Chairman. The MCP leadership, including Dr. Banda, were also fond of referring to the Youth
Leaguers, as “the Malawi Police,” and could entertain the youths’ actions, such a forming a “guard
of honor” for Banda on his arrival at public rallies.434
The Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP) was another youth-based movement that served the Banda
regime. On the one hand, the MYP youths were associated with developmental programs, while
on the other hand, they were also associated with various atrocities committed by the regime. The
initial stages towards the establishment of the MYP dated back to early 1963, when Banda sent a
delegation of his cabinet ministers, led by Kanyama Chiume (then Minister of Education, Social
Development, and Information), on a familiarization tour and youth leadership course in Ghana.
In Ghana, a similar movement (known as the Young Pioneers Movement) had been established by
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President Kwame Nkrumah. The initial plans for the movement, to work alongside the Youth
League, would give the youth the opportunity to contribute to the country’s economic development
while also improving their own livelihoods, through training in such areas as carpentry, mechanics,
building construction, agricultural production, and brick laying, among others. The earmarked
headquarters of the MYP was a location which later came to be known as Nasawa Training Base,
in Zomba District, following its formal establishment on August 11th, 1963. The first National
Council that was put in place to oversee the transition, was headed by Banda as its National Patron
(and later Commander-in-Chief), and several of his cabinet colleagues served as executive
committee members.435 Even before the base at Nasawa was fully launched, Banda had already
sent nine Malawian youths for training in Ghana, on the understanding that these would serve as
the “foundation” on which to build the MYP.436 Apart from the support from Ghana, the MYPs
were also trained by Israeli officials, some of whom would come to Malawi, while in other
instances, it was MYP members and trainees who would go to Israel for training.437 The first Israeli
official to go to Malawi under this arrangement, was a Mr. P. Gomen, former leader of “Gadna,”
the Israeli National Youth Movement, who was appointed as an advisor to the MYP. In March
1964, he was joined by a team of three other instructors, namely Mesrrs. P. Lavie, Uri Yanay, and
Ran Lachman.438 The code of conduct for MYPs consisted of the following concepts: patriotism;
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discipline; loyalty; unity; obedience; honesty; self-sacrifice; punctuality; humility; hard-work; and
courage.439

Figure 6.6: The Malawi Young Pioneers, c.1968. Performing at the Second Anniversary of
Malawi’s Republican status. Take note of the military-influenced attire/uniforms, signifying the
notion that the MYP was a ‘para-military’ arm of the regime. Source: www.nyasatimes.com

“Youth in Malawi: Security and Progress with the Malawi Young Pioneers.” Source: Malawiana Section,
Chancellor College Library, University of Malawi.
439
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Figure 6.7: Dr. Banda, to the right, and Ghana’s President, Kwame Nkrumah, early 1960s. Dr.
Banda was a keen admirer of some of Kwame Nkrumah’s policies, including that of establishing
a youth movement. The Ghana youth movement was known as Young Pioneers Movement, while
the Malawian one became the Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP). Source: H.K. Banda Archive. See
also Kwame Nkrumah, second printing, Africa Must Unite (New York: International Publishers,
1972), 130.

At the end of 1963, in his capacity as the patron of the MYP, Banda embarked on a re-organization
process, when he dissolved the MYP’s National Council, which was responsible for the launch of
the organization, and announced that he had appointed the Secretary General of the MCP, Mr.
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Aleke Banda,440 who was also editor of the Malawi News (MCP’s propaganda newspaper), and
then Director-General Designate of Malawi Radio, later Malawi Broadcasting Corporation
(MBC), as the new chairperson of a national committee to run the affairs of the MYP, a position
which he would hold until the early 1970s. Aleke Banda, as chair of a new national committee,
was supposed to be directly reporting to Dr. Banda as the National Patron. Dr. Banda also moved
to allay the fears of many who feared that the Youth League would be dissolved following the
establishment of the MYP, when he stated that both youth organizations would continue to operate
under the Party’s stewardship. Seeking to clarify the position of the two organizations, Banda made
the following remarks in his address to the Malawi nation:
I would like to make it quite clear, in few but clear and unmistakable words or sentences.
I did not dissolve the Youth League. I did not substitute the Youth League by the Young
Pioneers. I did not abolish the Youth League, I repeat, and I did not put in its place, the
Young Pioneers.
When the Young Pioneers movement was organized, it was never my intention to
abolish the Youth League and to put in its place the Young Pioneers. As I said at
Nasawa, the Young Pioneers was simply a Spearhead of the Youth League, an
organization within the Youth League and not outside the Youth League or an
organization to supersede or to replace the Youth League. Similarly, it was never my
intention that the Young Pioneers should be independent of the Malawi Congress Party
or that it should have nothing to do with it….441

It was not until 1965, that what began as a party youth movement, was formally incorporated as a
government entity. Under the Young Pioneers Act of1965, the MYP was formally recognized as
a youth organization, which was there to provide training and discipline to the country’s youths.
Under the 1965 Act, some of the following issues were clarified: (1) that all members of the MYP
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were also members of the MCP; (2) that at all times, the Commander-in-Chief of the MYP, shall
be a cabinet minister; (3) that all MYPs shall wear such uniforms and insignia of rank as the
minister would authorize from time-to-time; (4) that the minister had powers to call upon the
MYPs to support the country’s security forces for purposes of the preservation of law and order
and public security; (5) that the MYPs as government servants, were authorized to carry and use
weapons similar to those of the security forces; (6) and that every Young Pioneer be given powers,
duties, and protection similar to a police officer acting in the execution of his duties.442
The MYP also served its purpose as one of the “development arms” of the regime. At its training
bases, agriculture was the main course in the program and the curricula comprised of the following
areas: (1) Theory and Practice in improved methods of agriculture and selection for Settlement
Schemes; (2) Civics and Citizenship; Government Policies and National Institutions; (3) Youth
Leadership Techniques, including social activities, such as sports and physical training; (4)
Literacy and Basic Education; (5) Rural Vocational Training; (6) Hygiene, First Aid, and Health
Education; and (7) Home-craft Training for girls.443 Thousands of Malawian youths underwent
such training courses, and in one way or the other significantly contributed to the country’s
development, and indeed uplifted their own livelihoods, especially where they did not have access
to university education in what was then the only university in the country, the University of
Malawi.444 The thought-process of the state and party authorities to come up with such curricula
and training programs came from the following conceptualization: “A young and growing nation
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can ill afford to leave its youth completely out of the development process. If they are not
encouraged to take part in constructive work, the young have a tendency of drifting into the towns
and cities where they often turn to non-constructive and undesirable activities. But since they are
more receptive to change and to new ideas than adults, their energies can be harnessed for the
development of the country and nation-building.”445

Figure 6.8: It was government policy to involve the MYP members in various development
programs, including the focus on agricultural production as the images above illustrate. Source:
Malawi Young Pioneers, MNA: PAM 986.

“Malawi Young Pioneers – Spearhead for Progress”. (Blantyre, Malawi: Department of Information. October
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Pioneers”. See also “Malawi Young Pioneers Activities in 1967”. Issued by the MYP Training and Operations
Department, Limbe, 1967. See also Malawi News. March 28th, 1969. “No Ideological Movements Here – Youth: Our
Army for Development”.
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It was however the “security branch” or “security functions” of the MYP, and the “police” powers
given to its members, that left an indelible mark on the country’s post-colonial history. As the
“ears” and “eyes” of the Banda regime, that branch was responsible for numerous atrocities
associated with the regime. As all members of the MYP did, they were required to pledge their
allegiance to Dr. Banda. All the security branch members of the MYP were handed powers like
those of the Malawi Police, where they could arrest people without a warrant issued by the courts.
Furthermore, the police were also prohibited from arresting members of the MYP without prior
consultation with officers in charge of MYP bases. Such powers made the MYP members to seem
more valuable to the Party, the State, and to Banda himself, and created room or loopholes for the
MYP to be involved in numerous atrocities.446 The MYP security branch, began to take significant
shape following the 1964 cabinet crisis, and the various reports, some propaganda-based, that some
of the exiled cabinet ministers were planning to launch attacks, aided by foreign forces, to
overthrow the regime. From then onwards, Banda openly encouraged MYP trainees to be taught
how to use firearms, so that they could protect the regime.447 By early 1965, Banda had also come
up with plans to only recruit members from the MYP and the Youth League into the Malawi Army,
to increase the security of his own position. His argument was that since ‘ninety-nine’ percent of
the country’s citizens owed their allegiance to the MCP, it was befitting that Malawi Army troops
should comprise of MCP members.448
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An analysis of confidential dispatches from the British High Commissioner’s Office in Malawi,
for the mid-1960s, indicates that the operations of the MYP were already becoming an ‘eyesore’
for the former colonial masters. The British were particularly worried about the rapid rate at which
the Malawi government was arming and providing paramilitary training to MYP cadres. For
instance, on August 11th 1965, the British High Commissioner reported as having held a meeting
with the Malawi Army Commander, Colonel Lewis (a British citizen), when the Colonel briefed
the High Commissioner that he had just been informed by Mr. Aleke Banda, that the MYP had
purchased weapons from an un-mentioned “friendly” country, as follows: 300 Rifles; 13 subMachines Guns; and 300 Grenades. The said weapons were stored at the MYP’s secret training
base, at Mount View Estate (owned by the MYP), in the southern region district of Thyolo. The
Mount View Estate was then used as the headquarters of the MYP’s “intelligence organization.”
By August 1965, about 200 MYP cadres had been trained to use different types of weapons,
including those used by the police. The “secret” Training Base at Mount View was run with the
support of the Israeli Embassy to Malawi, where the plan had been to produce MYP graduates who
could compliment police activities throughout the country, and also some to be deployed in the
police force, in the army, and in various government ministries (especially as body guards of top
government officials).449 Later that month (August 1965), the Deputy Police Commissioner, Mr.
Moore, also reported that £20,000 worth of ammunition had been purchased by the Malawi
government. However, instead of the ammunition going to the police, it was diverted to MYP
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Training Bases. Furthermore, some MYP cadres were also imposed on the police force to work
alongside police officers on police check points (road blocks).450
The youths from both the Youth League and the MYP were responsible for committing most of
the atrocities of the Banda regime. Firstly, they were responsible for enforcing Party discipline at
public rallies, where the youths were given roles to control crowds and spy on those who were
suspected to be troublemakers. The MYPs were posted to various education institutions where
they acted as State agents spying on both learners and teachers. There were also spying services
from the MYP-run training bases and settlement schemes across the country. From the bases, the
members were able to monitor and spy on events taking place in the countryside. The Youth
Leaguers were fond of putting on red shirts, and through their country-wide membership were
responsible for harassing Malawians, especially those who did not carry with them the Party
(MCP) membership card; and enforced the collection of “gifts” to be presented to Dr. Banda. They
were also used as Banda’s “ground troops” for spying on suspected enemies, and enforcing the
Party’s four cornerstones, of Unity, Loyalty, Obedience, and Discipline.451
The Malawi Police Force and its Role in Political Policing
Similar to the analysis of the role of the police force during the colonial period, the application of
the ‘political economy’ approach also becomes handy for the post-colonial era. The operations of
the police force became a mirror reflection of the political and economic developments of the postcolonial era. The post-colonial leadership, as highlighted in this chapter, had vested interests in the
country’s economy, and had also put in place measures to retain political power if they lived,
450
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including where Dr. Banda was constitutionally allowed to be “president for life.” As such, the
police became the tool with which to deter the rise of or operations of perceived political
opponents, especially because access to political power ensured one access to economic power.
The development of the Malawi Police Force, just like other government departments, was not
fast-tracked to include Africans in the top management positions. Banda’s slow ‘Africanization’
policy saw him retain some of the top colonial British policemen into the post-colonial era. For
instance, the Police Commissioner, Mr. P. Long, O.B.E., who was appointed in that position in
1964, retained his post until July 1971, when he was replaced by a Malawian, Mr. Mc. J. Kamwana,
himself a British-trained policeman having attended various police training courses at the Hendon
Police Training School in England (1968), and also at the Scottish Police College, Tulliallan,
Scotland (1969).452 Banda himself also retained the position of Commander-in-Chief of the armed
forces and the police force. The Police Force itself also retained such colonial era branches, which
included General Administration; the CID; the Special Branch; Police Mobile Force (PMF);
Finance Branch; Radio Communication; Traffic and Transport; Immigration; the Training School;
and the Depot.453
Furthermore, to emphasize the continued influence of British police training methods in the
Malawian police system, Dr. Banda also preferred to send high ranking police officers to Great
Britain for further training. Such training opportunities were widely reported in the local press, as
it helped signify the continued diplomatic relations between the two countries. For instance, in
July 1971, the Malawi News reported that three members of the Malawi Police Force were among
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fifteen police officers who had just completed an eleven-week overseas command course at the
Dishforth Wing of the Police College, North East England. The police officers from Malawi
included Superintendent J.B. Mweso (from the CID Headquarters at Zomba), and Superintendents
R. Mijoso and B.G. Kumwembe, both from the Police Headquarters at Zomba. The newspaper
report also noted that this was not the first time the three policemen had been trained in Britain.
Superintendent B.G. Kumwembe gave the following remarks about his police training in Britain:
‘From every point of view, including the study of police methods the opportunity to meet British
people in their own homes and to see sophisticated systems of crime detection, road traffic speed
control and industrial security, it has been a very worthwhile course.’454 Superintendent Mweso
on his part was impressed with the scientific developments he had seen in Britain, including things
like working with computers, electronic aids, and forensic science, which had not yet been
incorporated in the Malawian policing system.455 The point being driven home here, is that, Banda
had envisaged very little change between what developed as the policing system during the
colonial era, to what developed in the post-colonial period. As someone who had spent over four
decades in the West (USA and Britain), he had come to admire their policing systems and standards
and hence wanted the same to apply to Malawi. Furthermore, maintaining British officials
(especially the non-partisan ones) in government organs, also helped to create a smooth transition
from the colonial to the post-colonial period, and the avoidance of political instability as had
happened in other African countries. It was from that perspective that Banda retained all the organs
of the Malawi Police that had existed in the colonial period, including the notorious CID and the
Special Branch, to carry out functions like those of the late colonial era.456
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Figure 6.9: Dr. Banda, left, with Police Commissioner J.V. Mullin, in Nyasaland, 1962.
Commissioner Mullin had been appointed to his position in 1958. Due to the ‘slow Africanization
policy’, Banda retained such expatriate personnel in his administration. Source: H.K. Banda
Archive.

At the swearing-in ceremony of Commissioner Mc J. Kamwana in July 1971, President Banda
revealed what he termed as ‘the motto of the Malawi Police force,’ which he explained as “Ex
Populo, Pro Populo” – which meant “From the People, For the People.” He stated that what this
meant was that the police force was not there to suppress the people or to give trouble to the people,
rather to protect them. He also stated that it had always been his policy not to rush into the
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“Africanization” of both the police force and the civil service at large, as some of his former cabinet
ministers had demanded, arguing that he felt that Malawi did not have a well-trained native
workforce to take over the key government posts. He could only Africanize his workforce, when
he was assured that they had received substantial training. In his parting words to the out-going
Police Commissioner, Mr. P. Long, O.B.E., Dr. Banda affirmed that position when he said: “Thank
you for training my boy”. Furthermore, he mentioned that he would still retain some European
officers in the police force to work under the new Commissioner, including another British citizen,
Mr. F.B. Chevallier, who was retained as Deputy Police Commissioner until his retirement in
February 1973.457 All that while, Banda also retained a British national, a Mr. B.C. Roberts, who
served as the Attorney-General, and also as Permanent Secretary to the Office of the President and
Secretary to the Cabinet, who retired in May 1972.458 It was also not until May 1972, that Brigadier
Graciano Matewere was appointed as the first Malawian to head the Army replacing an expatriate
officer, and was promoted to the rank of Major-General.459 Until 1972, Banda also retained a
British citizen, Captain Savage, as his Chief Bodyguard.460
From this background, then, it was unsurprising that Banda was reluctant to depart from employing
a policing system that would be different from its colonial era predecessor. What had changed over
the years was merely the personnel, but the structures and techniques of colonial policing and
indeed security forces in general, remained intact. Among other powers, officers of the Malawi
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Police Force were given constitutional powers to arrest people without any warrant, so long as the
police officer(s) involved deemed one’s conduct as constituting ‘reasonable grounds’ for breaching
peace and threatening the country’s stability.461
As a result, there are many cases involving police brutality in post-colonial Malawi.462 One
prominent case was the merciless murder of three cabinet ministers and a sitting Member of
Parliament (MP), on May 17th, 1983, at Thambani, in the southern region district of Mwanza.
When the murders occurred, the Banda regime reported the deaths of the four politicians, namely
Messrs. Dick T. Matenje (Minister Without Portfolio; and also Secretary General and
Administrative Secretary of the MCP), Aaron E. Gadama (Minister for the Central Region),
Twaibu J. Sangala (Minister of Health), and David Chiwanga (MP, and formerly Minister for
Housing and Community Development between 1981 and 1982), as being merely a ‘car accident’
that had occurred as the politicians were about to escape into neighboring Mozambique, having
had disagreements with the regime. However, when Banda lost in the 1994 general elections, his
successor, Bakili Muluzi, seeking to legitimize his own ascendance to power, immediately
instituted a commission of inquiry, to investigate the Mwanza murders. The commission was
appointed at the end of June 1994 and started to conduct its hearings on July 11th, 1994. The
chairperson of the commission was a Supreme Court Judge, Michael Mtegha, and was assisted by
twelve other members during the hearings, towards the production of the overall findings, which
were presented to President Muluzi on December 23rd, 1994.
The Commission of Inquiry, also known as “the Mtegha Commission,” was charged with the
responsibility to consider, determine, and inquire into all aspects of the deceased persons,
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including: (1) the circumstances and causes of the deaths; (2) the place or places where each of the
deceased persons died and the hospital, if any, where he was certified dead; (3) the condition of
the body of each deceased person when the body was being delivered to the place of burial and the
manner and mode in which the body was so delivered; (4) the identity of the person or persons
who delivered the body of each deceased person to the place of burial; (5) the funeral arrangements
and the conduct and pronouncements of those in authority at the time; (6) the instructions,
messages or explanations, if any, that were issued or given in each case by those who delivered
the body; (7) the explanations, if any, given to the relatives as to what caused the death or, if the
deceased was killed by any person, why he was killed; (8) the conduct and mode of the burial, and
the threats, if any, issued to members of the family or to any other person and by whom; (9)
examination of the post-mortem reports on each of the deceased persons and/or of the oral
testimony of those who conducted the post-mortem examinations; (10) and if evidence tends to
show that the deceased persons were killed by any person, then the commissioners had to identify
the people involved in the murders; who gave the instruction for the murders; and also to ascertain
if the killers received some form of reward for their actions.463
Between July and early December 1994, the commission received testimony from over 160
witnesses, from which the final report was generated. The findings of the commission indicated
that the killings of the four politicians were done by Malawian policemen. The process began on
May 14th, 1983, when the then Inspector General of Police, Mr. Mc J. Kamwana, ordered Mr.
McPherson Bervin Itimu, then Commissioner of Police and head of the Special Branch in the
Malawi Police Force, to have the four politicians arrested and later killed. The arrests were planned
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for May 17th, 1983, a day when Parliament was meeting for a special session at Parliament
Building in Zomba, to pass some bills and look at some electoral rule changes, in readiness for a
general election in June 1983. Upon receiving the instructions, Mr. Itimu sought the assistance of
two other senior police officers, both from the Special Branch Headquarters in Lilongwe, namely
Mr. Lywell Ezron Ngwata (who held the rank of Assistant Commissioner of Police); and Mr.
Victor W. Maunde (who held the rank of Senior Superintendent of Police). The two officers
arrived in Zomba on May 16th, 1983. When they got to Zomba, they also sought the support of
another police branch, known as “The Special Operations Squad,” headed by a Mr. L.J. Maluwaya,
who was reporting directly to the Police Inspector General. The Special Operations Squad had
been formed by Kamwana in 1977, however its responsibilities were largely unknown to most
police officers, except that its officers were involved in patrols and gathering political intelligence.
The Squad’s members (with membership drawn from branches of the Police Force, including the
Special Branch, Criminal Investigation Department, Police Mobile Force, and General Duties
Officers), were required to be in civilian clothing and to use unmarked police vehicles.
When the entire team of police officers assembled at the Police College in Zomba, they laid out
the plan by which to have the four politicians killed. It would start with erecting impromptu police
road blocks; arrest the four politicians; keep them at a secluded place while waiting for official
directives, with each politician kept in a separate room (in the Special Branch offices) to avoid
chances of their communication. After the parliamentary deliberations of May 17th, 1983, the
policemen who manned the road blocks arrested three of the four politicians, from the different
vehicles they were travelling in. Mr. Chiwanga was picked later in the day, as he was on his way
to hand himself to the police following a notice sent to his relations. On the night of the same day,
the four politicians were transported to Mikuyu Detention Center, where each was allocated to a
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separate cell. On May 18th, Mr. Maluwaya and his team of police officers went to Mikuyu to collect
the four politicians, and initially told them that they had been freed, and asked all of them to ride
a Blue Peugeot, which belonged to the MCP, and was driven by one of the politicians, Mr. Matenje,
while a police officer (from the Special Operations Squad) was also one of the passengers. That
was when all the four gentlemen knew that they had all been arrested together. The Blue Peugeot
travelled towards Zomba, sandwiched between two unmarked police vehicles occupied by
members of the squad. From Zomba, the politicians were directed to drive to Blantyre, on the
understanding that they would be freed there at the MCP regional premises.
However, the politicians were not freed as they had been told. Instead, they were later that night
driven to the Special Branch sub-office at Limbe, Blantyre. That same night, Kamwana instructed
the Commissioner of Police, Southern Region, Mr. Andrew Makina, to issue a press release on the
state-run Malawi Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) to the effect that the four politicians were
missing and that anybody who saw them or knew of their whereabouts should report to the nearest
police station. The first announcement was made on MBC that same night at 10:05 pm, while a
second announcement was made the following morning at 6:05 am, even though the four
politicians were still in police custody. From the Special Branch sub-office at Limbe, the
politicians, placed in handcuffs, were driven in an unmarked police Land Rover towards Mwanza
district, a district that borders Mozambique to the south-west. There were three vehicles on that
trip, with the Land Rover sandwiched between two unmarked police cars full of armed policemen.
Having reached Mwanza district headquarters, the convoy of cars branched into a forest road, a
dusty road to Thambani, some eleven kilometers away from the tarmac road that goes towards the
Malawi-Mozambique border post. It was on the road to Thambani where the four politicians were
mercilessly killed using hammers and other sharp objects, and probably fire arms. The politicians,
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now dead, were then placed in the Blue Peugeot, which had all its doors locked, and the car was
rolled towards a river bank to make it appear as if the politicians had been involved in a car
accident. By midnight of May 18th and towards the wee hours of May 19th, the four politicians had
been summarily killed. However, the car did not roll into the Thambani River, as it was blocked
by a tree some twenty meters from the edge of the road where the killings were conducted. The
policemen also tried to cover the blood spots from the road where the killings were made, by
spilling some top soil on the spots. Later that month, each of the police officers involved in the
merciless murders was rewarded with a check of MK1, 000.00 from the Police Headquarters, while
the senior police officers involved received amounts ranging from MK3, 000.00 to MK4, 000.00.
The Blue Peugeot, allegedly involved in a “car accident” was discovered by a passer-by driver on
the morning of May 19th, who later alerted his bosses at Mwanza Hospital and then later other
district administrative and security officials at the Mwanza boma.464
While there was enough incriminating evidence from other policemen and medical doctors who
went to the scene of the “accident,” the Banda regime did not dare to pursue the matter with the
respect it deserved, especially since the murdered politicians were all members of the MCP
National Executive Committee, three of them were cabinet ministers, while the other was a former
cabinet minister and a serving Member of Parliament. The car (Blue Peugeot) itself was not
damaged at all, except for a broken indicator light on the right-hand front side; while some of the
deceased’s bodies were found with big wounds on their heads, others with distorted tongues. No
funeral arrangements were made or announced by either the MCP or the Malawi government,
which was not a normal procedure when a senior party or government official had died. No party
or government officials were also present at the funeral ceremonies for each of the four murdered
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politicians, nor did the Head of State send any condolence message. The only official
representation, if any, was that of some plain clothed policemen from the Special Branch, at each
of the four funeral ceremonies. The only statement that came from the government side was to
announce on national radio that the four politicians had died in a car accident as they were escaping
to Zimbabwe when they met their fate. All members of Banda’s cabinet at the time of the murders,
who testified before the Commission also stated that the issue of the deaths of the four politicians
was never discussed at any subsequent cabinet meeting nor at the MCP Executive Committee
meetings, due to the “culture of silence” that existed at the time.465
The commission’s other findings indicated that the four murdered politicians, as members of the
MCP National Executive Committee, were part and parcel of discussions purporting to the choice
of an individual who would act as a caretaker president, while Dr. Banda was out of the country
to seek medical care. It was revealed that while Dr. Banda favored Mr. John Z.U. Tembo, who was
the uncle to Banda’s Official Hostess, Miss Cecilia Kadzamira, the other politicians had not been
in favor of the suggestion, hence their subsequent murders. Miss Kadzamira and Mr. Tembo were
part of the so-called “inner circle” that ruled the country, alongside the ailing and aging Banda.
That evidence, was supported by the testimony given by Mrs. Kamwana, wife to the then deceased
Inspector General of Police, who told the Commission, that the orders to have the four politicians
murdered, given to her deceased husband, actually came from Banda and Tembo, both of whom
had called upon Mr. Kamwana to “eliminate” the politicians because they had refused to support
the temporary handover of power to Tembo. The commissioners interviewed Dr. Banda on
November 28th, 1994, after being earlier denied that chance due to requests and medical reports

465

Ibid., 8-63.

295

received from the Banda camp that the former President had been in poor health for some time,
due both to depression and hearing impairment. Due in part to his old age, and maybe “coaching”
on the part of his lawyers, the interview with Banda did not yield the information or implicating
evidence that the commissioners had intended to hear. In the commission’s view, Banda and his
camp, had made calculated efforts to frustrate the commissioners. The commission’s final
assessment concluded that the killings were premediated, brutal, and diabolic, and that the Malawi
Police Force was involved in the killings following orders from Dr. Banda and Mr. Tembo. 466
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Figure 6.10: Dr. Banda, on the extreme left, is seen here with Hon. Aaron Gadama, on the right,
pointing towards something. Banda would later be implicated in Gadama’s murder, alongside three
other prominent politicians, in May 1983. Source: H.K. Banda Archive.

The murders of the four politicians at the hands of the Malawi Police Force, clearly indicated how
the security men had become “political pawns” or “puppets” that were used by the Banda regime
to “eliminate” critics of the regime.467 As I have discussed above, there were numerous case studies
where many were eliminated, some from the civil service, the private sector, and politicians.
However, this case was probably the climax of Banda’s ruthlessness, especially the fact that he
issued orders to have his own cabinet ministers to be murdered. The evidence presented before the
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Commission clearly implicated Banda and his inner circle, which explains why none of the top
politicians went to the funeral ceremonies of the murdered politicians, something which was and
still is, unusual for a Head of State, or other cabinet ministers, to skip the funeral ceremony of a
cabinet minister or members of the party executive committee of the then only political party in
the country. Although the so-called members of the “inner circle” were acquitted in the court case
that followed, that was just a case of technicalities, rather than the lack of incriminating
evidence.468 According to the Emergency Arrangements which the country was following at the
time, which had been drafted by Mr. Bryan Roberts (the former Chief Secretary and Attorney
General), alongside Dr. Banda, in 1972, when Dr. Banda was in the country, he alone had the
powers to order the movement of troops and police, except when an emergency was so sudden that
the Army and Commissioner of Police could act on Banda’s behalf.469 Since there was no
“emergency” in May 1983, therefore it is only fair to conclude that it was Banda who ordered the
movement of policemen, from Lilongwe, Zomba, and Blantyre, to commit the murders of his
cabinet ministers.
Western support and the consolidation of the Banda regime
The previous sections of this chapter have laid emphasis on the local institutions that served the
counter-insurgency measures of the Banda regime. However, the Malawian post-colonial state did
not survive only by using these locally-available resources. Rather, one must also focus on the role
of the international community to help in the consolidation of the regime. In this section, I focus
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on the relationship which Dr. Banda and his government cultivated with two of Malawi’s most
important bilateral donors, namely the British and American governments. The former being the
country’s former colonial “master,” and the latter, being the leader of the Western bloc during the
Cold War, and one of Malawi’s most important sources of budgetary and development aid since
independence.
These bilateral donors and other international agencies, such as the Bretton Woods Institutions,
worked together with the Banda regime, despite its flaws, as Banda and the state he governed were
a representation of the people both nationally and internationally. The inclusion of the two bilateral
donor states in this study, also concurs with the argument that for Malawi, as was the case in other
post-colonial African states, it is impossible to envisage state survival without some form of
foreign support or intervention. In the case of the former metropole, their continued interest in
African states tended to favor the stability of the post-colonial state, which often assured the
retention of the metropole’s economic interests. In turn, the African rulers were rewarded, usually
with economic and material aid, but also security assistance, in cases of uprisings or suspected
coups. Such provision of aid helped to cement an effective central government, which the former
metropole could deal with. The relations that ensued in the post-colonial era, thus, were beneficial
to both the African states and the former colonial power, and to an extent the USA, which often
sided with the former colonial powers.470
Christopher Clapham argued that there were three main interests which the former metropole
harbored for its continued relations with post-colonial African states. Firstly, the need to ensure
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“territorial security.” That was important as it would preserve the state’s integrity against secession
and dismemberment. Secondly, the need to ensure “state security.” This represented the desire to
help the African states to establish effective central government structures, including providing aid
to such departments as the judiciary, the army, the police, and other expatriate expertise. The third
level of support revolved around the assurance of “regime security.” This involved making sure
that there was no interference by other interested states in the affairs of the former colonies.471
The British and American governments had already agreed by the late 1950s on the need to
maintain their influence on the former colonies after independence. They made it clear that it would
not be in their interest to see the former colonies fall into the hands of the Eastern bloc led by the
Russians. For instance, in a dispatch of a meeting held in April 1957 between government officials
from the two countries, these sentiments were raised:
Because of Tropical Africa’s political, economic and military importance to the West,
it is imperative that the present dominant Western political influence in this part of the
world be maintained. It would be a major victory for the Sino-Soviet bloc if Tropical
Africa could be detached from the West. There is conclusive evidence that the leaders
of the communist bloc have the long-term objective of dominating Tropical Africa.
Although their ultimate aim is presumably the Sovietization of the continent, their
purpose in the present is to detach Tropical Africa from the West, both economically
and politically, thus weakening the position of the Metropolitan powers and the rest of
the free world. Our two governments have a common purpose in combating these aims.

The best counter to Soviet aims is to pursue systematically the constructive policy of
leading dependencies as rapidly as is practicable toward stable self-government or
independence in such a way that these governments are willing and able to preserve
their political and economic ties with the West. In the opinion of Her Majesty’s
Government, present British colonial policy is a sincere attempt to achieve this
purpose.472
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Before Malawi gained its independence in 1964, Dr. Banda seemed to be in favor of the “NonAligned Movement,”473 and was open to working with the super powers, either from the Western
or Eastern blocs, but after independence, and especially in the aftermath of the “cabinet crisis,” his
position completely shifted to be a Western ally. His remarks in a 1960 interview, attest to that:
“If anybody comes to me and says ‘Dr. Banda, we’ll give you a loan and if you get our loan, well,
you must have nothing to do with the Russians’ (or anybody else), I’ll say ‘No, thank you’. I want
to be entirely independent, I do not want to be committed to anyone. I do not want anyone to take
me for granted. I would refuse in the same way if the Russians came and offered me anything. I
do not want to be committed either to the West or the East; I know what I want but I am not going
to have anybody taking it for granted that I am in his pocket, whether it be Washington or
Moscow.”474
Malawi and Britain: Post-Colonial Relations
For the British government, it should be noted that part of their involvement in Malawi in 1964,
had to do with the fact that Malawi had not yet attained her “Republic status.” That meant that
Malawi still had a British Governor-General, in the name of Sir Glynn Jones, while Dr. Banda was
the Prime Minister until July 1966 when Dr. Banda assumed the position of State President. At the
independence luncheon in July 1964, Dr. Banda is said to have assured the British government of
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Malawi’s continued relations with Britain, no matter the circumstances. He made the following
statement to HM’s representative, Prince Philip, the Duke of Edinburgh: “You are the only people
who sent me to gaol yesterday and invite me to Buckingham Palace tomorrow. I think the
Commonwealth is the best club in the world, so I still work with Britain… For myself, I have no
quarrel with the British, and I want to work with you and stay within the Commonwealth.”475 And
from the onset of the Cabinet Crisis and in its immediate aftermath, the British authorities were
concerned with making sure that there was political and economic stability in the country, while
also supporting a key ally in the Cold War. As argued by Joseph Frankel and Gaynor Johnson,
Britain’s foreign policy in the aftermath of both the Second World War and the decolonization era
that followed, was one in which the British authorities made significant efforts to revive Britain’s
declining world and imperial power. Britain realized her new status as a “major second rank
power” but was determined to maintain a global presence and influence, through her input in
matters of global security and economic development. Britain was also interested in working
towards reviving her own ailing economy, devastated in the aftermath of the war. This saw her
continue diplomatic relations with her former colonies, including co-opting them in the
Commonwealth, where for long periods Britain remained the largest customer and the largest
supplier of manufactured goods to the member countries, except Canada.476
An analysis of Britain’s aid to Malawi, and the confidential reports and memos from the British
government officials (both in Malawi and in London), from 1964 onwards, attest to this
perspective. For instance, a confidential dispatch by the British High Commissioner to Malawi,
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Mr. D.L. Cole, on the major causes of the cabinet crisis, clearly pinpointed that Dr. Banda had
been partly to blame for the outbreak of the crisis. Among other things, it noted his authoritarian
tendencies and his preference to continue trusting and working with British colonial officers, rather
than employing or promoting Africans to top government positions. The High Commissioner also
doubted Banda’s claims that the cabinet ministers had intended to overthrow and murder him, as
sheer fantasy. On the other hand, he sided with Banda’s claims that some of his ministers
(especially the Minister of External Affairs, Kanyama Chiume) had been in contact with
Communist Chinese government officials, highlighting the efforts of Chinese officials to penetrate
Malawi. He even went further to suggest that after the crisis, Mr. Chiume went to Dar-es-Salaam,
Tanzania, to look for Chinese money.477
Having taken note of the unstable political climate in the country, Mr. Cole hinted that the British
government’s priority should be to ensure that there was political stability in the country and that
the only leader to support was Dr. Banda. He was the only person who could ensure stability in
the newly independent country. Furthermore, he was a key ally in the Cold War, as follows:
The outline of future British policy towards Malawi thus seemed clear. We must support
the Government of Dr. Banda which seemed to promise stability, anti-communism,
realism and moderation in foreign policy, and slow but sensible progress in its internal
political development. We must continue to give Malawi economic aid in appropriate
doses both because of its satisfactory political orientation, which must be preserved, and
in recognition of a certain moral obligation towards a country which, after the bitter
controversy of Federation, had attained its independence prematurely in precarious
economic circumstances.478
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The British and American governments were particularly interested in maintaining political
stability in the country. As such, through their representatives in Malawi (British High
Commissioner to Malawi, Mr. David Cole; and the US Ambassador to Malawi, Mr. Gilstrap), they
whisked out of the country some of the ministers involved in the cabinet crisis. For instance,
Minister Henry M. Chipembere was provided a “safe way” to the United States by the two
governments with the assistance of Malawi police authorities. This followed a botched uprising
which Chipembere had engineered in his home District of Mangochi. 479 It was clear from that
perspective that the international community, especially Britain, was more interested in
maintaining both economic and political stability in the country. They were willing to support the
Banda government despite acknowledging his authoritarian tendencies, including acknowledging
that the Banda regime ran a series of detention centers for political detainees. He was regarded as
an important ally in the Cold War in Africa. The British authorities argued that only when there
was political and economic stability in Malawi, would it ensure the country’s continued support in
the Cold War, and would also allow the people of Malawi to enjoy “the fruits of independence.”
They were determined to avoid “another Congo” (where political instability ensued immediately
after independence) in Malawi, hinting that political and economic instability would have brought
national tragedy and horror, anti-Western sentiments and communism in all its most virulent
forms. There were also sentiments expressed that at independence, there were still about 20,000
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British citizens in Malawi, many of whom were business persons. It was the responsibility of the
British government to provide a conducive environment for their business operations.480
The need to ensure both economic and political stability also saw Britain insist that its former
African colonies (who became members of the Commonwealth) had to remain within the sterling
system, which often meant that governments, like the one in Malawi, remained bound by
metropolitan financial and economic systems.481 For Malawi, it was not until 1971 that she
dropped the sterling system in favor of her own currency, the Malawi Kwacha. It also allowed for
closer and “softer” trade ties between Britain and her former colonies. For instance, in the case of
Malawi, until 1975, one-third of British goods were imported duty free, while over 95 percent of
British goods also enjoyed a measure of preference. On the other hand, Britain also imported
Malawi’s products, especially tobacco, tea, groundnuts, cotton, and maize. Twenty five percent of
Malawi’s exports were sent to Britain. For the period 1964 to 1973, for instance, forty percent of
Malawi’s tobacco was exported to Britain.482
There is overwhelming evidence of Britain’s continued support to the Malawi government for the
period under study, which indicated the high levels of “dependence” in the then newly
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“independent” country. In a study commissioned by the British government and assigned to the
Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in 1974-75, it was stipulated that Britain remained
committed towards financing Malawi’s budgetary requirements and other development-related
projects, ensuring that there was security, stability and prosperity in its former colony. The funds
provided came in the form of grants and loans for development projects; grants and loans for nonproject purposes (which included budgetary aid, import finance, pensions, and disaster relief); and
technical assistance, which was mostly grant aid. In the case of former British colonies receiving
such aid, between 1964 and 1975, only India, Pakistan, and Kenya, received more than Malawi.
In terms of the amount of money involved, between 1964 and 1972, Britain disbursed the sum of
£80.3 million gross to the Malawi government. In per capita terms, British aid to Malawi averaged
roughly £1.80 per head of the country’s population per year. Such aid helped to stabilize Malawi’s
economy, making it one of Africa’s success stories since the age of independence.483
These sentiments were also confirmed in a dispatch from the British High Commissioner to
Malawi, K.G. Ritchie, to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in May 1974, as follows:
The Malawians are comparatively law-abiding people, who seem to respond to constant
appeals for greater economic effort from a dynamic Life President and a government
determined to achieve progress by, on the whole, sound and well-planned measures.
These in turn are attracting attention. In 1971, my predecessor remarked that British aid
was greater than that of all (other) countries put together. Although we provided 65%
of all net aid to Malawi during its first seven years of independence and still remain –
and are likely to remain – the largest single donor, we are by no means alone. Others
are now recognizing Malawi’s needs and its current ability to use development funds in
an efficient and effective manner… British aid will therefore continue to be applied as

483

Kathryn Morton, Aid and Dependence: British Aid to Malawi (London: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1975),
51-62. See also Bangura, Britain and Commonwealth Africa, pp.171-172. Bangura posited that because Malawi
attained her independence without having an established taxable capacity, her revenue could not match the needed
expenditure, hence the need for continued British aid. See also Carolyn McMaster, Malawi: Foreign Policy and
Development (London: Julian Friedmann Publishers, 1974), pp.78-87. See also Philip Short, Banda (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), 231-250.

306

in the past to improve the basic infrastructure and to projects benefitting rural areas and
the lower income groups.484

Britain was compelled to provide such aid to the Malawi government, because the latter faced
numerous challenges at independence. First, there were high levels of poverty in the country. The
challenge was that the country lacked the resources with which to reduce the levels of poverty, a
development which worried not just the British government, but also the international community
at large. Although there was some economic development under the CAF, at independence,
Malawi still ranked among the poorest countries in the world. In 1964, the country’s average
growth domestic product (GDP) per head was only £20 (roughly 39.5 Malawi Kwacha). Over 90
percent of the African population lived in rural areas, with subsistence agriculture as their major
source of livelihood. Out of the 4.8 million citizens, only about 130,000 were in wage employment,
while about 2,000,000 others migrated to work within the mining areas of the southern African
region. The Malawian economy was also in stagnant form, at least since 1962, following the
uncertainties created by the pending dissolution of the CAF.485
Secondly, one of the country’s budgetary challenges emanated from the roles which the
government inherited from the CAF. During the federal period, the Nyasaland government
increased its provision of social services to Africans, mostly using resources generated from across
the federal government. However, after the federation was dissolved at the end of 1963, the
Nyasaland and later the Malawi government had the task of financing the services that were
provided by both the federal government and the territorial government. Furthermore, the
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territorial government inherited the debts that had been incurred by the federal government. All
these provided challenges for the then newly independent government to pay for services and
balance its books. For instance, while the government generated an estimated local revenue of MK
(Malawi Kwacha) 16 million, the estimated government expenditure was at MK31.2 million. Other
related shortfalls included the lack of a central banking system and an underdeveloped banking
sector. Previously, such services were centered in the federal capital, Salisbury, Southern
Rhodesia. Similarly, when it came to preparation of development plans, the expertise was based
in Southern Rhodesia. Furthermore, the lack of proper statistical services often hampered the
required planning for the management of the economy.486
The newly independent country also lacked skilled manpower. During the first five decades of the
colonial period, both the government and Western missionaries mainly focused on the provision
of basic or primary education. While the situation slightly improved after the Second World War,
by 1960, there were only four secondary schools, while opportunities for vocational training were
also limited. It was not until 1963 that the government established the Staff Training College, at
Mpemba, in Blantyre, meant to provide in-service training to African civil servants. This
background meant that at independence, Malawi still needed to rely on the expatriate community
to draw plans for development, administration, and run some of the businesses. It is thus
unsurprising that in 1964, the expatriates held most of the senior administrative positions in the
civil service and predominated in several professional and technical spheres in the public and
private sector.487
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The country’s economic infrastructure also remained largely underdeveloped. Dr. Banda inherited
very little in terms of the transport, communication, and electric power outlay needed to boost the
country’s agro-based economy. For instance, the country only had a single railway system
connecting some parts of the southern and central region, for a total of 289 miles. However, most
of the railway line was in a state of disrepair. The paved road network was only up to 6,000 miles,
a majority of which were unusable during the rainy season.488
From this background, it is clear to note why Britain felt compelled to continue funding the Banda
regime. While the report produced by the ODI only covered up to the 1974-75 fiscal year, this
study provides evidence of Britain’s continued financial commitment to the Malawi government.
Further details of British aid to Malawi, for the period 1975 to 1978 indicate that the British
government committed to disburse £15 million for capital aid. Of that figure, £12 million was
made available on grant terms, whereas the remaining £3 million was set aside as an interest free
loan. A further £3 million was set aside by HMG as contingency funds, meant to be released in
emergency circumstances.489 By the 1979-80 financial year, the British Government had provided
a total £140 million (from 1964 to 1979-80) as grant aid to the Malawi Government. The British
government also converted all outstanding loans owed by the Malawi Government, into grants.
That decision helped to ease Malawi’s burden of repaying the loans which would have reduced
Malawi’s foreign exchange resources.490 The loans in question fell under a scheme known as “UK
Development Loan,” which the Malawi government used in various sectors, including transport
and communication, agriculture, health, and education. Further funding to the Malawi Government
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was also extended through the “British Development Fund.”491 Most of the funds provided by the
British government were overseen by British expatriates who were retained in the civil service
while others served as consultants and advisors to Dr. Banda.492

Figure 6.11: Dr. Banda meeting with Margaret Thatcher, the Conservative British Prime Minister,
early 1980s. A clear indication of the good relations between Malawi and Britain. Source: H.K.
Banda Archive.
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Malawi and US Bilateral Relations
Like Malawi-British relations, discussed in the sub-section above, Malawi retained cordial
bilateral relations with the US government for the post-colonial period covered in this chapter. The
American government was convinced and comfortable to work with the Banda regime, because of
his open support for the West during the Cold War. American aid to Malawi was provided in
monetary, material, and personnel terms. That had been the foreign policy direction of the
American government, to focus on providing aid to African governments from 1961 onwards.
Since the ascendancy of President John F. Kennedy to power in 1961, the US government’s
approach towards Africa had been one which left no chance to let the USSR and China influence
the turn of events in the yet to be independent or the newly independent states. There were
deliberate efforts on the part of the American Government to directly intervene in African affairs
and initiate contacts with African leaders. He held the view that for the USA to win the Cold War,
there was need to prevent the postcolonial states in Africa from falling under the trap and influence
of the USSR.

493

During his short stint as US President, he (President Kennedy) had personally

received African leaders at the White House as follows: eleven in 1961; ten in 1962; and seven in
1963.494 In May 1961, President Kennedy met with Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda, then leader of
the opposition MCP, at the White House.495 From then onwards, the US foreign policy towards
Malawi, would be guided by political, cultural, and economic considerations. Politically, the US
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needed allies in the Cold War, especially working alongside the USA as a voting bloc at the UN
where one-third of the member states were African. Culturally, it considered the historical links
between African Americans and Africans in the continent. Economically, the US looked to Africa
as a source of mineral, petroleum, and agricultural commodities, while also serving as a market
for US manufactured goods.496 Such objectives, could only be attained, in the eyes of the American
authorities, when African states were able to maintain peace and stability, had access to
development aid and trade opportunities, and where racial and political justice prevailed.497

Figure 6.12: Meeting between Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda (of Nyasaland) and President John F.
Kennedy (USA), at the White House, May 1961. Sitting on the far left was Hon. G. Mennen
Williams, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Source: John F. Kennedy Library
and Museum.
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At independence in 1964, the US government was one of the first to establish formal diplomatic
relations with Malawi. That same year, the US government began to dispatch Peace Corps
Volunteers (an institution established by President Kennedy in 1961) to Malawi to work in the
rural areas of the country in the areas of agriculture, health and sanitation, water supply, fisheries,
and credit union development.498 The Americans also monitored with keen interest the events
surrounding the 1964 cabinet crisis, and it was clear that they were in support of Banda’s continued
stay in power as he was a key US ally, despite noting that he had authoritarian tendencies. 499 A
CIA Report of September 5-8, 1964, hinted: “Malawi (Nyasaland): Yet another African state is in
trouble. The Cabinet of pro-Western Prime Minister Banda is in virtual revolt against his highhanded methods.”500 The CIA also keenly followed the activities of the former Cabinet Ministers,
all of whom had gone into exile. It alerted the Malawi government of the plans of the dissidents to
assassinate “pro-Western Prime Minister Banda.”501 That seemed to confirm Banda’s public
remarks on the dissidents, and in doing so the Americans also helped Banda to gain public
sympathy and to cement his political position. Later that year, in December, Dr. Banda visited the
State Department, in Washington DC, where he was assured of US government support, to deal
with the communist elements in the Southern African region, especially in Zimbabwe, Zambia,
Tanzania, and the Congo.502 Unlike the other countries in the region, Dr. Banda did not tolerate
the spread of communism in Malawi. Furthermore, he opened diplomatic relations with such pro-
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Western countries such as South Africa and Portugal, despite being called upon by the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) to desist from doing so.503
There were also confidential American government reports that Dr. Banda would from time-totime take advantage of his support for the West, to ‘demand’ financial aid from the US government.
A CIA Report for 6 May 1966 read as follows:
Malawi – formerly the British Protectorate of Nyasaland, is desperately seeking money.
The US Ambassador says that the government has badly overspent, thanks to Prime
Minister Banda’s determination to ‘push buttons, throw switches, and cut ribbons to
dramatize his political sagacity, economic savvy, and planning genius’. The
Ambassador is worried that the West may have to submit to ‘financial whitemail’ or see
Dr. Banda either appeal to the East for aid or lead the country’s economy down the
Nkrumah road. Malawi’s Finance Minister in fact has already suggested that the US
should be willing to offer $50 million, ‘the amount Banda has saved the US by
delivering Africa from communism’.504

It was in that atmosphere that in June 1967, as a Cold War ally, Dr. Banda paid a visit to President
Lyndon Johnson at the White House, where the Malawi leader was praised for supporting
America’s war in Vietnam. In his public pronouncements of December 1966, Dr. Banda had
apparently praised the efforts of the US to bring peace to Vietnam, unlike the Communist Chinese
and the North Vietnamese, who in his words “stood in the way of peace.” In the preparatory
minutes of the meeting between the two Heads of State, it was indicated that Dr. Banda had to be
praised for being an important ally of the US in Southern Africa, and one who had adopted a
pragmatic approach on international affairs. In return, the US government promised to increase the
monetary aid to the Malawi Government, which by 1967 had totaled a little over $10million. The
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US government also promised to continue with the Peace Corps Volunteer Program, whose
number stood at 160 in 1967. Further monetary aid was also promised towards the completion of
the Lake Shore (Lake Malawi) road (which cuts across the southern, central and northern regions
of the country), and the development of a wood pulp project at Viphya in northern Malawi.505 By
mid-1968, the US government had honored its pledge of funding the Lake Shore road project, for
an initial sum of $3million which Dr. Banda announced to Malawians.506 The road was funded by
the US government through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID),
and was constructed by an American construction firm which brought with it engineers and
construction materials and equipment from the USA. The construction work was completed in
1972. 507
In August 1969, an American Congressional delegation visited Malawi and met with Dr. Banda,
and the Congressmen were reportedly pleased to have found a strong anti-communist ally in the
Malawi leader. In the delegation’s report, compiled by Hon. Charles C. Diggs Jr. (Michigan) and
Hon. Lester L. Wolff (New York), the Congressmen noted with delight that since independence
from Britain, and despite being a poor country, the country’s leadership, under Dr. Banda, did not
accept aid from communist sources, and had also refused to establish diplomatic relations with any
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Communist country. As such, further US aid was promised to the Malawi leadership due to the
country’s continued alliance with the Western powers.508
In a newspaper interview, the American Ambassador to Malawi, Mr. Harold Horan, expressed his
country’s commitment to providing development aid to the Malawi Government. Despite Banda’s
appalling human rights record, he pledged his government’s total support to the Banda regime. He
for instance clearly stated: “The Life President’s priorities are very similar to ones set by our
Congress – emphasis on agriculture, aid to the rural population and concern for basic human
rights…Our plans for the immediate future, subject off course to Congressional approval of funds,
focus on the agricultural sector, training and rural development.... It is a policy based on the
President’s (Jimmy Carter) commitment to human rights …to consider a recipient country’s
observance of internationally recognized rights. Internationally recognized rights are those which
enjoy a world-wide consensus and are found in documents like the UN’s Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.”509 The Ambassador also mentioned that as a sign of the US government’s
commitment to its bilateral ties with Malawi, it had appointed, for the first time in Malawi, a
permanent USAID Representative, a Mrs. Vivian Anderson.510 At the end of August 1980, the US
government showing further commitment, through USAID, also granted the Malawi government
a grant of $15.1 million, earmarked for three main projects, namely: Expansion of an engineering
project at the University of Malawi; the provision of piped water in rural areas; and the
establishment of the Malawi Union of Savings and Credit Co-operative Organization
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(MUSCCO).511 Such trends continued throughout Banda’s reign, as had been the case in other
pro-Western African states, at least until the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the Cold War
ended.512 Only then, as I will discuss in chapter seven, did the Western powers begin to call for
political and economic liberalization in African states, if they were to continue enjoying Western
aid.
Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the notion that our understanding of the political-economy of postcolonial Malawi, roughly 1964 to 1994, should be regarded as a continuation, adoption, and
adaptation of processes that began in the late colonial era, hence the notion of an ‘imported state.’
It has focused on such areas as the notion of the ‘developmental state’ and its associated antiopposition stance, whereby the post-colonial state emerged as an arena of contestation. I have also
highlighted the specific roles that the country’s women, the youth and the police force, played to
enhance the post-colonial state. Locating the state within the international ideological climate of
the Cold War, it has also been highlighted that the Western powers helped to consolidate and
prolong the Banda regime despite the country’s appalling human rights record. Dr. Banda was a
reliable Cold War ally for the Western powers, and this saw him decline to receive aid or open
diplomatic relations with countries belonging to the Eastern bloc, including the Soviet Union and
Communist China. The next chapter focuses on the fall of the Banda regime, or in the argument
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of this study, the end of the post-colonial state, which I argue could be discussed as having
emanated from both national and transnational forces.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
EPILOGUE: BANDA’S DOWNFALL - THE END OF THE POST-COLONIAL STATE?
The 1993 human development report released by the UNDP confirms that Malawi has
eighty-two percent of its population in absolute poverty. Over two million Malawians
have no access to health services and 4.7 million have no access to safe drinking water.
Other miserable statistics show that for every one thousand people there are 238 radios,
three daily newspapers, six telephone installations, and zero television for every nine
million people.513

Introduction
In this chapter, I argue that Banda’s downfall in the early 1990s, had much more to do with the
country’s economic downturn. By that time, the State could no longer continue with the principle
of “protectionism” for its political and economic interests due to wide-spread economic challenges,
especially following the economic downturn which the government and indeed the country begun
to face since the 1979/80 fiscal year. By the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, the country’s
economy was significantly controlled by conditions and aid from the international community,
which significantly weakened the reach which the government had in the first fifteen to twenty
years after independence. After the Cold War in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the same
international community also began to pressure the Banda regime to liberalize the economic and
political systems and withheld their aid to Malawi until such policy changes had been
implemented. This then sustains the argument raised in chapter one of this study, that the country’s
history, colonial and post-colonial, can only be understood as having been influenced by global
developments. In this case, the “winds of change” that blew across the globe following the end of
the Cold War also affected Malawi and saw the traditional donor countries and the Bretton Woods
Institutions, exert pressure for the country’s leadership to institute liberal changes. The domestic
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pressure for regime change soon followed, and among the key issues raised by the pressure groups,
both religious and secular, was on the need for both political and economic liberalization, and the
need for respect of peoples’ personal liberties. Such calls, which were a sign of the agency of the
Malawian peoples, attracted the support of the rural poor and the urban laboring masses, who had
suffered for decades under the authoritarian regime but had had no voice of their own to air out
their concerns. In the period between 1990 and 1992, the country also suffered a serious drought,
which helped to widen the gap between the rich and the poor, especially as the subsequent famine
had serious repercussions on the livelihoods of the rural poor. I also sustain the argument, raised
in chapter six of this study, that the fall of Banda in May 1994, following his loss in the general
elections, should be regarded as having marked the end of the so-called “post-colonial state,”
where most of the instruments, policies, systems, and so on, that had been ‘imported’ from the
colonial state had now been significantly altered. Such changes significantly altered or watered
down the “Bula Matari” or “Leviathan” powers which the state had imported from its colonial era
predecessor.
The international push for regime change
As discussed in chapter six of this study, Dr. Banda had throughout his reign enjoyed substantial
economic support from the international community, a development which significantly helped to
sustain the country’s economy and indeed his own political position since independence. This
study specifically focused on the support from Great Britain (the former colonial power) and the
USA (Britain’s ally and leader of the Western bloc during the Cold War). However, from time-totime, the relationship had its own points of tension. For instance, from the late 1970s onwards,
some tensions appeared between Dr. Banda and the British Government, as the latter refused to
fund some of Banda’s long-term development goals and projects– especially when it came to
320

Banda’s high priority for symbolic investments, such as the construction of presidential palaces in
Lilongwe and Blantyre; the construction of the new capital city at Lilongwe; and the construction
of Banda’s private school, known as Kamuzu Academy, a lavish project modelled on a British
“public school,” which was completed in 1981.514
In part, due to that British aid, the Malawian economy boomed for the first eight years or so after
independence, such that the Malawi leader even had the audacity to send a letter to the British
Prime Minister, the Right Hon. Edward R.G. Heath, M.P., in 1973, telling the British leader to
suspend the budgetary aid which the British Government had been sending to Malawi, while the
aid that was disbursed as development loans, and for technical assistance, among others, could still
continue. Part of Banda’s letter read as follows:
My Dear Prime Minister,
In your present preoccupation, with so many domestic and international problems, I felt that you
might welcome hearing one matter, at least, which is not a new problem, but is the ending of an
old one.
From the time when Malawi became an independent sovereign member of the Commonwealth,
Her Majesty’s Government has, most generously, provided financial aid in support of our recurrent
budget, as well as other forms of assistance related directly to our development. This budgetary
aid, though essential, particularly in our early years of independence, and received by Malawi with
gratitude, was, however, as both our Governments have frequently made clear, not a form of
assistance which either wished to see continued a day longer than was essential.
At the time of our independence, in 1964, though I made clear our determination to balance our
recurrent budget as quickly as possible, and bring to an end this form of assistance, I am afraid that
many international observers, and outside ‘experts’, were very skeptical of our ability to deliver
the goods. This skepticism, though diminished, persisted among some of the international experts,
even after, in turn, I had set 1975 as our target date for the ending of budgetary aid, and, later, our
two Governments had agreed, at the final annual financial aid talks in February 1971, that 1973/74
would be the last year of such aid.
I am, therefore, very pleased indeed to be able to tell you that our revised estimates of revenue and
expenditure for 1972/73 indicate that we are likely to end the current financial year with a true
Jonathan Kydd, “Malawi in the 1970s: Development Policies and Economic Change,” In Malawi: An Alternative
Pattern of Development. Conference/Seminar Proceedings no.25, Center of African Studies, University of Edinburgh.
May 24th and 25th, 1984., 293-312.
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surplus, though, instead of the budgeted deficit. In this light, and in the light of our budget estimates
for the 1973/74 financial year, which will be presented to Parliament on 15th March, my
Government has decided that it will not call on the budgetary aid agreed for the current financial
year, or in future. Indeed, our last effective drawing will have been that in the 1971/72 financial
year, when our actual deficit finally turned out to be only £100, 000…
My Government, my people and I are most grateful for the Budgetary Aid Malawi has received in
the past – as we are glad that it is no longer required. We shall not forget the support we have
received from our oldest friends.

With kindest personal regards,
H. Kamuzu Banda,
President of the Republic of Malawi.515

The period of economic boom that Banda had referred to early in the 1970s decade, was merely
short-lived, as by the 1979/1980 fiscal year, the Malawian economy had begun to show a
downward spiral. Banda had himself declared the 1970s as “a decade of economic construction
and political consolidation.” The perception then, had been that since the early forms of opposition
against the regime had been decimated, hence the need to totally focus on economic development
and political consolidation.516 Politically, I have highlighted that it was in 1971, when Banda was
confirmed as the country’s “life president,” having already served in that capacity for his Party
since the early 1960s; while economically, I have highlighted that it was in the 1970s decade, when
most of the investments under the two conglomerates (MDC and PGC), were put in place.
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However, by the close of that decade, it had become increasingly clear that the economy was in
recession. Confidential information contained in some cables, mostly exchanged between the
British High Commission in Malawi, and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London,
indicated that the debt crisis of the Malawi Government and the companies run by Banda (under
the Press Group of Companies) had reached alarming levels. The Bank of England, one of the
major lenders to the Malawi Government’s coffers, also raised its concerns about the direction of
the Malawi economy as early as 1980, as follows:
We here view with deep concern the apparent re-emergence of Banda’s infatuation with
expensive, non-productive, prestige projects. Spending on these types of projects is
precisely what is not required at this moment in time. Not only will such expenditure
increase the resources gap, but it will also reduce the chances of Malawi meeting the
performance criteria in the fiscal field laid down in the current IMF program. We are
also worried that Malawi appears set to take a further debt on (expensive) commercial
terms. The implications for the country’s debt service burden could be extremely grave.
In addition, the authorities appear to us, were they to take on such commitments, to run
the very real risk of breaching the undertaking given to the IMF not to contract more
than the equivalent of MK25m of public and publicly-guaranteed external debt with a
maturity of between one and twelve years during the period of the IMF program.517

Apart from the concerns raised by the Bank of England, similar sentiments were also issued to the
Banda regime, from another important international money-lender, hereafter, the Bank of America
(BAM). As the Americans were considering lending money to Banda, in the region of $70 m, they
also stipulated that they would only be willing to do so, if the Banda government had reduced its
expenditure on expensive projects. For instance, the BAM was not in favor of Banda’s funding of

Malawi Internal Political Situation, 1980, BNA: FCO 105/366. See in particular, ‘Confidential dispatch from the
Bank of England, signed by Mr. J.A. Howard, to the FCO’. September 4 th, 1980. One of the expensive projects being
referred to in the dispatch was an international high school, known as The Kamuzu Academy, solely owned by Banda,
built in his home district of Kasungu.
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such expensive projects as the Kamuzu Academy; a new Presidential Palace in Lilongwe; and a
Faculty of Humanities Building at the University of Malawi.518
A diagnosis from the British High Commission staff in consultation with Malawi Government
officials, indicated that there were four main causes of the economic downturn by the turn of the
1980s decade, namely: (1) the rocketing global oil prices. Since Malawi was not an oil producing
country, she had to rely on oil imports, and hence any price increase on the international market,
also affected Malawi; (2) huge debts incurred by the government, including those from the IMF,
and the National Westminster Bank. Unfortunately, most of the money was spent on luxurious
projects as highlighted above; (3) in 1980, Malawi was also hit by a partial failure of the maize
crop (the country’s staple food), low returns on tobacco, and dangerous rises in the levels of Lake
Malawi; and (4) the underperformance of most state-run companies – parastatals, most of whom
had been turned into receivership, while others had been forced to trim their operations, and
retrench employees. Hence recommendations were made by the British High Commission in
Malawi, for the British Government to continue offering budgetary aid to the Malawi
Government.519 The same year, the US Embassy in Lilongwe, also made a commitment to provide
food aid to Malawi, for an amount of $9m.520 The World Bank Economic Report for Malawi
released in February 1982, also diagnosed a number of shortfalls in the Malawi economy as of the
late 1970s, including (1) the economic challenges posed by the disturbances in neighboring
Mozambique, where the civil war which had hit the country since independence from Portugal had
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blocked Malawi’s access to the ports of Beira and Nacala, a process which affected Malawi’s
imports and exports; (2) the falling global prices for Malawi’s main export crops, especially
tobacco and tea, accompanied by rapid increases in import prices (especially for fuels, fertilizers,
and transport), all of which led to a reduction, by twenty-five percent, of the trade output and in
flow by the mid-1970s; (3) the Report also deplored the expansion of government expenditures
which outstripped the growth in revenues, which led to larger budgetary deficits and increased
borrowing from the domestic banking system.521 Keith Somerville, who worked as a British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) correspondent in Malawi in the 1970s and 1980s, reiterated in
his 2015 publication that aside from the country’s back-tracking from its democratic path, the
economic and social conditions were highly appalling. He experienced the decline of the Malawian
economy, characterized by fuel shortages, lack of basic consumer goods, including the most basic
items as toilet papers. Where food stuffs were available, the prices had skyrocketed. He also
reported of increasing levels of impoverishment and malnutrition, which led to high mortality rates
among the country’s children – coming out of such diseases as measles, diarrhea and malaria.522
It was in that perspective that in early 1980, Sir Michael Scott, then out-going British High
Commissioner to Malawi, reiterated his government’s commitment in supporting the Banda
regime. He mentioned, in a newspaper interview, that Britain had continued to be one of Malawi’s
trading partners, and the largest purchaser of Malawi’s exports, particularly tea and tobacco.
Britain’s principal exports to Malawi were in the form of metals and manufactured goods,
transport, and machinery. On bilateral aid, he stated that between 1964 and 1979, Britain had
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granted aid to the Malawi government amounting to £140 million. By the close of 1979, the British
Government had also converted all outstanding loans owed by the Malawi Government, into
grants. Such a call was made to relieve Malawi of the burden of repaying the loans and thus
reducing the call on Malawi’s foreign exchange resources. He mentioned that it was the British
Government’s belief that for its former colonies to be stable, it was not just because of political
developments, but more importantly there also had to be economic development. Therefore,
Britain was not in a position to impose its own will on what system of government its former
colonies had selected to pursue, however what was important was that there had to be stable
economic development.523
On the part of the US government, its “non-conditional” assistance to the Banda regime only
stretched to as far as the end of the Cold War hostilities. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the
focus of the US Government began to shift, as it began to link its economic aid to the liberalization
of the politico-economy. In September 1991, US Vice President, Dan Quayle paid a visit to Malawi
to meet with Dr. Banda to urge him to liberalize the country’s political system. The following year,
in June 1992, the US Congress’ Subcommittee on Africa, also met and deliberated on among other
things, the deteriorating abuse of human rights and the lack of political liberalization in Malawi.
The June 23rd, 1992 meeting was chaired by Hon. Mervyn M. Dymally, and focused on events in
Malawi, Kenya, and Somalia. The committee heard testimonies of field officers and leaders of
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international non-governmental organizations (including a report from Amnesty International) and
other political pressure groups from the three countries. In presenting the state of conditions in
Malawi, Mr. Herman J. Cohen, then Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of African Affairs, clearly
stipulated that although the US and Malawi had enjoyed cordial relations for a long time, especially
due to Malawi’s pro-Western policies and values, the US government had now become concerned
with Malawi’s lack of respect for fundamental human rights and the absence of progress toward a
more open political environment. Mr. Cohen stated that the US government was unhappy with
such human rights abuses as political detentions, controlled press, harsh laws curbing speech and
expression, and the single-party political system.524 The Executive Director of TRANSAFRICA,
Mr. Randall Robinson, clearly mentioned that the end of the Cold War, meant the US would no
longer tolerate human rights abuses in the countries that were beneficiaries of US aid, as follows:
With respect to Kenya and Malawi, both nations have recently had to grapple with
internal political movements that are at various stages of maturity. In each case,
however, courageous citizens have faced the brunt of brutal government repression at
high personal cost.
Today, I call on the U.S. Congress to support these brave and precedented efforts, and
to do all it can to bolster the larger movement of democratization in Africa. The United
States must take a strong stand to foster the development of the formation of opposition
movements in Kenya and Malawi that are preparing the way for the establishment of
multiparty societies.
We are entering a new era of global politics, vastly different from the Cold War era.
Stability and security interests will no longer mute national concerns about good
governance and respect for civil liberties. Kenya and Malawi – both stalwart allies of
the United States against the erstwhile ‘communist menace’ - must now recognize that
times have changed along with American expectations. The obstinate rulers of these
nations must be urged to follow new trends toward government accountability. We must
not forget our responsibility to serve as a catalyst to spur the international pressure that
will ultimately nurture the political and economic development of Africa’s emerging
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democracies. The administration must disregard the tunnel vision of the past and begin
to acknowledge all atrocities committed by friend and foe alike.525

The following spring, in March1993, the concerns raised at the June 1992 Congressional hearing,
were followed by a joint resolution released by the US Senate and Congress, following a motion
moved by Senator Edward Kennedy, Massachusetts, to withdraw US aid to Malawi unless several
conditions were met by the Malawi government. The conditions set in the joint resolution to
suspend aid were as follows: the Congress (1) strongly condemns the Malawi government’s
continued incarceration and harassment of dissidents; the restriction of freedoms of speech, press
and assembly; and the repeated, short-term arrests of opposition leaders in order to impede their
prodemocracy efforts; (2) further condemns all efforts by the Malawian Government to limit the
ability of political parties and popular organizations to campaign in relation to the upcoming
referendum; (3) strongly urges the Government of Malawi to consider the recommendations of the
United Nations Technical Team on the Conduct of a Free and Fair Referendum on the Issue of a
One Party/Multiparty System in Malawi; (4) calls upon the Government of Malawi to release
immediately all political prisoners, including Chakufwa Chihana, and demands that the
Government immediately cease arresting opponents for the peaceful expression of their views; (5)
commends the actions of the United States and the United Nations in support of democratic change
in Malawi and the freedom of expression and human rights and encourages the President and the
Secretary of State to work closely with other governments to these ends, and; (6) calls upon the
President and Secretary of State to ensure that the United States development assistance program
bears relation to the Government of Malawi’s progress toward an open political system and respect
for human rights and to work to ensure that the assistance of other governments and multilateral
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institutions is directed toward these same goals. Furthermore, the joint resolution clearly stipulated
that only when the US Congress was satisfied with the changes implemented by the Banda regime,
would the US president and his government be given powers to resume financial aid to Malawi.526
At the same time, the World Bank, also began to pressure the Banda regime to change its political
and economic system. The World Bank officially began its operations in post-colonial Malawi in
1965, following the enactment of the “Bretton Woods Agreement Act, 1965” by the Malawi
government, through the National Assembly. Through the 1965 Act, the government of Malawi
committed itself to abide by the Bank’s rules and regulations, and to accept the terms and
conditions of any financial arrangement that the Bank would set under its Board of Governors.
The Banda government also committed itself to adhere to all monetary payments that would be
demanded by the Bank from time-to-time, which would ensure Malawi’s continued membership
to the Bank. The Reserve Bank of Malawi, was, under the 1965 Act, designated to be the
depository of all funds from the World Bank.527
From then onwards, the Bank was involved in financing several development projects in the
country. The Bank’s first project in the country was to finance the construction of the M1 Road
connecting the colonial capital at Zomba and Malawi’s current capital city, at Lilongwe. Between
1966 and 1971, when the project was completed, the Bank provided the Banda regime with a sum
of $11,990,000. In 1974, a further $10m was approved and released by the Bank for the
construction of the Lilongwe-Kasungu Road, Kasungu being Banda’s district of birth and origin.
In 1977, the Bank approved a further $10.5m for the stretching of the road from Kasungu to the
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neighboring district of Mzimba.528 One other main project where the World Bank had been heavily
involved, alongside the International Development Association (IDA), was the financing of the
Lilongwe Land Development Project, where a portion of land covering 1.1 million acres lying to
the west of the present-day City of Lilongwe, was earmarked for extensive agricultural production.
The project, which cost the Bank a total of $8.5m, adopted an integrated model, involving the
distribution of farm inputs (such as seeds and fertilizers); funding of agricultural extension
services; land re-organization; and the general development of infrastructure (in the form of
markets, roads, conservation measures, and other social amenities). The project targeted about half
a million people in the area, with a view towards individual ownership of land to ensure the security
of tenure and the right of title, with the hope that it would help raise agricultural productivity by
increasing the yields through the adopted agricultural methods.529
When the Malawian economy began to falter from 1979/80 onwards, it was also the intervention
of the World Bank, through its Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), which helped to bail out
the ailing Malawian economy.530 The World Bank recommended a restructuring of the country’s
economy, which would involve the improvement of the financial viability of the country’s

“The World Bank and Malawi’s Main National Highway”. From http://go.worldbank.org/6T9OA3EXJ0 . 2013.
Note also that between 1966 and 2013, the World Bank had supplied the Malawi Government with funding amount
to $2.5 billion.
529
“Project to continue for 15 Years,” Malawi News, June 29th, 1973. See also Frederick L. Pryor, Malawi and
Madagascar: The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity and Growth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 72-75.
Pryor highlighted that some of the main projects which the World Bank was involved in Malawi in the 1960s, included
the following: (1) The Karonga Rural Development Project, located in the Northern Region; (2) the Lilongwe Land
Development Project, in the Central Region; (3) the Lakeshore Project, in the Central Region; and (4) the Shire Valley
Agricultural Development Project, in the Southern Province. The four projects lasted for about a decade, before later
being replaced by the National Rural Development Program. See also The Lilongwe Land Development Program is
IDA Financed. March 1972. Source: Library of Congress (African Section).
530
A good starting point for studying the SAPs in the so-called Third World is that by Daniel M. Schydlowsky, ed.,
Structural Adjustment: Retrospect and Prospect (London: Praeger Publishers, 1995). See also Lionel Demery,
“Structural Adjustment: its origins, rationale and achievements,” in Giovanni Andrea Cornia and Gerald K. Helleiner,
eds., From Adjustment to Development in Africa: conflict, controversy, convergence, consensus? (London: Macmillan
Press Ltd., 1994), 25-48. See also Nicholas Van de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis,
1979-1999 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
528

330

statutory organizations, and also minimizing the banking sector’s financial commitments to the
public sector. In a confidential dispatch from the British High Commissioner, Mr. W. Peters,
following his meeting with Mr. John Z.U. Tembo, the Reserve Bank of Malawi Governor, the
latter was said to have thrashed out details of his meetings with World Bank officials who came to
Malawi in mid-1980. Mr. Tembo acknowledged that the government was in a deep economic hole,
such that it sought more funding than what the World Bank had initially offered. One of the main
problems for the economic downturn had been the civil war in neighboring Mozambique, which
meant that goods coming into Malawi through Mozambican ports of Beira and Nacala, were
blocked. Some of the High Commissioner’s sentiments on the Malawi economy were as follows:
As you know from paragraph five of my letter of 26 August, the World Bank appraisal
team for the proposed structural adjustment loan began arriving in Malawi some ten
days ago. I have quizzed Mr. J.Z.U. Tembo, Governor of the Reserve Bank of Malawi,
and Mr. Julius Malange, Principal Secretary of the Ministry of Finance, about the way
the negotiations are going. They have been quite frank with me, saying that, initially,
the differences between the World Bank team’s position and that of the Malawi
Government was quite wide; the team came with suggestions for a structural adjustment
loan of around $32 million, whereas the Malawi target was upwards of $60 million to
$70 million. Mr. Tembo was somewhat pessimistic about this when we met on 1
September….Mr Malange appeared satisfied with the direction of the talks and took
note of my assurance to him that, when the time came for the appraisal team’s
recommendations to be studied by the Board, the British representative would do his
best to ensure a positive outcome…
Malange is clearly in favor of a high proportion of program aid because this is better
adopted to help is Ministry out of its difficult corner; however, even he acknowledged
that there should be an admixture of capital aid because otherwise the revenue earning
capacity of the Malawi economy could not be expected to grow. Tembo made it clear
that he hoped for a judicious mix of program and capital aid.531

Following the deliberations, in June 1981, the Minister of Finance, Mr. Chakakala Chaziya,
introduced the so-called International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Structural
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Adjustment Loan) Authorization Bill, 1981, which empowered the Minister to borrow the
equivalent of $15 million in various international currencies. The proceeds from the loans were to
be used for covering the SAPs as prescribed by the World Bank.532 The official World Bank Loan
Authorization Document indicated that the Malawi Government had committed itself to
undertaking a comprehensive economic program for short-term stabilization, the medium-term
adjustment and long-term development of its economy. The Loan Agreement, which covered the
years 1981 and 1982, covered an amount of $45,000,000. The interest for the Loan was pegged at
nine and three fifths percent per annum on the principal amount of the Loan withdrawn from timeto-time, payable on June 15th and December 15th each year.533 The recommendations that the
World Bank passed on to Third World countries and states at the time, had been significantly
influenced by the so-called “Washington Consensus,” which was tied to the enactment of neoliberal principles and policies. The focus of the consensus (whose main ideas came from two
Washington-based thinks tanks, the pro-Republican American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research; and the pro-Democrat Institute for International Economics), was to champion
the return to the earlier theories that revolved around free, liberal and unfettered markets. The socalled consensus condemned the tenets of the ISI and socialism, as these pertained to the Third
World and to the communist regimes of Eastern Europe. Once adopted by the US government, the
consensus was transferred unto the Bretton Woods Institutions, and other developmental banks,
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where the US was one of the major financial donors.534 Under the neo-liberal turn, there was also
the argument that “economic freedom was an indispensable means towards the achievement of
political freedom,” and that such processes and goals could best be attained “by getting the state
out of the way and letting the engines of capitalism run their inevitable course.”535
The World Bank had also instituted several studies since the late 1970s to analyze the main causes
of the economic downturn which many sub-Saharan African countries, including Malawi, had
begun to face at the time. The most widely-acknowledged of those reports was the so-called “Berg
Report” of 1981, named after Elliot Berg, who chaired the World Bank team tasked to analyze the
major constraints to development in the continent. The Berg Report focused on some structural
forces for Africa’s economic stagnation, and grouped the forces as falling under internal and
external explanations. The internal forces included questions over underdeveloped human
resources, where most governments had to rely on expatriate staff; political and military conflicts
in most states since independence; the adoption of colonial systems and structures by most states,
including systems of education, health care, and government administration, most of which had
limited success; the inheritance of colonial economic systems, and more especially development
projects that started in the late colonial era (after the Second World War), which however, had still
left many Africans in the realm of subsistence production. That, augmented with limited
investment in education, also meant that most African states had limited personnel with access to
tertiary education. There was also the general lack or limited access to health facilities, a condition
also inherited from the colonial era. The Berg Report also blamed Africa’s climatic and
geographical conditions, most of which were/are “preeminently tropical,” and hence posed as an
534
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obstacle to development, due to unfertile soils, most of which had deficiencies in organic materials.
Lastly, Africa’s rapid population growth, which was no longer able to fit into African agrarian
systems of extensive land use, such as the shifting cultivation, long farrow periods, and the limited
use of manure and off-farm inputs. The external forces, as highlighted in the Berg Report, included
the following: the soaring of oil prices at the international market, especially the two oil price hikes
of 1973-74 and 1978-80, following disturbances in the Middle East, a condition which led many
countries to fall into debts to cover the costs of importing the oil; there was also the swelling of
external debts, incurred by most governments to meet the demands for other essential
commodities, at a time when most African products had not been doing well at international
markets due to various trade-restriction based policies.536
Similar sentiments, as those raised in the World Bank and by the Berg Report, were also
highlighted by the former US Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, in a public lecture, on
November 1st, 1985, which was hosted by the World Bank. His speech highlighted four critical
challenging areas which sub-Saharan African countries, including Malawi, faced during the 1980s.
Firstly, he lamented the declining levels of per capita domestic growth rates which had begun to
fall by the late 1970s. To concur with the findings of earlier World Bank reports, McNamara
argued that the economic challenges had both domestic and international causes. Domestically, he
pinpointed the over-valued exchange rates that discriminated against exports; mounting fiscal
deficits; and a variety of burdensome government interventions and controls in the production
process. He also blamed what he termed “the encroachment of the state or the political elite” in
almost every economic activity, who were only interested in self-accumulation rather than in the
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development of the state. The leaders of African countries were also blamed for initiating poor
economic policies, most of which had increased the debt crisis. Some of the global or international
economic forces included the severe decline in prices of commodities; the persistent recessions;
and the increasing protectionism by international players. The second significant challenge, as
highlighted by McNamara, was the rampant growth of population in most African countries, an
issue which he referred to as “a ticking time bomb” in most of the countries. The challenge for
many countries for the high population growth rates, with population densities of as high as forty
persons per square kilometer, was the access to basic resources and states’ ability to provide
amenities such as health care and education. The other equally important challenge for African
states was the widespread ecological degradation across the continent. He deplored such processes
including widespread deforestation, soil erosion, the falling water tables, and the general overusage of the ecosystems. Such processes were responsible for the persistence of drought and
subsequent famines in most of sub-Saharan Africa. Lastly, he deplored the general lack of financial
resources in most of the countries, and called on the international community to come up
interventions that would help the countries in such areas as funding to support structural
adjustments essential for long-term economic growth; investing in physical infrastructure and
human resource development; support the fight against desertification and environmental
degradation; and also for humanitarian efforts to assist the victims of famine.537
The following was the chronology of events of the intervention of the Bretton Woods institutions
in Malawi between 1979 and 1986: October 1979 (IMF Stand-by Agreement, to run for 30
months); April 1980 (IMF Revised Stand-by Agreement, to run for 24 months); June 1981 (World
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Bank Structural Adjustment Loan I); August 1982 (IMF Stand-by Agreement, to last for 12
months); September 1982 (Paris Club Agreement on Debt Rescheduling); March 1983 (London
Club Agreement on Debt Rescheduling); April 1983 (World Bank/International Fund for
Agricultural Development Smallholder Fertilizer Loan); September 1983 (IMF Extended Fund
Facility Agreement, to last for 36 months); October 1983 (Paris Club Agreement on Debt
Rescheduling); December 1983 (World Bank Structural Adjustment Credit II); December 1985
(World Bank Structural Adjustment Credit III); March 1986 (Consultative Group Agreement on
External Aid); April 1986 (Cancellation of IMF Extended Fund Facility Agreement); and
December 1986 (World Bank Supplement to Structural Adjustment Credit III). 538 From 1979
onwards, staff from both the IMF and World Bank played an important role to help galvanize and
re-construct the Malawian economy, sometimes overseeing the spending or utilization of funds
that came from the Bretton Woods institutions and other international money-lending institutions.
Among other recommendations made, was that the government had to relinquish its hold on
parastatals, such as Malawi Housing Corporation (MHC); Malawi Book Service (MBS); Blantyre
Water Board; Lilongwe Water Board; and the Electricity Supply Commission of Malawi
(ESCOM), through what became known as the privatization process. That also included the
overhaul the financial and management structure of the MDC, Press Holdings Limited, and
ADMARC.539 In other words, the SAPs recommended the dilution of the “overdeveloped” state,
which had been a main characteristic of the Malawian state since the late colonial period. Other
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scholars even argue that the SAPs in a way “transferred sovereignty away from African states into
the hands of the Bretton Woods Institutions”.540
From the World Bank’s long history of involvement in Malawi’s economic planning and
development, it was thus unsurprising that the Bank was among the international donor and
money-lending agencies (influenced by the principles of the Washington Consensus) that was
involved in the push for economic and political liberalization in Malawi. Since the World Bank
was historically of Western origin, it was, in ideological orientation bound to favor the liberal
values promoted by the USA and its Western allies especially after the economic downturn of the
1970s. The main target at the time were the economically vulnerable states, many of which were
“developmental” in structure and ideology. The liberal values being promoted since the early
1980s shifted from merely economic concerns towards calls for political change as well. As posited
by David William and Tom Young, since the late 1980s, the World Bank had begun to employ the
concept of “governance” in its approach towards the “Third World” where it applied the SAPs.
The concept of “governance” had two main elements, where, firstly, there was a “technical
stream,” concerned with the building blocks of a liberal capitalist state focusing on the rule of law.
Secondly, there was the “civil society stream,” with special emphasis on the notion that a vigorous
civil society would help to hold states to account. Through civil society institutions, the Bank
would emphasize the recognition of certain liberal political virtues without the Bank itself
necessarily being in the forefront advocating for liberal democracy. By then, the Bank had also
come to realize that the SAPs were not producing positive results in many countries, for which
some of the reasons were to be found in social and political systems of the target countries. These
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factors, combined with the “triumph” of the West led by the USA during the Cold War, compelled
the Bank to insist on pushing the “liberal agenda” in its approach to the countries that received aid
and loans under the SAPs. The spread of the “liberal ideology” then was also fueled by the
globalization agenda, in which predominantly Western ideologies, such as “liberalism” were
spread and encouraged, at times undermining the sovereign rights of “Third World” countries to
choose their own political trajectories.541
In the case of Malawi, World Bank personnel participated in and chaired what was designated as
“The Consultative Group,” which focused on recommending liberalization measures during the
late 1980s and early 1990s. After its May 1992 meeting, the Consultative Group, through the
World Bank headquarters, communicated the following message to Banda:
Your Excellency,
The Consultative Group meeting chaired by the World Bank, which took place in Paris, May 1113, 1992, raised a number of issues of fundamental importance to the future of Malawi. While all
donors paid tribute to Malawi’s strong record of economic management, deep concern was
expressed about the lack of progress in basic freedoms and human rights in Malawi, and the need
for early implementation of appropriate reforms in these areas. Most donors refused to make any
new aid commitments at the meeting, leaving a significant gap in respect of Malawi’s external
financing requirements. Donors agreed that further consultations among the Consultative Group
would take place only after they see tangible and irreversible evidence of a fundamental
transformation in the treatment of human rights issues in your country.
This is a critical juncture in Malawi’s history. The very severe drought currently afflicting the
country and the recent industrial unrest have made the economic situation even more precarious,
and threaten to undermine the economic reforms pursued by Malawi in recent years. Given the
concerns, the donor community will be carefully watching developments in Malawi to monitor
progress in improving the environment for basic freedoms and human rights. While we are
planning to continue to process new loans in support of investments and policy reforms, concrete
action by the Government on issues of concern to the donor community is essential if the
David Williams and Tom Young, “The World Bank and the liberal project,” in David Moore, ed., The World Bank,
Development, Poverty, Hegemony (South Africa: University of KwaZulu Natal Press, 2007), 203-216. See also David
Moore, “Sail on ship of state: neoliberalism, globalization and the governance of Africa,” in David Moore, ed., The
World Bank, Development, Poverty, Hegemony (2007), 227-261. See also Graham Harrison, “The World Bank and
the construction of governance states in Africa,” in David Moore, ed., The World Bank, Development, Poverty,
Hegemony (2007), 369-386.
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combination of multilateral and bilateral financing required by the economic adjustment program
is to remain in place. I hope, therefore, that your Government will take all necessary and urgent
steps to follow up on the conclusions of the Paris meeting, thus allowing an early resumption of
consultations on future donor assistance to Malawi.

Sincerely,
Lewis T. Preston
(President, World Bank).542

The cutting of the budgetary and developmental aid to the Malawi Government occurred at a
particularly critical juncture in the country. The country had been undergoing a drought which
contributed to massive food shortages, as well as shortages of foreign currency needed to purchase
foodstuffs and other manufactured products from outside the country. The 1991-92 drought, which
also affected other Southern African countries, was particularly more devastating for Malawi, as
in part, its mitigation was also challenged by the civil war in neighboring Mozambique, which saw
an increase in the number of refugees trekking into Malawi, and also more importantly the cutting
off of Malawi’s trade routes to the sea through the Mozambican ports of Nacala and Beira. Such
conditions helped to weaken further Banda’s grip on the country’s political and economic system,
especially where the precedence had now been set that his government could not go on without
international donor support.543
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Figure 7.1: A cartoon depicting the Inspector General of the Malawi Police Force, c.1993, Mr.
McWilliam Lunguzi, instructing political prisoners to be thankful for their release (following both
domestic and international pressure for political liberalization) and vote for Dr. Banda and the
MCP. November 1993. Source: The Enquirer, November 1993.

Domestic forces for regime change
The international pressure for political and economic liberalization, and more especially the
pulling out of budgetary aid to the Malawi Government, opened room for local opposition elements
to come out in the open to challenge the Banda regime. Many had begun to openly criticize the
regime, especially mocking Banda’s claims that Malawi was a democratic country,544 when it was
a one-party state. There was also a unanimous outcry that despite Banda’s touting of his
government as an economic success story, the claimed material benefits had not necessarily
“Malawi is a Democratic State,” Malawi News, May 16th, 1969. From time-to-time, Banda used to argue that
Democracy in Malawi should not be compared to or equated to Democracy elsewhere, especially in the West. What
was important, in his view, was that people had the choice to elect their local representatives. See also Malawi News,
June 29th, 1974. “Malawi: A One-Party State by will of Majority.”
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trickled down to improve the livelihoods of the rural poor and the urban working classes. It was
thus inevitable that the early pressure groups called for the liberalization of both the economic and
political systems, a “song” which at the time was being sang loudly by the international
community.
The immediate internal pressure for political and economic liberalization, and the general respect
of people’s human rights began following the issuing of the so-called “Pastoral Letter” by the
country’s Roman Catholic Bishops, titled “Living Our Faith,” at the beginning of March 1992.
The Letter, which was duplicated into 16,000 copies and distributed to Catholic diocese and
churches across the country, deplored the general and rampant abuse of people’s rights under the
Banda regime, and the alarming levels of state inefficiency which had contributed to the rise in
levels of poverty. Although Banda had tried to suppress the Bishops by threatening them with
arrest, setting on fire the publishing house that published the letter, and declaring the Pastoral
Letter to be a seditious document, the threats fell on deaf ears, and only seemed to fuel further
unrest across the country. It was in the aftermath of the success of the Bishops’ Letter that several
pro-democracy movements also came out in the open to challenge Banda’s authority. The earliest
of them to appear were the Interim Committee for a Democratic Alliance (ICDA), which later
became the Alliance for Democracy (led by a Trade Unionist, Chakufwa Chihana, whom Banda
had dismissed from the MCP in the early 1960s). The other key pro-democracy movement was the
United Democratic Party (UDP), later United Democratic Front (UDF), led by Bakili Muluzi (the
man who later succeeded Banda), alongside his fellow businessmen who had not been part of the
regime for some time, having fallen out of favor with Banda or his cronies at some point.545 It was
See Paul Chiudza Banda, “Hastings Kamuzu Banda: How the Cold War Sustained Bad Leadership in Malawi,” In
Baba G. Jallow, Leadership in Postcolonial Africa: Trends Transformed by Independence (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2014), 39-40. Apart from the Roman Catholic clergy, in June 1992, the leadership of the Church of Central
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highly likely that the Bishops and the opposition pressure groups were significantly encouraged
by the stance that had been taken by the international donor community, to deny budgetary aid to
authoritarian governments in the Third World, including Malawi. The international donor
community, as highlighted above, was much concerned with withholding their monetary aid to
countries that continued with “keeping the gate shut,” and thus left little or no room for political
and economic opportunities for the majority.

Figure 7.2: Chakufwa Chihana (center), leader of the ICDA, was immediately placed in handcuffs
by Banda’s state agents, as he alighted from a plane at Kamuzu International Airport, 1992. Notice
that in the background, some passengers were still alighting from the plane. Source: H.K. Banda
Archive.

in crisis,” and among other issues, addressed the country’s appalling human rights record. See Tony Woods, “The
High Costs of Obstinacy: Banda hangs on,” Southern Africa Report 8, no.2 (November 1992): 19.
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For instance, when one analyzes the campaign messages and statements of the leaders of the promulti-party democracy movement, it is clear that most of them being businessmen had wanted a
share of the national “economic cake.” They often equated or associated ascendancy to political
power with the access of economic or material resources, with which to reward their own clientele,
which Jean-Francois Bayart described as “politics of the belly.”546 The man who succeeded Banda
as President, Bakili Muluzi, had served Banda both in the MCP (as Secretary General), and also
as a cabinet minister. He then resigned from the Party in the late 1979s, to concentrate on his
personal businesses. In the business sector, Muluzi was also prominent, as he held such positions
as the Deputy Chairman of the Malawi Chamber of Commerce and Industry; Chairman of the
Southern African Development Community (SADC) National Business Council; and, as of 1993,
he was the Chairman of the Malawi Road Transporters Association. In a newspaper interview, in
the run-up to the 1994 general elections, which Banda lost, Muluzi was in the forefront to call for
a liberalization of the economy, which he argued had been monopolized by Banda and his cronies.
He made the following remarks:
Take the Banking sector for example. Malawi has only two banks. The Chairman of
Commercial Bank is the Chairman of Press Corporation, where the Chairman of
National Bank is employed. Press has substantial shareholding in both banks which are
effectively one bank. You cannot expect to have a free competitive banking sector in
that way. Another example is that the same Chairman is also the Chairman of Air
Malawi and Minister of State in the President’s Office. As a result of his influence, all
government travel bookings are made directly with the airline. This creates a monopoly
of the Travel Agency sector by the Airline and in the process private agencies cannot
thrive. The Travel Agency Sector in Malawi is not a free and competitive sector. There
are scores and scores of examples I can give you…. Look at ADMARC. They have a
complete monopoly over all smallholder tobacco in Malawi. The average man
producing tobacco has no access to a competitive market where a price can be obtained
546
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on the basis of market forces. Instead, ADMARC sets prices which by all means
guarantee them a profit, and I mean a profit. There are too many distortions in the
economy.547

There was also a significant contribution by junior workers in both the main stream civil service
and state-run companies (the so-called parastatals), who embarked on various strikes and
demonstrations between 1992 and 1994. In April and May 1992, for instance, policemen shot at
and allegedly killed over thirty demonstrating workers in the city of Blantyre. In May 1992 (May
6th to 8th), for instance, workers from David Whitehead fabric factory (which was partly owned by
MDC), embarked on widespread demonstrations in the city of Blantyre, where their actions led to
the looting and destruction of property which belonged to the Banda clique, especially targeting
the People’s Trading Center (PTC) chain of stores. Apparently, the PTC stores were run by the
PGC. That also helped to indicate the close connection between the people’s economic and
political grievances. The massacre of the unarmed demonstrators was carried out by the Malawi
Police after the Army had allegedly refused to participate in the annihilation of anti-government
demonstrators or rioters, of whom twenty were mercilessly massacred within two days. 548 By
August 1993, junior civil servants had also given an ultimatum to Banda to give them a 100 percent
salary increment, and also a general review of their own conditions of service. Having had their
demands ignored, the junior civil servants went on a strike on September 2nd, 1993, blocking major
roads in the cities, especially in Blantyre, where Banda had his official residence. Some of the
striking civil servants could be heard airing out their grievances against the regime, as follows:
“we also want to lead comfortable lives…we have been surviving on okra, mustard leaves, and

“Muluzi and his perspectives on the Malawi economy,” The Enquirer, August 2nd to 8th 1993. Note that the
‘Chairman’ Muluzi was referring to was Mr. John Z.U. Tembo, who was the Uncle to Ms. Cecilia Kadzamira, Banda’s
so-called “Official Hostess.”
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other wild vegetables without tasting meat all these years. So, we now want a better life.”549
University students, from the two constituent colleges of the University of Malawi, namely
Chancellor College and the Polytechnic, also joined the striking and demonstrating workers. The
Malawi Police Force responded by arresting seventy-five students at the Polytechnic, while many
were also beaten up and tortured by the security forces.550
By the early 1990s, the situation was also made complicated by Banda’s aging status (he was in
his early 90s), which also significantly affected his grip on both the country’s economy and
political dynamics. As I have argued above, the economic downturn which the country had been
experiencing since the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, needed a steady hand, which Banda
could obviously not provide, due to both old age and ill-health. In late 1993 (October 2nd, 1993)
for instance, the president underwent a brain surgery at a South African hospital (Garden City
Clinic in Johannesburg), such that for the remainder of that year, he was replaced by an interim
Presidential Council, made up of a triumvirate of cabinet ministers, John Z.U. Tembo, Gwanda
Chakuamba, and Robinson Chirwa. Each of the three men represented the country’s three main
administrative regions, hereafter, Central, Southern, and Northern Regions, respectively. That
move was necessary since Banda did not have a vice president throughout his thirty-year reign,
therefore the Presidential Council filled the void left by the ailing Banda.551 Under the 1966
Constitution, a provision was made under Chapter III, Section 13, for a Presidential Council to be
appointed under the following conditions: “Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of President,
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or the President is so incapacitated as to be unable to appoint a Presidential Commission.” The
constitution thus provided for such a council to be appointed, to be headed by the Secretary General
of the Party (MCP); to be joined by two cabinet ministers, each of whom had to be an executive
member of the MCP; and that the said Presidential Council would remain in power until a new
President assumed office.552 An analysis of the constitutional provision leading to the appointment
of the Presidential Council, in that case, meant that since he was not dead, then there was no
vacancy, however, he was incapacitated, which meant that he was unable to appoint a Presidential
Commission. For a man who was in his 90s, to undergo a brain surgery meant that there was a
significant reduction in his mental and physical capacities, and perhaps not worthy to continue
performing the functions of Head of State and Government. Even when he resumed his position
as President in early 1994, he was still not in tip-top shape. During the campaign period for the
1994 general elections, Banda had to cancel or postpone some scheduled public rallies due to his
deteriorating health condition. There were also rumors circulating in the country that he had been
flown back to South African for a follow-up brain surgery. In early May 1994, he also turned down
the invitation to attend the swearing in ceremony of Nelson Mandela in South Africa, having
received medical advice not to fly long distances. Instead, he sent a delegation of three cabinet
ministers, namely: John Z.U. Tembo (Minister of State); Hetherwick Ntaba (Minister of Foreign
Affairs); and Gwanda Chakwamba (Minister of Home Affairs).553
Following the pro-multiparty outcome of the June 1993 National Referendum (63 percent voted
in favor), there were several changes brought in that eventually reduced some of Banda’s powers.
It was when the Presidential Council was in power that some constitutional amendments were
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made to liberalize the political and economic systems. In November 1993, the National Assembly
convened, under pressure from both the international and local pressure groups, to repeal some of
the country’s repressive laws. The internal pressure came from such groups as the Public Affairs
Committee (PAC), made up mainly of representatives from the clergy; and the National
Consultative Committee (NCC), which mainly comprised of politicians and businessmen; who
held discussions with the Government side, represented by a Presidential Committee on Dialogue
(PCD). Among the amendments made, were the repeal of the Forfeiture Act; amendment of the
Preservation of Public Security Act (associated with “detention without trial”); and also, the
amendment of the Decency in Dress Act (which previously prohibited women from wearing miniskirts or any such short dresses). The meeting also agreed to disarm the MYPs and the Youth
Leaguers, as there was no longer need to maintain party-paramilitary wings.554 In mid-September
1993, Banda was also forced to relinquish the powers and/or honor he enjoyed as the “life
president” of the country, while he retained powers to be life president of the MCP. Section IX of
the country’s constitution, which conferred Banda the honor of being a “life president” was
repealed, following consultations involving the PAC, NCC, and PCD. The report sent to Dr. Banda
on the need to repeal the said Section clearly stipulated that the Section was no longer compatible
with the spirit of the new multi-party democracy dispensation, hence the need to repeal the Section.
Banda was however assured that, should the MCP win the 1994 general elections, then the title of
‘Life President’ would be re-conferred upon him.555
While the government side dilly-dallied to disarm the MYP, it was an altercation in early
December 1993, between MYP members (from Kaning’ina MYP Base) and Malawi Army soldiers
“Editorial,” The Enquirer, November 23rd to 29th 1993.
“Memorandum to His Excellency, the Life President – Repeal of Section IX of the Constitution.” From: H.M.
Ntaba, Vice Chairperson of the Presidential Committee on Dialogue. September 17 th, 1993. Source: H.K. Banda
Archive.
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(from Moyale Barracks), which helped to significantly change the course of events. An altercation
which started at a pub in the northern region city of Mzuzu, between some soldiers and MYP
members, soon became a country-wide battle between the two camps. The MYP members
involved in the altercation left the pub to collect firearms from a nearby MYP base, and waylaid
the soldiers, on their way out of the pub. They managed to kill one soldier and wounded three
others. One of the wounded soldiers died the following day, December 3rd, 1993. That began an
all-out fight between the two sides, with the soldiers attacking MYP offices and camps throughout
the country to disarm the Youth Movement in what was locally named as “Operation Bwezani”
(literally meaning “operation give back”), in reference to the fire arms which Banda diverted to
the MYP, as they were originally supposed to be for use by the Malawi Army soldiers. During the
operation, which nearly turned into a civil war, the soldiers ransacked MYP offices across the
country, attacked members of the MYP and their households, and also created room for civilian
demonstrators and sympathizers to attack business premises known to have been under the
ownership of Banda and his inner-circle, especially the People’s Trading Center (PTC) chain of
stores, which was run by the Press Group of Companies. In the capital city, Lilongwe, the soldiers
attacked the headquarters of the MYP, known as Youth House; they also attacked and nearly
demolished the Kamuzu Institute for Youth, which was the sports mecca of the Youth Movement.
Furthermore, truckloads of captured members of the MYP were also driven across the capital city
to an unknown location. In the ensuing disturbances, especially in the country’s main cities, more
than ten civilian deaths were also reported. It was then that the Presidential Council issued a
directive, on December 5th for the MYPs to be totally disarmed.556
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Rather surprisingly, at the end of 1993, the Malawi Army General, General Yohane, a Banda
appointee, was “forced” to retire early from his position, allegedly due to condemnation from the
civil society, especially the National Consultative Council (NCC), following continued Army
repression of MYP members and MYP premises, and rumors of continued unrest in the Army,
well into 1994. He was forced to retire alongside other top Army brass, Brigadier Manyozo and
Major-General Liabunya.557 In the run-up to the May 1994 general elections, however, there were
some anxieties spreading across the country following rumors that most of the MYP members,
especially those from the Security Branch, had actually not been disarmed, but had actually
escaped into neighboring Mozambique, where they set up a camp at Milanje, to prepare an all-out
war of revenge against the Malawi Army and any other party which would win the 1994 general
elections other than the MCP. There were rumors that they run-away MYPs were still under the
command of John Z.U. Tembo, who had become a de-facto leader of the country, due to Banda’s
old age and ailment.558
Banda subsequently lost the May 17th, 1994 general elections, which marked the end of an era of
one of Africa’s longest serving dictatorships. The presidential election was contested among four
candidates, namely: Dr. Banda (MCP); Bakili Muluzi, from the United Democratic Front (UDF);
Chakufwa Chihana, from the Allinance for Democracy (AFORD), and; Kamlepo Kalua, from the
Malawi Democratic Party (MDP). The statistical results of the 1994 General Elections, that ousted
Banda from power, were as follows: Bakili Muluzi of the UDF (47.2 percent); Hastings Kamuzu
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Banda of the MCP (33.5 percent); Chakufwa Chihana of AFORD (18.9 percent); and Kamlepo
Kalua of MDP (0.5 percent).559

Figure 7.3: A cartoon depicting the likelihood that Dr. Banda and his MCP were on their way to
losing the May 1994 General Elections. The cartoon was published merely four days before the
elections and depicted purported MCP members taking their party’s coffin to the graveyard for
burial. The phrase ‘MCP yagwira mseu!!’ was used to represent the notion that ‘the MCP was on
its way to the graveyard, literally’. Source: The Enquirer, May 16th to 19th, 1994.

The following were Banda’s parting words to the Malawi nation on May 19th, 1994, a statement
which I argue as I close the discussion, marked the end of the post-colonial state, and ushered in a
new economic and political dispensation in the country, from May 1994 onwards.
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Bwanas and Donas,
The general elections which we were all waiting for have now come and passed peacefully and
orderly.
Although the results have not been officially confirmed and announced, there is every indication
from the votes that have been counted so far, and announced on Malawi Broadcasting Corporation
(MBC), that Mr. Bakili Muluzi is the clear winner on the contest for the Presidency.
I wish to congratulate him wholeheartedly for his victory. May I offer him my full support and
cooperation as he takes over the Presidency of this country. As one of the incoming opposition
parties, I wish to assure him that the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) will work with the United
Democratic Front (UDF) Government in building a better democratic Malawi.
Personally, I wish to thank all Malawians for having allowed me to be your leader for the past
thirty-one years. You listened to me when I requested you to uphold the four cornerstones of the
Malawi Congress Party, namely: Unity, Loyalty, Obedience, and Discipline. In a way, those have
served as pillars for our long-standing political stability and for continuing social and economic
development….
I am aware that politicians said so many unkind things about each other during this heated
campaign. This is the nature of partisan democratic competition. Now is the time to bury all our
political differences and work together for a united and prosperous Malawi.

Bwanas and Donas,
Thank you very much.560

The state-of-affairs in the post-Banda era
Since the downfall of the Banda regime in 1994, the Malawian state has undergone several
substantial constitutional, political, and economic changes. Although some elements of the Banda
regime still linger on, including those of police brutality, I argue that we should not continue to
refer to the state as a “post-colonial state.” The systems and practices that still linger on are
certainly there only in “diluted” form and thus must not be attributed as having emanated from the
colonial period.
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For instance, in 1995 a constitution was enacted to go along with the new multi-party democratic
dispensation, which among other things brought back the bill of rights which had been removed
from the constitution since 1966. There were also other human rights-related amendments,
including the creation of the Malawi Human Rights Commission, the office of the Ombudsman,
and the clarification of the role that the police force would play in democratic era Malawi. For
instance, the police were now compelled not to take orders from politicians, not to become
members of a political party, and that they had to discharge their duties with impartiality. 561 Under
the 2010 Republican Constitution, as amended, the name of the police was also changed from a
Police Force to Police Service, hence the current name of Malawi Police Service (MPS).562
There have also been other reforms in the Malawi police, leading to the inclusion of the component
of human rights in the police training school curriculum. This has happened as Malawi is now a
member of the International Human Rights Manual Drafting project, which began in 1999, which
was implemented in Malawi in 2005. At the time of launching the manual, there was an atmosphere
of hope in as far as the protection of human rights was concerned, if the sentiments of the then
Police Inspector General were anything to go by:
You are all aware that central to the democratization process of this country is the Bill
of Rights. The Bill of Rights relates primarily although not exclusively, to the
relationship between the state and its people…. I believe that the implementation of this
human rights training comes in at an opportune time when we are desirous of fulfilling
our aspirations of becoming more humane and responsive police service. As a police
service, we have never taken for granted the mutual relationship between us and the
community as a result of our other efforts like community policing. We believe that this
Training Manual will help us consolidate our efforts. I say this on the basis of my firm
belief that in countries where human rights are constitutionally protected, the
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relationship between the police and the citizenry can more easily be of co-operation and
support.563

The second chapter of the training manual also includes an overview of the meaning of human
rights; and a classification of human rights (civil, political, economic, social, cultural, and
solidarity rights). It also refers to various documents that have been issued internationally such as
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948; and the African Charter on Human
and People’s Rights (ACHPR) of 1981, to promote the human rights agenda. It also includes a
brief overview of the historical trajectory of the human rights agenda in Malawi, starting from the
colonial era, thru the post-colonial era, and the post-Cold War era. It also highlights the roles that
the police played when they were used as instruments of oppression, in such a way that the police
had wide powers to deny people their rights through vicious interrogations, detentions without
trial, and other cruel interrogation methods.564
On the political scene, Malawi is no longer a one-party state having embraced multi-party
democracy following the 1993 national referendum. Under the constitution of Malawi, every
citizen enjoys the freedom of association, which includes then right to establish political parties
provided they are approved by the office of the registrar of political parties. Malawians are no
longer forced to belong to the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) as had been the case when Dr. Banda
was in power.565 Malawi now has over 40 legally-registered political parties, although many of
them are non-operational, and only exist in name. Since the 1994 general elections that led to the
downfall of the Banda regime, there have also been periodic general and by-elections, where
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candidates from political parties and other independent candidates have exercised their
constitutionally-given rights.566 This has been a complete departure from the state of affairs during
the Banda regime, where since 1971 when Dr. Banda became the “life president,” Malawians were
barred from voting for a state president. Since the 1994 general elections, Malawi has now been
ruled by three other political parties other than the MCP. These parties include the United
Democratic Front (UDF), the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), and the People’s Party (PP).
Presidents Bakili Muluzi, Bingu wa Mutharika, Joyce Banda, and Peter wa Mutharika, have all
been beneficiaries of the new democratic dispensation.
The Malawian state is no longer as “over-developed” as it used to be. In the post-Banda era, most
of the previously state-owned businesses were privatized, following recommendation from the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These Bretton Woods institutions have
since the late 20th century, as part of the neo-liberal agenda, encouraged the privatization of stateowned businesses to improve or increase productivity, efficiency, and output. Countries like
Malawi who were subjected to the SAPs were given the privatization of state-owned businesses as
one of the conditions to access aid and monetary grants.567 In Malawi, the march towards
privatization began in the early 1980s, when the government was compelled to establish the
Department of Statutory Bodies (DSB), to among other things monitor and control the operations
of state-owned enterprises. But by the end of the Banda regime, the results were still discouraging,
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as many of the enterprises posted low accountability levels and still had limited managerial
autonomy. The targeted companies during this first phase included ADMARC, PGC, and MDC.568
When Bakili Muluzi and the UDF came to power in 1994, the government initiated the second
phase of the privatization program. This saw the government establish the privatization
commission to oversee the restructuring and sale of state-owned businesses. About 150 companies
were targeted during this second phase. Among other reasons for this, the government sought to
bring about efficiency in the economy; increase competition and reduce state monopoly in the
business sector; promote participation by the Malawian public in doing business; and to raise the
much-needed revenue for the government.569 This saw the sale of such companies as the Cold
Storage, Malawi Book Service, Malawi Distilleries Limited, Nzeru Radio Company, Grain and
Milling Limited, Portland Cement Company, Blantyre Dairy Limited, and Wood Industries
Corporation, among others.570
While studies about privatization of state-owned enterprises indicate that there are improved levels
of efficiency and generally better profit margins,571 there are several downsides to such policy
changes. For instance, Ernest Harsch, in his studies on the effects of privatization programs across
the African continent, argues that they have been accompanied by both political and socioeconomic risks and challenges. The privatization programs, including that of the Malawi
government, has led to retrenchment of workers, has been followed by strikes by workers, closure
of some companies, and the prominence of foreigners who have bought some of the companies.
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Furthermore, the privatization process has had little or no impact at all on broader development
goals of most African countries. Most of the proceeds from privatization have either gone to
foreign business owners or the few African elites and politicians who purchased the companies.572
It is thus imperative upon the subsequent post-Banda governments in Malawi to ensure that the
leaders should minimize the job losses, to link the privatization program to Malawi’s broader
development goals, and to make sure that there is more local or Malawian ownership of the former
state enterprises. Only then can the privatization program play a significant role in the livelihoods
of the people of Malawi.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have focused on the downfall of the regime of Malawi’s first post-colonial Head
of State, Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda, which took place in May 1994. I have sustained the
argument that the downfall of the regime represented the end of the post-colonial state in Malawi.
I have argued that the downfall of Banda had much more to do with the economic downturn which
Malawi began to encounter since the 1979/80 fiscal year, which then allowed for intervention in
the country’s economy, by major bilateral donors and the Bretton Woods Institutions. Once
Banda’s Malawi lost its economic autonomy, it gave room to the international community to
dictate the country’s economic and later political path (with their ready-made political and
economic policies), leading to the conditions for aid of the late 1980s and early 1990s. By then,
the once strong Malawian state, had lost a significant chunk of its sovereignty and had to be
influenced by liberalization policies of the West. Furthermore, Banda’s own old age and ill health,
meant that he could not provide the kind of leadership that Malawi needed at such a time of
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economic recession. If Banda had been of a younger age, and indeed if the economy had been
doing well, maybe Banda would have withstood the pressure (both international, and later
domestic). I have also highlighted that the issues that were raised by the international community,
were the very same issues that the local opposition elements pounced upon, an important indication
of the agency which Malawians had to shape the future political and socio-economic development
of the country. The end of the post-colonial state itself and indeed the fall of Banda’s authoritarian
rule, could not be described as a bad development, especially because of its lack of adherence to
liberal principles and the associated abuse of people’s rights. As Plato stated: “Death is not the
worst thing that can happen to men.”573
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSION
Must not all things at the last be swallowed up in death?574
This dissertation adopted the long-duree historical approach, by discussing the history of colonial
and post-colonial Malawi, from 1891-1994, rather than merely focusing on a shorter period of time
to discuss some of the major issues for the country’s history. 575 In discussing the notion of “state
counter-insurgency,” I have weighed through various local and transnational spaces and
documents, to analyze the different ways both the colonial and post-colonial states used the
resources at their disposal to eliminate different forms of opposition against the state. The journey
has thus taken this study into political, social, and economic grievances that influenced the
country’s citizens to challenge the authority and legitimacy of the state; and there has also been
focus on the different ways which the state responded to the citizens’ agitation, where I have
highlighted that although there is a tendency in most scholarship to focus on the use of force
(especially through the police force and other para-military agencies of the state) by authoritarian
regimes, there is also need to focus on the non-brutal or the more peaceful means through which
the states under study responded to the rise of opposition. In this study, I have used such terms as
“winning hearts and minds” and “the stick and the carrot,” to refer to the different ways in which
the state carried out what I refer to as “counter-insurgency.” I have also adopted and sustained the
argument that in the case of Malawi, there is need to have clear-cut demarcations on such dates as
what is meant by the “colonial state” and the “post-colonial state.” I have argued that for the
Plato, In Quote Me: World’s Most Inspiring Words (Compiled by Uplifting Publications. Undated), 59.
For a study of the Longue durée historical approach, see Jo Guldi and David Armitage, The History Manifesto
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colonial state, our focus should be on the period between 1891 and 1964; while the post-colonial
state should be considered as having stretched from 1964 to 1994. My analysis of the rise of
insurgencies and the accompanying counter-insurgency measures has been guided by insights from
the political-economy approach.
In chapter two, focus was on the first two decades of British rule in Nyasaland, roughly between
1891 and 1910. That was a period when the colonial state was being established, and required, in
most cases, the use of state-sponsored brutality to deal with resisting Africans. I have argued that
it was the sight of material needs or benefits that determined the kind of relationship that existed
at the time. The colonial authorities were keen to set up conducive conditions for the operation of
European enterprises in the country, hence the need to eliminate all forms of opposition in the
country. In that perspective, most of what could be termed as counter-insurgency, came in the form
of “the stick” against the resisting native societies, where I have adopted Crawford Young’s notion
of bula matari (literally “he who crushes rocks”).
In chapter three, the study has revolved around a critical analysis of the principle of “civilizing
mission,” as it applied to Nyasaland. I have argued that since the colonial enterprise was a
“makeshift settlement,” it was often impossible to fully apply it (the civilizing mission). In part,
the African discontent against the land, labor and taxation policies of the colonial state led to the
uprising of 1915, which is widely described as the “Chilembwe uprising.” In chapter four, I have
focused on the notion of “winning hearts and minds” as it pertained to the time of the 1915 “native
uprising,” both during and after, roughly between 1915 and 1930. I have focused on the use of
both “the stick and the carrot,” as measures employed by the colonial state to defeat the insurgents.
Unlike other works, on the native uprising, most of whom have concentrated on the use of brutal
force, especially the killing of Chilembwe and the execution of his accomplices, I have highlighted
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how the initiation of development and welfare programs for the benefit of the colonized peoples,
was also used as a counter-insurgency measure. I have focused on the question of changes in the
land tenure system, and the disbursement of funds towards such areas as water supply, agricultural
development, public health, education, and communication systems, among others. I have also
stretched my focus on the colonial police, by adopting the political-economy approach, to argue
that the operations of the Nyasaland Police significantly reflected the organization of the
Nyasaland society of the time. We also see at this time, the creation of the paramilitary group,
known as the Nyasaland Volunteer Reserve, whose activities and importance to the colonial state,
perhaps matched what we later saw in the post-colonial state, through the Malawi Young Pioneers.
The Volunteer Reserves served in both capacities of development, and as an army-in-waiting for
the colonial state; and while it started as a non-state actor, its activities were soon legalized and
were funded from state coffers.
In chapter five, this study has tackled the question of the ambiguity of colonial notions of
development, and how that contributed to the rise of radical forms of nationalism in the post-World
War Two era. I have traced the colonial state’s involvement in the development of the Nyasaland
Protectorate from the late 1920s onwards, from the enactment of the Colonial Development Act
of 1929, through the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 and 1945, and through the
work of the Colonial Development Corporation. I have highlighted the notion that the British
authorities were not initially interested in developing their tropical colonies, as the laissez faire
beliefs from the late 19th century to the mid-1920s, had been that colonial development initiatives
should be left as a domain for private enterprises. However, following the failure of the private
sector to take up that responsibility, it now became incumbent upon the colonial state to take up
the responsibility. With regards to Nyasaland, I have highlighted that the peak of that state-led
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development came through the formation of the Central African Federation (CAF). The ambiguity
of the notion of development at the time was in the fact that the federation, just like the other
development initiatives, was not necessarily meant for the benefit of the “natives,” as was claimed
by the colonial authorities. The development initiatives were targeted at serving the exploitative
interest of the colonial authorities, and after World War Two, joined by the USA, to extract as
much as possible, from Britain’s colonial possessions in Tropical Africa. During that phase, the
major forms of “native” insurgency contributed to the declaration of the 1959 State of Emergency,
where by the end of the hostilities, close to fifty Africans were killed, tens of others were wounded,
and hundreds of others were detained without trial. The leaders of the African nationalist
movements in the federation were also referred to as “communist implants” even though there had
not been significant evidence to justify such claims. In as far as counter-insurgency was concerned
at that stage, notions of “the stick and the carrot” also prevailed, where such measures as brutal
force (through the activities of the Nyasaland police force), legalization of state oppression through
the enactment of repressive laws, and indeed the establishment of development initiatives for the
benefit of the both the colonizer and the colonized were initiated.
In chapter six, the focus shifted to the post-colonial state, which I have argued stretched from 1964
to 1994. For that period, I have argued that what Malawi had was “an imported state” for which
one could trace the continuation of practices and systems that operated under British rule into the
post-colonial period. I have focused on the area of state-led development initiatives, which I have
argued were a continuation from the late colonial era. Once Dr. Banda, the Malawi leader from
1964 to 1994, adopted that policy, he and his cronies created a system which adopted a
“protectionist” approach, which barred others from accessing the economic and political
opportunities of the time. I have focused on two conglomerates that were controlled under the neo361

patrimonial regime of Banda, namely the Malawi Development Corporation (MDC) and the Press
Group of Companies (PGC), where I have argued that so far as these companies were doing well,
Banda and his cronies were not willing to liberalize the country’s economic and political space.
Here, the notion of lack of liberalism that we saw in the colonial state, also continued in its postcolonial successor. And just as under the colonial state, we also saw the use of both “the stick” and
“the carrot,” in Banda’s counter-insurgency tactics. I have also departed from most studies that
over-concentrate on the brutality of the Banda regime, especially through the enactment of
repressive laws, and also the brutal tactics of the Malawi Police Force and two Youth Movements
of the MYP and the Youth League, to focus on the notion that “development” was also at the center
of Banda’s tactics to prolong his stay in power for three decades. He incorporated the youth and
women, as the main groups through which to carry out his development agenda but was also quick
to utilize them to attack his political opponents. One also must consider how the international
community, during the era of the Cold War, helped to prolong the authoritarian regimes in postcolonial Africa, whereby in this study I have focused on the roles played by the British government,
the American government, and the Bretton Woods Institutions, especially the World Bank.
In chapter seven, I have argued that the fall of Banda after the 1994 general elections marked the
end of the post-colonial state in Malawi. I have attributed the developments that led to Banda’s
exit from power, as emanating from the economic downturn or recession which the country began
to face since the 1979/80 fiscal year. The economic downturn was brought about by both
international and domestic forces, including the increase in global oil prices; huge debts incurred
by the Banda regime; environmental challenges; the under-performance of state-run companies;
and the civil war in neighboring Mozambique, which blocked Malawi’s access to the ports of
Nacala and Beira. From then onwards, Banda lost control of the economy, and had to rely on
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foreign aid from bilateral donors and the Bretton Woods institutions, through the Structural
Adjustment Programs (SAPs). By the late 1980s and early 1990s, the international money lenders
and aid providers, had shifted from simply giving their resources to Malawi, but had also begun to
demand the liberalization of the regime as a condition for the continuation of the aid program. I
have highlighted that after the end of the Cold War, the Western powers were no longer in the
mood to entertain the wide-spread abuses of human rights in countries that relied on Western
support for both budgetary and developmental aid. The international pressure soon began to
encourage domestic forms of opposition against the regime, which ranged from members of the
clergy, political movements, and the general citizenship. The economic hardships which the
country faced were also compounded by Banda’s ill-health and old age, which meant that it became
almost inevitable that Banda had to go, as the center of his regime, which was maintained by
controlling the economy and the brutality associated with it, could no longer hold in the midst of
both international and domestic pressure. The post-Banda era in Malawi is significantly different,
in such areas as political liberalization, economic liberalization, and limited police brutality.
However, the international community continues to play a significant role in influencing policymaking.
From this analysis, this study has shown that there are certain elements of state management or
administration that one can trace to have started in the colonial period and were subsequently
imported into the post-colonial period. Such an argument has been supported by the two main
historical approaches that I adopted for this study. The longue durée approach has been utilized to
investigate the recurring themes in terms of the rise of resistance and state counter-insurgency over
the long historical period covered in this study, focusing on both the colonial and post-colonial
eras. The political-economy approach has also been used to discuss how economic needs
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determined what form of government was established, and also how the system of government
also determined the kind of economic system which the country had over the study period.
Legacies
From what has been explored in this study, there are several lessons that can be drawn by current
and future scholars on the history of British imperialism and the Malawian post-colonial state.
Firstly, that there is need to recognize that the end of European colonial rule (or decolonization),
did not necessarily mean an abrupt departure from principles, systems, and practices of the colonial
period. While I picked the umbrella term of “counter-insurgency” for this study, analyses that
consider such forms of continuation can concentrate on all sorts of areas that states are involved
in. Among the key issues that were included in this study, included such areas as land tenure;
taxation; labor distribution; abuse of the police force or service; the role of women and the youth
in development; the developmental state; and the role of the international community in the
operations of both the colonial and post-colonial state, among others. In this, I have highlighted
that the question of who controls the country’s resources (human, material, and natural resources),
has been and would probably be a point of contention for so many years to come.
One other significant area that has consumed space in this study is the notion of the ambiguity of
development. I have argued in this study, that “development” or “development aid” as it was used
by both the colonial and post-colonial states always came with some ‘strings attached.’ Under the
colonial state, the development and development projects initiated under the 1929, 1940, and 1945
Development Acts, and later the Central African Federation (CAF), were not simply meant for the
benefit of the Africans, but had more to do with serving the interests of the colonizer, both during
the era of the Great Depression (late 1920s and throughout the 1930s) and also in the post-World
War II era, where development projects were meant to supply raw materials to British industries
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and also providing employment opportunities for British nationals. In the post-colonial era, what
was termed as “development” by the Banda regime, also similarly served the interests of the ruling
elite and those in the inner circle, and that what was served as “development” to the masses were
but crumbs of what the ruling elite had as left-overs from their tables. I have also highlighted how
the notion of “development” can both be analyzed as a source dispute in society (such as the claims
of developing the Africans towards the establishment of the Federation), and that governments can
also utilize the same notion of “development” to win the hearts and minds of those in the opposition
camp.
Along the same lines of argument, I have also highlighted the notion of foreign intervention in the
economic and political decision-making processes of the country. One can trace this to the late
colonial era when foreign powers, especially the USA, were part and parcel of the decision to
create the CAF. In post-colonial Malawi, one can also see the role of the international community
influencing the operations of the state. This was mainly the case due to the on-going Cold War,
which saw African leaders being compelled to support either the Western or Eastern bloc. It was
also the very same Western powers who called for regime change in the post-Cold War era. More
detailed studies need to be conducted to evaluate the impacts which the “imported” liberal or neoliberal ideologies have had in the country since the time of their imposition. In most African
countries, the route taken since the SAPs were introduced has been at best unrecognizable and
anarchist, with no clear-cut positive economic changes to uplift the livelihoods of the masses.
Another equally important and related area to study is the performance of the civil society
organizations that begun to receive extensive international donor support to provide checks and
balances to the post-colonial and other successor states since the introduction of the SAPs.
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I have also zeroed-in on the role played by the police in the history of the country. For both regimes,
I have used the political-economy approach, to argue that the operations of the police, as did most
of the governments’ security forces reflected the kind of political and economic developments that
country was going through, and that over the years, through the actions of the police, Malawians
citizens, some unaccounted for, lost their lives and property at the hands of the police forces. While
there have been changes in the administration and activities of the Malawi police since 1994,
Malawians must remain cautious as on several occasions the police have resorted to return to their
old ways when the institution was known as a “police force.” I have also sustained the argument
that with the downfall of Banda in 1994, historians and other scholars in the field, should consider
it as the end of the post-colonial state. It would be unfair, in my view to continue attributing the
operations of the Malawian state, and indeed any other such states, in the 21st century, to still be
affected or influenced by the era of British colonial rule. Some, if not most, of the leaders that
came to power after the end of the Cold War, have or had no connection whatsoever to the era of
British colonial rule. Doing so would liberate Africans and other such formerly colonized states to
find better solutions to the overwhelming problems affecting each individual country, rather than
always focusing on the colonial period.
I have also highlighted how important it is to focus on the notion of how the international
community can make or break a regime. In the colonial era, I have for instance discussed how the
USA, especially after the Second World War, became a major force in influencing British
colonialism, both at the level of encouraging and partaking in colonial exploitation and later
discouraging continued colonial rule, to serve US interests during the era of the Cold War. In the
case of post-colonial Malawi, I have highlighted how the international community provided
monetary and material aid to the Banda regime which helped to prolong the regime roughly
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between 1964 and the late 1980s, despite the appalling human rights record of the regime. This
includes the roles played by the British and American governments, and the Bretton Woods
institutions, especially the World Bank. Banda’s position during the Cold War, influenced the
Western powers to ignore the lack of liberalism in the country, and their unflinching support
contributed to a condition where Banda alienated himself from his own people. Only when the
Cold War was over, did they condition their aid to political and economic liberalism.
One other issue that has dominated the analysis of both the colonial and post-colonial states is that
of liberalism. I have analyzed the notion of the lack of liberalism during the era of British rule,
despite the fact that in Britain itself the society was guided by liberal principles, which however
the colonists did not want to employ in their African colonies, despite it being a so-called “Empire
Project,” which would have meant the application of the same principles across the empire. The
African, often regarded as barbaric and uncivilized, was looked upon as someone undeserving of
enjoying privileges enjoyed by European citizens, both in the metropole and in the overseas
colonies. Many Africans were alienated from their lands, subjected to forced labor, deported from
their colonies, forced to pay heavy fines, and worse still killed under the authority of British rule.
Many of those who ordered and indeed committed such atrocities were never tried in any court of
law. Turning to the post-colonial state, I have also highlighted how, despite the claims by the ruling
elite, that Malawi was under a democratic system, there was wide-spread abuse of human rights
during the life-span of the Banda regime. Many of those who were behind the atrocities had
suffered under British rule, either directly or indirectly, and despite promising a change of system
in the post-colonial period, ended up violating the rights of the “decolonized.” Worse still, many
of the perpetrators of the atrocities were not subjected to account for their complicity. The political
and administrative system of the day protected them from exposure and accountability. One only
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hopes that many will draw lessons from this study and provide the necessary kind of leadership.
As the saying goes: “the world would be happier if its leaders had more vision and fewer
nightmares.”576
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368

BIBLIOGRAPHY

(A) PRIMARY SOURCES
1. FROM THE MALAWI NATIONAL ARCHIVES
MNA S2/25/19: Official Correspondences.
MNA S1/397/31: Official correspondences.
MNA S1/397/31: Nyasaland Volunteer Reserve, History.
MNA S2/68/19: Chilembwe Rising, 1915 – Deportations.
MNA S1/68/19: Political Prisoners, Deportation, 1918-1921.
MNA S1/1179/19: Political Prisoners, Deportation, 1919-1923.
MNA S1/1729/27: Official Correspondence – reorganization of the Nyasaland Police
Force.
MNA S1/152/19: Official Correspondence.
MNA/S2/39/22: Political Cases, 1922-1930.
MNA S2/102/23: Political Cases, 1923-1924.
MNA S2/50/23: Republic Vs. Mr. Isa Macdonald Lawrence., 1926.
MNA S34/1/3/1: Native Unrest, Southern Province, 1939-1940.
MNA S2/140/39: Political Intelligence Bureau, 1939.
MNA: PMF Reports, 1958-1964.
MNA PAM 2,835: Malawi Congress Party Annual Convention Resolutions, 1965-1975.
MNA PAM 4,350: Mikuyu Prison Museum.
369

MNA PAM 4,161: The Ngwazi and Malawi: A Success Story of Development and
Prosperity. Produced by the Malawi Department of Information, 1992.
MNA PAM 982: Malawi: Ten Years of Progress, 1974.
MNA PAM 2,825: The Economic Development of Malawi since Independence. Blantyre,
Malawi; Department of Information, 1975.
MNA PAM 984. “Guide to a career in the Malawi Young Pioneers”.
MNA PAM 4,584. “Malawi Young Pioneers National Headquarters – Basic Working
Orders”. February 1967.
MNA PAM 985. “Malawi Young Pioneers – Spearhead for Progress”. October 1972.

2. MALAWIANA

COLLECTION

(CHANCELLOR

COLLEGE

LIBRARY,

MALAWI)
“Youth in Malawi: Security and Progress with the Malawi Young Pioneers”.
‘Malawi Police Force: Annual Report for the Year ended 31st December 1966.’
‘Annual Report of the Malawi Police Force – For the Period 1971-1972.’

3. FROM THE BRITISH NATIONAL ARCHIVES
WO/106/262: ‘The Commission Appointed by His Excellency the Governor to Inquire into
Various Matters and Questions concerned with the Native Uprising within the Nyasaland
Protectorate’. Zomba: Government Printer, 1916.
CO 525/198/5: Post War Development Committee Report on Education.
CO 525/198/2: Report of the Post War Development Committee for the Nyasaland
Protectorate, 1945.
CO 525/210/1: Post War Development Committee: Public Health Plan, 1947-1948.
370

CO 525/210/2: Post War Development Committee, Finance, 1947.
CO 525/198/7: Post War Development Committee: Report on Demobilization.
CO 1035/126: Official Committee on Counter-Subversion in Colonial Territories –
Communism in Africa, 1956 Report.
DO 35/6851: Passive Resistance in Nyasaland to Central African Federation.
CO 1015/1133: Governor’s Reports, Nyasaland: Dispatch by Governor Geoffrey Colby, to
the Rt. Hon. Alan Lennox-Boyd.
CO 1015/464: Nyasaland Political Intelligence Reports, 1952-1953.
CO 1015/465: Monthly Political Intelligence Reports for Nyasaland, August and
September 1953.
DO 35/6851: Passive Resistance in Nyasaland to Central African Federation.
CO 968/275: Police and Constabulary – Reorganization of Nyasaland Special Branch.
September 1953.
FCO 141/14237: ‘Report of the visit to Nyasaland, by Mr. J.A. Harrison, the Security
Intelligence Adviser at the Colonial Office’.
CO 1015/1838: Governor’s Reports: Nyasaland. October 1957.
CO 1035/143: Security Situation in Nyasaland, 1957-1959.
DO 35/7476: Position of Nyasaland Detainees, 1959.
CO 1035/119: Counter-subversion in colonial territories: Central African Federation.
CO 1035/144: Security Situation in Nyasaland, 1957-1959.
CO 1015/1839: Governor’s Report on current situation in Nyasaland, 1957-1959.
DO 35/7689: Official Correspondences.
DO 35/7689: Publicity and Propaganda in Nyasaland.
371

CO 1015/1527: ‘Political Situation in Nyasaland, 1959.
FCO 105/365: Malawi Internal Political Situation, 1980.
FCO 105/366: Malawi Internal Political Situation, 1980.
FCO 45/1227: Political Situation in Malawi, 1972.
DO 183/565: Malawi Political Crisis, 1965.
DO 224/23: Internal Political Situation in Malawi, July 1965 – April 1966.
FCO 45/1227: Political Situation in Malawi, 1972.
FCO 45/2169: Malawi Internal Political Situation, 1977.
DO 224/28: Malawi Young Pioneers and Youth League.
FCO 141/142/14234: Nyasaland Intelligence Reports, January to June 1964
FCO 29/291: Malawi political and administrative affairs (internal), criticisms against Dr.
Banda.
FCO 45/755: Review of internal political developments in Malawi, 1970.
FCO 45/1227: Internal Political Situation in Malawi, 1972.
FCO 45/2169: Malawi Internal Political Situation, 1977.
CO 1045/431: Phelps-Stokes Commission – Africa.
CO 847/9/1: Education of African Communities in Social and Economic Development in
Native Territories.
CO 879/123/12: Education in Tropical Africa, Colonial Office, August 1930. African,
No.1135.

4. FROM SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY ARCHIVE
WO 106/571: Operations in Nyasaland.
372

CO 527/70: Official Correspondences.
CO 525/67: Official Correspondences.
CO 525/61: Official Correspondences.
CO 525/63: Official Correspondences.
CO 525/68: Official Correspondences; and Nyasaland Volunteer Reserve Rewards, 1915.
CO 525/62: Official Correspondences.
CO 525/65: Official Correspondences.
CO 525/72: Official Correspondences.
CO 525/71: ‘Report on the Government Commission of Inquiry into the Recent Native
Rising’. June 19th 1916.
DO 183/565: Official Correspondences from the British High Commission, Malawi, 1965.
FCO 105/365: Malawi Internal Political Situation, 1980.
CO 1015/2445: Malawi Congress Party, 1960-1962.
CO 525/138: Tax Regulations in Nyasaland.

5. FROM H.K. BANDA ARCHIVE (INDIANA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY)
Nyasaland Chiefs’ Petition against Central African Federation, April 1952.
Thiessen, Henry A. ‘Some Remarks on Transportation and Economic Development in
Nyasaland’. March 18th, 1963.
‘Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Report on an Economic Survey of Nyasaland,
1958-1959’ (1960).
Kanyama Chiume, M.W. “Nyasaland Speaks: An Appeal to the British People”. 1959.

373

‘Federation and Nyasaland: The Facts’. Salisbury: Government Printer, 1962. Produced by
the Publications Department of the Federal Public Relations Department.
‘Confidential dispatch from H. Kamuzu Banda, President of the Republic of Malawi, to
the Right Hon. Edward R.G. Heath, M.P., British Prime Minister and First Lord of the
Treasury’. March 9th, 1973.
‘Letter from the World Bank to Dr. Banda’. May 27th, 1992.
‘Memorandum to His Excellency, the Life President – Repeal of Section IX of the
Constitution’. From: H.M. Ntaba, Vice Chairperson of the Presidential Committee on
Dialogue’. September 17th, 1993.
‘Malawi at War: Against Poverty, Disease and Ignorance.’
‘The Republic of Malawi: The Challenge Met’. Published by the Malawi Information
Department, June 1976.
Malawi Development Corporation: Ten Years of Progress. 9th April 1974.
‘Malawi: Ten Years of Progress’. In Progress International, February 1974.
This is Malawi, Vol.4, No.7, July 1974.
Malawi, 1964-1974: Building the Nation. 1974.
‘The Truth and Myth about Press Trust’. January 1996.
‘Press in the 90s: Questions and Answers’. Published by the Press Corporation Limited,
January 1995.
‘Malawi: Dialogue and Development.’ Published by Africa Publications Trust, London
Nyasaland Government: Press Release No. 69/63: Dr. Banda to be Sworn-in as Premier on
February 1. January 25th, 1963.
Republic of Malawi: Commission of Inquiry: Mwanza Road Accident. December 1994.
374

“Report of the Special Study Mission to Southern Africa”. Compiled by the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives. October 10th, 1969.
Brody, Paula Rae. Chitukuko Cha Amayi M’Malawi: The Story of CCAM, 1985-1993.
Unpublished book manuscript. 3rd draft. August 1994.
‘Report on the All-African People’s Conference’, compiled by Edwin S. Munger, for
American Universities Field Staff, January 1959.
The Listener. “Talking about Africa: Hastings Banda and Tom Mboya in Conversation
with John Freeman”. September 1st, 1960.

6. FROM JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM
Image of Meeting between Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda (of Nyasaland) and President John
F. Kennedy (USA), at the White House, May 1961.
‘William H. Attwood Oral History Statement, 11/8/1965’.

7. FROM LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (WASHINGTON, DC)
Phiri, Canaan R.K. “The Viphya Tung Scheme, 1945-1968: A Futile Strategy to ‘Awaken
the Dead North”. History Seminar Paper, 1987/88, No.6. Chancellor College, University
of Malawi.
Woods, Anthony E. “Political Autonomy and Administrative Policy in Nyasaland, 19151921”. History Seminar, 1984/85, Paper No.9, Chancellor College, University of Malawi.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Vol. XI, Part 1, Africa and South Asia,
Document 124. January 31st, 1952.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Vol. XI, Part 1, Africa and South Asia,
Document 128.
375

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Vol. XI, Part 1, Africa and South Asia,
Document 136. May 8th, 1953.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. XXI, Africa. Document 320. May
2nd, 1961.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol. XXIV, Africa. Document 184:
Draft National Security Action Memorandum. Washington, DC. Undated.
Botzaris, Alejandro. “Communist Penetration in Africa.” Lisbon, 1961.
The Times. “Dr. Banda to adopt policy of flexible neutralism: Malawi’s belief in value of
the Commonwealth”. July 7th, 1964.
US Department of State. ‘Outgoing Telegram – to the US Embassy, Blantyre, Malawi’.
Titled, “Malawi – Banda Visit”. December 8th, 1964.
President Banda’s State Visit to the Republic of China. Pamphlet, Library of Congress.
1967.
Department of State, Policy Planning Council. “National Policy Paper: Southern Africa”.
3rd Draft, Revised, November 1968.
‘Malawi: Country Development Strategy Statement’. Prepared by the US Agency for
International Development, Washington DC. January 1982.
A Review of U.S. Policy and Current Events in Kenya, Malawi, and Somalia. Hearing
before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of
Representatives. 102nd Congress, 2nd Session. June 23rd, 1992.
The Senate of the United States, 103rd Congress, 1st Session: Joint Resolution regarding
the Government of Malawi’s arrest of opponents and suppression of freedoms, and
conditioning assistance for Malawi’. March 26th, 1993.
376

The Lilongwe Land Development Program is IDA Financed. March 1972.
Malawi Development Corporation: Reports and Accounts, 1964-1966.
Annual Report of the Malawi Police Force for the year ended 31st December 1966. Zomba,
Malawi: Government Printer, 1967.
Annual Report of the Malawi Police Force for the year ended 31st December 1967. Zomba,
Malawi: Government Printer, 1968.
Amnesty International Briefing: Malawi, August 1976.
DO/201/15: Confidential dispatch from the British High Commissioner to Malawi, Mr.
D.L. Cole, titled ‘Malawi: British Policy’.
National Security Council. ‘National Security Memorandum No.39 – Southern Africa’.
Washington DC, April 10th1969.
The Peace Corps in Malawi. Washington DC, 1980.
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): ‘The President’s Review’. Top Secret. 5-8 September
1964.
CIA: ‘The President’s Daily Brief’. 2 July 1965.
CIA Report. Top Secret. 6 May 1966.
US Government. “Background Notes: Malawi”. (Washington DC: Department of State,
1989).
Foreign Office - Military Collection, File No.322: British Central Africa, 1896-1898.
Foreign Office (FO 881/6383, Confidential File No.6383) - Memorandum on Land
Claims in the British Central Africa Protectorate, August 1893.
FCO 45/2205: Human Rights in B.L.S.M.
CIA, Directorate of Intelligence: ‘Malawi: Troubles times ahead’. July 15th, 1983.
377

8. GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS
British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. LXXXV, 1892-1893.
Colonial Annual Report for the British Central Africa Protectorate, 1900.
Colonial Annual Report for the British Central Africa Protectorate, 1901.
The British Central Africa Order-in-Council, 1902. In British Central Africa Gazette.
October 31st, 1902.
Colonial Annual Report for the British Central Africa Protectorate, 1902-1903.
Colonial Annual Report for the British Central Africa Protectorate, 1903-1904.
Colonial Annual Reports for the Nyasaland Protectorate: 1905-1906.
Colonial Annual Reports for the Nyasaland Protectorate: 1906-1907.
The Nyasaland Order-in-Council, 1907. In British Central Africa Gazette (Extraordinary).
October 21st, 1907.
Speech by Sir Alfred Sharpe, at the 2nd Ordinary Meeting of the Session. Hotel Metropole,
UK. December 10th, 1907.
Colonial Annual Report for Nyasaland, 1907-’08.
The Nyasaland Gazette. June 30th, 1908.
Colonial Annual Report for Nyasaland, 1912-’13.
‘Nyasaland Protectorate: Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture. 31st March
1912’: CO 626/1
Colonial Annual Reports for the Nyasaland Protectorate, 1913-’14.
Orders of the King in Council Relating to the Nyasaland Protectorate, in force by 31 st
December 1913.

378

‘The Seditious Publication (Prohibition) Ordinance, 1918’. In Ordinances of the Nyasaland
Protectorate for Year ended 31st December 1913.
Proclamations, Rules and Notices Relating to the Nyasaland Protectorate in force on the
31st December 1914”.
The Nyasaland Government Gazette, Vol. XXIII, No.1, Order Number 5 of 1916, dated
June 31st, 1916.
The British Protectorates (Defense) Order-in-Council, 1916. Nyasaland Government
Gazette. April 1st, 1917.
The British Protectorates (Defense) Order-in-Council, 1916’. The Nyasaland Government
Gazette. May 25th, 1917.
The Nyasaland Government Gazette, November 10th, 1917.
The Native Rents (Private Estates) Ordinance, 1917’. Ordinances of the Nyasaland
Protectorate for the year ended 31st December 1917.
The Nyasaland Government Gazette, March 23rd, 1918.
Colonial Annual Report for Nyasaland, 1920.
Handbook of Nyasaland. Prepared under the Direction of the Historical Section of the
Foreign Office, No.95. London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1920.
Report of the Commission to Inquire into and Report upon Certain Matters Connected with
the Occupation of Land in the Nyasaland Protectorate’. Zomba: Government Printer, 1921.
Colonial Annual Report for Nyasaland, 1927.
Colonial Annual Report for Nyasaland, 1928.
Colonial Development Act, 1929. London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1929.
379

Report of the Commission on Closer Union of the Dependencies in Eastern and Central
Africa’. London; H.M. Stationery Office, 1929.
Colonial Annual Report for Nyasaland, 1930.
CO 847/1/4: ‘Report on Education in British Tropical Africa’. 1932.
The Laws of Nyasaland, Vol. II, 1933. London: C.F. Roworth Ltd, 1934.
Colonial Annual Report for Nyasaland, 1934.
Report on Education of African Communities’. In Economic and Social Development in
Native Territories. 1937.
Report of the Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Financial Position and Further
Development of Nyasaland’. London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1938.
Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission Report’. Presented to Parliament by Command of
His Majesty, March 1939.
Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission Report. London; H.M. Stationery Office, 1939.
Colonial Development and Welfare Act, 1940: Report on the Operation of the Act to 31st
October 1942’. London: HM Stationery Office, Feb. 1943.
Proceedings of the Legislative Council of Nyasaland’. 59th Session, December 7th, 1943.
Record of the Proceedings of a Meeting of the 60th Session of the Legislative Council,
December 5th, 1944.
Nyasaland Protectorate: Land Commission Report, 1946, Vol. 1’. Prepared by The Right
Hon. Sir Sidney Abrahams, P.C. Zomba: Government Printer, 1946.
380

British Information Services. “Britain and Trusteeship”. 1946.
Speech by Hon. Arthur Creech Jones, Secretary of State for the Colonies, House of
Commons Session on Colonial Affairs, July 29th, 1947, Vol. 441.
Record of the Proceedings of a Meeting of the Legislative Council’. Held at Zomba, July
19th, 1948.
Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons Official Report, 5th Series, Vol.472. March 1st
to March 24th, 1950.
Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons Official Report, 5th Series, Vol.473. March
27th to April 6th, 1950.
Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons Official Report, 5th Series, Vol.478. July 24th
to October 26th, 1950.
Speech by Hon. James Griffiths, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in the House of
Commons, Session on the Colonial Development Corporation’. October 19th, 1950.
Speech by King George VI’, House of Commons Debates, Vol. 480. October 31st, 1950.
Speech by The Rt. Hon. Arthur Creech Jones, P.C., Cust Foundation Lecture at the
University of Nottingham, March 9th, 1951.
Speech by The Hon. C.W.F. Footman, Esq., The Nyasaland Government Chief Secretary
in the Nyasaland Legislative Council’. December 8th, 1952.
The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Constitution) Order-in-Council, 1953. August
1st, 1953.

381

Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure of the Nyasaland Protectorate’. Consolidated
Edition, 31st December 1955. Zomba: Government Printer, 1955.
The Laws of Nyasaland, Vol. II. January 1957.
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: A Guide for the Investor. London, June 1959.
Colonial Office: Report of the Nyasaland Commission of Inquiry’. London: H.M.
Stationery Office, July 1959.
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Newsletter. July 3rd, 1959. ‘Information Services
being expanded’.
Annual Report of the Nyasaland Police Force, December 1959.
Nyasaland Government: The Southworth Commission Report’. May 1960.
Speech by Rt. Hon. Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, to the
Houses of Parliament, Cape Town. Wednesday, 3rd February 1960.
Report by the Advisory Commission on the Review of the Constitution of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland. October 1960.
Proceedings of the 1st Meeting of the 76th Session of the Legislative Council. November
28th and 29th, 1961.
Nyasaland Development Plan, 1962-1965. Zomba: Government Printer, 1962.
Proceedings of the 8th Meeting of the 76th Session of Legislative Assembly. 9th to 16th
July, 1963.

382

Proceedings of the 8th Meeting of the 76th Session of Legislative Assembly. 9th to 16th
July 1963.
Malawi Government Gazette: Ordinance No.13 of 1964: Malawi Development
Corporation.
Parliament of Malawi, Official Report of the Proceedings. 2nd Meeting, First Session, 8th
and 9th September 1964.
Malawi Government Gazette. February 19th, 1965: ‘The Bretton Woods Agreement Act,
1965’.
Malawi Government Gazette Supplement. March 19th, 1965.
The Constitution of The Republic of Malawi, 1966.
Malawi Government: Development Plan, 1965-1969. Zomba, Malawi: Government
Printer, 1965.
‘Forfeiture Act, 1966’. In the Malawi Government Gazette, July 8th, 1966: from The
Republic of Malawi (Constitution Act), 1966, No.23 of 1966.
Laws of Malawi. Penal Code, 1968. Chapter VII: Treason and other Offences against the
Government’s Authority.
Malawi Government Gazette, April 8th, 1968: ‘The Censorship and Control of
Entertainment Act, 1968’.
The Constitution of The Republic of Malawi, 1972.
The Constitution of The Republic of Malawi, 1995.
383

The Constitution of The Republic of Malawi, 2010.
Laws of Malawi: Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code, 1969-1973.
Government of Malawi: History and Hope in Malawi. Repression, Suffering and Human
Rights under Dr. Kamuzu Banda, 1964-1994. Prepared by the National Compensation
Tribunal, March 2005.
Malawi Police: Training Manual on Human Rights.
9. FROM CENTER FOR RESEARCH LIBRARIES
The Central African Times. July 22nd, 1899.
The Central African Times. August 5th, 1899.
The Central African Times. September 2nd, 1899.
The Central African Times. October 14th, 1899.
The Central African Times. November 11th, 1899.
The Central African Times. February 3rd, 1900.
The Central African Times. February 17th, 1900.
The Central African Times. March 11th, 1900.
The Central African Times. April 4th, 1900.
The Central African Times. January 11th, 1902.
The Central African Times. February 22nd, 1902.
The Central African Times. November 1st, 1902.
The Central African Times. November 6th, 1902.
The Central African Times. November 8th, 1902.
The Central African Times. November 15th, 1902.
384

The Central African Times. November 22nd, 1902.
The Central African Times. April 23rd, 1903.
The Central African Times. May 9th, 1903.
The Central African Times. May 16th, 1903.
The Central African Times. January 30th, 1904.
The Central African Times. March 24th, 1905.
The Central African Times. May 6th, 1905.
The Central African Times. July 8th, 1905.
The Central African Times. June 23rd, 1906.
The Central African Times. August 4th, 1906.
The Central African Times. February 16th, 1907.
The Central African Times. March 23rd, 1907.
The Central African Times. March 14th, 1908.
The Central African Times. March 14th, 1908.
The Times. March 31st, 1908.
The Nyasaland Times. March 20th, 1913.
The Nyasaland Times. April 16th, 1914.
The Nyasaland Times. February 4th, 1915.
The Nyasaland Times. February 18th, 1915.
The Nyasaland Times. April 22nd, 1915.
The Times. ‘Communism in Africa: Marxist Propaganda in the British Territories’.
November 23rd, 1951.
The Times. August 22nd, 1953.
385

The Times. August 23rd, 1953.
The Nyasaland Times. January 20th, 1959.
The Nyasaland Times. February 20th, 1959.
The Daily Telegraph. August 10th, 1959.
The Daily Telegraph. August 24th, 1959.
The Times. June 1st, 1961.
Malawi News. December 23rd, 1961.
Malawi News. June 1st, 1962.
Malawi News. June 29th, 1962.
Malawi News. December 14th, 1962.
Malawi News. December 28th, 1962.
Malawi News. January 25th, 1963.
Malawi News. July 19th, 1963.
Malawi News. August 2nd, 1963.
Malawi News. August 16th, 1963.
Malawi News. September 13th, 1963.
Malawi News. November 1st, 1963.
Malawi News. December 6th, 1963.
Malawi News. February 28th, 1964.
Malawi News. April 1st, 1964.
Malawi News. May 27th, 1964.
Malawi News. May 29th, 1964.
Malawi News. November 3rd, 1964.
386

Malawi News. January 29th, 1965.
Malawi News. February 19th, 1965.
Malawi News. March 26th, 1965.
Malawi News. February 6th, 1966.
Malawi News. April 15th, 1966.
Malawi News. April 19th, 1966.
Malawi News. January 20th, 1967.
Malawi News. March 9th, 1967.
Malawi News. October 20th, 1967.
Malawi News. March 28th, 1969.
Malawi News. May 16th, 1969.
The Times. October 6th, 1969.
Malawi News. July 3rd, 1970.
Malawi News. July 2nd, 1971.
Malawi News. July 9th, 1971.
Malawi News. July 22nd, 1971.
Malawi News. November 2nd, 1971.
Malawi News. January 7th, 1972.
Malawi News. May 30th, 1972.
Malawi News. February 2nd, 1973.
Malawi News. March 9th, 1973.
Malawi News. June 29th, 1973.
Malawi News. March 2nd, 1974.
387

Malawi News. June 29th, 1974.
Malawi News. September 1st, 1974.
Malawi News. January 26th, 1977.
Malawi News. February 19th, 1977.
Malawi News. February 26th, 1977.
Malawi News. April 23rd, 1977.
Malawi News. January 27th, 1980.
Malawi News. June 8th, 1980.
Malawi News. August 31st, 1980.
Malawi News. June 27th – July 3rd, 1981.
Malawi News. August 15th to 21st, 1981.
Malawi News. October 8th, 1981.
The Enquirer. August 2nd to 8th, 1993.
The Enquirer. October 12 to 18th, 1993.
The Enquirer. November 2nd to 8th, 1993.
The Enquirer. November 9th to 16th, 1993.
The Enquirer. November 23rd to 29th, 1993.
The Enquirer. December 7th, 1993.
The Chronicle. December 1993.
The Chronicle. February 15th to 21st, 1994.
The Enquirer. April 12th, 1994.
The Independent. May 10th to 16th, 1994.
The Enquirer. May 16th to 19th, 1994.
388

Daily Times. May 20th, 1994.
The Nation. February 16th, 1995.
‘What is Communism?’ Speech by Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda, Prime Minister of Malawi,
at the Zomba Debating Society, April 1964.
Speech by His Excellency the Life President, Ngwazi Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda’, at a mass
rally, Moto Village, Mangochi District. September 30th, 1974.
‘Speech by His Excellency the Life President, Ngwazi Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda, at the
Opening Ceremony of the MCP Convention, at Zomba Catholic Secondary School’.
September 24th, 1978.
‘Speech by His Excellency the Life President, Ngwazi Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda, on the 20th
Anniversary Celebrations of His Return Home’. July 1st, 1978.

10. UNPUBLISHED DISSERRATIONS/THESES AND SEMINAR PAPERS

Atz, James Robert. “The British Colonial Police Service: A Study of its Organization and
its Operations in Six British African Colonies”. (PhD Diss., Temple University, January
1988).

Barnekov, Timothy Kiel. “An Inquiry into the Development of Native Administration in
Nyasaland, 1888-1839”. (Masters Thesis, Department of Political Science, San Jose State
College). Included in a compilation by Syracuse University, at the Maxwell Graduate
School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, The Program of East African Studies, Occasional
Paper No.48, June 1967.
389

Chipeta, Mapopa O.J. “Labor in Colonial Malawi: A Study of the Growth and
Development of the Malawian Working Class, 1891-1961”. (PhD Thesis, History
Department, Dalhousie University, Canada, October 1986).
Chirwa, Wiseman Chijere. “Theba is power: rural labor migrancy and fishing in Malawi,
1890s-1985”. (PhD Diss., Queen’s University, Ontario, Canada, August 1992).

Dvorin, Eugene P. “The Central African Federation: A Political Analysis”. (PhD Diss.,
Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles, August 1955).

Krishnamurthy, Bangalore S. “Land and Labor in Nyasaland, 1891-1914”. (PhD Diss.,
London University, 1964).

Nkhwazi, Denis. “Presidential Leadership in Malawi: A Study in the reconciliation of
historical fate with developmental concepts and political institutional creation (Malawi
1964-1969) as seen from the core of the First Presidency,” (PhD Dissertation, University
of Hamburg, Germany, 1971).

Nthenda, Louis James L. “H.M. Treasury and the Problems of Nyasaland Public Finance,
1919-1940.” (PhD Thesis, University of Oxford, 1972).

390

Tangri, Roger K. “The Development of Modern African Politics and the Emergence of a
Nationalist Movement in Colonial Malawi, 1891-1958”. (PhD Thesis, Faculty of Social
Sciences, University of Edinburgh, August 1970).

Volman, Daniel Henry. “United States Foreign Policy and the Decolonization of British
Central Africa (Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi), 1945-1965”. (PhD Diss., History
Department, University of California, Los Angeles. 1991).

White, Bayla Francis. “Political and Economic Interests and the Creation of the Federation
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland”. (MA Thesis in Economic and Social Studies, Faculty of
Economic and Social Studies, University of Manchester, 1964).

Woods Jr, Anthony E. “Political Autonomy and Administrative Policy in Nyasaland, 19151921”. (History Seminar, 1984/85, Paper No.9, Chancellor College, University of Malawi).

Volman, Daniel Henry. “United States Foreign Policy and the Decolonization of British
Central Africa (Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi), 1945-1965”. (PhD Diss., History
Department, University of California, Los Angeles. 1991).

11. ORAL TRADITION
Oral Interview with Mr. Arabson Namate, conducted in 2009, by Professor Kings M. Phiri
(Lead Researcher) and Paul Chiudza Banda (Graduate Research Assistant).

391

(B) SECONDARY SOURCES
BOOKS
Abbink, Jon, et al, eds., Rethinking Resistance: Revolt and Violence in African History. Boston:
Brill, 2003.
Adam, Elaine P., ed., American Foreign Relations 1977: A Documentary Record. New York: New
York University Press, 1979.
Ake, Claude. A Political Economy of Africa. New York: Longman Inc., 1981.
Amin, Samir. Accumulation on a world scale: a critique of the theory of underdevelopment. New
York: Monthly Review Press, 1974.
Anderson David, Histories of the hanged: The dirty war in Kenya and the end of Empire. New
York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2005.
Appiah, Kwame A. and Henry Louis Gates, eds., Africana: The Encyclopedia of the African
American Experience. New York: Basic Books, 1999.
Ashcroft, Thomas. An Outline of Modern Imperialism. London: The Plebs League, 1922.
Ashton, S.R. and S.E. Stockwell, eds., Imperial Policy and Colonial Practice, 1925-1945, Part II:
Economic Policy, Social Policies, and Colonial Research. London: HMSO, 1996.
Ashton, S.R. and Wm Roger Louis, eds. British Documents on the end of Empire: East of the Suez
and the Commonwealth, 1964-1971, Part III: Dependent Territories, Africa, Economics, Race.
London: The Stationery Office, 2004.

392

Badie, Bertrand and Pierre Birnbaum. The Sociology of the State. Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1983.
Badie, Bertrand. The Imported State: The Westernization of the Political Order. California:
Stanford University Press, 2000.
Baker, C.A. Johnston’s administration, 1891-1897. Zomba: Government Printer, 1971.
Baker, Colin. Seeds of Trouble: Government Policy and Land Rights in Nyasaland, 1946-1964.
London: British Academic Press, 1993.
Baker, Colin. Development Governor: A Biography of Sir Geoffrey Colby. London: British
Academic Press, 1994.
Baker, Colin. State of Emergency: Crisis in Central Africa, Nyasaland, 1959-1960. London: Tauris
Academic Studies, 1997.
Bangura, Yusuf. Britain and Commonwealth Africa: The politics of economic relations, 1951-75.
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983).
Barnes, John and David Nicholson. Eds. The Empire at Bay: The Leo Amery Diaries, 1929-1945.
London: Hutchinson, 1988.
Bayart, Jean-Francois. The African State: The Politics of the Belly. 2nd edition. Cambridge, UK:
Polity Press, 2009.
Bell, Duncan, ed., Victorian Visions of Global Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2007.
Bellamy, Richard. Beccaria: On crimes and punishments and other writings. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
393

Bennet, Huw. Fighting the Mau Mau: The British Army and Counter-insurgency in the Kenya
Emergency. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Berger, Stefan et al, eds. Writing History: Theory and Practice. 2nd Edition. New York:
Bloomsbury Academic Press, 2010.
Berman, Bruce. Control and Crisis in colonial Kenya: The dialectic of domination. Athens, OH:
Ohio University Press, 1990.
Berman, Bruce and John Lonsdale, eds., Unhappy Valley: conflict in Kenya and Africa. Book one:
state and class. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1992.
Bloch, Jonathon and Patrick Fitzgerald. British Intelligence and Covert Action. Ireland; Brandon
Book Publishers, 1983.
Boahen, Adu A. General History of Africa, Vol.7: Africa under colonial domination, 1880-1935.
California: University of California Press, 1985.
Boeder, Robert B. Alfred Sharpe of Nyasaland. Blantyre, Malawi: Society of Malawi, 1980.
Branch, Daniel. Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War and
Decolonization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Buell, Raymond Leslie. The Native Problem in Africa, Vol.1. New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1928.
Cain, P.J. and A.G. Hopkins. British Imperialism, 1688-2015. 3rd edition. London: Routledge,
2016.
Carruthers, Susan L. Winning Hearts and Minds: British Governments, the Media and Colonial
Counter-Insurgency, 1944-1960. London: Leicester University Press, 1995.
394

Cesaire, Aime. Discourse on Colonialism. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972.
Chamberlain, M.E. The scramble for Africa, 3rd edition. London: Longman, 2010.
Charlton, Peter. Cinderella’s Soldiers: A History of The Nyasaland Volunteer Reserve. United
Kingdom: Dolman Scott, 2010.
Cheeseman, Nic, et al, eds., The African Affairs Reader: key texts in politics, development, and
international relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
Chirwa, Vera Mlangazuwa. Fearless Fighter: An Autobiography. London: Zed Books, 2007.
Chisiza, D.K. Realities of African Independence. (London: The African Publications Trust, 1961).
Clapham, Christopher, ed., Private Patronage and Public Power: Political Clientelism in the
Modern State. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982.
Clapham, Christopher. Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Cohen, Andrew Sir. British Policy in Changing Africa. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959.
Cohen, Andrew. The Politics and Economics of Decolonization in Africa: The Failed Experiment
of the Central African Federation. London: I.B. Tauris, 2017.
Conklin, Alice L. A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa,
1895-1930. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997.
Conklin, Alice L. and Ian Christopher Fletcher, eds., European Imperialism, 1830-1930. New
York: Houghton Mifflin and Company, 1999.

395

Constantine, Stephen. The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 1914-1940. London:
Frank Cass and Company, 1984.
Cooper, Frederick. African since 1940: The Past of the Present. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2002.
Cooper, Frederick. Colonialism in Question: theory, knowledge, history. Berkeley, CA: University
of California Press, 2005.
Cornia, Giovanni Andrea and Gerald K. Helleiner, eds., From Adjustment to Development in
Africa: conflict, controversy, convergence, consensus? London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1994.
Cowen, M.P. and R.W. Shenton. Doctrines of Development. London: Routledge, 1996.
Crowder, Michael, ed., The Cambridge History of Africa, Vol.8: c.1940-c.1975. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1984.
Darwin, John. Britain and Decolonization: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World. New
York: Macmillan, 1988.
Darwin, John. The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Dotson Floyd and Lillian O. Dotson. The Indian Minority of Zambia, Rhodesia and Malawi. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.
Duff, Hector Livingston. Nyasaland Under the Foreign Office. London: George Bell and Sons,
1906.
Duffy, James and Robert A. Manners. Africa Speaks. New York: Van Nostrand Company, 1961.

396

Duignan, Peter and Robert H. Jackson. Politics and Government in African States, 1960-1985.
California: Hoover Institution Press, 1986.
Elkins, Caroline. Imperial Reckoning: The untold story of Britain’s gulag in Kenya. New York:
Henry Holt and Company, 2005.
Englebert, Pierre and Kevin C. Dunn. Inside African Politics. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
2013.
Fage, J.D. and R. Oliver, eds., The Cambridge History of Africa, Vol.6, 1870-1905. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Falola, Toyin. Development Planning and Decolonization in Nigeria. Tallahassee: University of
Florida, 1996.
Falola, Toyin, ed., Africa: Colonial Africa, Vol.3, 1885-1939. Durham, North Carolina: Carolina
Academic Press, 2002.
Falola, Toyin. Colonialism and Violence in Nigeria. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,
2009.
Falola, Toyin and Emily Brownell, eds., Africa, Empire and Globalization: Essays in Honor of
A.G. Hopkins. Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 2011.
Fanon, Frantz. The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Press, 1961.
Ferguson, Niall. Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for
Global Power. New York: Basic Books, 2002.
Ferguson, James. Global Shadows: Africa in the neoliberal world order. Durham: Duke University
Press, 2006.
397

Fieldhouse, D.K. The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century. 2nd
edition. New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1982.
Frankel, Joseph. British Foreign Policy, 1945-1973. London: Oxford University Press, 1975.
French, David. The British Way in Counter-Insurgency, 1945-1967. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011.
Gann, L.H. and Peter Duignan. Burden of Empire: An Appraisal of Western Colonialism in Africa
South of the Sahara. Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1967. 1971 edition.
Gardner, Leigh A. Taxing Colonial Africa: The Political Economy of British Imperialism. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012.
Gegout, Catherine. Why Europe Intervenes in Africa: Security, Prestige and the Legacy of
Colonialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
Gifford, Prosser and Wm. Roger Louis, eds. Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and
Colonial Rule. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1967.
Giglio, James N. The Presidency of John F. Kennedy. Kansas: The University of Kansas State,
1991.
Greene, Anna and Kathleen Troup. The Houses of History: A critical reader in twentieth-century
history and theory. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016.
Gulhati, Ravi. Malawi: Promising Reforms, Bad Luck. Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1989.
Guldi, Jo and David Armitage. The History Manifesto. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2014.

398

Hailey, Lord. Native Administration in the British African Territories, Part II: Central Africa:
Zanzibar, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1950.
Hailey, Lord. Native Administration and Political Development in British Tropical Africa, 194042. Liechtenstein: Kraus-Thomson Organization Ltd, 1979 publication.
Hanna, A.J. The Beginnings of Nyasaland and North-Eastern Rhodesia, 1859-95. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1956.
Harlow, Barbara and Mia Carter, eds., Archives of Empire, Volume II: The Scramble for Africa.
Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2003.
Havinden, Michael and David Meredith. Colonialism and Development: Britain and its Tropical
Colonies, 1850-1960. London: Routledge, 1993.
Henige, David P. Colonial Governors, from the 15th century to the present. Milwaukee: The
University of Wisconsin Press, 1970.
Herbst, Jeffrey. States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control. New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000.
Hetherwick, Alexander. The Romance of Blantyre: How Livingstone’s Dream Came True.
London: James Clarke and Company, 1931.
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. London: Penguin Books, 1985 Reprint.
Hobsbawm, Eric and Terence Ranger, eds., The invention of tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1983.
Hobson, J.A. Imperialism: A Study. London: James Nisbert and Co., 1902.

399

Hodge, Joseph M. Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies
of British Colonialism. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2007.
Hodge, Joseph M. et al, eds., Developing Africa: concepts and practices in twentieth-century
colonialism. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014.
Hyam, Ronald. Elgin and Churchill at the Colonial Office: The Watershed of the EmpireCommonwealth. London: Macmillan Press, 1968.
Hyam, Ronald and Wm. Roger Louis, eds., The Conservative Government and the end of Empire,
1957-1964. Part II: Economics, International Relations, and the Commonwealth. London: The
Stationery Office, 2000.
Jackson, E.F., ed., Economic Development in Africa: Papers presented to the Nyasaland Economic
Symposium, Blantyre, July 18th -28th 1962. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1965.
Jackson, Robert H. and Carl G. Rosberg. Personal Rule in Black Africa. Los Angeles: University
of California Press, 1982.
Jallow, Baba G. Leadership in Postcolonial Africa: Trends Transformed by Independence. New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
James, Lawrence. Empires in the Sun: The Struggle for the Mastery of Africa. New York: Pegasus
Press, 2017.
Jeffries, Charles. The Colonial Police. London: Max Parrish and Co. Ltd, 1952.
Jeffries, Charles. The Colonial Office. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1956.
Jeronimo, Miguel Bandeira. The ‘civilizing mission’ of Portuguese colonialism, 1870-1930. New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.
400

Johnson, Gaynor, ed., The Foreign Office and British Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century.
London: Routledge, 2005.
Johnston, Harry Hamilton. British Central Africa: An Attempt to Give Some Account of A Portion
of the Territories Under British Influence North of the Zambezi. New York: Edward Arnold, 1897.
Jones, Griff. Britain and Nyasaland: A Story of Inattention, Fitful care, Political Vacillation.
London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1964.
Knaplund, Paul. Gladstone and Britain’s Imperial Policy. New York: The Macmillan Company,
1927.
Kohli, Atul. State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global
World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Kolsky, Elizabeth. Colonial Justice in British India: white violence and the rule of law.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Kubicek, Robert V. The Administration of Imperialism: Joseph Chamberlain at the Colonial
Office. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1969.
Laidi, Zaki. The Super-Powers and Africa: The Constraints of a Rivalry, 1960-1990. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1990.
Latham, Michael E. The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign
Policy from the Cold War to the Present. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011.
Lee, Christopher J. ed., Making A World After Empire: The Bandung Moment and its Political
Afterlives. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2010.

401

Leffler, Melvyn P. and Odd Arne Westad, eds., The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol.2:
Crises and Détente. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Legum, Colin. “Background to the Disturbances in Nyasaland”. Supplement to the Information
Digest, No.11. London: African Bureau, 1953.
Levtzion, Nehemiah and Randall L. Pouwels, eds., The History of Islam in Africa. Athens, OH:
Ohio University Press, 2000.
Linstrum, Erik. Ruling Minds: Psychology in the British Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2016.
Louis, Wm. Roger. In the Name of God, Go! Leo Amery and the British Empire in the Age of
Churchill. London: W.W. Norton and Company, 1992.
Low, D.A. Fabrication of Empire: The British and the Uganda Kingdoms, 1890-1902. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Lucas, Charles Sir., ed., The Empire at War. Volume 4. London: Oxford University Press, 1924.
Lugard, John Dealtry. The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa. London: William Blackwood
and Sons, 1922. 2012 edition., published by Forgotten Books.
Lwanda, John Lloyd. Kamuzu Banda of Malawi: A Study in Promise, Power and Legacy. Zomba:
Kachere Series, 2009.
Lyttleton, Oliver. The Memoirs of Lord Chandos: An Unexpected View from the Summit. New
York: The New American Library of World Literature, 1963.
Macdonald, Roderick J., ed., From Nyasaland to Malawi: Studies in Colonial History. Nairobi,
Kenya: East African Publishing House, 1975.
402

Mair, L.P. Native Policies in Africa. New York: Negro Universities Press, 1936.
Majumdar, Rochona. Writing Postcolonial History. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2010.
Malawi Government. Economic Report for 1971. Zomba: Government Press, 1971.
Malawi Government. Economic Report for 1979. Zomba: Government Press, 1979.
Malawi: An Alternative Pattern of Development. Conference/Seminar Proceedings No.25, Center
of African Studies, University of Edinburgh. May 24th and 25th, 1984.
Marlow, C. A History of the Malawi Police Force. 1971.
Marsh, Peter T. Joseph Chamberlain: Entrepreneur in Politics. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1994.
Maugham, R.C.F. Africa as I Have Known It: Nyasaland-East Africa-Liberia-Senegal. (New
York: Negro Universities Press, 1969).
Maxon, Robert M. Struggle for Kenya: The Loss and Reassertion of Imperial Initiative, 19121923. Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 1993.
McCracken, John. A History of Malawi, 1859-1966. UK: James Currey Ltd, 2012.
McCracken, John, ed., Voices from the Chilembwe Rising: witness testimonies made to the
Nyasaland Rising Commission of Inquiry, 1915. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
McMaster, Carolyn. Malawi: Foreign Policy and Development. London: Julian Friedmann
Publishers, 1974.
Meinhardt, H. Free at Last! Malawi’s Democratic Transition. Lilongwe: NICE, 2004.

403

Melson, Robert. Revolution and Genocide: on the origins of the Armenian genocide and the
holocaust. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992.
Memmi, Albert. The Colonizer and the Colonized. New York: Orion Press, 1965.
Mhone, Guy C.Z. Malawi at the Crossroads: The Post-Colonial Political Economy. Harare:
SAPES Books, 1992.
Migdal, Joel S. Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities
in the Third World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988.
Mockaitis, Thomas R. British Counterinsurgency, 1919-60. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990.
Morgan, D.J. The Official History of Colonial Development. Volume 1: The Origins of British Aid
Policy, 1924-1945. New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1980.
Moore, David, ed., The World Bank, Development, Poverty, Hegemony. South Africa: University
of KwaZulu Natal Press, 2007.
Morris-Jones, W.H. and Georges Fischer, eds., Decolonization and After: The British and French
Experience. London: Frank Cass, 1980.
Morton, Geoffrey J. The Just Job: Some Experiences of a Colonial Policeman. London: Hodder
and Stoughton, 1957.
Morton, Kathryn. Aid and Dependence: British Aid to Malawi. London: Holmes and Meier
Publishers, Inc., 1975.
Moyo, Sam and Paris Yeros. Eds. Reclaiming the Land: The Resurgence of Rural Movements in
Africa, Asia and Latin America. London: Zed Books, 2005.

404

Muehlenbeck, Philip. Betting on the Africans: John F. Kennedy’s Courting of African Nationalist
Leaders. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
Muiu, Mueni wa and Guy Martin. A New Paradigm of the African State. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2009.
Muluzi, Bakili, et al. Democracy with a Price: The History of Malawi since 1900. Blantyre,
Malawi: Jhango Heinemann, 1999.
Mulwafu, Wapulumuka O. Conservation Song: A History of Peasant-State Relations and the
Environment in Malawi, 1860-2000. Cambridge, UK: The White Horse Press, 2011.
Munro, J. Forbes. Britain in Tropical Africa, 1880-1960: Economic Relationships and Impact.
London: Macmillan Press, 1984.
Murphy, Philip. Alan Lennox-Boyd: A Biography. London: I.B. Tauris and Co. Ltd, 1999.
Murphy, Philip, ed., British Documents on the End of Empire: Central Africa, Part II: Crisis and
Dissolution. London: The Stationery Office, 2005.
Murray, S.S. (compiler). A Handbook of Nyasaland. Zomba: Government Printer, 1932.
Nelson, Harold, D., et al. Area Handbook for Malawi. Washington DC: American University,
1975.
Nkrumah, Kwame. Africa Must Unite. 2nd edition. New York: International Publishers, 1972)
Nzunda, Matembo S. and Kenneth R. Ross. Church, Law, and Political Transition in Malawi,
1992-’94. Gweru, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1995.

405

Ochonu, Moses E. Colonial Meltdown: Northern Nigeria in the Great Depression. Athens, OH:
Ohio University Press, 2009.
Oliver, Roland. Sir Harry Johnston and the Scramble for Africa. London: Chatto and Windus,
1959.
Pachai, Bridglal, ed., The Early History of Malawi. London: Longman Group Ltd, 1972.
Pachai Bridglal. Malawi: The History of the Nation. London: Longman Group Limited, 1973.
Pachai Bridglal. Land and Politics in Malawi, 1875-1975. Ontario, Canada: The Limestone Press,
1978.
Parsons, Timothy H. The Rule of Empires: Those who built them, those who endured them, and
why they always fall. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Phillips, Anne. The enigma of colonialism: British policy in West Africa. London: James Curry,
1989.
Phiri, Desmond D. Let Us Die for Africa: An African Perspective on the Life and Death of John
Chilembwe of Nyasaland/Malawi. Blantyre, Malawi: Central Africana Ltd, 1999.
Pike, John G. Malawi: A Political and Economic History. New York: Frederick A. Praeger
Publishers, 1968.
Pitts, Jennifer. A Turn to Empire: The rise of imperial liberalism in Britain and France. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005.
Porter, Bernard. Critics of empire: British radical attitudes to colonialism, 1895-1914. New York:
Macmillan, 1968.

406

Power, Joey. Political Culture and Nationalism in Malawi: Building Kwacha. New York:
University of Rochester Press, 2010.
Press, Steven. Rogue Empires: Contracts and Conmen in Europe’s Scramble for Africa. MA:
Harvard University Press, 2017.
Price, Steven D., ed., 1001 Smartest Things Ever Said. Connecticut: The Lyons Press, 2005.
Pryor, Frederick L. Malawi and Madagascar: The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity and
Growth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
Rist, Gilbert. The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith. 3rd edition.
London: Zed Books, 2010.
Roberts, Clifton C. Tangled Justice: Some Reasons for a Change in Policy in Africa. New York:
Negro Universities Press, 1937.
Robinson, Ronald and John Gallagher. Africa and the Victorians: The Climax of Imperialism. New
York: Anchor Books, 1968 edition.
Rodney, Walter. How Europe underdeveloped Africa. London: Bogle L’Ouverture, 1972.
Rotberg, Robert I. and Ali M. Mazrui, eds. Protest and Power in Black Africa. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1970.
Rothchild, Donald and Naomi Chazan, eds., The precarious balance: state and society in Africa.
Boulder: Westview Press, 1988.
Rusche, Georg and Otto Kirchheimer. Punishment and Social Structure. New York: Russell and
Russell, 1968.

407

Samatar, Abdi Ismail and Ahmed I. Samatar. Eds. The African State: Reconsiderations. New
Hampshire: Heinemann, 2002.
Saunier, Pierre-Yves. Transnational History: Theory and History. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2013.
Schmidt, Elizabeth. Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Schydlowsky, Daniel M., ed., Structural Adjustment: Retrospect and Prospect. London: Praeger
Publishers, 1995.
Shepperson, George and Thomas Price. Independent African: John Chilembwe and the Origins,
Setting and Significance of the Nyasaland Native Rising of 1915. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 1958.
Short, Philip. Banda. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974.
Sinclair, Georgina. At the end of the line: Colonial Policing and the Imperial Endgame, 19451980. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006.
Sindima, Harvey J. Malawi’s First Republic: An Economic and Political Analysis. New York:
University Press of America, 2002.
Somerville, Keith. Africa’s Long Road since Independence: The Many Histories of a Continent.
London: Hurst and Company, 2015.
Strauss, William L. Joseph Chamberlain and the Theory of Imperialism. Washington DC:
American Council on Public Affairs, 1942.

408

The Crucial Problem of Imperial Development. No.15. Royal Empire Society. London: Longmans,
Green and Co., 1938).
The World Bank. Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action.
Washington, DC, 1981.
The World Bank. “Report and Recommendation of the President of the International Development
Association on a proposed credit of SDR 51.9 Million to the Republic of Malawi for a Second
Structural Adjustment Project.” November 29th, 1983.
Thomas, Martin. Violence and Colonial Order: Police, Workers and Protest in the European
Colonial Empires, 1918-1940. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Thompson, Andrew S. Writing Imperial Histories. Manchester: Manchester University Press,
2013.
Thompson, Robert. Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam. New
York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1966.
Thorp, Rosemary, ed., Latin America in the 1930s: the role of the periphery in world crisis.
London: The Macmillan Press, 1984.
Throup, David W. Economic and Social Origins of Mau Mau. London: James Currey, 1988.
Turner, Victoria, ed., Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960. Vol.3: Profiles of Change: African Society
and Colonial Rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971.
United Nations. Human Development Report, 1991. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.
USAID: Malawi: Country Development Strategy Statement. Washington, DC, 1982.

409

Van de Walle, Nicholas. African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Walton, Calder. Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence, The Cold War, and the Twilight of Empire.
London: William Collins, 2013.
Welensky, Roy. Welensky’s 4000 Days: The Life and Death of the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland. London: Collins Clear-Type Press, 1964.
Westad, Odd Arne. The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our
Times. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Weiner, Martin J. An Empire on Trial: race, murder, and justice under British rule, 1870-1935.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
White, Landeg. Magomero: Portrait of an African Village. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1989.
Wiarda, Howard J. Political Development in Emerging Nations: Is there still a Third World?
California: Wadsworth and Thomson Learning, 2004.
Williams, David T. Malawi: The Politics of Despair. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975.
Woddis, Jack. Africa: The Roots of Revolt. New York: The Citadel Press, 1960.
Woolf, Leonard. Economic Imperialism. New York: Fertig, 1970.
Young, Crawford. The African Colonial State in Contemporary Perspective. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1994.

410

Young, Crawford. The State in Postcolonial Africa: Fifty Years of Independence, 1960-2010.
Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2012.
Zeilig, Leo, ed., Class Struggle and Resistance in Africa. 2nd edition. Chicago, IL: Haymarket
Books, 2009.
Zeleza, Paul Tiyambe. Africa’s Resurgence: Domestic, Global and Diaspora Transformations.
Los Angeles, CA: TSEHAI publisher, 2014.
JOURNAL ARTICLES AND ONLINE SOURCES
Alejandro, Carlos F. Diaz. “Latin America in Depression, 1929-1939.” Center discussion Paper
no. 344 (Yale University, Economic Growth Center, March 1980): 1-41.
Austen, Ralph A. “Africa and globalization: colonialism, decolonization and the postcolonial
malaise.” Journal of Global History, Issue 1 (2006): 403-408.
Baker, Colin. “A hundred years ago: The Nyasaland Order-in-Council, 1907.” Society of Malawi
Journal, 60, no.2 (2007): 1-5.
Bayart, Jean-Francois and Stephen Ellis. “Africa in world history: a history of extraversion.”
African Affairs, Vol.99, No.935, Centenary Issue: a hundred years of Africa (April 2000): 217267.
Bellucci, Beluce. “The State in Africa.” The Perspective of the World View. 2, no.3 (Dec. 2010):
9-42.
Bleichmar, Javier. “Deportation as Punishment: A Historical Analysis of the British Practice of
Banishment and its Impact on Modern Constitutional Law.” Georgetown Immigration Law
Journal, 14, (Fall 1999): 115-163.
411

Boisen, Camilla. “The Changing Moral Justification of Empire: From the Right to Colonize to the
Obligation to Civilize.” History of European Ideas, 39, no.3 (2013): 335-353.
Burton, Andrew. “The eye of authority: ‘native’ taxation, colonial governance and resistance in
inter-war Tanganyika.” Journal of East African Studies, 2, no.1 (March 2008): 74-94.
Brune, Nancy, et al, “The International Monetary Fund and the global spread of privatization,”
IMF Staff Papers 51, no.2 (2004): 195-219.
Bryant, W.R. Mumford and B.N Parker. “Education in British African dependencies: A review of
the 1935 annual reports on native education in Nyasaland, N. Rhodesia, Tanganyika, Uganda, Gold
Coast, Nigeria and Sierra Leone.” Journal of the Royal African Society (Jan.1937): 17-32.
Butler, L.J. “The Central African Federation and Britain’s Post-War Nuclear Programme:
Reconsidering the Connections.” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 36, no.3
(Sept. 2008): 509-525.
Cain, P.J. and A.G. Hopkins. “The Political Economy of British Overseas Expansion, 1750-1914.”
The Economic History Review, New Series, 33, no.4 (Nov. 1980): 463-490.
Cain, P.J. and A.G. Hopkins. “Gentlemanly capitalism and British expansion overseas II: New
imperialism, 1850-1945.” The Economic History Review, 40, no.1 (Feb. 1987), 1-26.
Cain, Peter J. “Character, ‘ordered liberty’, and the mission to civilize: British moral justification
of Empire, 1870-1914.” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 40, no.4 (Nov.
2012): 557-578.
Charlton, Peter. “Some Notes on the Nyasaland Volunteer Reserve.” The Society of Malawi
Journal, 46, no.2 (1993): 25-51.
412

Chijere Chirwa, Wiseman. “Alomwe and Mozambican Immigrant Labor in Colonial Malawi,
1890s-1945.” The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 27, no.3 (1994): 525-550.
Chipembere, Henry B.M. “Malawi in Crisis”. In Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies, 11, No.1,
(1981): 76-96.
Chiudza Banda, Paul. “The 2009 General Elections: process, results, and lessons,” Society of
Malawi Journal 63, no.2 (2010): 4:14.
Chiudza Banda, Paul and Gift Wasambo Kayira. “The 1959 State of Emergency in Nyasaland:
Process and Political Implications.” The Society of Malawi Journal, 65, no.2 (2012): 1-19.
Chirwa, Ephraim. “Privatization and technical efficiency: evidence from the manufacturing sector
in Malawi,” African Development Bank (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 2001): 276-307.
Clay, Edward, et al. “Malawi and Southern Africa: Climatic Variability and Economic
Performance.” World Bank Working Paper Series No.7, 2003.
Coleman, James S. “The Resurrection of Political Economy.” Mawazo, 1, Issue 1, (June 1967):
31-40.
Collins, Michael. “Decolonization and the ‘Federal Moment’,” Diplomacy and Statecraft, 24, no.1
(February 2013): 21-40.
Cooper, Frederick. “Conflict and Connection: Rethinking Colonial African History.” American
Historical Review, 99, no.5 (Dec. 1994): 1516-1545.
Crowder, Michael. “Whose Dream was It Anyway? Twenty-Five Years of African Independence.”
African Affairs, 86, no. 342, (January 1987): 7-24.

413

Crush, Jonathan. “colonial coercion and the Swazi tax revolt of 1903-1907.” Political Geography
Quarterly, 4, no.3 (July 1985): 179-190.
Deflem, Mathieu. “Law Enforcement in British Colonial Africa: A Comparative Analysis of
Imperial Policing in Nyasaland, the Gold Coast, and Kenya.” Police Studies, 17, no.1, (1994): 4568.
Dissent, Issue No.12, 22nd October 1959.
Dixon, Paul. “‘Hearts and Minds’? British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq.” Journal of
Strategic Studies, 32, no.3, (June 2009): 353-381.
Doornbos, Martin. “The African State in Academic Debate: Retrospect and Prospect.” The Journal
of Modern African Studies, 28, no.2 (June 1990): 179-198.
Forstater, Mathew. “Taxation and Primitive Accumulation: The Case of Colonial Africa”. The
Capitalist State and Its Economy: Democracy in Socialism Research in Political Economy, Vol.
22. Elsevier Ltd. 2005.
Harrison, Graham. “The World Bank, governance and theories of political action in Africa,”
British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 7, no.2 (May 2005), 240-260.
Harsch, Ernest. “Privatization shifts gears in Africa: more concern for public acceptance and
development impact but problems remain,” Africa Recovery (April 2000): 8-17.

Hodgson, Geoffrey M. “What are Institutions?” Journal of Economic Issues, 40, no.1 (March
2006): 1-25.

414

Hooker, J.R. “Witnesses and Watchtower in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland,” Journal of African
History, 6, no.1 (1965), 91-106.
Hussein, Iza. “Circulations of law: colonial precedents, contemporary questions,” Onati SocioLegal Series, 2, no.7 (2012), 18-32.
Hynd, Stacey. “Decorum or Deterrence? The Politics of Execution in Malawi, 1915-66.” Cultural
and Social History, 5, Issue 4 (2008): 437-448.
Hynd, Stacey. “The extreme penalty of the law: mercy and the death penalty as aspects of state
power in colonial Nyasaland, 1904-47.” Journal of Eastern African Studies 4, no.3 (2010): 542559.
Hynd, Stacey. “Law, violence and penal reform: state responses to crime and disorder in colonial
Malawi, 1900-1959.” Journal of Southern African Studies, 37, no.3 (Sept. 2011): 431-447.
Isaacman, Allen and Barbara Isaacman. “Resistance and Collaboration in Southern and Central
Africa, 1850-1920.” The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 10, no.1, (1977): 3162.
Johnston, H.H. “The British Central Africa Protectorate.” The Geographical Journal, 5, no.3,
(March 1895): 193-217.
Kalinga, Owen J.M. “European Settlers, African Apprehensions, and Colonial Economic Policy:
The North Nyasa Native Reserves Commission of 1929.” The International Journal of African
Historical Studies, 17, no.4 (1984): 641-656.
Kettlewell, R.W. “Agricultural Change in Nyasaland: 1945-1960.” Reprinted from Food Research
Institute Studies, no.3, (1965): 229-285.
415

Langworthy III, Harry W. “Joseph Booth, prophet of radical change in Central and South Africa,
1891-1915,” Journal of Religion in Africa 16, no.1 (February 1986): 22-43.
Lodhi, Abdulaziz Y. “Muslims in Eastern Africa – Their past and present.” Nordic Journal of
African Studies, 3, no.1 (1994): 88-98.
Lovejoy, Paul and J.S. Hogendorn. “Revolutionary Mahdism and resistance to colonial rule in the
Sokoto Caliphate, 1905-6.” Journal of African History, 31, no.2 (1990): 217-244.
McCracken, John. “Coercion and Control in Nyasaland: aspects of the history of a colonial police
force”. The Journal of African History 27, no.1 (1986): 127-147.
McGowen, Randall. “Civilizing Punishment: The End of the Public Execution in England”. The
Journal of British Studies, 33, no.3, (July 1994): 257-282.
Mpakati, Attati. “Malawi: The Birth of a Neo-Colonial State.” African Review, 3, Issue 1 (Jan.
1973): 33-68.
Mtewa, Mekki. “Problems of Oedipal Historicism: The Saga of John Chilembwe – the Malawian.”
Journal of Black Studies – African Cultural Dimensions, 8, no.2 (December 1977): 227-250.
Munger, Edwin S. “Racial Tension in Nyasaland.” American Universities Field Staff. October
1956.
Murphy, Philip. “Intelligence and Decolonization: The Life and Death of the Federal Intelligence
and Security Bureau, 1954-63.” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 29, no.2,
(2008): 101-130.
Murphy, Philip. “A Police State? The Nyasaland Emergency and Colonial Intelligence.” Journal
of Southern African Studies, 36, no.4, (December 2010): 765-780.
416

Mwasi, E.D. “Reminiscences of my detention.” Society of Malawi Journal. 59, no.2 (2006): 4049.
Neale, Walter C. “Institutions”. Journal of Economic Issues, 21, no.3 (Sept. 1987): 1177-1206.
Ng’ong’ola, Clement. “The State, Settlers, and Indigenes in the Evolution of Land Law and Policy
in Malawi.” The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 23, no.1 (1990): 27-58.
North, Douglas C. “Institutions.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5, no.1 (Winter 1991):
97-112.
O’Brien, Donal Cruise. “Towards an ‘Islamic Policy’ in French West Africa, 1854-1914.” Journal
of African History, 8, no.2 (1967): 303-316.
Pachai, Bridglal. “Land Policies in Malawi: An Examination of the Colonial Legacy.” The Journal
of African History, 14, no.4 (1973): 681-698.
Page, Melvin. “The War of Thangata: Nyasaland and the East African Campaign, 1914-1918.”
Journal of African History, XIX, no.1 (1978): 87-100.
Patel Nandin and Michael Wahman. “The presidential, parliamentary and local elections in
Malawi, May 2014,” Africa Spectrum, 50, no.1 (2015): 79-92.
Porter, Andrew. “Gentlemanly capitalism and empire: The British experience since 1750?’ The
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 18, no.3 (1990): 265-295.
Reynolds, Jonathan. “Good and Bad Muslims: Islam and Indirect Rule in Northern Nigeria.”
International Journal of African Historical Studies, 34, no.3 (2001): 601-618.
Richardson, Channing B. “The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.” Africa Today Pamphlets,
no.4, 1960.
417

Roberts, Simon. “The direct taxation of Africans in the Nyasaland protectorate, 1892-1939: some
determinants of revenue policy,” British Tax Review, 193 (1967): 192-206.
Schreuder, D.M. “The cultural factor in Victorian imperialism: a case study of the British
‘civilizing mission’.” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 4, no.3 (1976): 283317.
Sharpe, Alfred. “The Geography and Economic Development of British Central Africa.” The
Geographical Journal, 39, no.1 (Jan. 1912): 1-17.
Stuart-Mogg, David. “A Brief Investigation into the Genealogy of Pastor John Chilembwe of
Nyasaland and Some Thoughts upon the Circumstances Surrounding his Death.” The Society of
Malawi Journal, 50, no. 1 (1997): 44-58.
Tuck, Michael W. “The Rupee Disease: taxation, authority, and social conditions in early colonial
Uganda.” The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 39, no.2 (2006): 221-245.
Vail Leroy and Landeg White. “Forms of Resistance: Songs and perceptions of power in colonial
Mozambique.” American Historical Review, 88, no.4 (Oct. 1983): 883-919.
van Donge, Jan Kees. “The Fate of an African ‘Chaebol’: Malawi’s Press Corporation after
Democratization.” The Journal of Modern African Studies, 40, no.4 (Dec. 2002): 651-681.
Wicker, E.R. “The Colonial Development Corporation, 1948 - ’54.” The Review of Economic
Studies, 23, no.3 (1955-1956): 213-228.
Young, Crawford. “The End of the Post-Colonial State in Africa? Reflections on Changing
African Political Dynamics.” African Affairs, 103, no.410 (Jan. 2004): 23-49.

418

419

